Reform of Charity Governance in China: From Economic and Comparative Perspectives by Li, Dejian
Reform of Charity Governance in China: From
Economic and Comparative Perspectives
Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the
University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in
Philosophy
by
Dejian Li
September 2017
iABSTRACT
In mainland China, given inefficient governance mechanisms, in practice,
there occur a range of charity scandals, leading to lack of public confidence
in the charitable sector and continuing calls for reform. In this context, this
thesis is aimed at making suggestions for reform of the current legal
framework relating to charity governance in China based on an economic
analysis along with a comparative study of English law and practice.
In terms of economic theories, due to the lack of a comprehensive
framework suitable for assessing the efficiency of charity governance, this
thesis develops a revised agency theory by taking account of the features of
charities and the reasonable aspects of the traditional agency theory and
other theories, to facilitate the assessment of charity governance and to
direct the legal reform in this respect.
In this theory, the charitable purpose/public benefit of a charity plays the
role of the charity trustees’ (persons who govern this charity) principal
whilst persons who are not the charity trustees but who provide charitable
resources to this charity (‘key stakeholders’) and ‘other selected
stakeholders’ (by operation of law) should act as the supervisors having the
rights to make the charity trustees accountable on behalf of the charitable
purpose/public benefit. And the human nature of the charity trustees (who
are often volunteers) should be understood in a more pragmatic manner,
which means that they can usually be trusted but should be monitored in
some circumstances to control serious moral hazard.
In this revised agency theory, although agency costs continue their role in
evaluating charity governance, their contents should be extended to the costs
relating to co-ordinating the supervisors and their collective decision-
making process; the costs of supervision, support and enforcement; the costs
of the supervisors’ moral hazard; the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention; and the residual loss. In the meantime, the thesis also carries
out a comparative study of English law and practice, which can facilitate the
above economic analysis on the one hand and provide both experience and
lessons to the future reform of Chinese law on the other.
On this basis, the thesis makes a complete examination of charity
governance from four significant aspects, i.e., governmental regulation,
internal governance, accountability to third parties and public accountability,
in order to provide a variety of reasonable solutions for how to enact or
revise the principles or rules of the current legal framework regarding
charity governance in China.
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1Chapter 1 Introduction
Along with the development of a market-oriented economy in China,1 its
traditional socialist social welfare system is being gradually replaced by a
multilevel social welfare system, in which charities are playing an
increasingly significant role. However, given inefficient governance
mechanisms, in practice, there occur a range of charity scandals, leading to a
lack of public trust and confidence in the charitable sector and continuing
calls for reform. In this context, this thesis is aimed at making suggestions
for reform of the current legal framework relating to charity governance in
China from an economic perspective and with a comparative study of
English law and practice.
To achieve this goal, this chapter begins by clarifying the research question.
Then it further introduces and justifies the usefulness of the research
methods utilised to answer this question and points out the main theoretical
contributions of this thesis. In addition, it also sets up the background and
provides a brief introduction to the argument put forward in this thesis.
1.1 Research Question
For the purposes of this thesis, charity governance means any governance
mechanism ensuring that members of the governing body/‘charity trustees’
(i.e., persons who govern and are finally responsible for a charity)2 comply
with their duties in order to efficiently realise the charitable purpose/public
benefit pursued by their charity.
Usually, better charity governance can result in higher public confidence
and trust and more financial support from donors, the government and the
general public.3To facilitate sound charity governance, there must be a well-
1 It is worth noting that, for the purposes of the thesis, the term ‘China’ refers to mainland China, and
the legal systems in Taiwan, Macao and Hong Kong will not be discussed in this thesis.
2 Regarding the definition and a further examination of charity governance and members of the
governing body/charity trustees, see the discussion in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.
3 Erica Harris, Christine M. Petrovits and Michelle H. Yetman, ‘The Effect of Nonprofit Governance
2designed and efficiently implemented legal framework.
Hence, this thesis is aimed at dealing with this question: how can the current
legal framework concerning charity governance in China be improved in a
cost-effective manner? An economic and comparative analysis will be
carried out to help assess the laws, policies and practices associated with
charity governance in China and England, and to further recommend a range
of solutions to address the problems of Chinese law and practice. To the best
of the author’s knowledge, this thesis is the first time that an economic and
comparative analysis of Chinese law regulating charity governance has been
undertaken, as will be discussed below.
1.2 Research Methods
This thesis carries out its study from an economic perspective and with a
comparative analysis of English law and practice. In terms of economic
theories, due to a lack of a comprehensive framework suitable for assessing
the efficiency of charity governance, this thesis develops a revised agency
theory, to facilitate the assessment of charity governance and to direct the
legal reform in this respect.
The thesis also carries out a comparative study of English law and practice
concerning charity governance, which may provide both insightful
experience and lessons for the future reform of Chinese law.
1.2.1 Economic Theories
1.2.1.1 Why Are Economic Theories Chosen as the Main Research
Method?
Many legal systems, institutions and mechanisms can be ‘best understood
and explained as efforts to promote the efficient allocation of resources’.4
on Donations: Evidence from the Revised Form 990’ (2015) 90(2) The Accounting Review 579.
4 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3rd edn, Little, Brown and Company 1986) 20.
3This argument is of great value in assisting this thesis to identify the ways to
enhance charity governance.
In terms of charity governance, if there was no cost relating to designing
and implementing legal rules aiming to ensure compliance by members of a
charity’s governing body, those rules could be as strict as possible.
However, the reality is that resources are limited, so the law has to take
costs into account. In this context, economic theories can help interpret or
evaluate which legal principle, system or mechanism is cost-effective in
terms of improving charity governance.
1.2.1.2 The Challenges Facing an Economic Analysis of Charity
Governance and the Contributions of this Thesis
In this respect, a variety of economic and social theories5 are available, such
as agency theory, stewardship theory, crowding out theory, stakeholder
theory, enterprise ownership theory and public goods theory. However, it
will be seen in Chapter 3 that, in relation to charity governance, none of
these theories can provide a comprehensive theoretical framework in
assessing the efficiency of charity governance.
For example, the traditional agency theory ignores the altruistic motivation6
and voluntary nature of charity trustees, thus some of its suggestions on
controlling misconduct or mismanagement (i.e., ‘moral hazard’)7 of the
governing body in a for-profit company may not work well in the context of
charity governance. In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory and
crowding out theory take the non-monetary motivations of charity trustees
very seriously,8 but cannot provide a complete solution to avoiding or
5 With respect to a recent summary of theories in relation to charity governance, see Noel Hyndman
and Paul McDonnell, ‘Governance and Charities: An Exploration of Key Themes and the
Development of a Research Agenda’ (2009) 25(1) Financial Accountability & Management 5.
6 Lex Donaldson and James H. Davis, ‘Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and
Shareholder Returns’ (1991) 16(1) Australian Journal of Management 49.
7As to the interpretation of ‘moral hazard’, see the discussion in Chapter 3.
8 Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (Random House 1986) 234; Bruno S. Frey,
4reducing the charity trustees’ moral hazard.
Stakeholder theory pays special attention to the role of stakeholders in
charity governance,9 but cannot clarify the scope of stakeholders relating to
a charity, let along explain how to distribute the rights, duties and liabilities
of those stakeholders in supervising its charity trustees. Enterprise
ownership theory explains the important role of persons voluntarily
providing charitable resources in maintaining the existence of any charity,10
but cannot further provide solutions for ensuring sound charity governance.
Public goods theory helps justify the government as the regulator,11 but also
cannot offer any further recommendations on improving the legal
framework regarding charity governance.
Therefore, before it undertakes a comprehensive assessment of charity
governance, the thesis has to deal with this question. Accordingly, one
contribution of this thesis is to develop a revised agency theory which
critically draws on a range of insights from the theories mentioned above,
and provides a more reasonable framework explaining and examining the
current laws and practices concerning charity governance in China.
A complete discussion of this revised agency theory will be made in Chapter
3. Here, it is only necessary to point out that, the contents of agency costs in
this theory mainly comprise the monitoring costs (which can be further
divided into the costs relating to co-ordinating supervisors and their
collective decision-making process; the costs of supervision, support and
enforcement; the costs of the supervisors’ moral hazard; and the costs of the
negative effects of external intervention), and the residual loss.12 Those
‘On the Relationship between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation’ (1997) 15 International
Journal of Industrial Organization 427.
9 Ciaran Connolly, Noel Hyndman and Danielle McConville, ‘Conversion Ratios, Efficiency and
Obfuscation: A Study of the Impact of Changed UK Charity Accounting Requirements on External
Stakeholders’ (2013) 24 Voluntas 785, 788.
10 Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Harvard University Press 1996) 227-245.
11 Burton A. Weisbrod, ‘Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector
Economy’ in Edmund S. Phelps (ed), Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory (Russell Sage
Foundation 1975) 171-195.
12 These costs will be analysed in detail in Chapter 3.
5costs are taken into account in evaluating the current problems in four vital
aspects of charity governance (i.e., governmental regulation, internal
governance, supervision by third parties and public accountability), and in
further offering recommendations on legal reform throughout the thesis.
Of course, it is worth noting that, this thesis will not utilise any complex
mathematical model to carry out the economic analysis of charity
governance. Instead, it seeks to deploy some basic economic ideas to
interpret and assess the legal framework concerning charity governance.
1.2.2 Comparative Analysis
1.2.2.1 Why English Law Has Been Selected for the Comparison
The reason the thesis chooses comparative analysis as the other research
method is quite simple: it ‘can provide a much richer range of model
solutions than a legal science devoted to a single nation’.13 Nevertheless,
here it is necessary to explain the main reasons for selecting English law
(rather than laws in other jurisdictions) as the object to be compared.
First, in terms of the study and practice relating to charity governance, civil
law countries do not perform well. Given that China is a civil law country, it
would seem to be more reasonable and easier to compare Chinese law with
laws in other civil law jurisdictions, such as France and Germany. However,
in Germany, corporate governance plays a very small role in the non-profit
sector. 14 Similarly, France does not truly have any mature academic
research and legal reform relating to non-profit governance.15 Therefore,
neither country can provide effective guidance to China in reforming its law
and policy dealing with charity governance.
13 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, translated by Tony Weir
(2nd edn, OUP 1987) 15.
14 Thomas von Hippel, ‘Nonprofit Organizations in Germany’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von
Hippel (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 226.
15 Katrin Deckert, ‘Nonprofit Organizations in France’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds),
Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 324.
6Second, in contrast to Chinese law, English law16 experienced the problems
concerning charity governance much earlier and improved its legal system
governing charities accordingly. For example, in terms of governmental
regulation, following the recommendation in the Strategy Unit Report
‘Private Action, Public Benefit’17 to ensure independent, open and
proportionate regulation, the Charity Commission, the former office of the
Charity Commissioners,18 was restructured and modernised as an
independent regulator to replace the Charity Commissioners in regulating
charities.19 In contrast to English law, charity regulators were not identified
in Chinese law until the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China) (‘慈善
法 ’).20 However, so far even the basic regulatory principles, such as
proportionality and accountability, are still not clarified by Chinese law or
formally recognised by Chinese charity regulators.
Another example is associated with internal governance. In this respect, in
designing fiduciary duties, English law recognised the problems that could
arise from excessive burdens being placed on charity trustees a long time
ago:
If the administration of the funds, though mistaken, has been honest,
and unconnected with any corrupt purpose, the Court, while it
directs for the future, refuses to visit with punishment what has
been done in time past. To act on any other principle would be to
deter all prudent persons from becoming trustees of charities.21
Accordingly, English law is not only aimed at regulating the conduct of
charity trustees, but also seeks to avoid placing excessive burdens on those
16 Given that, in the UK, English law (along with the law in Wales) is, more or less, different from the
law in Scotland or Northern Ireland, in providing a comparative assessment of Chinese law, the thesis
only examines English law rather than the law of the whole UK.
17 Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and the Wider
Not-For-Profit Sector (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit 2002).
18 Hubert Picarda QC, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (4th edn, Bloomsbury Professional
2010) 763.
19 Charities Act 2006 (CA 2006), ss 6-7.
20 Charity Law 2016 (China) (CL 2016 (China)), s 6.
21 Attorney General v Corporation of the City of Exeter (1826) 2 Russell 45, 54.
7charity trustees through a range of mechanisms, such as indemnity insurance
for charity trustees22 and the power of the Charity Commission to relieve
charity trustees from liability.23 By contrast, Chinese law neither provides
detailed rules relating to fiduciary duties24 nor contemplates reducing the
burdens of charity trustees as necessary.25
As a matter of fact, charity law in England is well established having
developed from the Charitable Uses Act 1601. Meanwhile, English law has
changed fundamentally in accordance with the political, social and
economic transformation.26 Therefore, although English charity law still has
to adjust itself in response to ‘a time of profound economic, social and
technological change’,27 both its experience and lessons can benefit China
greatly in rethinking and reforming its legal system in respect of charity
governance.
Third, related to the above two points, there is an increasing demand among
Chinese legislators, regulators and research institutes to have a deeper
understanding of and to learn from English law and practice regarding
charities. For example, there is one chapter (Chapter 5) in the recently
enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) that introduces and provides legal rules
governing charitable trusts. Meanwhile, after the enactment of this new law,
in 2016, a delegation of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (‘民政部’), the charity
regulator at the national level in China, made a visit to the Charity
Commission during the period between 24th October and 27th October to
build a closer relationship with this Commission and to draw on its relevant
22 Charities Act 2011 (CA 2011), s 189.
23 CA 2011, s 191.
24 One rule directly related to fiduciary duties in the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) is to
require that the managers of a charity cannot participate in the decision relating to the transaction
between this charity and themselves and that the matters concerning the related transaction must be
disclosed to the public. CL 2016 (China), s 14.
25 There is no similar rule reducing or relieving the liability of charity trustees to section 191 of the
Charities Act 2011 in the Charity Law 2016 (China).
26 For example, see Michael Chesterman, Charities, Trusts, and Social Welfare (Weidenfeld and
Nicolson 1979).
27 House of Lords Select Committee on Charities, Stronger Charities for a Stronger Society (Report
of Session 2016-17) (Select Committee on Charities 2017) 6.
8experience and practices in regulating charities and charitable activities.28
In addition, recently a great deal of professional research institutes focusing
on the study of charities and charity law have been established in China,
such as the China Philanthropy Development Research Institute of Shanghai
Jiaotong University, the China Philanthropy Research Institute of Beijing
Normal University, the China Institute for Philanthropy and Social
Innovation of Renmin University of China and the School of Philanthropy
of Sun Yat-sen University, which carry out a range of academic activities in
support of the legal reform, the policy-making of the government and the
development of the charitable sector as a whole. Among them, the China
Philanthropy Research Institute of Beijing Normal University, with which
the author has co-operated several times and thus is quite familiar, often has
a detailed analysis of English law and practice in its academic projects
funded by the government, foundations and other organisations.
Hence, the fact that charity law in civil law jurisdictions is less developed,
the comparatively well-designed legal and regulatory rules in England and
the increasing demand of Chinese legislators, regulators and research
institutes for a better understanding of the experience of English law form
the basic reasons for this comparative study of the law and practice
regarding charity governance in China and England.
1.2.2.2 The Main Difficulties of Comparative Study and the
Contributions of this Thesis
Comparative study itself usually faces many challenges in practice, such as
how to identify the definition, scope and context of comparative law itself,
and how to understand the relationship between a given legal system and its
28 On 27th October 2016, the author, representing the Charity Law & Policy Unit at the University of
Liverpool, held a seminar for this delegation at the Liverpool Office of the Commission, where the
members of this delegation were very interested in English charity law and practice, and asked a
variety of problems associated with how England tackled the relevant issues which were troubling
Chinese regulators and practitioners at that time.
9political, social, economic and cultural contexts.29
For the purposes of this thesis, the main difficulty lies in the fact that China
and England do not share the same legal system. In contrast to England, a
typical common law jurisdiction, China is a civil law country, leading to a
range of different legal mechanisms, rules, ideas and practices. For example,
China does not accept case law, which means that all legal rules, including
those governing fiduciary duties, have to be provided by statutory law. In
addition, Chinese law does not accept the ‘consideration’ theory of English
law, and accordingly recognises an inter vivos donation as a type of contract
(‘donation contract’). 30
Hence, a comparative analysis of Chinese law and English law is much
more difficult than that focusing on the laws in jurisdictions with the same
legal tradition and system (such as common law jurisdictions or civil law
jurisdictions). That may be one important reason why there are a range of
books carrying out a comparative study of charity law in common law
countries,31 but there is no similar comparative analysis of Chinese charity
law and English charity law. As a result, this thesis is the first comparative
analysis of English law and Chinese law regulating charity governance. 32
In order to tackle the challenge in comparing Chinese and English charity
law, this thesis takes the following steps. First, it clarifies the meaning and
scope of the key terms used in this study, such as Chinese law, charities,
charity governance and members of the governing body/charity trustees, in
Chapter 2.
29 For example, see Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Comparative Law and the Court: What Counts as Comparative
Law’ in Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Courts and Comparative Law (OUP 2015) 54.
30 Contract Law 1999 (China) (CL 1999 (China)), Chapter 11.
31 For example, see Kerry O’Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study
(Routledge 2007); Kerry O’Halloran, Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Karla W. Simon, Charity Law
& Social Policy: National and International Perspectives on the Functions of the Law Relating to
Charities (Springer 2008).
32 Regarding a brief but interesting comparative study of charity law between the US, another
common law country, and China, see Stephanie Hoffer, ‘A Comparison of Tax Exempt Organizations
in the People’s Republic of China and the United States’ (2005) 3(1) Loyola University Chicago
International Law Review 1.
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This can help identify the scope to be compared and reduce the difficulties
in understanding and examining English and Chinese legal rules relating to
charity governance. For example, the discussion relating to charity
governance in this thesis focuses on four core aspects, i.e., governmental
regulation, internal governance, supervision by third parties and public
accountability.33 In this respect, this thesis can contribute to the related
knowledge and ideas to facilitate any future comparative study of charity
law between China and England, in particular the laws regarding charity
governance.
Second, this thesis also sets up the aim of the comparative analysis, i.e.,
facilitating the assessment of whether any principle, mechanism or rule
contributes to reducing agency costs in relation to charity governance. In
other words, the comparative analysis carried out in this thesis aims to assist
an economic evaluation of charity governance and its related problems in
China and England.
In this context, it is not important whether a donation is a contract, or
whether fiduciary duties are provided by statutory law or case law. Instead,
what matters is whether any specific legal principle, system or rule in
England and China can greatly assist in the reduction of agency costs.
Therefore, through the comparative study, any difference or similarity
relating to legal rules and practices between the two jurisdictions will be
further assessed and evaluated by the revised agency theory of this thesis.
This will assist the judgment on whether it is necessary to incorporate some
specific legal principles or rules in England into Chinese law.
Meanwhile, when the same or similar legal rules or problems regarding
charity governance exist, this thesis will further discuss whether the current
Chinese law should be sustained, or whether there are still some more
detailed and reasonable rules and practices in England that may better
reduce agency costs and thus should be taken into account in improving the
33 Those four aspects will be explored in Chapters 4-7 respectively.
11
current rules or practices in China. For example, although charity regulators
in both jurisdictions are facing challenges regarding proportionality and
accountability, in contrast to Chinese law, English law has developed a
range of well-designed systems, rules and approaches to handle them.34 In
this context, this thesis will identify and incorporate them as part of the
reform suggestions for Chinese law concerning charity governance.
1.3 Background35
In this section, the thesis sets up the background of its study, which can be
further divided into two points. First, with the emerging market-oriented
economy in China, its traditional socialist social welfare system is being
gradually replaced by a multilevel social welfare system, which allows
charities to play an increasingly significant role. Second, due to inefficient
governance mechanisms, there occur a range of charity scandals, reducing
public trust in the charitable sector and resulting in continuing calls for
reform. Amore detailed analysis is carried out as follows.
1.3.1 The Increasingly Important Role of Charities in Social Welfare
Delivery
1.3.1.1 Insufficient Social Welfare Provision by the Government in
Developing a Market-oriented Economy
For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘social welfare’ is used in a wider
sense, including both the welfare focusing on the underprivileged and that
delivered to any other group or to the general public. Charities played an
important role in social welfare delivery both in ancient China36 and during
the period of the Republic of China (1911-1949). 37 However, after the
34 See the discussion in Chapter 4.
35 Some of the material in this section has been published in Dejian Li, ‘Comments on the Emerging
Law on the Administration of Foreign NGOs in China: Based on Its Historical, Political, Social and
Legal Contexts’ (2015) 13(1) International Journal of Charity Sector Law 15.
36 Karla W. Simon, Civil Society in China: The Legal Framework from Ancient Times to the ‘New
Reform Era’ (OUP 2013) xxviii.
37 Miu Chung Yan and others, ‘Charity Development in China: An Overview’ (2007) 17(1) Asia
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establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by the Communist
Party of China, according to the socialist ideology held by the leadership at
that time, charity itself was considered as part of the capitalist regime and
‘an instrument of the ruling class that was used to control, denigrate, and
mark off as different the poorer classes of society’.38
Accordingly, after the establishment of the PRC, along with the setting up of
a planned economy (‘计划经济 ’),39 China established a socialist social
welfare system, fully responsible for the social welfare delivery. In this
context, all independent charities were either incorporated into part of the
government (such as Red Cross Society of China) or prohibited as illegal
organisations. Foreign charities had to leave China whilst their branches and
the charities they funded suffered the same destiny as Chinese domestic
charities.40 Accordingly, no independent charities existed in mainland China
after the establishment of this socialist social welfare system.
Since the carrying out of the ‘Reform and Opening Up’ (‘改革开放’) policy
in 1978, the planned economy has been gradually transformed into a
market-oriented economy (the so-called ‘socialist market economy’).41
Alongside the market-oriented economic reform, China has fundamentally
changed its traditional social welfare system in order to make citizens take
on more responsibility in support of their family members and themselves.
In this context, at the initial stage of this new policy, the government chose
to cut its social welfare expenditure,42 and ‘[t]he provision of security by
way of guaranteed access to jobs or land was discontinued’.43 Consequently,
Pacific Journal of Social Work & Development 80.
38 ibid 80.
39 Under such an economic system, the state was the only owner of all public enterprises and was
responsible for the whole operation of economic production, exchange and consumption whilst
enterprises could receive the financial support from the state and workers could receive their wages
regardless of their performance. Generally, see Arnaldo Gonçalves, ‘China’s Swing from a Planned
Soviet-Type Economy to an Ingenious Socialist Market Economy: An Account of 50 Years’ (2006)
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=949371> accessed 20 September 2017; Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of
Modern China (6th edn, OUP 2000).
40 Simon (n 36).
41 Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski (eds), China’s Great Economic Transformation (CUP 2008).
42Yan and others (n 37) 90.
43 Stein Ringen and Kinglun Ngok, ‘What Kind of Welfare State Is Emerging in China?’ (2013)
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millions of employees have lost their jobs in state-owned enterprises,44
social inequality has become much more severe,45 and there have emerged a
host of other novel social, economic, cultural and environmental problems.
Currently, China is facing severe pressure in delivering public goods.
Hundreds of millions of the disadvantaged, such as older people, the
disabled, impoverished students, unattended children and the unemployed,
need to be relieved in terms of health care, education, financial support and
other areas. For example, by the end of 2013, even given the lower living
standards in China compared to Western countries, there were 82.49 million
poor people living in rural areas; and China’s elderly population--those aged
over 60--was 202.43 million, among whom 131.61 million were aged over
65.46 By the end of 2013, there were 9.26 million registered unemployed
people in urban areas.47 In addition, according to the China Disabled
Persons’ Federation (CDPF), a national umbrella organisation for persons
with diverse disabilities in China, there were an estimated 85.02 million
disabled people by the end of 2010, of whom 25.18 million were extremely
disabled.48
And the environmental pollution is very severe in almost all aspects.49 For
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development Working Paper 2013-2
<http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/28BCE0F59BDD3738C1257BE30053
EBAC/$file/Ringen%20and%20Ngok.pdf> accessed 20 September 2017.
44 ‘The figure for 1998 was 6.1 million.’Yan and others (n 37) 81.
45 The Economist, ‘Gini Out of the Bottle’ The Economist (London, 26 January 2013)
<http://www.economist.com/news/china/21570749-gini-out-bottle> accessed 20 September 2017.
46 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, Statistical Communique on the
National Economy and Social Development 2013 (National Bureau of Statistics 2014)
<http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201402/t20140224_514970.html> accessed 20 September 2017.
47 Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, Statistical
Communique on Human Resources and Social Security Development 2013 (Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security 2014)
<http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/dongtaixinwen/buneiyaowen/201405/t20140528_131110.h
tm> accessed 20 September 2017.
48 CDPF, The Number of the Total Disabled and Different Kinds of the Disabled in China by the End
of 2010 (CDPF 2012) <http://www.cdpf.org.cn/sjzx/cjrgk/201206/t20120626_387581.shtml>
accessed 20 September 2017.
49 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China, Statistical Communique
on Environment 2015 (Ministry of Environment Protection 2016)
<http://www.mep.gov.cn/hjzl/zghjzkgb/lnzghjzkgb/201606/P020160602333160471955.pdf> accessed
20 September 2017.
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example, ‘among 4,778 testing spots in 203 cities, 44% had “relatively
poor” underground water quality; the groundwater in another 15.7% tested
as “very poor”’.50 In this context, with the increasing social demand for
fresh air, clean water and healthy food, the public requires more
environmental protection.51
Furthermore, as the quality of life has been gradually improving recently,
more and more Chinese citizens have been developing themselves in
relation to the arts, amateur sports and other social, cultural, physical52 or
spiritual aspects.53 For instance, according to a 2013 survey of citizens aged
between 20-69 in 10 provinces and cities, the percentage of citizens
frequently participating in sports had amounted to 32.7% by the end of
2012.54
However, given that China is the largest developing country in the world so
far, even the general needs of most Chinese citizens for public goods cannot
be satisfied by the government: the government’s public finance expenditure
in the above areas is far from sufficient and consequently cannot satisfy the
increasing social demand for public goods.55
50 Jonathan Kaiman, ‘China Says More than Half of Its Groundwater Is Polluted’ The Guardian
(London, 23 April 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/23/china-half-
groundwater-polluted> accessed 20 September 2017.
51 As a response, Chinese legislators strengthened the environmental protection law recently. Jonathan
Kaiman, ‘China Strengthens Environmental Laws’ The Guardian (London, 25 April 2014)
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/25/china-strengthens-environmental-laws-
polluting-factories> accessed 20 September 2017.
52 The prime minister of the Chinese government, Keqiang Li, has announced that the government
will provide medical and health services, as public goods, to all citizens. China News, ‘Keqiang Li:
Providing Medical and Health Services, as Public Goods, to All Citizens’ China News (Beijing, 28
June 2013) <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/06-28/4983175.shtml> accessed 20 September 2017.
53 For example, see Anugrah Kuma, ‘China to Have World’s Largest Christian Population by 2025,
Religion Expert Says’ The Christian Post (Washington DC, 27 April 2014)
<http://www.christianpost.com/news/china-to-have-worlds-largest-christian-population-by-2025-
religion-expert-says-118646/> accessed 20 September 2017.
54 Kai Zhu, ‘Mass Sports Are Gradually Developing’ People’s Daily (Beijing, 4 January 2014)
<http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2014-01/04/content_1371192.htm> accessed 20
September 2017.
55 Hongjie Qiu, ‘A Research Report Indicates that Public Services in China Is ‘‘at a Low Level as a
Whole’’’ Xinhua (Beijing, 8 April 2007) <http://www.gov.cn/zfjs/2007-04/08/content_575303.htm>
accessed 20 September 2017.
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More seriously, in China, the need of the disadvantaged for public goods is
much harder to meet in practice. For most ordinary citizens, although so far
they can hardly influence the government’s policy on public goods delivery
by voting, their common demand is playing an increasingly vital role in the
government agenda setting concerning public policy, which focuses on the
major issues associated with the whole society and of general concern.56 In
this context, the public goods supplied by the Chinese government and
‘government-controlled charities’57 can at least satisfy the social demand of
some citizens.
However, in a heterogeneous society like China, other citizens, particularly
those marginalised groups whose voices cannot be reflected or efficiently
reflected in the governmental policy, may not obtain the support or efficient
support from the government in terms of quantity and quality of public
goods delivery.58
1.3.1.2 Towards a Multilevel Social Welfare System in the Future
All those problems are forcing the Chinese leadership to gradually realise
the necessity of providing a supportive social welfare system in developing
the market economy.59 However, this kind of social welfare system cannot
be the same as the traditional model in the context of a planned economy. As
56 Shaoguang Wang, Governing the State Well: the Goals and Approaches of State Transformation
(SDX Joint Publishing Company 2007)166 (王绍光《安邦之道：国家转型的目标与途径》，三联
书店 2007年).
57 Government-controlled charities will be defined in Chapter 2.
58 A theory interpreting this phenomenon is Weisbrod’s ‘public goods theory’. According to this
theory, in a democratic country, the governmental policy concerning public goods delivery is
determined by the majority of the voters (‘median voters’). However, different subgroups of citizens
may have diverse demands of public goods (‘demand heterogeneity’). Accordingly, in terms of both
quantity and quality, the public goods provided by the government may not effectively satisfy the
demand of citizens who are not among the median voters (government failure). Burton A. Weisbrod,
‘Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy’ in Edmund S.
Phelps (ed), Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory (Russell Sage Foundation 1975) 171-195. Of
course, given China does not accept a Western democratic model, the above analysis may be not
suitable for China. Nevertheless, it at least points out one important fact, i.e., the government cannot
sufficiently provide public goods to satisfy the demands of some subgroups.
59 Ringen and Ngok (n 43).
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a compromise, ‘a new multilevel system’60 involving the government,
market and non-profits is being established: in such a system, although the
government still plays a role in social welfare delivery, ‘non-governmental
sectors--including the market, NGOs, family, and individuals--are expected
to fund and provide the major portion of social welfare’.61
As a matter of fact, ‘[i]n the 2000s, the government unveiled a number of
initiatives that expressly identified NGOs as important partners in its efforts
to address pressing social needs’.62 In other words, it can be reasonably
believed that the increasing economic pressure is primarily motivating the
Chinese government to allow for and promote the development of charities
and other non-profits. Meanwhile, given the specific conditions in China,
the participation of Chinese charities in public goods delivery will not only
fill the gap in relieving disadvantaged groups, but also relax the financial
pressure on the government to provide public goods to the whole society.
In this context, the basic trend in public goods delivery in China can be
reasonably expected to be that based on the economic and social conditions:
the government will further increase its public expenditure on social welfare
to enhance the well-being of citizens on the one hand and gradually promote
the involvement of charities and other non-profits in public goods provision
on the other. This arrangement will provide a platform for charities to meet
the social demand for public goods.
According to the recent official statement on the development of registered
non-profits (usually called ‘social organisations’ (‘社会组织’) in China), by
the end of 2015, there were about 662,000 registered non-profits, which
employed more than 7.3 million employees, received donations of about 6.1
billion yuan, and mainly carried out activities in areas such as education,
60 Zhenyao Wang and Yanhui Zhao, ‘The Collapse and Reemergence of Private Philanthropy in China,
1949-2012’ in Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds), Philanthropy for Health in
China (Indiana University Press 2014) 28-29.
61Yan and others (n 37) 83.
62 Adam Chodorow, ‘Charity with Chinese Characteristics’ (2012) 30(1) UCLA Pacific Basin Law
Journal 1, 4.
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health, social services, culture, sports, environmental protection, religion
and commercial and industrial development.63 The following table indicates
the recently increasing number of registered non-profits, a large portion of
which are in fact charities.64
Table 1 The Increasing Number of Registered Non-profits in China
Year Associations65 Foundations66 Civil non-commercial units67
2000 13.1 -- 2.3
2001 12.9 -- 8.2
2002 13.3 -- 11.1
2003 14.2 -- 12.4
2004 15.3 892 13.5
2005 17.1 975 14.8
2006 19.2 1144 16.1
2007 21.2 1340 17.4
2008 23 1597 18.2
2009 23.9 1843 19
2010 24.5 2200 19.8
63 Ministry of Civil Affairs, Statistical Communique on the Development of Social Services 2015
(Ministry of Civil Affairs 2016)
<http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/sj/tjgb/201607/20160700001136.shtml> accessed 20 September 2017.
64 Before the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), there was no legal definition or registration
procedure for charities. However, many non-profits could fall within the current scope of charities as
defined by the Charity Law 2016 (China), such as some non-profits aimed at relieving poverty and
enhancing education, health, environment and science. As to the legal definition of charities in this
law, see CL 2016 (China), ss 3, 8 and 9.
65 According to the Regulation on the Registration and Administration of Associations 1998 (China,
revised in 2016), associations (‘社会团体’) are referred to as ‘non-profit social organisations which
are voluntarily established by Chinese individuals to act according to the constitution and in the
interests of their common will’. Regulation on the Registration and Administration of Associations
1998 (China, revised in 2016) (RRAA 1998 (China, revised in 2016)), s 2.
66 In accordance with the Regulation on the Administration of Foundations 2004 (China), foundations
(‘基金会’) are ‘non-profit legal persons established according to the Regulation, for the public benefit
purposes by using the donations of individuals, legal persons or other organisations’. Regulation on
the Administration of Foundations 2004 (China) (RAF 2004 (China)), s 2.
67 Civil non-commercial units (‘民办非企业单位’) are ‘social organisations conducting non-profit
social services, which are established by, and use the non-state owned assets of, enterprises, public
institutions (‘事业单位’), associations, other forces and individuals’. Provisional Regulation on the
Registration and Administration of Civil Non-commercial Units 1998 (China) (PRRACNU 1998
(China)), s 2. Civil non-commercial units are renamed by the Charity Law 2016 (China) as social
service institutes (‘社会服务机构’). CL 2016 (China), s 8.
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2011 25.5 2614 20.4
2012 27.1 3029 22.5
2013 28.9 3549 25.5
2014 31 4117 29.2
2015 32.9 4784 32.9
Unit: 10000 for associations and civil non-commercial units; 1 for
foundations68
Meanwhile, given the government’s strict control on the establishment of
non-profit organisations, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, it
can be assumed that the data in this table does not reflect the real number of
non-profits, including independent charities, most of which until recently
could not be registered in practice.
In addition, under this system, the government monopolises charitable
resources and controls the majority of charities recognised by law whilst
most independent charities cannot be registered and accordingly are
regarded as illegal organisations, let alone being able to enjoy the tax
benefits.69 Consequently, this legal arrangement curbs the aspiration of
individuals and private enterprises to form charities, to make charitable
donations and to participate in the voluntary work70 organised by charities,
eventually reducing the amount of charitable resources.
Hence, after the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), which allows
independent organisations to register as charities, it can be reasonably
expected that more and more donors and volunteers will fund or participate
68 The data in this table was collected by the author according to several Statistical Communiques on
the Development of Social Services issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which are available on the
official website of the Ministry of Civil Affairs <http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/sj/tjgb/?> accessed 20
September 2017.
69 Karla W. Simon, ‘The Regulation of Civil Society Organizations in China: Current Environment
and Recent Developments’ (2011) 9(1) International Journal of Civil Society Law 55. For an
overview of the previous tax issues relating to charities, generally see Leon E. Irish, Dongsheng Jin
and Karla W. Simon, ‘China’s Tax Rules for Not-for-profit Organizations’ (2004) A Study Prepared
for the Work Bank 2004 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCHINA/1503040-
1122886803058/20601839/NPO_tax_En.pdf> accessed 20 September 2017.
70 The traditional volunteer regulations in China limit ‘the ability for spontaneous volunteering to
occur, much as it was needed in recent natural disasters’. Simon (n 36) 262.
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in the charitable activities organised by charities, increasing charitable
resources available to public goods delivery in the future. This will
definitely make charities play an increasingly significant role in this area.
1.3.2 Inefficient Governance Mechanisms Leading to Frequent Charity
Scandals, Lack of Public Trust, and Calls for Reform
Due to inefficient governance mechanisms, charity scandals are being
frequently exposed by the media, greatly damaging the public trust and
confidence in charities.71 For example, in 2013, it was found that Red Cross
Poverty Alleviation Development Service Center (‘红十字会扶贫开发服务
中 心 ’) had misappropriated a charitable donation worth more than 84
million yuan (about 8.4 million pounds) for other causes.72 Also in 2013,
Song Qingling Foundation of Henan Province was discovered by the media
to have abused its charitable resources in a variety of ways. For instance,
this charity spent more than 100 million yuan (about 10 million pounds)
building a sculpture but immediately destroyed it.73 In 2015, Jiabi Wen, the
former vice-director of Red Cross Society of Sichuan Province, was
sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for corruption.74
Those scandals have, to a great degree, damaged the public confidence and
trust in Chinese charities. Due to those frequent charity scandals, in 2011,
from June to August, ‘charitable donations in China fell more than 80
71 Xiaoyong Huang and Liqiang Cai, ‘A Major Breakthrough in the Development of the Nonprofit
Sector in China’ in Chien-Chung Huang and others (eds), China’s Nonprofit Sector: Progress and
Challenges (Transaction Publishers 2014) 67-72.
72 See, for example, Hanliang Zheng, ‘Red Cross Society of China Recognised that It Misappropriated
84,700,000 RMB of Charitable Donations Which Should Have Been Used in the Disaster Relief of
Wenchuan Earthquake’ Radio France Internationale (Paris, 29 April 2013)
<http://cn.rfi.fr/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20130429-
%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%BA%A2%E5%8D%81%E5%AD%97%E4%BC%9A%E6%89
%BF%E8%AE%A4%E6%8C%AA%E7%94%A8%E6%B1%B6%E5%B7%9D%E8%B5%88%E7%
81%BE8470%E4%B8%87%E5%B7%A8%E6%AC%BE> accessed 20 September 2017.
73 People, ‘How Deep Is the Water in the Event of Song Qingling Sculpture’ People (Beijing, 5
August 2013) <http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/363551/367637/index.html> accessed 20 September
2017.
74 Jian Zhang, ‘Why was the Charity Property of the Red Cross Society Changed into Private
Property’ Caijing (Beijing, 15 September 2015)
<http://www.caijingmobile.com/wxshare/208790.html> accessed 20 September 2017.
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percent because of public mistrust’.75 In addition, lacking trust in charities,
individual donors do not play an important role in charitable donations:
currently ‘80 percent of donations are from corporations’,76 which usually
employ charitable donations as a tool to improve their reputation in order to
pursue higher financial returns.77
In the meantime, as a response to those scandals and due to the lack of
public trust, recently ‘the Chinese public has become much more engaged,
demanding greater effectiveness, more transparency, and the control of
corruption’78 in terms of the use of charitable resources. Even an article
published by one of the largest government news agencies also recognised
the fact that ‘[w]hat people are really concerned about is finding a way of
establishing a fair, transparent and reliable charitable organization’.79 Here
is a brief analysis of the major governance drawbacks in China, which will
be examined in detail in the following chapters.
1.3.2.1 Inefficient Governmental Regulation80
In terms of governmental regulation in China, one fundamental problem is
that ‘[r]egistration standards are unjustifiably high, but there is little
emphasis on overseeing [non-profit organisations’] operations and
implementation.’81
75 Adam Chodorow, ‘Charity with Chinese Characteristics’ (2012) 30(1) UCLA Pacific Basin Law
Journal 1, 49; Sabrina Mao and Sui-Lee Wee, ‘Donations to Charities in China Plunge after Scandals’
Reuters (London, 8 December 2011) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-donations-
idUSTRE7B70F820111208> accessed 20 September 2017.
76 Eileen Heisman, ‘Philanthropic Leapfrog: Giving in China’ Nonprofit Quarterly (Boston, 6
September 2013) <https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2013/09/06/philanthropic-leapfrog-giving-in-china/>
accessed 20 September 2017.
77 For example, see Xiufeng Chen and Li Li, ‘The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility and
Charitable Foundations in China’ in Chien-Chung Huang and others (eds), China’s Nonprofit Sector:
Progress and Challenges (Transaction Publishers 2014) 23-24.
78 Lincoln C. Chen, Jennifer Ryan, and Tony Saich, ‘Introduction: Philanthropy for Health in China:
Distinctive Roots and Future Prospects’ in Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds),
Philanthropy for Health in China (Indiana University Press 2014) 14.
79 Junping Wang, ‘How Can Red Cross Society of China Regain Public Trust?’ People’s Daily
(Beijing, 6 July 2011) <http://en.people.cn/90001/90780/91342/7431300.html> accessed 20
September 2017.
80 This problem will be comprehensively examined in Chapter 4.
81 Peifeng Liu, ‘Nonprofit Legislation in China’ in Chien-Chung Huang and others (eds), China’s
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First, regulators have not reduced all undue limitations on the establishment
of independent charities. As noted above, historically, based on the
traditional socialist ideology and social welfare system, all charities were
either incorporated into the government or prohibited as illegal
organisations. Consequently, before the carrying out of the ‘Reform and
Opening Up’ policy, no charities existed that could be independent from the
government. After the implementation of the new policy in 1978, no
comprehensive law governing charities at the national level existed until the
enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China).
A more serious problem lies in the fact that the government built and is still
maintaining a ‘dual administrative system’ (‘双重管理体制’). 82 Although
this system involves dual regulation, it should be clearly distinguished from
the ‘dual regulation’ of charities in England, where some charities are
regulated by both the Charity Commission and other regulators.83
According to this system, regulators ‘place tremendous ideological
importance on position [, and] most government efforts are focused on
strictly regulating the registration process’.84 In this context, before the
enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China) with the aim of relaxing the
related limitations on the establishment of independent charities, few
independent charities could be registered as legal organisations in practice.
Instead, currently the majority of charities recognised and registered by the
government are those affiliated to the government (government-controlled
charities, i.e., quasi-government agencies),85 which are distinguished from
Nonprofit Sector: Progress and Challenges (Transaction Publishers 2014) 81.
82 Xiaoguang Kang and Feng Li, ‘NGO Governance in China: Achievements and Dilemmas’ in Lisa
Jordan and Peter van Tuijl (eds), NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations (Earthscan
2006) 144.
83 For example, charitable companies are jointly regulated by the Charity Commission and Companies
House.
84 Liu (n 81) 81.
85 Karla W. Simon, ‘Reform of China’s Laws for NPOs: A Discussion of Issues Related to Shiye
Danwei Reform’ (2005) The Forum on the Legal Framework of NPOs in China, Xiao Shan
Conference <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan042432.pdf>
accessed 20 September 2017; Project Team on ‘Reform of China’s Public Institutions and
Development of China’s Non-Profit Organizations’, ‘Reform of China’s Public Institutions—
Retrospect and Prospects’ (2004) 2(1) International Journal of Civil Society Law 7; Yunsong Ge,
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independent charities in Western countries. And it remains to be seen to
what extent the Charity Law 2016 (China) can change this situation in the
future.
Second, regulators maintain direct control over governance issues in
charities. Some basic modern regulatory principles, such as accountability
and proportionality, are still not clarified by law or officially recognised by
Chinese regulators, nor has there been any fundamental improvement to the
relevant legal rules.
In this context, it is reasonable to expect that efficient use of charitable
resources cannot be achieved due to a lack of sufficient competition,
excessive control by the government over internal governance, and a lack of
basic regulatory principles and rules.86
1.3.2.2 Lack of Well-Designed Legal Rules in Respect of Internal
Governance87
Before the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), there were several
regulations in charge of regulating charities and other non-profits. The
problem is that they focused on governmental regulation rather than on
internal governance in charities. Meanwhile, although the model governing
documents (‘章程示范文本 ’) issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, to
some extent, provide more rules regarding internal governance, those rules
are not well-designed. Even though this new law has been enacted, it has
done little to improve the rules regarding internal governance.
First, there are few, if any, legal rules governing the fiduciary duties of
charity trustees. In respect of the Charity Law 2016 (China), there is only
one specific rule dealing with conflicts of interest, which requires that the
‘Nonprofit Organizations and the Reform of China’s Public Institutions’ (2004) 2(1) International
Journal of Civil Society Law 27.
86 For a detailed analysis of those problems, see the discussion in Chapter 4.
87 This problem will be fully examined in Chapter 5.
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initiators (‘发起人’), major donors (‘主要捐赠人’) and managers (‘管理人
员 ’) of a charity cannot participate in the decision relating to their
transaction with this charity and that the matters concerning the related
transaction must be disclosed to the public.88
However, this rule is insufficient in overcoming conflicts of interest in
practice. For example, the managers’ scope is unclear. And there is no rule
regulating the remaining managers in deciding whether to transact with
those interested managers. In addition, there is no further mechanism
limiting the number of managers benefiting from this transaction. All those
problems may lead to managers abusing their powers.
Second, rules governing internal bodies are not well-designed. For example,
there is no unified title referring to those persons in charge of a charity.
According to the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China), there are
‘responsible persons’ (‘负责人 ’),89 ‘decision-making bodies’ (‘决策机
构’),90 ‘executive bodies’ (‘执行机构’),91 ‘managers’92 and other terms, but
who are finally responsible for the conduct of their charity is not clear.
Meanwhile, different types of charity have different internal bodies. For
example, in an incorporated association, the members (‘成员; 社员; 会员’)
and the board of directors (‘理事会’) are its essential internal bodies.93 By
contrast, the board of directors and the supervisory board (‘监事会’) are the
essential internal bodies in a ‘donated legal person’ (‘捐助法人 ’).94 The
88 CL 2016 (China), s 14. A similar rule exists in the Regulation on the Administration of Foundations
2004 (China). RAF 2004 (China), s 23. In addition, the previous policy regulating foundations is the
Measure for the Administration of Foundations 1988 (China) (‘基金会管理办法’), which has been
repealed.
89 CL 2016 (China), ss 9, 16, 54 and 95.
90 CL 2016 (China), ss 11, 18 and 54.
91 CL 2016 (China), s 11.
92 CL 2016 (China), ss 14 and 58.
93 Model Governing Document of Associations, ss 14 and 17; General Provisions of the Civil Law
2017 (China) (GPCL 2017 (China)), s 91.
94 A donated legal person is a new organisation created by the recently enacted General Provisions of
Civil Law 2017 (China). Those donated legal persons include but are not limited to foundations and
social service institutes (the new name for ‘civil non-commercial units’). GPCL 2017 (China), ss 92-
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existence of a range of internal bodies further increases the difficulty in
identifying the charity trustees of a charity.
In addition, even though there are rules governing internal bodies in the
General Provisions of the Civil Law 2017 (China), the Regulation on the
Administration of Foundations 2004 (China) and the model governing
documents issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs,95 the legal rights, duties
and liabilities relating to those internal bodies are not well-designed. For
example, in a charitable association, formally, its members are the authority
body, but they are not required to be finally responsible for this charity,
whilst most of the governance functions are performed by the board of
directors, which is only regarded as the executive body.96
Without reasonably distributing rights, duties and liabilities among internal
bodies, those rules may lead to unnecessary disputes and conflicts in
practice, negatively affecting the efficient use of charitable resources and the
realisation of charitable purposes and public benefit pursued by a charity.
1.3.2.3 Unreasonable Supervisory Mechanisms Relating to Donors and
the Public97
First, in Chinese law, donors (‘捐赠人 /赠与人 ’) are conferred too many
rights with few duties in charity governance, which may lead to them
abusing their powers. For example, in a charitable trust, apart from some
rights relating to access to information,98 the settlor has the right to ask the
trustee to adjust the management methods of the trust property.99 In addition,
the settlor has the right to ask the trustee to recover the trust property or
93. Regarding those organisations, see a further discussion in Chapter 5.
95 See, for example, GPCL 2017 (China), ss 89, 91 and 93; RAF 2004 (China), ss 20-24; Model
Governing Document of Associations, ss 7-29; Model Governing Document of Foundations, ss 8-28;
Model Governing Document of Civil Non-commercial Units (Legal Persons), ss 10-23; Model
Governing Document of Civil Non-commercial Units (Partnerships), ss 10-16.
96 Model Governing Document of Associations, s 18.
97 Those mechanisms will be further evaluated in Chapters 6-7 respectively.
98 Trusts Law 2001 (China) (TL 2001 (China)), s 20.
99 TL 2001 (China), s 21.
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make compensation if the trustee violates his/her fiduciary duties.100
However, the law does not provide any rule monitoring the settlor when s/he
has the rights to make decisions for the trust’s affairs or to supervise the
trustee.
Second, there is a lack of reasonably designed public accountability
mechanisms relating to accounting, reporting, auditing and information
publicity. Even after the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), which
established one chapter relating to disclosure of information,101 there
remains many problems in this area, such as the unclear relationship
between financial reports and annual work reports,102 insufficient rules
regarding remuneration of charity trustees,103 and no differing rules
concerning accounting, reporting and auditing of larger charities,104 which
may negatively affect the role of this new law in enhancing the public trust
and confidence in charities.
1.4 Thesis Argumentation
Chapter 2 sets the scene by clarifying the scope of the key terms deployed
throughout this thesis, including Chinese law, charities, charity governance
and members of the governing body/charity trustees. This chapter presents a
definition of each term, and discusses the reasons for this definition and the
relationship between the terms and the topics explored in this thesis.
Chapter 3 provides a critical assessment of the traditional agency theory and
other related economic and social theories in respect of evaluating charity
governance. Combining the features of charities and the reasonable aspects
of those theories, this chapter develops a more pragmatic and revised
agency theory to supply a more reasonable and comprehensive guidance on
100 TL 2001 (China), s 22.
101 CL 2016 (China), Chapter 8.
102 CL 2016 (China), s 13.
103 ibid.
104 Instead, this law only requires that the financial reports of charities having the public fundraising
status should be audited. CL 2016 (China), s 72.
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the assessment of charity governance.
On this basis, the thesis further examines the legal issues regarding charity
governance from four important aspects in Chapters 4-7, i.e., governmental
regulation, internal governance, third parties’ supervision and public
accountability. In these chapters, the thesis deploys the approaches and ideas
developed in the above chapters to provide an economic and comparative
analysis of the current laws, practices and problems regarding charity
governance in China, and accordingly to propose the specific measures
required to tackle the problems of governance in relation to Chinese
charities.
Chapter 4 focuses on how to improve governmental regulation on charity
trustees. Given the tradition of Chinese law in limiting the existence of
independent charities whilst ignoring the building of efficient regulatory
mechanisms, this chapter argues that, for Chinese regulators, the reform
strategy of governmental regulation should be from strict control to efficient
regulation. Based on an economic and comparative analysis of the law and
practice in England and China, this chapter seeks to identify the related
principles and rules in English law that can reduce the agency costs
concerning governmental regulation and help China to improve its
regulatory system governing charities.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the reform of internal governance mechanisms
in Chinese law. This chapter focuses on two major issues, i.e., fiduciary
duties and internal bodies. After a comprehensive economic and
comparative analysis, this chapter explores specific measures facilitating the
improvement of internal governance in Chinese charities.
Chapter 6 assesses the legal rules making charities accountable to third
parties, including donors and beneficiaries, in both jurisdictions, and further
offers the relevant reform strategies. This chapter clarifies the separate roles
donors and beneficiaries should play in charity governance and puts forward
a variety of suggestions for the reform of the legal rules governing donors
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and beneficiaries in China in order to reduce the related agency costs.
Chapter 7 provides specific reform suggestions relating to legal rules
regarding accountability to the public. In this chapter, public accountability
mainly involves accounting, reporting, auditing and public access to
information. After comparing charity law and practice in both jurisdictions,
this chapter further gives suggestions for future reform in China from the
perspective of reducing agency costs.
Chapter 8 summarises the core points in the previous chapters, comments on
the possibility of implementing the reform suggestions of this thesis in
practice, and discusses the work that remains to be carried out in the future.
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Chapter 2 Setting the Scene
2.1 Introduction
To facilitate the economic and comparative study of charity governance in
China, this chapter sets the scene by clarifying the scope of the key terms
deployed throughout this thesis, including Chinese law, charities, charity
governance and members of the governing body/charity trustees. In this
context, this chapter also seeks to define those terms, give reasons for the
definitions, and further point out the relationship between the terms and the
topics which are to be discussed in the following chapters.
2.2 The Scope of Chinese Law Discussed in this Thesis
As noted by Jean Warburton, ‘[c]harity governance will not improve across
the whole of the sector until the law that underpins the operation of charities
is clear and easily accessible’.1 To ensure that the governing body of a
charity performs well, there must be a well-designed legal system.2
However, before discussing how to improve this system, it is necessary to
identify the scope of Chinese law discussed in this thesis first.
2.2.1 The Disadvantages of Defining Chinese Law in the Strict Sense
In China, the rules that can be formally regarded as laws (‘法律’) are those
enacted by the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee,3
which definitely fall within Chinese law discussed in this thesis, the
equivalent of which in England are statutes, such as the Charities Act 2011.
In this restrictive sense, there are several laws regulating charities in China,
such as the Charity Law 2016 (China), the Enterprise Income Tax Law 2007
1 Jean Warburton, ‘Charities and Governance: the Role of the Law’ in Debra Morris and Jean
Warburton (eds), Charities, Governance and the Law: the Way Forward (Key Haven 2003) 273.
2 See, for example, Henry Hansmann, ‘The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal
835, 898.
3 Constitutional Law 1982 (China, revised in 2004) (CL 1982 (China, revised in 2004)), ss 62 and 67.
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(China) (‘企业所得税法 ’), the Law on the Promotion of Privately Run
Schools 2002 (China, revised in 2013) (‘民办教育促进法’), the Trusts Law
2001 (China) (‘信托法 ’), the Public Benefit Undertakings Donations Law
1999 (China) (‘公益事业捐赠法 ’),4 the Red Cross Society Law 1993
(China, revised in 2017) (‘红十字会法 ’) and the Individual Income Tax
Law 1980 (China, revised in 2011) (‘个人所得税法’).5
However, a strict understanding of Chinese law may not facilitate the work
of this thesis, because, except for a few rules provided by the recently
enacted Charity Law 2016 (China), the main rules regulating charities at the
national level are regulations and policies established by the State Council
(‘国务院’) or other departments of the State Council, such as the Regulation
on the Registration and Administration of Associations 1998 (China, revised
in 2016) (‘社会团体登记管理条例’),6 the Provisional Regulation on the
Registration and Administration of Civil Non-commercial Units 1998
(China) (‘民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例’)7 and the Regulation on the
Administration of Foundations 2004 (China) (‘基金会管理条例’), which
regulate three types of non-profits in China.
In this context, it is impossible to have a clear understanding of the specific
rules in practice if this thesis only deals with the rules enacted by the
National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee.
4 Some Chinese scholars regard this law as the first law relating to charity undertakings since the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Qiuguang Zhou and Guilin Zeng, A Brief History of
Charity in China (People’s Publishing House 2006) 404 (周秋光、曾桂林：《中国慈善简史》，
人民出版社 2006年版).
5 Concerning Red Cross Society of China, see Caroline Reeves, ‘The Red Cross Society of China:
Past, Present, and Future’ in Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds), Philanthropy for
Health in China (Indiana University Press 2014) 214-233.
6 The previous policies in this area mainly include the Provisional Measure for the Registration of
Associations 1950 (China) (‘社会团体登记暂行办法’) and the Regulation on the Registration and
Administration of Associations 1989 (China) (‘社会团体登记管理条例’), which have been repealed.
7 Although the title of the Provisional Regulation on the Registration and Administration of Civil
Non-commercial Units 1998 (China) includes the word ‘Provisional’, similar to the other regulations,
it has been used to regulate civil non-commercial units since its enactment.
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2.2.2 Defining Chinese Law in a Wider Sense
Hence, in this thesis, the law should be understood in a wider sense and can
be defined as ‘[t]he regime that orders human activities and relations
through systematic application of the force of politically organized society’.8
In this context, all national laws enacted by Congress (in China)/Parliament
(in England), regulations, other policies and model governing documents
stipulated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (the reason for including those
model governing documents is given below) can fall within this definition.
In respect of this definition, four issues need to be pointed out.
First, in China, there is one important difference between national laws and
governmental regulations: ‘[a]dministrative regulations are always reflective
of ministerial interests, while a basic law is the product of maneuvering by
all of the different parties involved’.9
In other words, because these regulations are in reality drafted by the
relevant governmental departments, they usually reflect the special interests
and concerns of these departments and are mainly concerned with the
procedures of governmental regulation rather than, for example, the rights,
duties and liabilities among the governing body of a charity and its
stakeholders. Accordingly, after the enactment of the Charity Law 2016
(China), it has become urgent for those regulations to be revised to comply
with this new law’s requirement, which will be further discussed in Chapters
4-7.
Second, case law does not fall within Chinese law even in this wider sense.
In England, charity law ‘comprises a very substantial body of case law upon
which have been overlaid statutory provisions relating largely to matters of
administration’.10 By contrast, although introducing a variety of legal rules
8 Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, West 2009) 962.
9 Ming Wang and others, ‘Revising the Regulations on Social Organizations’ (2014) 6 The China
Nonprofit Review 1, 37.
10 Hubert Picarda QC, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (4th edn, Bloomsbury Professional
2010) 4.
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in Western countries into its domestic legal system, China is still a civil law
country, where there is no case law, and, accordingly, all legal rules are
stipulated in statutory laws.
In this context, even though China draws on numerous legal rules from
common law countries, such as trusts law and legal rules regarding
companies and financial regulation, given its civil law tradition, China has
to transform the rules stipulated in case law into legal provisions in statutory
laws. That is the potential value of English case law: some reasonable rules
developed by case law can be incorporated into the future laws, regulations
or policies in China.
Third, laws are the rules backed by the force of the state, differing from
informal norms explored in Chapter 3, which ‘individuals feel obligated to
follow because of an internalized sense of duty [or] because of a fear of
external non-legal sanctions’.11
Fourth, model governing documents issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs
are also regarded as part of Chinese law in this thesis. The reason is quite
simple: ‘they are important in practice because it is supposed that the
approval for the establishment of the respective NPOs will not be granted if
the requirements of [those model governing documents] have not been
fulfilled.’12
2.2.3 The Scope of Chinese Law
For the purposes of this thesis, the scope of Chinese law to be explored
covers laws stipulated by the National People’s Congress or its Standing
Committees, regulations, other policies and model governing documents
issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
11 Richard H. HcAdams, ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’ (1997) 96 Michigan
Law Review 338, 340.
12 Thomas von Hippel and Knut B. Pißler, ‘Nonprofit Organizations in the People’s Republic of
China’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-
Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 434.
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However, given the current differences in laws, regulations and policies
among mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, only those enacted
in mainland China will be examined. In addition, although case law will
also be discussed in assessing English law, it does not form part of Chinese
law.
2.3 The Scope of the Term ‘Charities’ Used in this Thesis
2.3.1 Looking for a Definition of Charities that Is Acceptable in Both
Jurisdictions
In England, in accordance with the Charities Act 2011, charities are defined
by charitable purposes,13 which are made up of the purposes stipulated by
charity law14 and for the public benefit.15 Those purposes include but are not
limited to the relief of poverty or of those in need due to youth, age,
disability or financial hardship; the advancement of education, religion,
health, citizenship, community development, arts, culture, heritage, science,
amateur sport, human rights, conflict resolution, equality, environmental
protection, or animal welfare; and the promotion of the efficiency of the
armed forces, police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services.16 And
the public benefit requirement provides a standard for evaluating whether a
purpose listed above is charitable or not.
With regard to Chinese law, there was no legal definition of charities until
the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China). According to this new law,
charities are defined as ‘non-profit organisations which are legally
established, comply with the rules in this law, and aim to conduct charitable
activities for the society’.17 Those activities include:
(1) relieving the poor and the needy;
13 CA 2011, s 1(1).
14 CA 2011, s 2(1)(a).
15 CA 2011, s 2(1)(b).
16 CA 2011, s 3.
17 CL 2016 (China), s 8.
33
(2) relieving the elderly, orphans, the ill, the disabled and providing
special care;
(3) alleviating damage caused by natural disasters, accidents, public
health events and other emergencies;
(4) enhancing education, science, culture, health, sports and other
causes;
(5) preventing and controlling pollution and other public hazards,
and protecting and enhancing the ecological environment;
(6) other public benefit activities complying with this law.18
Given the lack of a unified legal definition and the importance of charities in
the study of the thesis, it is necessary to define the term ‘charities’ in a way
that can be accepted in both jurisdictions to facilitate any further study.
Taking account of the common features of charities in both jurisdictions and
based on an economic analysis, in this thesis a charity is defined as ‘a non-
profit organisation exclusively aiming to realise the charitable
purpose/public benefit’.
On this basis, here it is necessary to further interpret the common features of
charities and to make an important distinction between ‘government-
controlled charities’ and ‘independent charities’ in the context of Chinese
law. The relationship between those features and the topics examined in this
thesis will also be discussed.
2.3.2 Common Features
2.3.2.1 Organisations
Charities form as organisations. This feature is shared by both Chinese and
English charities, although the meaning of the term ‘organisation’ is not
clear. In China, a charity is defined as an ‘organisation’ (‘组织’).19 But there
is no further legal definition of it.
18 CL 2016 (China), s 3.
19 CL 2016, s 8.
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In English law, a charity is defined as an ‘institution’,20 which is further
interpreted as ‘an institution whether incorporated or not, and includes a
trust or undertaking’.21 But there is no further interpretation of the
characteristics of ‘institution’. According to Black’s Law Dictionary,
institution means ‘[a]n established organisation, esp. one of a public
character, such as a facility for the treatment of mentally disabled persons’.22
And organisation is defined as ‘[a] body of persons (such as a union or
corporation) formed for a common purpose’.23
Given that there is no clear legal definition of the term ‘organisation’, in this
thesis, organisations are to be understood from an economic perspective. In
economics, the feature of an organisation mainly lies in its function of asset
partitioning, especially ‘the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims
of the creditors of the entity’s owners or managers’.24 In this sense, charities,
including charitable trusts, can be regarded as organisations in economic
terms because of their function of separating their assets from the charity
trustees’ and beneficiaries’ own assets.
Here, it is worth noting the potential relationship of this feature with the
topics discussed in this thesis. In terms of charitable trusts, although they are
not recognised as organisations in Chinese law,25 from an economic
perspective, they fall within the scope of organisations. This understanding
can help clarify some internal governance issues relating to charitable trusts
in Chinese law, which will be dealt with in Chapter 5.
20 CA 2011, s 1(1).
21 CA 2011, s 9(3).
22 Garner (n 8) 869.
23 ibid 1210.
24 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110
Yale Law Journal 387, 390.
25 ‘Charitable trusts belong to public benefit trusts, and are activities through which to realise a
charitable purpose, the principal entrusts his property to the trustee, who manages, disposes of the
property and carries out charitable activities in the trustee’s name but in accordance with the wishes of
the principal’. CL 2016 (China), s 44.
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2.3.2.2 Non-Distribution Constraint
Charities are non-profit organisations. Accordingly, they must abide by the
non-distribution constraint, which requires that the net income of an
organisation should not be distributed ‘to individuals who exercise control
over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees’.26 This feature is
shared by both Chinese and English charities.
According to Chinese law, the non-distribution constraint has been clarified
as one of the basic principles of charity law,27 and has also been used to
define charities.28 In addition, Chinese law further provides that a charity’s
property cannot be distributed among its initiators, donors and members.29
By contrast, in English law, the non-distribution constraint forms part of the
fiduciary obligations of those running charities.30 At the same time, with the
continuing efforts by case law, the non-distribution constraint has been
deeply rooted in, and functions as an invisible component of, the charitable
purpose of any English charity.
For example, according to English case law, ‘[t]he element of unselfishness
is well recognised as an aspect of charity’,31 and a purpose cannot be
recognised as charitable if it may give beneficiaries more than incidental
benefits.32 Therefore, it can be reasonably expected that any charitable
purpose may include a component of altruism or unselfishness.33 In this
context, this non-distribution constraint can be identified as an objective
26 Hansmann (n 2) 838; also CL 2016 (China), s 52.
27 CL 2016 (China), s 4.
28 CL 2016 (China), s 8.
29 CL 2016 (China), s 52.
30 See, for example, Robinson v Pett (1734) 3 P Wms 249; Attorney General v Earl of Clarendon
(1810) 17 Ves 491; Picarda (n 10) 633-641.
31 Incorporated Council for Law Reporting for England & Wales v Attorney General [1972] Ch 73, 86.
32 ibid 87; Charity Commission, Public Benefit: Analysis of the Law relating to Public Benefit
(Charity Commission 2013).
33 Regarding the philosophic debate of altruism in charity law, see Matthew Harding, ‘What is the
Point of Charity Law’ in Kit Barker and Darryn Jensen (eds), Private Law: Key Encounters with
Public Law (CUP 2013) 163-170.
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reflection34 of this requirement.
This feature has a direct relationship with a range of topics explored in this
thesis. First, the non-profit nature of charities is closely associated with the
justifications for their existence, in particular compared to the for-profit
nature of commercial companies. This will be dealt with when examining
enterprise ownership theory in Chapter 3.
Second, the non-profit nature of charities may make charity governance
more or less differ from corporate governance. For-profits are established
for the private benefits (self-interest) of their owners. Although for-profits
may also participate in the traditional areas of education, health care, etc.,
dominated by charities, for these for-profits, providing the above services is
only a channel for them to realise their self-interest (through distributing the
remaining assets to their owners).
By contrast, based on this non-profit nature, from an economic perspective,
no party owns a charity, i.e., no one can control and obtain residual earnings
from a charity.35 In this respect, based on the public benefit requirement
which requires charities to ‘benefit the community or a section of the
community’,36 charities have to comply with this rule more strictly than
other non-profit organisations that may be controlled by their members. In
the context of non-charitable non-profits controlled by their members, those
members can effectively distribute the net earnings to themselves by
subsidising the services that the non-profits provide in the future.37
Accordingly, mutual benefit non-profit organisations are more similar to for-
profit companies than to charities.
In this context, a range of governance mechanisms used in corporate
34 By contrast, as a subjective issue, motive is ‘immaterial in determining whether a gift is charitable’.
Picarda (n 10) 24; Hoare v Osborne (1866) LR 1 Eq 585, 587.
35 ‘Ownership’ used here has two essential attributes, i.e., exercising of control and receipt of residual
earnings. Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Harvard University Press 1996) 11.
36 Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Lid [1951] AC 297, 305.
37 Hansmann (n 35) 242.
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governance cannot be directly implemented in charity governance.
Therefore, in considering how to improve charity governance in China, the
non-profit nature of charities should not be neglected, which will be further
discussed throughout this thesis.
2.3.2.3 Exclusively Aiming to Realise the Charitable Purpose/Public
Benefit
A charity exclusively aims to realise the charitable purpose/public benefit.
Here, it is necessary to provide a brief analysis of charitable purposes and
public benefit. First, for the purposes of this thesis, charitable purposes can
be deployed to define charities in both jurisdictions. However, in contrast to
English law, in which charities are defined by charitable purposes, Chinese
law chooses to define charities by way of charitable activities.38
Despite this, in Chinese law, there seems to be no clear distinction between
‘charitable purposes’ (‘慈善目的’) and ‘charitable activities’ (‘慈善活动’),
let alone their respective roles in defining what a charity is. For example, the
recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) uses ‘charitable aims’ (‘慈善宗
旨 ’) to define charitable fundraising39 while ‘charitable purposes’ is
employed to define charitable donations, charitable trusts and charitable
services.40 In addition, this law also requires that ‘the property of a charity
should, according to its governing document and donation agreements, be
exclusively used for its charitable purposes’.41 Therefore, the Chinese
legislators seem not to strictly distinguish the two terms. So far, there has
not been sufficient academic debate on this problem in China. Accordingly,
the arguments in England can bring a number of insights into the next
academic study in this area. 42 For brevity, in this thesis, the term ‘charitable
purposes’ is deployed to define charities, charitable trusts and charitable
38 CL 2016 (China), ss 3 and 8.
39 CL 2016 (China), s 21.
40 CL 2016 (China), ss 34, 44 and 61.
41 CL 2016 (China), s 52.
42 For example, see Jonathan Garton, ‘Charitable Purposes and Activities’ (2014) 67 Current Legal
Problems 373, 373-407.
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donations in both jurisdictions.
Second, public benefit can be understood as legal benefits benefiting the
general public or a sufficient part of the public.43 With regard to public
benefit, there is no legal definition in Chinese law. Luckily, English case law
has provided some rules interpreting its meaning.44 Given the focus of this
thesis on governance mechanisms and the complexity of the current rules
regulating public benefit, for the purposes of this thesis, it is adequate to
have a brief introduction to rather than a comprehensive analysis of public
benefit.
In respect of the ‘benefit’ aspect, it must be legal.45 Meanwhile, if the
damage is given more weight than the benefit, it may not comply with the
public benefit requirement.46 In addition, this benefit should be identifiable
and justified by evidence.47
With regard to the ‘public’ aspect, the difficulty mainly lies in how to judge
what comprises ‘a sufficient part’ of the public. In answering this question,
English case law develops a range of detailed rules. In English law, the
public benefit requirement governing a purpose may differ from that
governing another;48 and, in terms of the relief of poverty, this requirement
may become so relaxed that organisations ‘which appeared otherwise to be
of a private nature were held to be charitable’.49
If a donation only aims to realise private benefits, it will not comply with
43 Regarding a more detailed assessment of public benefit in English law, see, for example, Mary
Synge, The ‘New’Public Benefit Requirement: Making Sense of Charity Law? (Hart Publishing 2015);
Matthew Harding, Charity Law and the Liberal State (CUP 2014); Jonathan Garton, Public Benefit in
Charity Law (OUP 2013).
44 Concerning a recent case comprehensively analysing public benefit in English law, see R
(Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch 214.
45 National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioner [1948] AC 31, 42; Re Macduff
[1896] 2 Ch 451, 474; Re Pinion [1965] Ch 85, 106.
46 R (Independent Schools Council) (n 44) [106].
47 Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society Ltd v Glasgow Corporation [1968] AC 138, 146;
National Anti-Vivisection Society (n 45); McGovern v Attorney General [1982] Ch 321; Southwood v
Attorney General [2000] WTLR 1199.
48 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Baddeley [1955] AC 572, 615.
49 Re Hobourn Aero Components Ltd’s Air Raid Distress Fund [1946] Ch 194, 194.
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the public benefit requirement. 50 By contrast, sometimes charities also
supply private benefits. However, as long as the private benefits delivered
by those charities belong to ‘incidental personal benefits’,51 delivering them
does not violate the public benefit requirement; rather, it forms a necessary
channel for those charities to satisfy this requirement. 52
If a purpose is aimed at mutual benefit, it may fail to be charitable,53 with a
few exceptions relating to the purpose of relieving poverty.54 In addition, if
beneficiaries are limited to those living in a specific region,55 or the persons
with ‘protected characteristics’ provided in the Equality Act 201056
(provided that this limitation also complies with the related legal rules57),
the public benefit requirement can be met. By contrast, if the beneficiaries
of a purpose explicitly exclude the poor,58 it may not comply with this
requirement.59
This feature has a close relationship with the topics dealt with in this thesis.
First, the charitable purpose/public benefit pursued by a charity can
distinguish it from a for-profit company and any other mutual benefit non-
profit organisation, which is related to the economic justifications for
charities discussed in Chapter 3.
50 Oppenheim (n 36) 305-306.
51 On personal benefits (or private benefits), see Charity Commission, Examples of Personal Benefit
(Charity Commission 2013).
52 London Hospital Medical College v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1976] 1 WLR 613, 620.
53 Waterson v Hendon BC [1959] 1 WLR 985; Re Clark’s Trust (1875) 1 ChD 497; Cunnack v
Edwards [1896] 2 Ch 679; Braithwaite v Attorney General [1909] 1 Ch 510.
54 Re Hobourn Aero Components Ltd Air Raid Distress Fund (n 49) 202; Charity Commission, Public
Benefit: The Public Benefit Requirement (PB1) (Charity Commission 2013) 12.
55 For example, see Verge v Somerville [1924] AC 496, 499.
56 Those protected characteristics include ‘age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil
partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation’. Equality Act
2010 (EA 2010), s 4.
57 For example, see EA 2010, s 193.
58 R (Independent Schools Council) (n 44) [178]. As to the evaluation of ‘poor’, see Re Clarke [1923]
2 Ch 407; Re Adams [1968] Ch 80; Re Resch [1969] 1 AC 514; Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust
Housing Association Ltd v Attorney General [1983] Ch 159; R (Independent Schools Council) (n 44)
[158]-[174]; Synge (n 43) 86-108; Mary Synge, ‘Poverty: An Essential Element in Charity after all’
(2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 649.
59 Re Hobourn Aero Components Ltd Air Raid Distress Fund (n 49) 206-209; Dingle v Turner [1972]
AC 601, 625.
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Second, the charitable purpose/public benefit should become the final aim
of the governing body in any charity, and thus forms the basic principle
governing its performance. Hence, the charitable purpose/public benefit
plays a vital role in charity governance, which will be further examined in
the following chapters, in particular in Chapter 3.
2.3.3 An Essential Distinction: ‘Government-controlled Charities’ and
‘Independent Charities’
2.3.3.1 ‘Government-controlled Charities’
‘Government-controlled charities’ is not a legal term but a reality in China.
As noted in Chapter 1, currently many Chinese charities are affiliated to the
government and act as quasi-government agencies.60 A typical example is
public institutions (‘事业单位’) with charitable purposes, 61 such as Song
Qingling Foundation and its branches at local level.
In accordance with the Provisional Regulation on the Registration and
Administration of Public Institutions 1998 (China), public institutions are
social service organisations ‘which are established for the social public
benefit purposes by the government or other organisations, use state assets
and carry out activities concerning education, science, technology, culture
and public health, etc.’. 62 Here, it is necessary to point out that this
definition cannot reflect the nature of public institutions, because charities
that are founded by the government or receive governmental funding do not
necessarily have to lose their independence and autonomy.
60 Generally see Karla W. Simon, ‘Reform of China’s Laws for NPOs: A Discussion of Issues Related
to Shiye Danwei Reform’ (2005) The Forum on the Legal Framework of NPOs in China, Xiao Shan
Conference <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan042432.pdf>
accessed 20 September 2017; Project Team on ‘Reform of China’s Public Institutions and
Development of China’s Non-Profit Organizations’, ‘Reform of China’s Public Institutions—
Retrospect and Prospects’ (2004) 2(1) International Journal of Civil Society Law 7; Yunsong Ge,
‘Nonprofit Organizations and the Reform of China’s Public Institutions’ (2004) 2(1) International
Journal of Civil Society Law 27.
61 Of course, it is worth noting that, public institutions are not charities if they do not have exclusively
charitable purposes.
62 Provisional Regulation on the Registration and Administration of Public Institutions 1998 (China),
s 2.
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As a matter of fact, apart from governmental funding, the biggest feature
making those charities different from independent charities in Western
countries may be that members of their governing body are usually selected
and controlled by the government, leading to a lack of independent
governance.63
Therefore, to facilitate the study of charity governance in China, it is
necessary to distinguish those charities from other independent charities in
which the governing body rather than any other external stakeholder is
independently responsible for the governance functions in practice.
2.3.3.2 Identifying the Core Requirements of Independence
In England, the independence of charities has been generally recognised and
protected by law,64 although recently there is a growing concern that
charities are becoming controlled by the government.65 By contrast, Chinese
law does not provide any legal rule directly including the term
‘independence’, although there are rules dealing with conflicts of interest.66
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, except for government-
controlled charities, charities in both jurisdictions are independent non-
profit organisations.67 As charities do not have owners, they cannot be
controlled by any party acting as if it were the owner. In this context,
independence itself is aimed at guarding the charitable purpose and public
benefit that a charity pursues by requiring its charity trustees to perform
independently in achieving the charity’s purposes.
63 It will be comprehensively analysed in Chapter 4.
64 For example, see CA 2011, s 20; Charity Commission, The Independence of Charities from the
State (RR7) (Charity Commission 2009).
65 Ben Cairns, ‘The Independence of the Voluntary Sector from Government in England’ in Matthew
Smerdon (eds), The First Principle of Voluntary Action: Essays on the Independence of the Voluntary
Sector from Government in Canada, England, Germany, Northern Ireland, Scotland, United States of
America and Wales (Baring Foundation 2009) 35-50; Kathryn Chan, The Public-Private Nature of
Charity Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 126-159.
66 CL 2016 (China), s 14.
67 Generally, see Charity Commission (n 64); Cairns (n 65).
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Accordingly, in respect of independent charities, independence can be
defined as a requirement that charity trustees should govern their charity
independently from their private benefits on the one hand and any undue
external intervention on the other. In this respect, in contrast to the charity
trustees of a charity, the governing body of a for-profit enterprise, such as
the board of directors in a commercial company, is not independent from the
owners, although those directors are required to make independent
judgments:68 the board of directors should act in the best interests of the
owners of this for-profit enterprise.
This independent nature of charities supported by this thesis is in the first
place directly related to the economic rationales for their existence
(distinguished from for-profit enterprises and government-controlled
charities), which will be comprehensively examined in Chapters 3-4.
At the same time, this feature is also associated with the design of
governance mechanisms relating to charities (the independent decisions of
charity trustees, and the level of external interventions, etc.). For example,
‘[f]or some charities, there are clear conflicts between public accountability
and organisational autonomy’.69 On the one hand, any action to harm the
independence of a charity and its governing body in the name of
accountability may finally damage the charity’s best interest. On the other
hand, inefficient accountability cannot benefit the realisation of the
charitable purposes pursued by a charity. In this respect, the core problem is
how to balance the relationship between autonomy and accountability,
which will be further assessed from an economic perspective in Chapters 3-
7.
2.3.4 A Further Limitation on the Scope
As noted above, the focus of the thesis is on any charity which is defined as
68 Companies Act 2006, s 173. This will be explored at length when discussing charity members in
Chapter 5.
69 Debra Morris, ‘Paying the Piper: The “Contract Culture” as Dependency Culture for Charities’ in
Alison Dunn (ed), The Voluntary Sector, the State and the Law (Hart Publishing 2000) 133.
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a non-profit organisation exclusively aiming to realise the charitable
purpose/public benefit. Therefore, mutual benefit organisations70 which are
non-profits (such as trade unions71 or friendly societies),72 and political
organisations73 will not be examined.
In addition, with regard to the governance in foreign charities and their
branches, there is a very different regulatory system in China,74 which
involves more detailed policy and technical issues and may be not very
relevant to the regulation of ordinary domestic charities. Therefore, for
brevity, Chinese charities discussed in the thesis are limited to the country’s
domestic charities.
2.4 The Scope of Charity Governance Explored in this Thesis
2.4.1 Defining Charity Governance
‘In essence, governance is about ensuring the fit between the organization’s
mission and its activities and performance’.75 With respect to charities,
70Although they may also pursue a purpose listed in charity law, such as the advancement of health or
education, the goods or services of those organisations are delivered to a group of beneficiaries which
may be too limited to satisfy the public benefit requirement. Therefore, they cannot be recognised as
charitable by law. Re Hobourn Aero Components Ltd’s Air Raid Distress Fund (n 49); Charity
Commission (n 54). Of course, as noted above, in English law, the public benefit requirement relating
to the relief of poverty is very relaxed. Hence, a mutual benefit organisation with such a purpose may
satisfy this requirement and thus be recognised as charitable by law.
71 Re Amos [1891] 3 Ch 159; Re Mead’s Trust Deed [1961] 2 All ER 836.
72 Re Clark’s Trust (n 53); Cunnack (n 53); Braithwaite (53).
73 For political organisations, some of them may also pursue purposes that fall within the purposes
listed in charity law, but they may not satisfy the public benefit requirement because ‘the court has no
means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit’.
National Anti-vivisection Society (n 45) 50; McGovern (n 47); Southwood (n 47); R (Independent
Schools Council) (n 44); Charity Commission (n 32). In respect of the recent debates on this topic, see
Christina Walton, ‘McGovern v Attorney General: Constraints on Judicial Assessment of Charitable
Benefit (2014) 4 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 317. Furthermore, regarding the recent
development in this area in other common law countries, see Aid/Watch Inc v Federal Commissioner
of Taxation [2010] HCA 42 (Australia); Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated [2014] NZSC
105.
74 For example, see Law on the Administration of Activities of Overseas Non-governmental
Organisations within the Territory of China 2016 (China) (‘境外非政府组织境内活动管理法’).
75 Helmut K. Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge 2005) 231;
also see Mike Hudson, Managing without Profit: Leadership, Management and Governance of Third
Sector Organisations (3rd edn, Directory of Social Change 2009) 52 (which provides a classic
description of the role of governance).
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‘“[g]overnance” is a commercial import from the corporate (profit)
sector’.76
In terms of corporate governance, a narrow version is usually concerned
with the relationship between shareholders and managers. By contrast, a
wider definition may involve ‘balancing the interests of three groups of
actors: investors, managers and third parties who interact voluntarily or
involuntarily with the firm’. 77
However, so far there is no legal definition of charity governance in both
jurisdictions. For the purposes of this thesis, charity governance can be
defined as any governance mechanism ensuring that members of the
governing body in a charity perform efficiently for the charitable
purpose/public benefit pursued by this charity.
2.4.2 Clarifying the Scope of the Legal Aspects of Charity Governance
In respect of the scope of the legal aspects of charity governance, a
traditional understanding of charity governance (‘治理’) in China seems to
be often equal to governmental regulation of charities, which is similar to
the term ‘administrative management’ (‘ 行政管理 ’).78 By contrast, in
respect of English law, according to Hubert Picarda QC:
the prime fiduciary duties of [charity] trustees are to observe and
not deviate from the prescribed objects unless authorised to do so
and to avoid or achieve resolution of conflicts of interest. These
involve not only equitable principles but also what is now modishly
76 Greyham Dawes, ‘Charity Commission Regulation of the Charity Sector in England and Wales: the
Key Role of Charity Audit Regulation’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative
Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 879.
77 Robert Flannigan, ‘The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability’ (2007) 32 Delaware Journal of
Corporate Law 393, 418.
78 For a brief introduction of the previous laws relating to charity governance in China, see Thomas
von Hippel and Knut B. Pißler, ‘Nonprofit Organizations in the People’s Republic of China’ in Klaus
J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit
Organizations (CUP 2010) 428-477; Karla W. Simon, ‘The Regulation of Civil Society Organizations
in China’ (2011) 9(1) International Journal of Civil Society Law 55.
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referred to as charity governance.79
If this view is correct, it seems that, in England, charity governance mainly
includes the fiduciary duties of members of the governing body (i.e.,
‘charity trustees’ in English law80) and the enforcement mechanisms relating
to those duties.81
Nevertheless, from an economic perspective, according to agency theory,82
the aim of charity governance is to reduce the agency costs when ensuring
that the performance of charity trustees in a charity complies with the
charitable purpose/public benefit pursued by this charity. Accordingly, the
law relating to charity governance should reduce the related agency costs
when making the performance of charity trustees comply with the charitable
purpose and public benefit requirement.
In this context, as to the legal aspects of charity governance, the analysis in
this thesis will not only include the fiduciary duties of charity trustees and
the enforcement mechanisms (which are usually limited to the parties who
have the legal standing to sue charity trustees),83 but also extend to other
aspects benefiting the compliance by charity trustees (such as public
disclosure) when necessary. In particular, four core legal aspects relating to
charity governance will be examined in this thesis, i.e., governmental
regulation, internal governance, supervision by third parties and public
79 Hubert Picarda QC, ‘Harmonising Nonprofit Law in the European Union: An English Perspective
and Digest’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance of
Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 186.
80 CA 2011, s 177. In addition, the term ‘trustee’, along with ‘director’, is also widely used by
American scholars. James J. Fishman, ‘Improving Charitable Accountability’ (2003) 62 Maryland
Law Review 218, 231.
81 As regards the law governing charity governance in England, see Debra Morris and Jean Warburton
(eds), Charities, Governance and the Law: the Way Forward (Key Haven 2003); Con Alexander and
the Charities Team at Veale Wasbrough Vizards, Charity Governance (2nd edn, Jordan Publishing
Limited 2014).
82Agency theory will be explored in Chapter 3.
83 In respect of a brief exploration of fiduciary duties and related enforcement mechanisms in English
law, generally, see Picarda (n 79) 170-196. With regard to a similar evaluation in American law, see
Henry Hansmann, ‘Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law’ (1981) 121 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 497; and Rob Atkinson, ‘Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
Charitable Fiduciaries?’ (1998) 23 Journal of Corporation Law 655.
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accountability, which form the topics explored respectively in Chapters 4-7.
2.5 The Scope of Members of the Governing Body/Charity Trustees
2.5.1 Defining Members of the Governing Body/Charity Trustees
For the purpose of this thesis, members of the governing body in a charity
are defined as persons who govern and are finally responsible for a charity.
In English law, a legal term sharing this meaning is ‘charity trustees’, which
is referred to as ‘the persons having the general control and management of
the administration of a charity’.84
By contrast, there is no united title or definition referring to the persons who
govern and are finally responsible for a charity in Chinese law. As noted in
Chapter 1, in the Charity Law 2016 (China), a range of legal terms, such as
responsible persons,85 decision-making bodies,86 executive bodies87 and
managers,88 are mentioned in its legal rules. However, neither the specific
meanings of those terms nor the persons who govern and are eventually
responsible for their charity are clear.
As a matter of convenience, the terms ‘members of the governing body’ and
‘charity trustees’ (for brevity, they are called ‘trustees’ in some contexts) are
to be interchangeably used to refer to persons who are in charge of and have
final responsibility for a charity both in England and in China.
2.5.2 Clarification of Who Falls Under the Term ‘Members of the
Governing Body’
Sound charity governance has to been achieved by the good performance of
charity trustees. Therefore, it is of vital importance to clarify who fall within
84 CA 2011, s 177.
85 CL 2016 (China), ss 9, 16, 54 and 95.
86 CL 2016 (China), ss 11, 18 and 54.
87 CL 2016 (China), s 11.
88 CL 2016 (China), ss 14 and 58.
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the definition of members of the governing body in a charity.
In this respect, in English law, it is comparatively clear who are the trustees
of a charity. Based on the explanation of the Charity Commission, directors
in a charitable company, managing trustees in a charitable trust, and
committee members in a charitable unincorporated association are usually
charity trustees,89 although the identity of charity trustees may also need
further clarification in some specific cases.90
However, in Chinese law, there is no rule defining or clarifying the scope of
members of the governing body. Furthermore, due to different governance
structures, whether an internal body in a charity can be identified as the
governing body in Chinese law needs to be examined on a case-by-case
basis, which will form an important theme discussed in Chapter 5.
2.6 Conclusion
In this thesis, ‘Chinese law’ includes laws stipulated by the National
People’s Congress or its Standing Committees, regulations, policies and
model governing documents (enacted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs) in
mainland China, but excludes case law, although case law will be discussed
in assessing English law. A ‘charity’ is referred to as a non-profit
organisation exclusively aiming to realise the charitable purpose/public
benefit and is limited to a domestic charity. ‘Charity governance’ is defined
as any governance mechanism ensuring that members of the governing body
in a charity perform efficiently for the charitable purpose/public benefit
pursued by their charity, and four legal aspects of charity governance,
governmental regulation, internal governance, supervision by third parties
and public accountability, are to be assessed in this thesis. The terms
‘members of the governing body’ and ‘charity trustees’ are interchangeably
used to refer to persons who govern and are finally responsible for a charity.
89 Charity Commission, The Essential Trustee: What You Need to Know, What You Need to Do (CC3)
(Charity Commission 2016) 39.
90 For example, see Charity Commission, Inquiry Report: Greenfinch Charitable Trusts (Charity
Commission 2016) 2.
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On this basis, the next chapter will develop a revised agency theory to
facilitate a more comprehensive and pragmatic evaluation of charity
governance in China and England.
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Chapter 3 Building an Economic Framework for Evaluating Charity
Governance
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a critical assessment of a range of major economic and
social theories associated with charity governance, including the traditional
agency theory, stewardship theory, crowding out theory, stakeholder theory,
enterprise ownership theory and public goods theory. On this basis,
combining the features of charity governance and the reasonable aspects of
those theories, the thesis further develops a more pragmatic and revised
agency theory to facilitate the evaluation of charity governance and to
further supply a more reasonable and comprehensive guidance on how to
improve charity governance.
3.2 A Critical Assessment of Major Economic and Social Theories
3.2.1 Introduction
In this section, the thesis critically examines the traditional agency theory
and other relevant economic and social theories, such as stewardship theory,
crowding out theory, stakeholder theory, enterprise ownership theory and
public goods theory,1 which are closely related to charity governance.
After a systematic analysis of those theories, this thesis argues that, on the
one hand, the traditional agency theory is still of value in evaluating the
performance of charity trustees in a limited sense, and other economic and
social theories explaining the behaviours of and the mechanisms governing
charity trustees also have their separate contributions in this area; but, on the
other hand, the above economic and social theories cannot provide a
comprehensive framework suitable for assessing the efficiency of charity
1 Some scholars have begun to explore non-profit governance by integrating different theories. For
example, see Stijn Van Puyvelde and others, ‘The Governance of Nonprofit Organizations:
Integrating Agency Theory with Stakeholder and Stewardship Theories’ (2012) 41(3) Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 431, 431-451.
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governance or helping to design the relevant governance mechanisms in a
detailed manner.
3.2.2 Agency Theory
3.2.2.1 Core Ideas
According to agency theory, agency costs are directly related to a principal-
agent relationship, which is different from the term ‘principal-agent
relationship’ in the legal sense.
The legal definition is about duty and liability. Agents are those
given a grant of authority by some principal. The principal is liable
for the acts of the agent under that authority, and the agent has a
duty of loyalty. In contrast to legal scholars, most economists
presume that loyalty per se is impotent and focus on the contractual
incentives that shape the agent’s performance. 2
According to this theory, in a principal-agent relationship, because the agent
usually has more information concerning his/her own intention and
performance, s/he may have the motivation to perform inappropriately and
harm the interest of the principal when their interests are different. For
example, in a private trust, the trustee usually has more information
concerning the trust property and his/her own performance relating to this
property than his/her beneficiary. In this context, once their interests are
different, this trustee may pursue his/her own interest instead of the best
interests of the beneficiary. This phenomenon is called ‘moral hazard’. And
the agency costs usually include the costs of reducing the moral hazard of
agents and the residual loss due to the ineffectiveness of monitoring.3
2 Richard Steinberg, ‘Principal-Agent Theory and Nonprofit Accountability’ in Klaus J. Hopt and
Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (CUP
2010) 76.
3 As to the agency costs, see Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial
Economics 305; Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’
(1983) 26 Journal of Law & Economics 327.
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For for-profit enterprises, it is commonly recognised that their owners are
the principals of the governing body, who have both the motivation and
rights to supervise the governing body and reduce its moral hazard. In this
context, the role of governance mechanisms is to reduce those agency costs
when ensuring that the performance of the governing body complies with
the interests of those owners.4
By contrast, there is a lack of ownership in terms of charities and other non-
profit organisations. In this context, at least at first sight, it may be costly to
avoid the moral hazard of the governing body and to ensure that it performs
well,5 due to a lack of owners who both have the motivation (obtaining their
residual earnings) and the right (controlling the organisation as the owners)
to monitor the governing body.6 Accordingly, it seems to be more urgent to
establish the related governance mechanisms in order to reduce the agency
costs concerning ensuring compliance in charities.
3.2.2.2 Contributions and Drawbacks
Agency theory has certain contributions to make to charity governance. First,
it points out the necessity for the law to control the moral hazard of charity
trustees. In order words, there should be relevant governance mechanisms,
such as public disclosure, fiduciary duties and governmental regulation, to
solve the problems arising from severe information asymmetry. Second,
agency costs need to be reduced. In English law, the rights of the parties
(such as persons interested in a charity) to bring charity proceedings are
limited.7 This legal arrangement may be interpreted as a mechanism to
control unnecessary agency costs.
4 See, for example, Robert H. Sitkoff, ‘Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance plus Asset Partitioning’ in
Lionel Smith (ed) The World of the Trust (CUP 2013) 430.
5 Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Harvard University Press 1996) 238.
6 In respect of this concern, see, for example, Susan N. Gary, ‘Regulating the Management of
Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law’ (1999) 21 University of Hawaii Law Review 593,
596; Evelyn Brody, ‘The Limits of Charity Fiduciary law’ (1998) 57 Maryland Law Review 1400,
1500.
7 CA 2011, ss 114-115. Regarding charity proceedings, see the discussion in Chapter 6.
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However, agency theory has its own drawbacks in evaluating charity
governance, including but not limited to the assumption about human nature
concerning charity trustees (and executives, volunteers and other paid staff),
vague accountability mechanisms and unclear performance evaluation
standards.8 Agency theory does not supply a unified theoretical framework
to resolve those problems.
First, and most fundamentally, what assumptions should people make about
charity trustees in charity governance? According to the traditional agency
theory, an agent is assumed to be a self-interested, rational, and financially
motivated person who will pursue his/her own interest rather than the best
interests of his/her owners, if there are conflicts of interest between them.
And this agent is described as ‘an individual calculating likely costs and
benefits, and thus seeking to attain rewards and avoid punishment,
especially financial ones’.9 Accordingly, in corporate governance, the
owners (shareholders) may align their interest with the agents (executives)
by utilising performance-related salaries or other monetary motivations.
This assumption is generally suitable to describe the situation in the
commercial sector, where both shareholders and executives are motivated
by profit.10
However, in the charitable sector, many charity trustees are volunteers who
are motivated by lower-powered incentives such as altruism, love and
pride.11 If in practice most charity trustees were totally self-interested, then
it would be impossible for the general public to trust, donate money to, or
volunteer in, a charity governed by those self-interested persons. In this
context, it is far away from the reality to assume that charity trustees are
motivated by economic motivations to perform for a charity.
8 These three issues have been reported based on an empirical study. Judith L. Miller, ‘The Board as a
Monitor of Organizational Activity: The Applicability of Agency Theory to Nonprofit Boards’ (2002)
12(4) Nonprofit Management & Leadership 429, 429-450.
9 Lex Donaldson and James H. Davis, ‘Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and
Shareholder Returns’ (1991) 16(1) Australian Journal of Management 49, 51.
10 However, even in terms of this assumption in the for-profit sector, there is a totally different view.
ibid.
11 Regarding the voluntary nature of charity trustees, see the discussion in Chapter 5.
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Second, in terms of charity governance, who should replace the role of
owners in corporate governance? In this respect, agency theory cannot
supply a satisfactory answer. Some scholars supporting agency theory take
the idea of donors as owners for granted.12 However, this view is totally
different from the economic understanding of ownership: the exercising of
control and receipt of residual earnings. In addition, as will be noted in
Chapter 6, donors have to face a range of limitations in supervising charity
trustees. Here, it is necessary to point out that donors ‘make gifts for a
variety of reasons, only some of which reflect concern for the gift recipient’s
general well-being’.13 Thus, in charity governance, it is unconvincing to
identify donors as the principals of charity trustees.14
Third, how should the performance of the governing body of a charity be
evaluated? A lack of ownership results in a charity having an obscure
mission and unclear performance criteria to analyse and improve its
performance generally and that of its trustees and executives especially.15As
a matter of fact, ‘given the complex, hard-to-define objective functions of
most nonprofit organizations, it is often difficult to measure their output
accurately’.16 In this context, even if donors of a charity are regarded as the
principals of its charity trustees, it is always hard for those donors to
evaluate the charity trustees’ performance.
According to contract failure theory, which will be discussed below, because
of the lack of efficient supervision measures to enforce a contract (high
monitoring costs), donors prefer to donate money to a charity rather than a
12 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2)
Journal of Law & Economics 301, 301-325; Geoffrey A. Manne, ‘Agency Costs and the Oversight of
Charitable Organizations’ (1999) Wisconsin Law Review 227, 227-272.
13 Robert A. Katz, ‘Can Principal-Agent Models Help Explain Charitable Gifts and Organizations?’
(2000) Wisconsin Law Review 1, 3.
14 ibid 24-29.
15 For example, see Robert D. Herman, David O. Renz and Richard D. Heimovics, ‘Board Practices
and Board Effectiveness in Local Nonprofit Organizations’ (1997) 7(4) Nonprofit Management and
Leadership 373, 374.
16 Puyvelde and others (n 1) 442; William A. Brown, ‘Exploring the Association between Board and
Organizational Performance in Nonprofit organizations’ (2005) 15 Nonprofit Management &
Leadership 317, 317-339; Gregory O. Jobome, ‘Management Pay, Governance and Performance: the
Case of Large UK Nonprofits’ (2006) 22 Financial Accountability & Management 331, 331-358.
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commercial firm. In contrast to a for-profit enterprise, a charity which is
aimed at realising the charitable purpose/public benefit and is regulated by
the relevant rules such as the non-distribution constraint, can obtain more
trust from donors and volunteers. In this context, the question remains about
how the charity’s donors can further accurately assess the performance of its
charity trustees.
3.2.3 Stewardship Theory
3.2.3.1 Core Ideas
Stewardship theory is mainly associated with sociology and psychology, and
is extremely different from the traditional agency theory. The most
fundamental difference may lie in the assumption about human nature.
Agency theory only focuses on self-interested behaviours and ‘neglects the
enormous amount of neural and other-regarding behaviors that exist […]
and the structures that might increase it’.17
By contrast, stewardship theory recognises a variety of non-financial
motivations of agents, such as ‘the need for achievement and recognition,
the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, respect for authority and
the work ethic’,18 and argues that the agents have the ‘tendencies to be
collectively oriented and intrinsically motivated’. 19 That may be why,
although without sufficient supervision from shareholders, many executives
working in a for-profit company, who are motivated by self-achievement,
self-satisfaction, the hope to be recognised or a sense of duty, can often
carry out their tasks quite well.20
17 Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (Random House 1986) 234.
18 Melinda M. Muth and Lex Donaldson, ‘Stewardship Theory and Board Structure: A Contingency
Approach’ (1998) 6(1) Corporate Governance: An International Review 5, 6.
19 Chamu Sundaramurthy and Marianne Lewis, ‘Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of
Governance’ (2003) 28(3) 397, 398.
20 Muth and Donaldson (n 18) 6; Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations:
On Power, Involvement and their Correlates (Free Press 1975).
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In this regard, there are two branches of stewardship theory.21 The first
branch recognises that ‘the interests of the [agent] and the principal [may
not be] aligned’,22 but argues that the agent will perform in the best interests
of the principal rather than her own personal gain because ‘the agent values
the effect of her actions on the utility of the principal and […] pursuing her
own objectives generate higher costs (in utility terms) than benefits’.23 The
second branch directly assumes that ‘the agent’s goals are perfectly aligned
with those of the principal’.24 Accordingly, in designing governance
mechanisms, this theory supports empowering structures rather than control
and monitoring in ensuring the sound performance of managers and
executives.
3.2.3.2 Contributions and Drawbacks
In respect of charity governance, stewardship theory can at least bring the
following insights: charity trustees, the majority of whom are volunteers,
should be generally trusted, and, in contrast to a control and monitoring
approach, a facilitative structure may perform better in promoting the
efficient performance of charity trustees in realising their charity’s purpose.
As a matter of fact, this idea seems to have been implemented in some
common law jurisdictions: ‘[s]ince most directors are unpaid and serve out
of a sense of civic duty, there is a reluctance to impose financial liabilities
upon them’.25
However, the biggest problem of this theory may be that it cannot
completely deal with the problems of the moral hazard of charity trustees. If
some basic regulatory and accountability mechanisms do not exist, it may
not be able to control this moral hazard in practice.
21 Ralf Caers and others, ‘Principal-Agent Relationships on the Stewardship-Agency Axis’ (2006)
17(1) Nonprofit Management & Leadership 25, 28-29.
22 James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman and Lex Donaldson, ‘Toward a Stewardship Theory of
Management’ (1997) 22(1) Academy of Management Review 20, 24.
23 Caers and others (n 21) 29.
24 Puyvelde and others (n 1) 436.
25 James J. Fishman, ‘Improving Charitable Accountability’ (2003) 62 Maryland Law Review 218,
234.
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3.2.4 Crowding Out Theory
3.2.4.1 Core Ideas
This theory relates to the ‘crowding out phenomenon’,26 which falls within
the research scope of economics and psychology. In practice, individuals
usually have intrinsic (the desire to work for work’s sake) and extrinsic (the
motivation forced by extrinsic intervention) motivations to do their job. And
‘the use of extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic work motivation
under identifiable conditions’. 27
In terms of charity governance, those intrinsic motivations, such as altruism,
generosity, humanity, love and affection, can play an instrumental role in
ensuring that charity trustees, volunteers28 and other staff perform well:
those motivations have ‘their own internal incentive to do the right thing
and put in the time and effort necessary for effective nonprofit
monitoring’.29 Meanwhile, apart from their instrumental role, if it is
commonly believed that those intrinsic motivations have an inherent value,30
they should be cherished and maintained within charities in carrying out
charitable activities.
In this respect, the law, as a typical external intervention, may affect
intrinsic motivations in charity governance ‘through the promise of
26 Bruno S. Frey, ‘On the Relationship between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation’ (1997) 15
International Journal of Industrial Organization 427; Bruno S. Frey and Reto Jegen, ‘Motivation
Crowding Theory’ (2001) 15(5) Journal of Economic Surveys 589; Yuval Feldman and Oren Perez,
‘How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms
on Moral Perceptions and Civic Enforcement’ (2009) 36 Journal of Law & Society 501.
27 Frey (n 26) 428.
28 Richard B. Freeman, ‘Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor’ (1997) 15 (1) Journal
of Labor Economics 140.
29 Thomas Lee Hazen and Lisa Love Hazen, ‘Punctilious and Nonprofit Corporate Governance--A
Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties’ (2012) 14(2) University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 347, 347.
30 The approach taken by Emad H. Atiq seems to hold this view: ‘the loss of intrinsic motivation can
be harmful to agents quite apart from the effect on behavioral outcomes’. Emad H. Atiq, ‘Why
Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of Legal Incentives’ (2014) 123 Yale Law
Journal 1070, 1087.
57
monetary payments or the threat of sanction’.31 However, a monetary
payment to, or an excessive regulatory burden on, charity trustees may harm
(‘crowd out’) these intrinsic motivations32 and further restrain the
involvement of capable volunteers substantially motivated by these factors
in charity governance.
For example, a monetary payment may ultimately not ‘bring in the people
with the characteristics and skills charities need’.33 Nor does an excessive
legal obligation contribute to the participation of potential volunteers in
charity governance. According to a previous survey by the Charity
Commission, ‘11% of charities surveyed always have difficulties filling
vacancies on the trustee body (2001: 12%). 39% of charities sometimes
have difficulties filling vacancies (2001: 31%)’.34 And one major reason is
that many persons do not ‘want the responsibility or are [not] willing to take
on the legal obligations’.35
3.2.4.2 Contributions and Drawbacks
In this context, crowding out theory can make a number of contributions to
charity governance. First, it interprets the necessity of allowing for the
existence of intrinsic motivations to assist the efficient performance of
charity trustees. As a matter of fact, the core of trusteeship is ‘trust’ and if
charity trustees are trusted they may perform better than the minimum
standards required by law.36 Accordingly, to reduce distrust37 arising from
31 ibid 1080.
32 Noel Hyndman and Paul McDonnell, ‘Governance and Charities: An Exploration of Key Themes
and the Development of a Research Agenda’ (2009) 25(1) Financial Accountability & Management 5,
16.
33 Lord Hodgson, Trusted and Independent: Giving Charity back to Charities-Review of the Charities
Act 2006 (The Stationery Office 2012) 38.
34 Charity Commission, Start as You Mean to Go on: Trustee Recruitment and Induction (RS10)
(Charity Commission 2005) 7.
35 ibid 24.
36 Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson, ‘Paying Respect’ (2007) 21(4) Journal of Economic
Perspectives 135.
37 See, for example, Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier and Pedro Rey-Biel, ‘When and Why Incentives
(Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior’ (2011) 25(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 191.
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control and monitoring, external regulation should be moderate and heavy
legal burdens should be avoided.
Second, a monetary stipulation may crowd out the intrinsic motivations of
charity trustees and lead to ineffectiveness. Therefore, in charity governance,
when designing the legal and other incentives, it may be preferable to
choose some social rewards other than direct monetary ones in ensuring the
good performance of charity trustees.
Third, it is of value to provide a supportive framework rather than to set up
an excessive regulatory system. Unnecessary or excessive regulation may
negatively affect the performance of charity trustees. Hence, it may be
unreasonable to only emphasise the idea that charity trustees should be
loaded with more strict fiduciary duties or any other legal burden. Instead,
some supportive information, training, education38 or other facilitative
measures should be put in place to promote their good performance.
However, similar to stewardship theory discussed above, this theory also has
its own limitations. One of them is the limited function of this theory: it can
only be used to complement rather than replace agency theory.
3.2.5 Stakeholder Theory
3.2.5.1 Core Ideas
In corporate governance, instead of only taking shareholders into account,
stakeholder theory argues that other parties involved, such as customers,
suppliers and the local community, should also be protected and valued.
With respect to charity governance, this theory believes ‘that the provision
of good quality information to stakeholders can enhance the legitimacy of
the charity, securing stakeholders’ continuing support and organisational
38 Rusell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 1051, 1132.
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survival’.39
3.2.5.2 Contributions and Drawbacks
As a matter of fact, in order to realise a charity’s purpose, its charity trustees
have to understand that they need to develop a good relationship with the
public and other stakeholders, such as donors, of their charity. In this
context, stakeholder theory makes at least the following contributions to
charity governance.
First, it provides the potential candidates to supervise charity trustees.
Second, the needs of stakeholders also form ‘moral or philosophical
guidelines for the operation and management of the [organisation]’.40 In
practice, to achieve a charity’s purpose effectively and successfully, its
charity trustees have to take account of and sometimes to satisfy the
concerns and needs of the charity’s stakeholders in performing their duties.
However, in charity governance, pure stakeholder theory itself cannot deal
with the following issues. First, there is no clear definition or scope of
stakeholders or key stakeholders, which may make it difficult to apply this
theory in charity governance. According to Edward Freeman, a stakeholder
can be ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of the organization’s objectives’.41 By contrast, Helmut K.
Anheier believes that ‘stakeholders include members, trustees, employees,
volunteers, clients or users, customers, funders, contractors, government,
oversight agencies, community groups and watchdog organizations, etc.’.42
In addition, Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle and Donna J. Wood argue
that the salience of stakeholders depends on three attributes: power,
39 Ciaran Connolly, Noel Hyndman and Danielle McConville, ‘Conversion Ratios, Efficiency and
Obfuscation: A Study of the Impact of Changed UK Charity Accounting Requirements on External
Stakeholders’ (2013) 24 Voluntas 785, 788.
40 Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts,
Evidence, and Implications’ (1995) 20(1) Academy of Management Review 65, 71.
41 Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman 1984) 46.
42 Helmut K. Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge 2005) 227.
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legitimacy and urgency.43 However, the above definitions and evaluation
standards are too wide to be adopted in improving the legal rules associated
with charity governance.
Second, it does not provide a reasonable solution regarding how to balance
the interests between a charity and its stakeholders or among the
stakeholders themselves. In some situations, ‘[o]ne stakeholder’s mission
drift might be another’s appropriate responsiveness, and each of these
conflicting characterizations is correct from that constituent’s perspective’.44
In this respect, the idea supporting that stakeholders, such as donors and
beneficiaries, should be regarded as the principals of charity trustees in
charity governance seems to ignore the potential tension between the best
interests of a charity and the private interests of its stakeholders.
3.2.6 Enterprise Ownership Theory
3.2.6.1 Core Ideas
Enterprise ownership theory follows the transaction costs tradition45 which
was founded by Ronald Coase, one of the founders of the modern school of
law and economics.46 Coase points out ‘that the operation of a market costs
something and that, by forming an organization and allowing some authority
(an “entrepreneur”) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are
saved’.47 Accordingly, ‘in social life, structuring the law so as to reduce
transactions costs is generally beneficial’.48
43 Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle and Donna J. Wood, ‘Toward A Theory of Stakeholder
Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts’ (1997) 22(4)
Academy of Management Review 853, 853–886.
44 Evelyn Brody, ‘Accountability and Public Trust’ in Lester M. Salamon (ed), The State of Nonprofit
America (Aspen Institute & Brookings Institute Press 2002) 472.
45 Concerning transaction costs, generally, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance
(OUP 1996).
46 Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press 1983) 4.
47 Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (The University of Chicago Press 1988) 40. Of
course, different scholars may have different descriptions of transaction costs.
48 Martin Ricketts, The Economics of Business Enterprise: An Introduction to Economic Organisation
and the Theory of the Firm (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2002) 431.
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In other words, organisations are established as an alternative mechanism to
a market to reduce the transaction costs, such as the costs of search,
information, bargaining, decision, policing and enforcement, incurred in an
economic exchange.49 However, because organisations also have their own
internal administrative costs, when those costs are higher than the
transaction costs incurred in a market, organisations will or should not
emerge in this area.
On this basis, Henry Hansmann creates an ‘enterprise ownership theory’.
According to this theory, ‘patron’ is a term referring to any person having a
contractual relationship with a firm.50 In a nutshell, ‘the efficient assignment
of ownership minimizes the sum, over all the patrons of firms, of the costs
of market contracting and the costs of ownership’.51 Accordingly, the most
efficient ownership of firms will emerge and dominate most industries
sooner or later. In this context, market contracting means that the patron can
determine the firm’s activities by implementing the contractual relationship
or ending it to build a new one with others, while ownership means that the
patron can determines the firm’s activities by utilising its internal
governance mechanisms.52
In terms of charities, it is worth noting that, charities discussed in this theory
are usually limited to independent charities.53 In this respect, this theory
seems to be a further development of Hansmann’s contract failure theory.54
According to contract failure theory, individuals and entities who want to
donate their property to benefit the public (we call them donors here)55 can
choose for-profits or charities to carry out their charitable activities. The
reason for them to donate to charities lies in contract failure. Its basic idea is
49 Carl J. Dahlman, ‘The Problem of Externality’ (1979) 22 (1) Journal of Law & Economics 141.
50 Hansmann (n 5) 12.
51 ibid 47.
52 ibid 19-20.
53 In terms of government-controlled charities in China, there will be a comparative assessment of
those charities and independent charities in Chapter 4.
54 Regarding the contract failure theory, see Henry Hansmann, ‘The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise’
(1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 835, 835-901.
55 Sometimes volunteers can also be regarded as donors because they donate their services, time,
information and energy to charity, although here only donors of money and other assets are explored.
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as follows.
In the context of severe information asymmetry between customers and
suppliers in some specific circumstances (such as separation between
purchasers and users of services, provision of public goods, price
discrimination, implicit loans, and complex personal services), because for-
profits are aimed at maximising the private benefits of their owners and
accordingly are likely to be motivated to betray the trust of consumers, high
costs exist from supervising the performance of those for-profits to control
their moral hazard.
As a result, consumers may be more likely to deal with non-profits instead
of for-profits. This is particularly true for charitable donors56 and volunteers.
Take volunteers for example: ‘[w]here these volunteers believe that their
effort left service quantity or quality unaffected and merely raised the profits
of the proprietor or the shareholders, their commitment would presumably
rapidly wane’.57
According to enterprise ownership theory, which is a further development of
contract failure theory, when market contracting costs and ownership costs
are both extremely high, the patrons may choose to establish or fund a non-
profit firm. Following this logic, the existence of charities is the result of
economising the sum of market contracting costs and ownership costs in
conducting charitable activities. The following discussion provides a basic
interpretation of this argument with a focus on the features of charities.
First, accordingly to Hansmann, there are high market contracting costs
which force donors to donate property to non-profits, especially to charities
(as justified by his contract failure theory). For organisations that are mainly
or partly funded by donations, due to the existence of severe information
asymmetry, it is usually very expensive for donors and the general public to
56 From an economic point of view, a charitable donation can be regarded as a contract, through which
donors purchase goods and services from charities to benefit the public.
57 Ricketts (n 48) 389.
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supervise the performance of those organisations in carrying out charitable
activities (high market contracting costs).
In this context, if those organisations are non-profits, the absence of owners
gives donors the assurance that they can trust (at least to some extent) and
donate money to them.58 In particular, in contrast to other mutual benefit
non-profits, the charitable purpose/public benefit and other accountability
mechanisms in relation to charities can facilitate them to gain more trust
from and thus reduce the market contract costs of donors and the general
public.
Secondly, in terms of Hansmann’ argument that, given the large number of
donors, allowing them to own their donated organisation would be too
costly (high ownership costs),59 it is necessary to point out that this theory
does not deal with the situation that the ownership costs may not be high
due to the small number of donors. In this respect, it is worth noting that,
even if the number of donors is limited in practice (such as a charitable trust
which only has several settlors), allowing those donors to act as the owners
of this organisation may reduce their supervisory costs, but will lead to the
continuing existence of high market contracting costs, because this
organisation owned by the donors is in essence a for-profit enterprise.
Thirdly, in The Ownership of Enterprise, Hansmann does emphasise that the
managerial agency costs relating to non-profits appear to be relatively
modest.60 In charity governance, one interpretation of this argument may be
that, given the charitable purposes and public benefit pursued by a charity, it
58 In some situations or at some stages, charities may not be the most efficient form through which to
provide public goods, especially for commercial charities, which mainly rely on fees or sales of goods
and service. Henry Hansmann, ‘The Economic Role of Commercial Nonprofits: The Evolution of the
Savings Bank Industry’ in Helmut K. Anheier and Wolfgang Seibel (eds), The Third Sector:
Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organizations (Walter de Gruyter 1990) 65-76. However, in this
context, even without direct or indirect subsidies (such as the government grant and tax exemption),
commercial charities may still have comparative advantages than for-profits: their characteristic of
non-profit distribution can help them reduce the market contracting costs and ‘remain in operation at
[their] current scale as long as [their] revenues are sufficient to cover depreciation----that is, sufficient
to earn just a zero net rate of return’. Hansmann (n 5) 240.
59 Hansmann (n 5) 228.
60 ibid 245.
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may attract more trustworthy persons who are motivated by non-financial
motivations to act as its charity trustees,61 which will reduce those charity
trustees’ moral hazard and the related monitoring costs.
3.2.6.2 Contributions and Drawbacks
For the purposes of this thesis, the major contribution of this theory is to
demonstrate that the existence of independent charities is beneficial to
reducing the related costs in ensuring that charity trustees perform well.
Firstly, independent charities help reduce the monitoring costs (one vital
component of the ‘market contracting costs’ used by Hansmann) of the
general public and donors. In terms of charities, there exist a range of
governance mechanisms, such as the charitable purpose/public benefit,
voluntary nature of charity trustees,62 fiduciary duties and other
accountability mechanisms.63 Those mechanisms, as a whole, can be
regarded as a mandate term between a charity’s trustees and its financial
supporters to ensure that ‘donations are used effectively and are not easily
expropriated’.64
As a result, the general public and donors trust charities more than for-profit
companies in public goods delivery. For many members of the general
public, only knowing that an organisation is a charity means that they give it
their trust and confidence,65 reducing the supervisory costs of donors,
volunteers and the public.
Secondly, independent charities help reduce the costs arising from the
governing body’s and other staff’s moral hazard in a charity. Given the
61 Gerhard Speckhacher, ‘Nonprofit Versus Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach’ (2008)
18(3) Nonprofit Management & Leadership 295, 314.
62 This can be a good signal to the outside world that members of the governing body ‘are motivated
to take their decision control task seriously’. For example, see Fama and Jensen (n 12) 319.
63 In respect of any further discussion of accountability relating to charity trustees, see Chapters 4-7.
64 See, for example, Fama and Jensen (n 3) 344; Steinberg (n 2) 85; Michael Chesterman, Charities,
Trusts and Social Welfare (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1979) 102; Henry Hansmann, ‘Reforming
Nonprofit Corporation Law’ (1981) 129 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 497, 507.
65 In contrast to for-profits, ‘the primary function of a nonprofit is to serve as an organization that
patrons can trust’. Hansmann (n 64) 518.
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charitable purposes and public benefit independent charities aim to achieve,
those charities have the potential to attract ‘committed employees and
voluntary workers since the lack of equity holders is an indication to them
that their selflessness will not enrich someone else’. 66 In other words, in
contrast to for-profits, the charitable purposes of a charity are attractive to
trustworthy persons to act as its charity trustees or other staff. For example,
in England, charity trustees are usually volunteers and motivated by non-
financial motivations.67 This arrangement, to some degree, reduces the
possibility of charity trustees experiencing moral hazard, and accordingly
‘allows low cost control of agency problems’.68
Thirdly, this theory emphasises the important role of voluntary financial
supporters in supervising charity trustees in a charity. It indicates that the
existence of a charity is to satisfy the information needs and concern of its
charitable contributors that charitable resources will be efficiently used for
the charity’s purposes. In this context, on the one hand, even if they do not
have any right relating to internal governance, the charitable contributors of
a charity can still supervise its charity trustees indirectly through contract
mechanisms. On the other hand, in considering which stakeholders should
be given extra rights by law to supervise the charity trustees, those
charitable contributors cannot be ignored.
However, although this theory contributes a great deal to justifying the
existence of independent charities, it explains little about how to further
improve charity governance after the establishment of a charity.69
66 Speckhacher (n 61) 314; Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Altruism, Nonprofits and Economic Theory’
(1996) 34 Journal of Economic Literature 701, 701-728.
67 Generally, see Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, ‘The Firm as an Incentive System’ (1994) 84(4)
The American Economic Review 972, 972-991; Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Not-for-
profit Entrepreneurs’ (2001) 81 Journal of Public Economics 99, 99–115; Bengt Holmstrom and Paul
Milgrom, ‘Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job
Design’ (1991) 7 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 24, 24-52.
68 Fama and Jensen (n 3) 344.
69 Mihir A. Desai and Robert J. Yetman, ‘Constraining Managers without Owners: Governance of the
Not-for-Profit Enterprise’ (2006) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=661301> accessed 20 September 2017.
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3.2.7 Public Goods Theory
3.2.7.1 Core Ideas
Here, the term ‘public goods’ is an economic definition and ‘goods’ can be
referred to all goods and services in their daily sense. From an economic
perspective, goods can be divided into pure private goods, pure public goods
and quasi-public goods.
Pure private goods have two basic features: rivalry and excludability.
Rivalry means that ‘individual use does limit and can even exhaust potential
use by others’,70 while excludability requires that ‘once produced only
consumers with property rights can benefit, and others can be prevented
from benefiting at no or little cost’.71 A typical example of pure private
goods is food.
As to pure public goods, they have two totally different characteristics, i.e.,
non-rivalry (‘individual use does not reduce the amount available for use by
users or potential customers’)72 and non-excludability (‘once produced
consumers cannot be prevented from benefiting except at great cost’).73
National defence is a typical example.
Between pure private goods and pure public goods there are quasi-public
goods, which can be further divided into non-excludable but rival quasi-
public goods (such as fishing in a sea) and excludable but non-rival quasi-
public goods (such as museums and theatres).
The core idea behind this theory is as follows. In economics, the term ‘free-
rider’ refers to somebody who benefits from the goods, services and other
resources without paying for the cost. With respect to public goods, due to
the free-rider problem, the market cannot supply an efficient amount of
70Anheier (n 42) 118.
71 ibid.
72 ibid 117.
73 ibid.
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public goods (‘market failure’). Accordingly, the government can overcome
this problem by collecting tax.74
3.2.7.2 Contributions and Drawbacks
In terms of charity governance, ensuring the sound performance of charity
trustees can be regarded as a public good:75 any individual can benefit from,
but does not need to pay for, the good performance of charity trustees in
achieving their charity’s purposes and benefiting the general public.
Therefore, due to the free-rider phenomenon, there may be insufficient
individuals willing to ensure the compliance of charity trustees through
accountability and supportive mechanisms. In this context, this theory can
be used to justify why the government is usually the principal enforcer of
fiduciary duties of charity trustees in charity governance whilst private
parties may also have the right to supervise charity trustees, but only under
limited conditions and situations.
However, this theory also has its drawbacks. First, it cannot provide a
reasonable approach in terms of how to make charity trustees perform well
for their charity’s mission and thus cannot supply detailed strategies for
designing governance mechanisms. Second, it cannot answer how to
evaluate the performance of charity trustees. Third, this theory cannot justify
which private party, along with governmental regulators, should have the
right, or have what forms of right, to supervise charity trustees.
3.2.8 Summary
Given the features of charities, although the traditional agency theory can
still play a role in evaluating the performance of charity trustees, such as
reducing moral hazard and agency costs, some of its drawbacks should be
74 Burton A. Weisbrod, ‘Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector
Economy’ in Edmund S. Phelps (ed), Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory (Russell Sage
Foundation 1975) 171-195.
75 Rob Atkinson, ‘Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable
Fiduciaries?’ (1998) 23 Journal of Corporation Law 655, 693.
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addressed accordingly. In this respect, although stewardship theory,
crowding out theory, stakeholder theory, enterprise ownership theory and
public goods theory cannot provide a comprehensive framework evaluating
charity governance, they may help revise the traditional agency theory to
make it adapt to the special conditions relating to charity governance (such
as a lack of owners and the voluntary nature of charity trustees).
3.3 Developing a Revised Agency Theory
3.3.1 Introduction
In this section, the thesis seeks to develop a revised agency theory which
incorporates the reasonable aspects of the above theories and provides a
more comprehensive, pragmatic and targeted approach to facilitating the
assessment of charity governance. Based on this revised agency theory,
charity trustees are the agents whilst the charitable purpose/public benefit is
regarded as the principal, with ‘key stakeholders’ (who voluntarily provide
charitable resources but who are not the charity trustees) and ‘other selected
stakeholders’ (by operation of law) as the supervisors ensuring that those
charity trustees comply with their duties to realise the charitable
purpose/public benefit of their charity.
The following discussion seeks to justify why the principal-agent
relationship in charity governance should be transformed into a relationship
which involves the charitable purpose/public benefit (as the principal), ‘key
stakeholders’ and ‘other selected stakeholders’ on behalf of the charitable
purpose/public benefit (as the supervisors), and charity trustees (as the
agents), and to explain how each of them should be understood. On this
basis, it further lists the components of agency costs in charity governance
and recommends general measures to reduce those costs.
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3.3.2 Regarding the Charitable Purpose/Public Benefit as the Principal
in Charity Governance
In this revised agency theory, the thesis argues that the charitable
purpose/public benefit should be regarded as the principal of charity trustees
in charity governance. The reasons are as follows.
3.3.2.1 ‘Mission-driven’Governance
First, charity governance is ‘mission-driven’ governance, in which the
charitable purpose/public benefit lays the foundation for the existence and
development of any charity. According to Helmut K. Anheier, ‘[t]he mission
is the principal purpose of the organization, and the very reason for its
existence’.76 In terms of charities, we can regard the charitable purpose of a
charity as its mission.
In contrast to for-profit companies ‘which are ultimately about financial
profit, nonprofit governance and management are ultimately about the
organization’s mission. Put simply, nonprofit organizations are mission-
driven rather than profit-driven’.77 Therefore, in the charitable sector,
‘mission-driven’ governance replaces ‘profit-driven’ governance, and
accordingly the charitable purpose/public benefit determines the specific
aims and current and future development of a charity.
3.3.2.2 The Fundamental Standard Regulating Charity Trustees
Second, following the first point, the charitable purpose/public benefit acts
as the fundamental standard to guide and constrain the conduct of charity
trustees. Although, due to a lack of ownership, no party (including the
government) has the same right as shareholders do in commercial
companies to control and obtain the residual earnings of charities, it does
not mean that charity trustees can do whatever they want to do. Instead,
76Anheier (n 42) 176.
77 ibid 226.
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charity trustees have to govern their charity and develop its relationship with
the outside world exclusively for the charitable purposes and to satisfy the
public benefit requirement. In this respect, charity trustees perform their
fiduciary duties to no party rather than the charitable purpose/public benefit
that their charity pursues.
On this basis, it is clear that charity trustees should be independent from any
other stakeholder in making decisions for their charity. As noted in Chapter
2, independence can be further divided into two aspects, i.e., charity trustees
should not perform for their own personal gain; and charity trustees should
not be controlled by other parties, to ensure that they perform in the best
interests of their charity. In both cases, the lack of independence will lead to
moral hazard and violate the charitable purpose and public benefit that the
relevant charity pursues. Reflected in the law, charity trustees should have
the duty to observe the objects and avoid and manage conflicts of interest,78
which will be further discussed in Chapters 4-5.
3.3.2.3 The Rule Guiding and Constraining Some Stakeholders
Third, associated with the above two points, the charitable purpose/public
benefit also plays a role in guiding and constraining the conduct of some
stakeholders of a charity. For example, if a donation is not for a charitable
purpose or does not comply with the public benefit requirement, it will not
become a valid charitable donation, and thus cannot enjoy the relevant tax
benefits. 79
In addition, although some stakeholders have the right to supervise the
performance of charity trustees in charity governance, they cannot damage
the charitable purpose/public benefit that their charity pursues, or force the
charity trustees to violate their fiduciary duties. In other words, in terms of
78 Peter Luxton, ‘Conflicts of Interest in Charity Law’ in Alison Dunn (ed), The Voluntary Sector, the
State and the Law (Hart Publishing 2000) 227-240; Charity Commission, Conflicts of Interest: A
Guide for Charity Trustees (CC29) (Charity Commission 2014).
79 See, for example, Oonagh Breen, ‘EU Regulation of Charitable Organisations: the Politics of
Legally Enabling Civil Society’ (2008) 10(3) The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 50, 57.
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charity governance, any person who has the right to make charity trustees
accountable should at least respect the charitable purpose/public benefit, and
any action damaging the charitable purpose/public benefit in the name of
accountability should not be allowed by law.
3.3.2.4 Summary
Therefore, the thesis argues that, in charity governance, the charitable
purpose/public benefit should replace the role of owners in corporate
governance and act as the principal of charity trustees.80 Accordingly,
charity trustees are responsible for ensuring that their performance complies
with the charitable purpose/public benefit81 that their charity aims to deliver.
Nevertheless, even if it is stipulated in detail in the governing document, the
charitable purpose/public benefit is still too abstract to provide sufficient
guidance to direct or regulate the performance of charity trustees. Hence, in
order to improve charity governance, it is necessary to identify the
charitable purpose/public benefit and to make it more specific, measurable
and attainable. This arrangement ‘will facilitate performance measurement
and ease of comparability’,82 strengthen accountability,83 and assist
stakeholders in understanding and evaluating the operational achievement of
charity trustees.84
Furthermore, the charitable purpose/public benefit cannot itself supervise
and enforce the fiduciary and other duties of charity trustees. In this context,
if no individual or organisation has the power/right to explain the meaning
of the charitable purpose/public benefit and regulate the conduct of charity
80 Of course, in the thesis, both ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ are used from the perspective of economics.
81 In the guidance of the Charity Commission, the public benefit requirement should be complied with
in all the following aspects: to be a charity, to operate as a charity and to report on a charity’s work.
Charity Commission, Public Benefit: The Public Benefit Requirement (PB1) (Charity Commission
2013). Furthermore, charity law also stipulates a host of legal rules to ensure the public nature of
charities, such as the cy-pres doctrine.
82 Ciaran Connolly and Noel Hyndman, Performance Reporting by UK Charities: Approaches,
Difficulties and Current Practice (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 2003) 24.
83 ibid 20.
84 Speckhacher (n 61) 315.
72
trustees, even severe charitable abuse such as conflicts of interest, fraud and
extreme carelessness will not be avoided in practice. Therefore, to protect
the best interests of a charity, it is necessary to authorise some individuals or
organisations with the power/right to supervise its charity trustees;85 such
candidates usually fall within the scope of the charity’s stakeholders (in the
widest sense).
3.3.3 Designating ‘Key Stakeholders’ and ‘Other Selected Stakeholders’
as the Supervisors on behalf of the Charitable Purpose/Public Benefit
In this revised agency theory, the thesis defines ‘key stakeholders’ of charity
trustees and ‘other selected stakeholders’, regards them as the supervisors
on behalf of the charitable purpose/public benefit to monitor the charity
trustees, and further explores the basic approach to designing the specific
rights and duties of those supervisors in charity governance.
3.3.3.1 Defining ‘Key Stakeholders’ and ‘Other Selected Stakeholders’
The term ‘supervisor’ can be defined as any person who has the right to
make charity trustees accountable for the charitable purpose/public benefit
in a direct (such as the right to enforce their fiduciary duties) or indirect
(such as public access to information) manner. To efficiently protect and
realise the charitable purpose/public benefit that a charity pursues, some of
its stakeholders have to be conferred the rights on behalf of the charitable
purpose/public benefit to supervise the charity trustees’ performance. In this
context, the thesis distinguishes two types of stakeholders of a charity who
can be regarded as the supervisors having the rights to monitor its charity
trustees.
First, ‘key stakeholders’, i.e., persons who are not the trustees of a charity
but who voluntarily contribute charitable resources (such as donations,
voluntary work and tax benefits) to this charity. Accordingly, donors
85 Kenneth L. Karst, ‘The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility’
(1960) 73(3) Harvard Law Review 433, 437.
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(including the government, grant-making foundations, for-profit companies
and individuals),86 volunteers, governmental regulators (representing the
interest of the whole community or the public) and the general public87 can
be regarded as the key stakeholders of a charity.
In this respect, the thesis follows Hansmann’s enterprise ownership theory
and argues that the existence of a charity is to satisfy the following concerns
and information needs of persons providing charitable resources to it: the
charity trustees of this charity can efficiently perform their duties to realise
the charitable purpose/public benefit.
In this context, to protect the concerns and information needs of those key
stakeholders, on the one hand, they can supervise the charity trustees’
performance through the contract mechanism: those key stakeholders can
enforce or end the contract (in economics) with their charity.88 For example,
if a charity’s trustees do not perform well, its donor can end his/her financial
support. On the other hand, to further satisfy and protect those concerns, the
law may give a range of extra legal rights to those stakeholders to supervise
the charity trustees, such as public access to information, and regulatory
powers of governmental regulators.
From the perspective of agency theory, clarifying key stakeholders of a
charity as the supervisors on behalf of the charitable purpose/public benefit
can not only help reduce the charity trustees’ moral hazard, but also reduce
the supervisory costs of those key stakeholders in ensuring that the charity
trustees comply with their duties. For example, the difficulty for key
86 According to an investigation of the key stakeholders of annual reports and accounts by Ciaran
Connolly, Noel Hyndman and Danielle McConville, ‘the consensus was that funders were the key or
primary stakeholders and they should be the main audience for the charity reports and accounts’.
Ciaran Connolly, Noel Hyndman and Danielle McConville, ‘UK Charity Accounting: An Exercise in
Widening Stakeholder Engagement’ (2013) 45 The British Accounting Review 58, 63.
87 ‘The government’s sizable financial support for the non-profit sector vests the taxpaying public
with a reasonable expectation that charitable assets should be used to advance socially beneficial
objectives.’ Reid Kress Weisbord and Peter DeScioli, ‘The Effects of Donor Standing on Philanthropy:
Insights from the Psychology of Gift-Giving’ (2009/10) 45 Gonzaga Law Review 225, 227; Evelyn
Brody, ‘Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement’ (2004) 79
Indiana Law Journal 937, 1035.
88 Hansmann (n 5) 19.
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stakeholders to supervise charity trustees will be reduced by empowering
public access to information contained in charity accounts and reports or
conferring other types of supervisory rights.
However, although their views and experience are quite useful for the
improvement of the quality of services or goods provided by a charity,
beneficiaries are not regarded as its key stakeholders in the thesis.89 Unless
they have to pay for the products or services provided by this charity,
beneficiaries cannot influence its charity trustees’ performance through any
contract mechanism. In the meantime, although charities are established to
achieve charitable purposes and to benefit the public, their existence is
aimed at meeting the information needs and concerns of charitable
contributors rather than those of beneficiaries in terms of efficient use of
charitable resources. In this context, beneficiaries are only regarded as a
channel for a charity to realise its charitable purpose/public benefit.
Second, ‘other selected stakeholders’ of a charity who have the right to
make the charity trustees accountable for the charitable purpose/public
benefit by operation of law, whether they provide charitable resources to this
charity in practice or not (although they may donate in practice). For
example, ‘trust supervisors’ (‘信托监察人’) in a Chinese charitable trust90
and external auditors of a charity have the rights to supervise the charity’s
trustees, whether they donate any asset to it or not. In this respect, it is worth
noting that, for the purposes of this thesis, if the law designs a special
governance mechanism requiring self-regulation of charity trustees, the
charity trustees themselves in this context can be regarded as falling with
the scope of ‘other selected stakeholders’.
For those selected stakeholders of a charity, the reason for them to enjoy the
rights to monitor its charity trustees on behalf of the charitable
89 Of course, when beneficiaries are also donors or part of the general public, they can become key
stakeholders as defined in this thesis. However, in this context, they are regarded as key stakeholders
not because of their role as beneficiaries, but due to their function as donors or members of the
general public.
90 Regarding ‘trust supervisors’ in Chinese law, see the discussion in Chapter 5.
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purpose/public benefit is not because they donate assets to or act as
volunteers to this charity. Instead, those supervisory rights enjoyed by the
selected stakeholders are directly given by operation of law.
From an economic perspective, if governance mechanisms relating to those
selected stakeholders work well in practice, they can control the moral
hazard of charity trustees on the one hand and reduce the monitoring costs
of key stakeholders noted above on the other. Of course, key stakeholders
themselves may also play such a role. For example, if the government can
efficiently regulate charity trustees, it will control both those charity
trustees’ moral hazard and the monitoring costs of other key stakeholders.
3.3.3.2 Reasonably Distributing the Rights and Duties of those
Stakeholders in Supervising Charity Trustees
Given that the charitable purpose/public benefit itself cannot monitor charity
trustees, it needs stakeholders to supervise them in performing their
fiduciary duties. After clarifying key stakeholders and other selected
stakeholders as the supervisors on behalf of the charitable purpose/public
benefit, it is necessary to explore how to design the legal rules relating to the
rights and duties of those stakeholders in charity governance. In this respect,
several points need to be discussed here.
First, the moral hazard of those stakeholders themselves should not be
neglected. In the context of charity governance, the aim of allowing some
stakeholders to make charity trustees accountable is not to help those
stakeholders to pursue their personal gain, but to protect the charitable
purpose/public benefit. As noted above, in charity governance, no party has
the same rights as those enjoyed by shareholders in a for-profit company.
However, in practice, some stakeholders may make use of their supervisory
rights to realise their own private benefits.91
91 See the discussion in the following chapters.
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Thus, to reduce the moral hazard of those stakeholders in supervising
charity trustees, the law should make it clear that, as the supervisors on
behalf of the charitable purpose/public benefit, they should not violate the
charitable purpose/public benefit of a charity or damage the fiduciary duties
of any charity trustee. Meanwhile, the scope of ‘selected stakeholders’
should also be reasonably limited in order to reduce unnecessary costs
relating to those stakeholders’ moral hazard.
Second, apart from the stakeholders’ moral hazard, the other monitoring
costs should also be taken into account. For example, numerous preferences
and interests among donors, volunteers, regulators and the general public
may negatively affect the performance of charity trustees in realising the
charitable purpose/public benefit.92 Therefore, to control those monitoring
costs, the law should reasonably limit the forms of those stakeholders’
supervisory rights and the scope of those selected stakeholders.
For example, apart from governmental regulators, the scope of stakeholders
who have the right to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity trustees directly
should be limited. As noted above, if ensuring charity trustees to comply
with the charitable purpose/public benefit can be regarded as a public
good,93 to overcome the free-rider problem, the government is able to
enforce the fiduciary duties of charity trustees.
However, to decide whether other stakeholders (key stakeholders or other
selected stakeholders) can have the right to enforce fiduciary duties, it is
necessary to have a comprehensive evaluation of the relevant agency costs,
which will be explored in the following chapters. In this regard, it is
apparent that, although the general public falls within the scope of key
92 In fact, the accountability of charities to their stakeholders meets a host of problems both in theory
and in practice. Generally, see Diana Leat, ‘Voluntary Organizations and Accountability: Theory and
Practice’ in Helmut K. Anheier and Wolfgang Seibel (eds), The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of
Nonprofit Organizations (Walter de Gruyter 1990) 141-153.
93 Atkinson (n 75) 693. In this context, although very obscure, a legal rule in Chinese law really hits
the nail on the head: ‘the donated property received by public benefit social organisations and any
value added to it are the public property of the community, which is protected by national laws, and
any organisation or individual cannot encroach upon, divert for other purposes, or cause damage to it’.
Public Benefit Undertakings Donations Law 1999 (China) (PBUDL 1999 (China)), s 7.
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stakeholders defined in this chapter, it cannot be cost-effective to empower
each member of the community to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees.
Meanwhile, in practice, stakeholders may have a range of other rights to
supervise charity trustees. For example, the general public usually has the
right to have access to the relevant information relating to a charity (such as
its charity accounts and annual reports).94 Furthermore, many donors,
including grant-making foundations, for-profit companies or even
individuals, can further monitor charity trustees directly by signing a
‘donation contract’.95 In this context, legislators should take agency costs
into account in legal reform.
3.3.3.3 Summary
In summary, incorporating enterprise ownership theory and stakeholder
theory together with the idea of identifying the charitable purpose/public
benefit as the principal of charity trustees, this revised agency theory refines
the role of key stakeholders (persons who are not the charity trustees but
who voluntarily provide charitable resources) and other selected
stakeholders (by operation of law) as the supervisors monitoring the charity
trustees to ensure compliance with the charitable purpose/public benefit.
With respect to the rights and duties of those stakeholders, this revised
agency theory argues that the moral hazard of stakeholders and other
monitoring costs should be taken into account in designing the relevant legal
rules. To control those costs, those stakeholders can neither violate the
charitable purpose/public benefit pursued by charities, nor force charity
trustees to breach their fiduciary duties. In addition, the forms of those
94 Generally, see Noel Hyndman and Danielle McMahon, ‘The Evolution of the UK Charity
Statement of Recommended Practice: the Influence of Key Stakeholders’ (2010) 28 European
Management Journal 455.
95 In English law it may sound strange to put ‘donation’ and ‘contract’ together. By contrast, a type of
contract called the ‘donation contract’ does exist in Chinese Law. CL 1999 (China), ss 185-195. As to
the role of donors in charity governance, see the discussion in Chapter 6.
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stakeholders’ rights and the scope of ‘other selected stakeholders’ should be
carefully designed or reasonably limited.
For example, in terms of the rights to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees, taking into account the public goods theory, this revised agency
theory argues that it can be regarded as a public good to make charity
trustees perform well. Accordingly, to overcome the free-rider problem,
governmental regulators should have the power to supervise and enforce the
fiduciary duties of charity trustees. Meanwhile, the rights of other
stakeholders to directly enforce fiduciary duties should be limited. In
addition, given governmental regulation may not efficiently make charity
trustees perform well, the law can also give other private parties (including
key stakeholders and other selected stakeholders) different forms of
supervisory rights in specific legal contexts, based on a systematic
consideration of the relevant agency costs.
3.3.4 Recognising Charity Trustees as Persons between Agents and
Partners
Even according to the traditional agency theory, there is no debate on the
view that charity trustees are regarded as the agents. Accordingly, the thesis
still regards charity trustees as the agents who are responsible for the
general control and management of a charity. However, given the total
differences between agency theory and stewardship theory/crowding out
theory, here it is necessary to discuss the assumption about human nature
relating to charity trustees.
3.3.4.1 The Assumption about Human Nature Relating to Charity
Trustees
In the commercial sector, it is reasonable to assume that both shareholders
and executives are motivated to make profits. By contrast, in terms of the
charitable sector, based on their voluntary or quasi-voluntary (less paid)
nature, the persons choosing to act as charity trustees can be reasonably
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assumed to be motivated by non-financial motivations, by and large.
Nevertheless, there are several exceptions to this assumption. For example,
because of the charitable status and the relevant benefits a charity brings,
some persons seeking to act as its charity trustees may use this charity as a
channel to carry out illegal activities, such as funding terrorism or tax
evasion,96 although in reality the number may be quite small.
In addition, after becoming the charity trustees of a charity, when facing
situations (such as conflicts of interest) that can bring great private benefits
to those charity trustees but may damage the charitable purpose/public
benefit of the charity (the best interests of the charity), the possibility for the
trustees to be motivated by self-interested motivations may become much
higher: even if they cannot directly obtain remuneration from their charity,
those charity trustees may in practice ‘enjoy profits distributed as
nonfinancial private perquisites, such as first-class travel to exotic locations
and architectural wonders for headquarters’.97
On this basis, in terms of the assumption about human nature concerning
charity trustees, a more compromised but pragmatic standpoint should be
put in place: charity trustees (and, in a wider sense, other volunteers and
lower-paid executives and staff) are generally altruistic persons and are
willing to realise the charitable purpose/public benefit out of their intrinsic
motivations or based on the social norms; however, without an effective
legal control, some of them may pursue their own interests instead of the
best interests of their charity or may sometimes not perform as efficiently as
possible.98
According to this assumption, charity trustees can be generally trusted by
96 A typical example in this respect is the charity scandal relating to the Cup Trust. Committee of
Public Accounts, Charity Commission: the Cup Trust and Tax Avoidance (Seventh Report of Session
2013-14) (The Stationery Office 2013).
97 Steinberg (n 2) 87.
98 As a matter of fact, this assumption reflects the tension between different motivations inherent in
people’s minds.
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the public but need to be regulated under some special circumstances where
it is highly possible for them to pursue their own interests instead of the best
interests of a charity, or to carry out their duties inefficiently.99
3.3.4.2 The Relevant Strategies
In this context, charity trustees should be given more facilitative support. In
view of the fact that voluntary charity trustees with the relevant skills,
experience and knowledge are of vital importance to the success of a charity,
efficient recruitment policies and methods should be put in place to ensure
that capable persons can be selected as charity trustees. And the training and
other facilitative support can also assist charity trustees in efficiently
performing their duties. Meanwhile, a minimum legal and regulatory system
should be implemented to tackle serious events relating to the moral hazard
of charity trustees.
3.3.5 Evaluating Charity Governance: Types of Agency Costs
3.3.5.1 Introduction: Expanding the Contents of Agency Costs in
Relation to Charity Governance
Traditionally, in respect of agency costs, different scholars may have
different views about the specific content. According to Michael C. Jensen
and William H. Meckling, agency costs include ‘(1) the monitoring
expenditures of the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and
(3) the residual loss’.100 From the point of view of Henry Hansmann, agency
costs are ‘the sum of the costs incurred in monitoring and the costs of
managerial opportunism that result from the failure or inability to monitor
with complete effectiveness’,101 in which the monitoring costs in fact
99 Hyndman and McDonnell (n 32) 23. For an analysis of the practice of charity governance from the
perspectives of the traditional agency theory, stewardship theory and stakeholder theory, see Rowena
Sinclair, Keith Hooper and Samir Ayoub, ‘Perspectives of Accountability in Charities in New
Zealand’ (2013) 14(4) Journal of Asia-Pacific Business 312, 312-335.
100 Jensen and Meckling (n 3) 308.
101 Hansmann (n 5) 38.
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include the above costs of (1) and (2).
However, for the purposes of the thesis, agency costs include not only the
costs of avoiding the charity trustees’ moral hazard (along with the residual
loss regarding the charity trustees’ moral hazard, which is not efficiently
controlled) but also the costs of assisting them in their sound performance
(and the residual loss concerning inefficient use of charitable resources due
to a lack of facilitative environment and necessary support). Meanwhile, the
costs relating to co-ordinating supervisors, the costs due to the moral hazard
of supervisors and the costs of the negative influence of external
intervention, etc., which have not received sufficient attention, will be
incorporated into the content of agency costs in the revised agency theory.
Those expanded agency costs can benefit a more comprehensive
cost/benefit analysis when considering the issues concerning how to
improve charity governance.
Accordingly, in this thesis, agency costs relating to charity governance
include the monitoring costs and the residual loss (such as the costs arising
from misconduct by charity trustees due to insufficient regulation and
supervision, or the costs relating to inefficient use of charitable resources
due to a lack of support from external stakeholders). Combining the above
theories and the unique characteristics of independent charities, the thesis
argues that the monitoring costs mainly include the following aspects, which
should be taken into account and balanced when designing the relevant legal
and regulatory mechanisms associated with charity governance.
3.3.5.2 The Costs Relating to Co-ordinating Supervisors and their
Collective Decision-making Process
First, the monitoring costs include the costs relating to co-ordinating
supervisors and their collective decision-making process.102Unless
otherwise specified, throughout the thesis, supervisors are regarded as
102 These costs are highly stressed by Henry Hansmann. Hansmann (n 5) 39-44.
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individuals/organisations that have the right to make charity trustees
accountable for the charitable purpose/public benefit. In addition, collective
decision mainly focuses on membership charities while co-ordination
principally stresses the co-operation between different governmental
regulators (such as the Charity Commission and HMRC).
For example, although lacking ownership, in a membership charity where
there are a host of members with the right to vote, if the interests and
preferences of those members are very diverse, it will be too costly to
exchange information and ideas and to balance those different interests and
preferences. Accordingly, members may not make an efficient decision
concerning charity governance.103 As noted by the Charity Commission,
‘[d]isputes and disagreements […] within the membership can be costly and
time consuming, and a diversion of charitable resources’.104
3.3.5.3 The Costs of Supervision, Support and Enforcement
Second, the monitoring costs include the costs of supervision, support and
enforcement. For instance, the government has to deploy time, money and
human resources, etc., to supervise, to supply the relevant guidance and
facilitative support to, and to enforce the fiduciary duties of, charity trustees.
In particular when facing budgetary cuts, it has become an urgent task for
regulators to control those costs.
3.3.5.4 The Costs of the Moral Hazard of Supervisors Themselves
Third, the monitoring costs comprise the costs of the supervisors’ moral
hazard. The traditional agency theory does not challenge who should be the
principal but may ‘simply assert that some party has the power to dictate
contract terms’.105 However, as argued above, in charity governance, charity
trustees should realise the charitable purpose/public benefit rather than the
103 Charity Commission, Membership Charities (RS7) (Charity Commission 2004).
104 ibid 11.
105 Steinberg (n 2) 81.
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private benefits of any stakeholder.
Accordingly, stakeholders cannot be regarded as the principals of charity
trustees. Therefore, in supervising the trustees of a charity, once the interests
of the charity’s stakeholders conflict with the charitable purpose/public
benefit that it pursues, it is necessary to control those stakeholders’ moral
hazard. In particular, given that the charitable purpose/public benefit cannot
itself directly control the charity’s trustees, those costs should be paid
special attention.
For example, although a charity’s donors do not have its ownership, they
can supervise its charity trustees by acting as the charity’s members, through
the rights authorised in its governing document or just by ending their
donations. However, ‘[w]hereas pure altruists wholly adopt the public
interest, impure altruists pursue self-interested objectives that might (or
might not) conflict with the public interest’.106 In several circumstances,
donors may take advantage of a charity to pursue their private benefits,
resulting in damage to that charity’s independence and, finally, to the public
confidence and trust.
In addition, sometimes, the requirements of a funder conflict with the
charitable purposes or fiduciary duties of the governing body of a charity,
although the funder is not totally aimed at benefiting him or herself. For
example, a contract by a charity which is located in London may restrict
‘the charity to providing community care facilities to mental patients
coming from one hospital, to the exclusion of other mental patients from
other hospitals who have links with that city’.107 This contract may violate
the public benefit requirement governing this charity.
More extremely, some donors may take advantage of charities as a channel
to launder money or fund terrorists; some government officers may take
106 Weisbord and DeScioli (n 87) 236.
107 Debra Morris and Karen Atkinton, ‘Charities Biting the Hand that Feeds: Relationships with Their
Funders’ in Debra Morris and Jean Warburton (eds), Charities, Governance and the Law: the Way
Forward (Key Haven 2003) 200.
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bribes when registering an organisation as a charity, deciding whether to
provide tax benefits108 or helping to conceal the illegal acts of charity
trustees; some funders may force a charity to only trade with their relatives.
In those situations, if the supervisors pursue their own personal gain in the
name of accountability, the charitable purpose/public benefit pursued by a
charity and the public, the government, volunteers and donors will suffer a
loss. Therefore, the right of supervisors in making charity trustees
accountable should also be limited to a reasonable extent. To copy with
those problems, some effective measures, such as defining the scope of the
right/power and clarifying the procedure of exercising this right/power,
should be put in place.
3.3.5.5 The Costs of the Negative Effects of External Intervention
Fourth, the monitoring costs contain the costs of the negative effects of
external intervention. These costs are usually ignored by the traditional
agency theory, but are highly stressed by crowding out theory.109 For
example, an excessive regulation may neither ensure the more efficient
performance of charity trustees nor encourage capable persons to act as
charity trustees. Moreover, external accountability may force a charity’s
trustees to use more charitable resources to satisfy the accountability
requirements rather than to directly carry out its charitable purposes.
Accordingly, more costs in ensuring compliance may mean that fewer
charitable resources are used directly in the mission of charities. In this
context, excessive regulation could be isolated from the original intention of
regulators and other supervisors.
In addition, a more singular problem in this respect is the costs of conflicts
or disputes between supervisors and charity trustees, which may not be
related to illegal or immoral activities. For example, in respect of a charity’s
108 For example, see Faizul Latif Chowdhury, Corrupt Bureaucracy and Privatization of Tax
Enforcement (Pathak Shamabesh 2006).
109 Frey (n 26).
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internal management affairs, some of the supervisors may have preferences
or views that differ from those of the charity trustees. In this context, the so-
called ‘supervision’ is, as a matter of fact, not associated with ensuring the
better performance of the charity trustees, but is a pure conflict which will
have no positive effect on charity governance.
And, when litigation is involved, ‘[f]or the disputing charity, it can divert
energy, time and resources away from its primary task and can damage its
public image. It can also have a very real financial cost in litigation and lost
revenue’.110 Accordingly, legal suits which are in the name of accountability
but in reality are only linked to pure conflicts, are too costly to be brought.
They are not beneficial to the realisation of the charitable purpose/public
benefit111 that a charity pursues or to maintaining a good relationship
between the charity’s stakeholders and its charity trustees.112
Hence, from the perspective of reducing the monitoring costs, instead of
legal suits between charities, charity trustees and the relevant stakeholders,
some clear internal dispute resolution mechanisms,113 external mechanisms
to deal with complaints and alternative dispute resolutions (ADRs) should
be put in place.114 However, the precondition of using these dispute
resolutions is that the relevant conflicts or disputes are not of serious
concern. If they are very severe, then, instead of the above dispute
resolutions, some legal enforcement mechanisms will be essential to tackle
them.115
110 Debra Morris, Disputes in the Charitable Sector (Charity Law Unit of University of Liverpool
2003) 1.
111British Diabetic Association v Diabetic Society Ltd [1996] FSR 1, 5-6.
112 Generally, see Charity Commission, Conflicts in a Charity: Statement of Approach (Charity
Commission 2008); Morris (n 110).
113 Peter Luxton, The Law of Charities (OUP 2001) 534.
114 Morris (n 110).
115 ibid 5.
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3.3.6 Improving Charity Governance: Drawing the Boundary between
Law and Other Mechanisms
From an economic perspective, the measures taken to improve charity
governance should be cost-effective. In this context, well-designed legal
duties and enforcement mechanisms should be put in place to control the
serious moral hazard of charity trustees and reduce excessive monitoring
costs. Meanwhile, intrinsic motivations (such as altruism and love),
informal norms (such as moral sanctions)116 and structural support (such as
facilitative training, information provision and clear guidance) are also very
important to reduce agency costs: intrinsic motivations and informal norms
are usually self-enforced and thus cost-effective whilst structural support
may result in costs but can, to some degree, be compensated by a better
performance and output from charity trustees.
Therefore, by incorporating the above theoretical framework, the thesis
argues that, to ensure charity trustees to perform efficiently to realise the
charitable purpose/public benefit of their charity, there should be reasonably
designed legal and regulatory mechanisms governing those charity trustees,
combined with intrinsic motivations, informal norms and structural support.
3.3.6.1 Reasonably Designed Legal and Regulatory Mechanisms
Charity governance is governance within the law. The law is essential in
protecting the right of citizens to establish charities, avoiding the moral
hazard of charity trustees and defining the rights, duties and liabilities of
charity trustees and their stakeholders.
From an economic perspective, the law, as an important institutional
arrangement relating to charity governance, should help reduce the whole
agency costs in ensuring compliance. In this respect, neither a lack of legal
rules nor excessive legal burdens may contribute to the reduction of the
116 In respect of the discussion of the role of norms in charity governance, see Fishman (n 25) 242-255.
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whole agency costs. Accordingly, with respect to the legal rules relating to
charity governance, they should be well-designed to control the serious
moral hazard of charity trustees on the one hand and to avoid excessive
monitoring costs on the other. In other words, the legal arrangement should
be maintained to the level of controlling severe situations such as conflicts
of interest, fault and excessive carelessness, and leave scope for the lower-
power incentives and norms to play a role in improving charity
governance.117
First, the law should focus on designing reasonable standards of fiduciary
duties and other supervision and enforcement mechanisms in order to
reduce the costs relating to the severe moral hazard of charity trustees.
Second, the law should also have its own limits in promoting sound charity
governance. When developing the legal rules associated with charity
governance in China, it is worth noting that, ‘[a]ttributing problems only to
inadequate laws and regulations would be an oversimplification.’118 To
reduce the relevant agency costs, the law is essential in setting up and
implementing legal rules governing the duties of charity trustees and the
relevant accountability mechanisms, but should also facilitate a wide scope
for other mechanisms, such as the intrinsic motivations of charity trustees,
informal norms, training and other structural support, to play a role.
For example, although key stakeholders and other selected stakeholders
acting as supervisors can make charity trustees accountable in a range of
ways, to reduce the costs of the supervisors’ moral hazard, the supervisory
costs and other monitoring costs, the law should limit the scope of persons
who have the rights to directly enforce the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees.
117 As many commentators suggest, ‘the law has played a relatively minor role in the evolution of
board structure and behavior; market and other social forces are far more important’. Donald C.
Langevoort, ‘The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 797, 800.
118 Peifeng Liu, ‘Nonprofit Legislation in China’ in Chien-Chung Huang and others (eds), China’s
Nonprofit Sector: Progress and Challenges (Transaction Publishers 2014) 83.
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In addition, in effectively curbing the severe misconduct or mismanagement
of charity trustees, the legal and regulatory system should reduce the high
costs relating to the negative effects of external intervention. In this respect,
for a voluntary charity trustee, as long as his/her decisions are reasonable
and honest, s/he should not be hindered by charity regulators or punished by
law.119 Meanwhile, as to those legal and regulatory mechanisms focusing on
the serious moral hazard of charity trustees, truly altruistic charity trustees
can be reasonably expected not to regard this kind of legal control as severe
external intervention so that their intrinsic motivations may be ‘crowded
out’.
3.3.6.2 Intrinsic Motivations
In terms of intrinsic motivations, it is of vital importance to allow intrinsic
motivations, such as a sense of responsibility, honour, altruism, love and
affection, to motivate charity trustees to perform well. 120 Associated with
this, for every charity, it is critically important to implement an appropriate
selection policy for potential charity trustees121 in order to attract truly
altruistic, skilled, experienced and capable persons.
For charity trustees who are more or less motivated by those intrinsic
motivations, the possibility of moral hazard and the related monitoring costs
may be low. In this respect, it is critical and urgent for China to encourage
the development of a voluntary spirit.
3.3.6.3 Informal Norms
With respect to informal norms, they are different from legal rules. These
norms are informal rules ‘that individuals feel obligated to follow because
of an internalized sense of duty [or] because of a fear of external non-legal
119 Brody (n 87) 976.
120 Steinberg (n 2) 81-82.
121 Puyvelde and others (n 1) 444.
89
sanctions’.122 For example, in England, there exist some codes of conduct123
that have been developed and recommended by the charitable sector itself,
which can facilitate the efficient performance of charity trustees without any
legal sanction.
More importantly, many informal norms in charity governance are self-
enforced and accordingly help reduce the monitoring costs. Therefore, they
‘may be far more important than legal sanctions in causing [charity trustees]
to adhere to their fiduciary responsibilities’.124 That may form an important
reason for the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
to emphasise good practices in dealing with the recent fundraising
controversy in the UK: ‘the [Charity] Commission and regulators should
assist the sector in developing a more ethical fundraising culture, and to
make sure that bad practices are not tolerated’. 125
3.3.6.4 Facilitative Support
As regards facilitative support, the reason why, in many situations, a
charity’s trustees are not performing as efficiently as possible is not due to a
lack of intrinsic motivations or legal and social constraints, but because of
the unclear mission or lack of knowledge and sufficient skills in dealing
with the charity’s affairs. Therefore, in charity governance, there is a
phenomenon which is quite similar to corporate governance: the vital
problem ‘is not the manager who consciously violates his trust, but the
manager who does his best but whose best is not good enough’.126
122 Richard H. HcAdams, ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’ (1997) 96 Michigan
Law Review 338, 340; Richard A. Posner, ‘Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach’
(1997) 87(2) The American Economic Review 365, 365.
123 For example, see The Governance Code Steering Group, Good Governance: A Code for the
Voluntary and Community Sector (2nd edn, The Governance Code Steering Group 2010); Charity
Governance Code Steering Group, Charity Governance Code for Larger Charities (Charity
Governance Code Steering Group 2017); Charity Governance Code Steering Group, Charity
Governance Code for Smaller Charities (Charity Governance Code Steering Group 2017).
124 Hansmann (n 54) 875.
125 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, The 2015 Charity Fundraising
Controversy: Lessons for Trustees, the Charity Commission, and Regulators (Third Report of Session
2015-16, HC431) (The Stationery Office 2016) 3.
126 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature’ (1984) 52
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In this context, similar to the commercial sector where ‘imitation of
standard managerial practices may suffice for relatively successful
performance’,127 facilitative support in charity governance is quite necessary,
such as training, information provision and practical guidance on the
specific aspects of charity governance (either supplied by regulators,
umbrella bodies, watchdog agencies, the media or a charity itself).128 This
will assist charity trustees in efficiently performing their duties.
3.3.7 Summary
In terms of this revised agency theory, charity trustees act as the agents; the
charitable purpose/public benefit plays the role of the principal; and persons
(excluding the charity trustees) voluntarily providing charitable resources
(‘key stakeholders’) and other selected stakeholders by operation of law are
regarded as the supervisors ensuring that the charity trustees efficiently
realise the charitable purpose/public benefit pursued by their charity.
In this context, agency costs are still the standards by which to evaluate
charity governance, whilst the content of those costs extends to the costs
relating to co-ordinating the supervisors and their collective decision-
making process; the costs of supervision, support and enforcement; the costs
of the supervisors’ moral hazard; the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention (the above four forms of costs are called the ‘monitoring costs’
in this thesis); and the residual loss (arising from insufficient accountability
or support). And the aim of charity governance is to reduce those agency
costs accordingly.
On this basis, the general measures reducing agency costs in relation to
charity governance should mainly include a reasonably designed legal
system relating to the legal duties of charity trustees and their enforcement
mechanisms, combined with intrinsic motivations, informal norms and
George Washington Law Review 582, 590.
127 Hansmann (n 5) 38.
128 Generally, see Lord Hodgson (n 33) 34-41, which focuses on ‘supporting the essential contribution
of trustees’.
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structural support.
3.4 Conclusion
The traditional agency theory cannot effectively explain or evaluate charity
governance. To make it adapt to the conditions in the context of charity
governance, it should be incorporated with other theories, such as
stewardship theory, crowding out theory, stakeholder theory, enterprise
ownership theory and public goods theory, in evaluating charity governance.
Taking into account the features of charities, this chapter has developed a
revised version of agency theory. According to this theory, in a charity, its
charity trustees are recognised as the agents (but the assumption about those
charity trustees’ human nature has been changed in a more pragmatic
manner), the charitable purpose/public benefit plays the role of the principal,
and the key stakeholders (persons who are not the charity trustees but who
provide charitable resources to this charity, such as the government, donors,
volunteers, and the general public) and other selected stakeholders by
operation of law (whether those selected stakeholders donate assets to this
charity or not) act as the supervisors on behalf of the charitable
purpose/public benefit.
According to this revised agency theory, agency costs continue their role in
evaluating charity governance. The contents of agency costs in the context
of charity governance include the monitoring costs and the residual loss.
However, the monitoring costs should be further extended to the costs
relating to co-ordinating the supervisors and their collective decision-
making process; the costs of supervision, support and enforcement; the costs
of the supervisors’ moral hazard; and the costs of the negative effects of
external intervention. The residual loss includes the costs of the charity
trustees’ moral hazard due to inefficient accountability and the costs
regarding inefficient use of charitable resources because of insufficient
support. Accordingly, charity governance should help reduce or strike a
balance between the above costs in ensuring compliance by charity trustees.
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In realising this goal, the law is essential in setting up and implementing
rules governing the duties of charity trustees and the relevant accountability
mechanisms, but should allow for other governance mechanisms to play a
role in helping to reduce agency costs, such as intrinsic motivations of
charity trustees, informal norms, training and other structural support.
Accordingly, in the following chapters, the thesis will make use of the
analytical framework developed in this chapter to examine the relevant
problems of laws and policies regarding governmental regulation, internal
governance, accountability to third parties and public accountability in
England and China, and to further discover a set of feasible ways to
transform Chinese law and practice in this area.
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Chapter 4 Promoting Efficient Governmental Regulation
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the thesis will take an economic and comparative approach
assessing governmental regulation on charity trustees and further offer a
range of reform measures facilitating efficient governmental regulation in
China.
As noted in Chapter 3, ensuring compliance by charity trustees can be
regarded as a public good. In this context, in supervising and supporting
charity trustees efficiently, governmental regulation can reduce the whole
monitoring costs of the society. According to Oliver E. Williamson, in terms
of the commercial sector, some transactions cannot occur in circumstances
that lack an effective protection mechanism, ‘because it is not cost-effective
for the parties to craft transaction-specific governance in [those]
circumstances’.1
Similarly, in the charitable sector, if the government performs well in
ensuring the compliance of charity trustees so that the public confidence in
the charitable sector is maintained,2 it will greatly reduce the whole
monitoring costs of donors, volunteers, the public and any other private
parties. Accordingly, ‘the extent of charity donation is likely to increase as a
donor will become more confident that his/her donation is going towards its
intended purpose’.3
However, governmental regulation has its own monitoring costs which
should be further reduced. According to the revised agency theory
developed in Chapter 3, these costs mainly include the costs relating to co-
1 Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (OUP 1996) 267.
2 Joel L. Fleishman, ‘Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizations and the Need for Regulatory
Reform’ in Charles T. Clotfelter and Thomas Ehrlich (eds), Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in
a Changing America (Indiana University Press 1999) 177.
3 Noel Hyndman and Paul McDonnell, ‘Governance and Charities: An Exploration of Key Themes
and the Development of a Research Agenda’ (2009) 25(1) Financial Accountability & Management 5,
14.
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ordinating regulators, the costs of supervision, support and enforcement, the
costs of the regulators’ moral hazard (those regulators or their staff may
pursue their private benefits in the name of accountability) and the costs of
the negative effects of external intervention.
Taking account of those costs, this chapter will analyse two major problems
respectively. First, whether the law should respect and protect the
independent governance of charity trustees. Second, how efficient
governmental regulation can be achieved.
Based on this revised agency theory, this chapter argues that Chinese law
should respect and protect the independent governance of charity trustees
and further build or improve a range of legal and regulatory mechanisms
regarding co-operative, proportionate and accountable regulation and
balancing the regulatory and supportive functions of regulators to achieve
efficient governmental regulation. A comprehensive economic analysis
along with a comparative study of English law and practice will be carried
out to support those arguments and to further recommend more detailed
reform strategies in improving Chinese law and practice.
4.2 Promoting the Independent Governance of Charity Trustees in
China
4.2.1 Introduction
In Chinese law, a vital problem relating to the governing body of a charity is
lack of independence: the establishment of independent charities is strictly
limited and the government has direct control over legally registered or
recognised charities. To tackle this problem, the thesis will compare the
regulatory approaches in both jurisdictions and further assess which one
performs better in reducing the agency costs relating to governmental
regulation.
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4.2.2 Comparing the Regulatory Approaches in Both Jurisdictions
The comparative analysis of the regulatory approaches dealing with
independent governance in England and China can be further divided into
two parts, the issues relating to independent governance at the establishing
stage and those at the daily operational stage.
4.2.2.1 The Regulatory Approaches at the Establishing Stage
In England, the basic regulatory approach relating to independent
governance at the establishing stage can be concluded as allowing the
establishment and development of charities and reducing any excessive
limitation on registration. For example, in practice non-profit organisations
with charitable purposes provided by law should be registered as charities in
England.4 In addition, organisations with charitable purposes provided by
law, which, according to the Charities Act 2011, do not need to register--
such as those ‘whose gross income does not exceed £5,000’5--can still be
recognised as charities in English law.
By contrast, in China, the government’s approach is to strictly restrict the
establishment and existence of non-profits, including charities. In this
respect, there is a dual administrative system6 which greatly limits the
establishment of independent charities, leading to there being few registered
independent charities in practice.
In China, the dual administrative system means that, before registering as a
non-profit organisation, an organisation has to find a professional
administrative unit7 (‘业务主管单位 ’) to be responsible for the direct
4 CA 2011, s 30.
5 ibid.
6 Xiaoguang Kang and Feng Li, ‘NGO Governance in China: Achievements and Dilemmas’ in Lisa
Jordan and Peter van Tuijl (eds), NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations (Earthscan
2006) 144.
7 In the context of Chinese law, the reason for using the term ‘units’ (‘ 单 位 ’) rather than
‘governmental departments’ is due to the fact that, except for governmental departments, some public
institutions (‘事业单位 ’) and other organisations authorised by the government to assume certain
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supervision of this organisation,8 to allow it to further apply for registration
in the department of civil affairs (‘民政部门’, for the purposes of the thesis,
‘the department of civil affairs’ refers to the Ministry of Civil Affairs or any
of its branches at local level), the registration and administration regulator
(‘登记管理机关’). Those professional administrative units include but are
not limited to governmental departments and public institutions.
Only after a unit agrees to become the professional administrative unit of
this organisation and all the required documents are submitted, can this
organisation continue to apply to the Ministry of Civil Affairs or one of its
branches to become a legally recognised non-profit organisation. The main
problem is that both the units functioning as professional administrative
units and the department of civil affairs are the branches/departments of the
government or the organisations controlled by the government that have the
absolute power to decide whether to become the organisation’s professional
administrative unit or to register it as a non-profit organisation.9 In this
context, for independent charities:
the biggest institutional restriction is the difficulty of official
registration, which represents a barrier for them in raising funds,
seeking tax exemption, receiving legal protection, gaining public
recognition, and carrying out activities smoothly.10
Under such a system, most independent charities cannot obtain legal status
as non-profits from the government.11 Accordingly, although some
independent charities may continue to apply as non-profits, others choose
public functions are also acting as regulators of charities and other non-profit organisations.
8 Kang and Li (n 6) 144.
9 Jillian Ashley and Pengyu He, ‘Opening One Eye and Closing the Other: the Legal and Regulatory
Environment for ‘‘Grassroots’’ NPOs in China Today’ (2008) 26 Boston University International Law
Journal 29, 32.
10 Wang Zhenyao and Zhao Yanhui, ‘The Collapse and Reemergence of Private Philanthropy in China,
1949-2012’ in Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds), Philanthropy for Health in
China (Indiana University Press 2014) 34. In this respect, it is worth noting that, not all non-profits
can receive tax benefits in England either.
11 Karla W. Simon, Civil Society in China: The Legal Framework from Ancient Times to the ‘New
Reform Era’ (OUP 2013) 244-245.
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alternative methods to survive. Here is a further analysis of three main
methods taken by charities in practice, i.e., directly applying to register as
non-profits (foundations, associations or civil non-commercial units), being
attached to other legal organisations (‘挂靠 ’) 12 or being registered as for-
profit companies.
First, some charities seek to register with governmental regulators as non-
profits, but similar to the application process for Japanese non-profits, ‘[t]he
application process is known to be very complicated and time-consuming.’13
Even if a small number of independent charities succeed in obtaining legal
status due to the urgent social need and their character that is deemed to pose
no threat to the government’s authority,14 the costs may be very high.
For example, One Foundation (‘壹基金’), a charitable foundation initialled
by Lianjie Li (a famous movie star), could not obtain legal status for a long
time. After two years’ efforts, Li succeeded in co-operating with Red Cross
Society of China (a typical government-controlled charity) and One
Foundation became ‘Lianjie Li One Foundation Project of Red Cross
Society of China’ in 2007. However, this meant that One Foundation could
only operate under the control of Red Cross Society of China. This was the
case until 2008 when, with the support of Red Cross Society of China and
the department of civil affairs in Shanghai, One Foundation finally became
incorporated.15
In this case, it is necessary to point out that the huge social influence of
Lianjie Li and the special support from the government played a vital role in
the success of this registration. Despite this, it took several years for him to
12 Interestingly, there is a similar phenomenon in England: ‘inability to access grant funding without a
registration number can lead to charities ‘‘sharing’’ registration numbers or larger organisations
applying for funds on behalf of smaller ones.’ Lord Hodgson, Trusted and Independent: Giving
Charity back to Charities-Review of the Charities Act 2006 (The Stationery Office 2012) 54.
13 Nobuko Kawashima, ‘Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Missing Chain of Accountability in
Nonprofit Corporation Law in Japan and Arguments for Reform in the U.S.’ (2006) 24 UCLA Pacific
Basin Law Journal 81, 89.
14 For example, some charitable foundations (‘基金会’).
15Concerning the development of One Foundation, see its official website:
<http://www.onefoundation.cn/> accessed 20 September 2017.
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establish One Foundation as an incorporated charity. Therefore, it is
reasonable to imagine that it is too difficult for most ordinary people to
register a non-profit.
Second, for charities which choose the form of ‘挂靠 ’ (being attached to
another legal organisation), it is very likely that they will be controlled by
the sponsor unit (‘挂靠单位’) to which they are attached, leading to a lack
of independent governance. Moreover, under the influence of the
government or other external pressure, they might face the risk of being
expelled at any time by their sponsor unit.
For example, Women’s Legal Research and Service Center at Peking
University, the first public benefit organisation16 aimed at providing legal
aid to and conducting research about the relevant legal issues of women in
China, was closed by Peking University several years ago, to which it had
been attached. One of the reasons why the university closed it was that this
organisation received overseas funding and tackled some sensitive cases.17
After this event, its founder established another public benefit organisation,
Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Counseling and Service Center, which was
forced by the government to shut down operations recently.18
Third, some charities choose to register as for-profit companies with the
department of industrial and commercial administration (‘工商部门’), such
as Beijing Star and Rain Educational Research Institute (‘星星雨教育研究
所’), which is the first non-profit educational organisation helping children
with autism in China. Such charities experience several problems in practice.
In contrast to the situation in England, where charitable companies do exist,
16 It is worth noting that, before the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), the term ‘public
benefit organisation’ (‘公益组织 ’) rather than ‘charity’ (‘慈善组织 ’) was more frequently used in
practice.
17 Yu Gao, ‘The Former Women’s Legal Research and Service Center of Peking University Responds
to the Event of Being Closed’ Caixin (Beijing, 2 April 2010) <http://china.caixin.com/2010-04-
02/100131464.html> accessed 20 September 2017.
18 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ‘China Is Said to Force Closing of Women’s Legal Aid Center’ The New York
Times (New York, 29 January 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/world/asia/beijing-
women-legal-aid-guo-jianmei.html?_r=0> accessed 20 September 2017.
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all companies should be for-profit legal persons in China.19 Therefore, the
for-profit nature and the related structure of companies in China might result
in inefficiency and ineffectiveness20 for those organisations aimed at
achieving charitable purposes. For example, charities registered as
companies could neither obtain tax benefits enjoyed by some registered
non-profits nor have the right to raise funds from the public. In addition, this
arrangement may also increase the moral hazard of their charity trustees due
to a lack of mandatory legal requirements on the non-distribution constraint.
Nevertheless, at the operational level, with regard to grass-root charities
which are beneficial to the community, share the same or similar purposes
with the government and never challenge the authority of the government,
regulators usually chooses to carry out an informal policy called ‘open an
eye, and close the other one’ (‘睁一只眼闭一只眼’), indicating both great
flexibility and uncertainty in policy preferences.21 This legal framework has
restricted and negatively affected the healthy development of independent
charities.
Realising those problems, on March 16th 2016, the Charity Law 2016 (China)
was passed by the National People’s Congress.22 It has been officially
recognised as the first comprehensive charity law since the establishment of
the PRC.23 This new law unifies the rules governing charity, and provides a
range of rules relating to charitable activities, charities, charitable
19 Company Law 1993 (China, revised in 2013), ss 3-4.
20 Chao Guo and others, ‘Civil Society, Chinese Style: the Rise of the Non-profit Sector in Post-Mao
China’ Nonprofit Quarterly (Boston, 25 October 2012)
<http://nonprofitquarterly.org/2012/10/25/civil-society-chinese-stylethe-rise-of-the-nonprofit-sector-
in-post-mao-chinaby/> accessed 20 September 2017.
21 Goshen Deng, ‘The Hidden Rules Governing China’s Unregistered NGOs: Management and
Consequences’ (2010) 10 The China Review 183.
22 As a matter of fact, the government had proposed a draft charity law for a long period. Regarding
the previous process of drafting charity law, see Mulan Zhang, ‘Charity Law Is Being Redrafted 9
Years Later’ China Philanthropy Times (Beijing, 14 May 2014)
<http://www.gongyishibao.com/html/yaowen/6463.html> accessed 20 September 2017; International
Center for Civil Society Law, ‘Comments on the Draft Charity Law for the People’s Republic of
China’ (2007) 5(1) International Journal of Civil Society Law 12, 12-27 (which provides an
introduction to the previously unpublished draft charity law in China).
23 Jinchao Guo, ‘China Enacted Its First Charity Law and Opens the Era of Governing “Charity” by
Law’ China News (Beijing, 16 March 2016) <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2016/03-
16/7799495.shtml> accessed 20 September 2017.
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fundraising, charitable donations, charitable trusts, charity property,
charitable services, disclosure of information, supportive measures, charity
regulation and legal responsibilities.
From the perspective of reducing the limitations on the establishment of
independent charities, the main contribution of this new law is that it defines
charities, and clarifies their main regulators,24 registration conditions and
procedures,25 making it possible for more independent charities to be
recognised and protected by law.
First, the law defines charities. In the strict sense, there was no charity in
China before the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China). Due to the
lack of a unified definition of charities, organisations with charitable
purposes could not be recognised as charities by law, although, in practice,
some ‘public benefit trusts’ (‘公益信托’)26 and foundations27--both of which
had public benefit purposes28--might fall within the scope of ‘charities’.
To facilitate independent organisations to acquire charitable status, the
recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) defines charities as legally
established non-profit organisations which comply with this law and aim to
carry out charitable activities benefiting the society.29
Second, after the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), non-profits
24 CL 2016 (China), s 10.
25 For example, see CL 2016 (China), ss 9-10.
26 Before the enactment of the CL 2016 (China), public benefit trusts were regulated by the Trusts
Law 2001 (China). In addition, technically, charitable trusts are not recognised as charities in Chinese
law even after the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China).
27 According to the Regulation on the Administration of Foundations 2004 (China), foundations are
non-profit legal persons established for the public benefit purposes. RAF 2004 (China), s 2.
28 As a matter of fact, before the enactment of this new law, the term ‘charity’ (‘慈善 ’)/‘charitable
purposes’ (‘慈善目的’) was rarely used in legal rules. Instead, ‘public benefit’ (‘公益/公共利益’) and
‘public benefit purposes’ (‘公益 /公共利益目的 ’) were widely mentioned in a range of laws and
regulations. For example, see PBUDL 1999 (China); TL 2001 (China), s 60; RAF 2004 (China), s 2.
After the implementation of this new law, a new problem arose related to how to understand the
relationship between charitable purposes and public benefit purposes. Regarding this problem, see
Dejian Li, Research on Charity Law in the United Kingdom (Law Press 2017) (李德健：《英国慈善
法研究》，法律出版社 2017年版).
29 CL 2016 (China), s 8.
101
complying with the requirements and conditions provided in this law have
the right to register as charities with the department of civil affairs.30
However, this new law does not deal with the problems relating to the ‘dual
administrative system’, so it remains to be seen whether this traditional
system will be abandoned or continue to exist in practice.
Third, to promote the development of charitable trusts in China, the law
clarifies the department of civil affairs as their regulator and further reduces
the requirements on their establishment. Before the enactment of the Charity
Law 2016 (China), the Trusts Law 2001 (China) did not even identify the
governmental regulator responsible for registration and regulation of public
benefit trusts.31 In practice, different governmental departments usually
announced that it was other departments who were responsible for the
registration and regulation of those public benefit trusts.32 Consequently,
after this form of trust was introduced into China, it was rarely used.
To tackle this issue, the Charity Law 2016 (China) clarifies the department
of civil affairs as the governmental regulator of charitable trusts.33
Meanwhile, this new law only requires charity trustees to file charitable
trust documents and other documents with the department of civil affairs,
which is expected to be a simpler procedure than the registration procedure
applying to other charities.34
Nevertheless, although this new law, to some extent, reduces the limitations
on the establishment of independent charities, given that the related
regulations, policies and practices are not fundamentally changed, it remains
to be seen whether and when the new rules in the Charity Law 2016 (China)
can be put in practice.
30 CL 2016 (China), s 10.
31Yinglu Li, ‘Charitable Trusts in China’ (2014) 20(4) Trusts and Trustees 345, 348.
32 ibid 346.
33 CL 2016 (China), s 45. Meanwhile, this new law provides that ‘charitable trusts belong to public
benefit trusts’. CL 2016 (China), s 44.
34 CL 2016 (China), s 45.
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4.2.2.2 The Regulatory Approaches at the Daily Operational Stage
In England, the Charities Act 2011 respects and protects the independent
governance of charity trustees by making it clear that this Act does not
authorise the Charity Commission ‘(a) to exercise functions corresponding
to those of a charity trustee in relation to a charity, or (b) otherwise to be
directly involved in the administration of a charity’.35 Meanwhile, even the
Charity Commission itself issues guidance on how to protect the
independent governance of charity trustees, such as ‘The Independence of
Charities from the State (RR7)’.36
By contrast, under the traditional regulatory system, Chinese regulators
maintain direct control over the governance issues of a charity, resulting in
charity trustees having a comparatively weak position in governing their
charity. The recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) seems not to seek to
resolve this problem: it does not make it clear whether this system will be
removed or relaxed.
Under this ‘dual administrative system’, independent governance in a
charity cannot be protected: currently, the participation of professional
administrative units ‘in the day-to-day running of NPOs effectively prevents
any political activity or other activities by NPOs which in the view of the
Chinese government pose a challenge to its own power or the unity of the
country’.37 In this context, the governing body of a Chinese charity (such as
the board of directors in a foundation) cannot play the same independent
and core role as English charity trustees have in terms of ‘the general
control and management of the administration of a charity’.38
35 CA 2011, s 20. For a general discussion of legal issues regarding independence and autonomy in
charity governance, see Evelyn Brody, ‘Governing the Nonprofit Organization: Accommodating
Autonomy in Organizational Law’ (2008) 46 Canadian Business Law Journal 343.
36 Charity Commission, The Independence of Charities from the State (RR7) (Charity Commission
2009).
37 Thomas von Hippel and Knut B. Pißler, ‘Nonprofit Organizations in the People’s Republic of
China’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-
Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 475.
38 CA 2011, s 177.
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Under this system, the professional administrative units of charities, usually
including the Communist Party of China, ‘democratic parties’,39
governmental regulators at all levels, organisations affiliated to them and the
branches of the above organisations, play a supervisory role in both the
internal and external governance of those charities.40 In practice,
professional administrative units can frequently exercise the power to select
members of the governing body and a range of other powers in deciding the
internal affairs of a charity. By contrast, although the Charity Commission
has similar powers (such as the powers to suspend, appoint and remove
charity trustees, to appoint an interim manager, and to direct specified action
to be taken or application of charity property),41 it can only exercise those
powers when serious events (such as ‘misconduct or mismanagement in the
administration of’42 a charity) occur.43
In this context, in respect of Chinese charities, ‘a board in its real sense does
not exist, neither in [government-controlled charities], nor independent
[charities]’44 which are lucky enough to be registered due to a good
relationship with the government.45 Given the government’s strict control of
those charities, independent governance cannot be guaranteed in practice.
4.2.3 An Economic Analysis of the Current Regulatory Approaches in
Both Jurisdictions
In contrast to English law, which respects and protects the independent
governance of charities, regulators in China still maintains strict restrictions
39 In mainland China, apart from the Communist Party of China as the governing party, there are still
eight democratic parties (‘民主党派 ’) as the parties participating in the governmental decision-
making process (‘参政党’). The Communist Party of China, these democratic parties and other social
forces make up ‘the multi-party cooperation and political consultation system’ (‘多党合作政治协商’).
40 Hippel and Pißler (n 37) 455.
41 CA 2011, ss 76-85.
42 CA 2011, s 76.
43 CA 2011, ss 76-87.
44 Kang and Li (n 6) 136. By comparison with registered charities, unregistered grass-root charities
usually have a true governing body. However, because these charities are regarded as illegal
organisations by law, the independence of their governing body will not be guaranteed.
45 ‘[Charities] that the government is not happy with cannot even register legally.’ Kang and Li (n 6)
137.
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on the establishment of charities and the governance function of their
charity trustees. This arrangement not only reflects the government’s
unhealthy and destructive attitude towards non-profits,46 but also leads to
higher agency costs relating to charity regulation in China.
4.2.3.1 Costs of the Moral Hazard of Regulators and Charity Trustees
Under the regulatory system in China, regulators can limit competition by
restricting the establishment of independent charities, 47 and replace or
control charity trustees in governing a charity, making regulators themselves
act as charity trustees in all but name. In this context, without sufficient
competition and efficient regulation, regulators/charity trustees usually do
not have a strong motivation to efficiently use charitable resources, to
quickly respond to the current social needs, and to prevent and fight against
corruption,48 leading to high costs relating to the governmental regulators’
and charity trustees’ moral hazard.
As a consequence, the phenomena relating to corruption and
misappropriation relating to the government and government-controlled
charities in public goods delivery are very serious. For example, ‘[i]n the
2010/11 Global Corruption Barometer, close to one in ten people surveyed
in China reported that they had paid a bribe for a public service in the
previous 12 months.’49 And Liangyu Chen, the former top officer in
Shanghai City, was ultimately imprisoned in 2008 because of a scandal
46 Peifeng Liu, ‘Nonprofit Legislation in China’ in Chien-Chung Huang and others (eds), China’s
Nonprofit Sector: Progress and Challenges (Transaction Publishers 2014) 81.
47 In practice, based on the government monopoly of charitable resources, government-controlled
charities receive the majority of charitable donations. Yue Pan and Yajun Zhou, ‘Ministry of Civil
Affairs Recognised that 60 % of Charitable Donations Were Received by the Government and
Government-controlled Charities’ People’s Daily (Beijing, 16 February 2012)
<http://news.qq.com/a/20120216/000170.htm> accessed 20 September 2017.
48 See, for example, Yongguang Xu, ‘Towards A Healthier Philanthropy Reforming China’s
Philanthropic Sector’ in Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds), Philanthropy for
Health in China (Indiana University Press 2014) 271.
49 Transparency International, ‘Fighting Corruption in China’ (2012)
<http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/fighting_corruption_in_china> accessed 20 September
2017.
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relating to pension misappropriation.50 In 2013, under great pressure from
donors, one officer from Red Cross Poverty Alleviation Development
Service Center had to admit that a charitable donation worth more than 84
million yuan had had been misappropriated for other causes.51 In 2015, one
former vice-director of Red Cross Society of Sichuan Province was
sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for corruption.52 Recently, the minister
and several vice-ministers of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, as the main
charity regulator at the national level, were directly removed from office
due to institutional corruption within this ministry.53
By contrast, in England, the law allows charities to be registered, reduces
any excessive limitation on their registration, and avoids direct participation
by the Charity Commission in the internal governance of a charity. This
legal arrangement can help reduce the costs associated with the Charity
Commission’s and charity trustees’moral hazard.
First, because the Charity Commission does not directly participate in the
internal governance of any charity, the possibility of conflicts of interest due
to the co-existence of the regulatory role of the regulator and its role as a
charity trustee has been greatly reduced. That may be one important reason
why there is very little corruption reported in the Commission, although
there are a range of criticisms concerning its inefficiency in performing its
functions.54
50 The Economist, ‘Hu Jintao Sticks Out His Elbows and Fires Shanghai’s Party Chief’ The Economist
(London, 28 September 2006) <http://www.economist.com/node/7971021> accessed 20 September
2017.
51 Hanliang Zheng, ‘Red Cross Society of China Recognised that It Misappropriated 84,700,000 RMB
of Charitable Donations Which Should Have Been Used in the Disaster Relief of Wenchuan
Earthquake’ Radio France Internationale (Paris, 29 April 2013)
<http://cn.rfi.fr/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20130429-
%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%BA%A2%E5%8D%81%E5%AD%97%E4%BC%9A%E6%89
%BF%E8%AE%A4%E6%8C%AA%E7%94%A8%E6%B1%B6%E5%B7%9D%E8%B5%88%E7%
81%BE8470%E4%B8%87%E5%B7%A8%E6%AC%BE> accessed 20 September 2017.
52 Jian Zhang, ‘Why was the Charity Property of the Red Cross Society Changed into Private
Property’ Caijing (Beijing, 15 September 2015)
<http://www.caijingmobile.com/wxshare/208790.html> accessed 20 September 2017.
53 Rujun Wen, ‘Minister and Vice Ministers of the Ministry of Civil Affairs Were Reduced to a Much
Lower Rank’ (Legal Evening News, 9 February 2017)
<http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170209/50666399_0.shtml> accessed 20 September 2017.
54 National Audit Office, The Regulatory Effectiveness of the Charity Commission (Session 2013-2014,
106
Second, the Charity Commission does not set excessive limitations on the
establishment of charities, which can ensure a more satisfactory competitive
environment and encourage volunteers to act as charity trustees, reducing
the charity trustees’ moral hazard. On the one hand, charities have to
compete with each other to obtain support from donors, volunteers and the
general public, which forces their charity trustees to perform better for
them.55 On the other hand, the participation of a large number of volunteers
who are motivated by non-monetary factors in charity governance will also
help reduce the charity trustees’ moral hazard. Accordingly, in English
charities, these costs can be reasonably expected to be lower than those in
China.
4.2.3.2 Supervisory Costs Placed on the General Public and Donors
In China, due to the inefficient governmental regulation, the general public
and ordinary donors cannot depend on government regulators to ensure
sound charity governance, further leading to higher supervisory costs
because they have to make use of other methods to supervise the
performance of charity trustees. Hence, directly associated with the first
point, the general public and donors have, to a great degree, lost confidence
and trust in government-controlled charities.56 A typical example is that
several years ago ‘charitable donations in China fell more than 80 percent
because of public mistrust’57 arising from a range of charity scandals, as
HC 813) (The Stationery Office 2013); Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee,
The Collapse of Kids Company: Lessons for Charity Trustees, Professional Firms, the Charity
Commission, and Whitehall (Fourth Report of Session 2015-16, HC 433) (The Stationery Office
2016).
55 Of course, in contrast to the restrictive approach in China, a relaxed approach in England has
already led to another problem: ‘there are too many charities competing for too few funds’. Charity
Commission, Collaborative Working and Mergers (RS4) (Charity Commission 2003) 1. However,
given the initial stage of the charitable sector in China, this problem should not be a strong argument
supporting the limitations on the establishment of charities.
56 By contrast, in England, for many citizens, ‘knowing that an organisation is a charity is often
enough to give the public confidence to donate money to it’. Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, Private
Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and the Wider Not-For-Profit Sector (Cabinet Office
Strategy Unit 2002) 14. However, there are also charitable scandals in England, such as the Cup Trust
and Comic Relief, although they do not occur as frequently as those arising in China. For example,
see Declan Lawn, ‘Comic Relief Money Invested in Arms and Tobacco Shares’ BBC (London, 10
December 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25273024> accessed 20 September 2017.
57 Adam Chodorow, ‘Charity with Chinese Characteristics’ (2012) 30(1) UCLA Pacific Basin Law
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noted in Chapter 1.
This distrust may also explain why in China most donations are from
companies58 rather than individuals. In modern society, commercial
companies can indirectly promote their economic benefit through charitable
donations.59 However, this may not apply to the general public and ordinary
donors, who lack confidence and trust in charities. Instead, the general
public is calling for more accountability to ensure efficient use of charitable
resources.60
In contrast to charity regulators in China, the Charity Commission does not
directly participate in the internal governance issues of charities, let alone
strictly control the whole charitable sector. Instead, it takes a risk-based and
accountable approach in ensuring that charity trustees comply with legal and
regulatory requirements, which is more efficient in promoting the sound
performance of charity trustees, as discussed in the following section of this
chapter.
Accordingly, a large number of donors and the general public can choose to
trust the Charity Commission rather than to further supervise the
performance of charity trustee on their own. For example, a recent survey
carried out on behalf of the Charity Commission found that ‘60% of the
public believe that charities are regulated effectively’.61 This will definitely
help reduce the supervisory costs of those key stakeholders.
Journal 1, 49; Sabrina Mao and Sui-Lee Wee, ‘Donations to Charities in China Plunge after Scandals’
Reuters (London, 8 December 2011) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-donations-
idUSTRE7B70F820111208> accessed 20 September 2017.
58 Eileen Heisman, ‘Philanthropic Leapfrog: Giving in China’ Nonprofit Quarterly (Boston, 6
September 2013) <https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2013/09/06/philanthropic-leapfrog-giving-in-china/>
accessed 20 September 2017.
59 For example, see Xiufeng Chen and Li Li, ‘The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility and
Charitable Foundations in China’ in Chien-Chung Huang and others (eds), China’s Nonprofit Sector:
Progress and Challenges (Transaction Publishers 2014) 23-24.
60 Lincoln C. Chen, Jennifer Ryan, and Tony Saich, ‘Introduction: Philanthropy for Health in China:
Distinctive Roots and Future Prospects’ in Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds),
Philanthropy for Health in China (Indiana University Press 2014) 14.
61 Populus, Public Trust and Confidence in Charities (Populus 2016) 39.
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4.2.3.3 Costs of the Negative Effects of External Intervention
In China, the strong governmental control over the internal affairs of a
charity may limit the voluntary spirit of capable persons to act as charity
trustees or the current charity trustees to actively perform their duties in the
best interests of their charity. It may lead to high costs relating to the
negative effects of external intervention.
For charity trustees in government-controlled charities, charitable activities
are mainly performed in order to carry out the tasks assigned by their higher
administrative authority rather than to realise their own altruistic pursuits.
This may not stimulate their non-monetary motivation in order to efficiently
use charitable resources to benefit the public. Meanwhile, for independent
charities which are lucky enough to be registered, given the excessive
control by the government over their internal governance issues, their
charity trustees’ non-monetary motivation may also be hurt frequently in
practice, negatively affecting the charity trustees’ efficiency in realising the
charitable purposes that those charities pursue.
Although it is hard to evaluate the costs of the negative effects of
governmental control on the performance of current charity trustees, there is
an official report about the number of volunteers in China, which may, to
some degree, reflect the negative effects of excessive governmental control.
According to the ‘Statistical Communique on the Development of Social
Services 2015’ issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, in China, a country
with a population of more than 1.3 billion, there were less than 9.4 million
persons participating in voluntary work in 2015.62 Here, it is worth noting
that, the real number of volunteers was even much less than 9.4 million,
because if a volunteer participated in charitable activities three times a year,
it would be reflected as three persons in this official report. Among them,
62 Ministry of Civil Affairs, Statistical Communique on the Development of Social Services 2015
(Ministry of Civil Affairs 2016)
<http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/sj/tjgb/201607/20160700001136.shtml> accessed 20 September 2017.
109
the number of persons choosing to act as charity trustees can be reasonably
expected to be much smaller.
By contrast, the English regulatory approach to allowing the establishment
of charities and to further protecting their independent governance can
encourage capable volunteers to act as charity trustees and enable them to
actively govern their charities, reducing the costs of the negative effects of
external intervention.
Although it is difficult to accurately evaluate the role of charity trustees’
non-monetary motivations in ensuring their high-quality performance, we
can at least assess the efficiency of English law in reducing the costs of the
negative effects of governmental regulation partly through the proportion of
individuals participating in charitable activities. According to the ‘UK Civil
Society Almanac 2017’, 27% people volunteer at least once a month and
41% people act as volunteers at least once a year.63
4.2.4 ‘Giving Charity Back to Charities’64
From an economic perspective, ensuring independent governance will
facilitate a reduction in agency costs, as analysed above. For example, in
contrast to government-controlled charities, to exist and further its
charitable purpose, the charity trustees of any independent charity have to
compete in attracting donations and voluntary participation. Accordingly,
they must enhance the efficient use of charitable resources and become
more accountable, transparent and user-oriented to maintain their charity’s
reputation, which will help reduce their own moral hazard.
Meanwhile, independent governance guaranteed by fiduciary duties and
other accountability and transparency mechanisms will further reduce the
supervisory costs of donors, volunteers and the general public; the moral
63 NCVO, ‘UK Civil Society Almanac 2017’ (NCVO 2017)
<https://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac17/fast-facts-6/> accessed 20 September 2017.
64 See, for example, Lord Hodgson (n 12).
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hazard of regulators that do not directly control the internal governance
issues of a charity; and the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention. Hence, China should draw on the experience of English law,
protecting the independent governance of charity trustees at the operational
stage and promoting the establishment of independent charities.
4.2.4.1 Protecting the Independent Governance of Charity Trustees
First, in the future legal reform, the laws or regulations in this area should
allow charity trustees to govern their charities independently. In doing so,
they should require that a governing body consisting of more private
individuals (rather than governmental officers) be responsible for the
general control and management of its charity.65 Furthermore, even if
sometimes there are local authority trustees in a charity, Chinese law should
make it clear that similar to English law, those charity trustees have the duty
to manage the conflicts of interest and act in the best interests of the
charity.66
Second, the law should reduce the situations in which regulators can have
direct control over the internal governance issues of any charity. In this
respect, Chinese law should draw on the experience of English law,
providing that, ‘unless the situation is so serious as to amount to a possible
breach of the law’,67 any governmental regulator should not play the role of
the governing body or directly manage and control the affairs of a charity, as
required by the Charities Act 2011.68
65 On this basis, some supportive measures should be put in place to help select, and strengthen the
capacity and skills of, members of the governing body to perform their duties. For example, see
Charity Commission, Trustee Recruitment, Selection and Induction (RS1) (Charity Commission 2002);
Charity Commission, Trustee Board: People and Skills (Charity Commission 2014).
66 Charity Commission, Local Authorities as Charity Trustees (Charity Commission 2013).
67 Lord Hodgson (n 12) 45. Of course, even in England, the Charity Commission may sometimes
excessively intervene in the independent decisions of charity trustees in terms of how to realise the
charitable purpose of their charity. For example, recently, the Commission required several charities
to stop funding CAGE, a campaign group, but finally withdrew its requirement. Randeep Ramesh,
‘Charities Can Fund Cage Campaign Group, Commission Agrees’ Guardian (London, 21 October
2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/oct/21/charities-can-fund-controversial-pressure-
group-cage-court-finds> accessed 1 June 2017.
68 CA 2011, s 20; Charity Commission (n 36). In addition, in terms of private law (which governs
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4.2.4.2 Reducing the Current Legal and Regulatory Rules Limiting the
Establishment of Independent Charities
As noted above, the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) has, to
some degree, reduced the previous limitations on the establishment of
independent charities. Despite this, given that some of the relevant
regulations have not been changed according to this new law, there remains
a need for legal reform in this area in order to reflect or implement the spirit
or requirements of the Charity Law 2016 (China) and to help reduce the
agency costs concerning charity regulation.
First, the law should further clarify the procedures related to setting up
charities. Here, it is worth noting that, ‘the more difficult it is to qualify for
charitable status the harder it will be for the [regulator] to force institutions
to register as charities and become subject to its regulation’,69 which may
increase the charity trustees’ moral hazard in those organisations.
Therefore, the law should provide that, for organisations conforming to the
required conditions, the department of civil affairs should register them as
charities, and should not delay or refuse to register without any legal reason.
The Charity Law 2016 (China) confirms this point:
organisations satisfying the requirements provided by this law
should apply to be registered and the registration should be
disclosed to the public; organisations not satisfying the
requirements provided by this law cannot be registered, but should
contract, tort, property, private organisations, family, etc.), China mainly learns the relevant theory
and legislation from Germany and Japan. With regard to organisation law, there is a basic principle
governing this area; that is, the ‘principle of the autonomy of associations’ (Thomas von Hippel,
‘Nonprofit Organizations in Germany’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative
Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 214.), which means that, in principle,
an organisation itself should decide its own internal affairs and any other party should not intervene.
Therefore, even according to the ideas of private law in China, the future law should also allow and
protect the independent governance of charities rather than maintain direct control by the government
or its branches.
69 Robert Meakin, The Law of Charitable Status: Maintenance and Removal (CUP 2008) 197.
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be given the reason in writing.70
However, because some of the requirements in this new law are very
abstract (for example, having necessary property),71 the department of civil
affairs still has too much discretion in practice. Therefore, given that the
Charity Law 2016 (China) empowers the State Council (the central
government) to enact the specific rules relating to the organisational
structures of charities and the registration and regulation issues, 72 the
relevant regulations enacted by the State Council should make the
requirements as clear as possible, to ‘avoid introducing measures which
increase bureaucracy and discourage people from forming [charities]’.73
Second, the relevant regulations and policies negatively affecting the
fairness and transparency of registration should be abandoned. Due to lack
of laws governing the application procedures, the previous process was not
transparent and fair. In this context, only organisations that had a close or
good relationship with the government could register as non-profits.
According to the spirit of this new law, the government should make a
decision on whether to register an organisation as a charity according to a
unified, fair and transparent procedure, rather than based on its relationship
with the government (such as political and/or personal ties with the
government74).
In this respect, the ‘one region, one organisation’ policy stipulated by
several regulations should be abandoned. Currently, there is a rule
concerning the strictest competition limitation, i.e., if an organisation exists
in an administrative region, other organisations with the same or similar
purposes will not be allowed to register.75 The government can use this
70 CL 2016 (China), s 10.
71As to the requirements on the establishment of charities, see CL 2016 (China), s 9.
72 CL 2016 (China), s 20.
73 Cabinet Office Strategy Unit (n 56) 30.
74 Concerning the implication of the relationship between charities and government, see, for example,
Xueyong Zhan and Shui-Yan Tang, ‘Understanding the Implications of Government Ties for
Nonprofit Operations and Functions’ (2015) 76(1) Public Administration Review 131.
75 For example, see RRAA 1998 (China, revised in 2016), s 13; PRRACNU 1998 (China), s 11.
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requirement as a good excuse to refuse a registration application if there is a
government-controlled charity with similar purposes in the same area.
Therefore, although the Charity Law 2016 (China) does not deal with this
problem, for the purposes of promoting the establishment of independent
charities, the thesis argues that the policy of ‘one region, one organisation’
should be totally abandoned. Accordingly, as long as charities comply with
the requirements stipulated by laws and regulations, they should be
registered or recognised by law.
Third, it is of value to change the current ‘no registration, no legality’ policy.
In England, a non-profit organisation is not illegal unless it carries out some
illegal activities.76 By contrast, in China, the positive right of citizens to
establish non-profits (such as foundations, associations and civil non-
commercial units) is generally denied by the government,77 which reflects
‘the general scepticism [of the government] toward privately initiated
NPOs’.78And legally established non-profits are usually identified as ‘an
arm of the government’.79 The three regulations80 governing associations,
civil non-commercial units and foundations do not provide any legal remedy
when governmental regulators refuse to register an organisation.81
In this context, there is one informal principle relating to the registration of
Interestingly, in England, there are concerns that there are too many charities all doing the same thing.
Chris Green, ‘There Are Too Many Charities Doing the Same Work, Claims Charity Commission
Chief Executive’ Independent (London, 25 June 2014) <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/there-are-too-many-charities-doing-the-same-work-claims-charity-commission-chief-executive-
9562997.html> accessed 20 September 2017.
76 Of course, a legal organisation may not necessarily benefit from the advantages of charitable status,
e.g., the Church of Scientology.
77 Hippel and Pißler (n 37) 435, 440, 442 and 445.
78 ibid 475.
79 Guosheng Deng, ‘The Development of China’s Nonprofit Sector since 1995’ in Chien-Chung
Huang and others (eds), China’s Nonprofit Sector: Progress and Challenges (Transaction Publishers
2014) 9.
80 As noted in Chapter 2, the three regulations are the Regulation on the Registration and
Administration of Associations 1998 (China, revised in 2016), the Provisional Regulation on the
Registration and Administration of Civil Non-commercial Units 1998 (China), and the Regulation on
the Administration of Foundations 2004 (China).
81 According to the Constitutional Law 1982 (China, revised in 2004), citizens have the right of
association. CL 1982 (China, revised in 2004), s 35. However, if this right is not confirmed in a
specific legal area (such as civil law or administrative law), it cannot be protected in practice.
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non-profit organisations, including charities: ‘no registration, no legality’.
Independent non-profit organisations which cannot be registered will be
regarded as illegal organisations. According to the Temporary Measure
Prohibiting Illegal Social Organisations 2000 (China) (‘取缔非法民间组织
暂行办法 ’), illegal organisations should be prohibited and their property
and other documents should be expropriated.82
On this basis, this ‘no registration, no legality’ policy is implemented
selectively in practice: regulators turn ‘a blind eye to the majority of illegal
NGOs according to the “no banning, no recognition, no intervention’’ rule’
in practice.83 However, this policy, even if selectively implemented, puts
unregistered non-profits at high risk, greatly damaging their reputation and
negatively influencing their normal activities.
After the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), this policy was
relaxed, at least in the charitable sector. According to this new law,
registration is still necessary if an organisation wants to be recognised as a
charity. However, for other non-profit organisations carrying out charitable
activities, the Charity Law 2016 (China) recognises their legality,84 although
they cannot refer to themselves as a charity when conducting activities.
Accordingly, the relevant governmental regulations and policies in this area
should comply with this new rule of the Charity Law 2016 (China),
changing the ‘no registration, no legality’ policy respectively. This change
can help some independent charities which cannot satisfy the strict
requirements and conditions on charity registration to continue to carry out
charitable activities as legal non-profit organisations, although technically
82 Temporary Measure Prohibiting Illegal Social Organisations 2000 (China), ss 9-10.
83 Guosheng Deng, ‘The Hidden Rules Governing China’s Unregistered NGOs: Management and
Consequences’ (2010) 10 The China Review 183.
84 According to the Charity Law 2016 (China), ‘other organisations which are not charities can
conduct charitable activities within their capacity’. CL 2016 (China), s 111; Internal Affairs Office of
the Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Department of
Policy and Law of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (eds), Q & A relating to the Charity Law of the
People’s Republic of China (China Legal Publishing House 2016) 230-232 (全国人大内部司法委员
会内务室、民政部政策法规司编著：《中华人民共和国慈善法学习问答》，中国法制出版社
2016年版).
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they are not recognised by law as ‘charities’ without registration.
4.3 Clarifying and Implementing the Basic Regulatory Principles
4.3.1 Introduction
In respect of governmental regulation, Chinese regulators usually focus on
the strict registration procedure rather than efficient regulation.85 In this
context, although the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) has
relaxed the related limitations on the establishment of independent charities,
as regards efficient governmental regulation, in contrast to English law, even
some basic modern regulatory principles, such as accountability,
transparency and proportionality, are still not clarified by law or officially
recognised by Chinese regulators.
Therefore, to promote efficient regulation in order to reduce the agency
costs in ensuring compliance, this chapter argues that those principles, such
as proportionality and accountability, should be recognised and
implemented by Chinese regulators. At the same time, following the same
logic, this chapter also recommends that cooperative regulation and a
balance between support and regulation should also be implemented by
Chinese law and regulators. Accordingly, in terms of the improvement of
specific regulatory mechanisms, both the experience and lessons in England
can facilitate China in its further reform.
4.3.2 Establishing Collaborative Regulatory Mechanisms
In terms of governmental regulation, the costs relating to co-ordinating
regulators are obvious in practice. Although there is a main regulator of
charities, such as the Charity Commission, governing charities, other
regulators are still playing a more or less active role in some specific aspects
of charity regulation. In practice, charity trustees are usually monitored by
85 Liu (n 46) 81.
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different regulators, such as administrative regulation by the Charity
Commission (in England and Wales) and the Ministry of Civil Affairs (in
mainland China), judicial regulation by the courts, self-regulation by the
charitable sector itself or legal proceedings by the Attorney General.86
In England, the Charity Commission is the independent regulator of
charities87 whilst the Attorney General can supervise charities by
participating in the relevant suits.88 In addition, the tax authority (HMRC)
can, to some extent, monitor the performance of charity trustees. In the
meantime, in respect of an ‘exempt charity’,89 its ‘principal regulator’ in
English charity law90 rather than the Charity Commission is directly
responsible for doing ‘all that [this regulator] reasonably can to meet the
compliance objective in relation to the charity’.91
Similarly, although the Charity Law 2016 (China) clarifies that the
department of civil affairs is in charge of the charity undertakings and the
regulation of charities and charitable activities in China,92 under the ‘dual
administrative system’, a variety of professional administrative units are
also responsible for charity regulation in some specific aspects.
In this context, if different regulators do not share the relevant information
86 Kathryn Chan, ‘The Role of the Attorney General in Charity Proceedings in Canada and in England
and Wales’ (2011) 89(2) Canadian Bar Review 373; Mary Synge, ‘The Attorney General and the
Charity Commission: One Rule without Reason?’ (2016) Public Law 409.
87 CA 2011, ss 13-20.
88 CA 2011, ss 113-114.
89 CA 2011, s 22 and sch 3; Charity Commission, Exempt Charities (CC23) (Charity Commission
2017).
90 CA 2011, s 25.
91 CA 2011, s 26.
92 CL 2016 (China), s 6. It may have a historic basis: ‘The Nationalist government created the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Bureau of Civil Affairs in 1927 and charged them with organizing
relief for the poor and managing the activities of philanthropies.’ Xiulan Zhang and Lu Zhang,
‘Medicine with A Mission: Chinese Roots and Foreign Engagement in Health Philanthropy’ in
Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds), Philanthropy for Health in China (Indiana
University Press 2014) 91-92; Xinzhong Yu, Plague and Society of Southern China in Qing Dynasty:
A Study of the History of Health and Society (Renmin University of China 2003) 249-255 (余新忠:
《清代江南的瘟疫与社会——一项医疗社会史的研究》，中国人民大学出版社 2003年). In this
respect, the Ministry of Civil Affairs seems to be similar to the Charity Commission. However, the
areas that this ministry regulates are wider than those of the Charity Commission, such as
administration of social organisations, registration of marriage, management of social services, etc.
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and co-operate with each other, the whole regulation will not be efficient.93
Hence, to reduce the co-ordination costs arising from the conflicts and
disputes between regulators, it is necessary for China to strengthen the co-
operation among those regulators in terms of the regulatory standards and
procedures.
4.3.2.1 Examining the Conflicts between Different Regulators in
Regulating Charity Trustees
Currently, neither Chinese law nor English law provides the principle of
collaboration and in practice some conflicts between different regulators
exist in both jurisdictions. First, sometimes there is a lack of clarity
regarding the powers and duties of different regulators. Take the charity
scandal relating to Kids Company, for example. As a registered charity
aimed at supporting vulnerable children and young people, Kids Company
had to be closed because of its long-term poor financial management, the
bad performance of its charity trustees in governing this charity, and the
government’s continuing financial support, which lacked sufficient
scrutiny.94 In respect of this charity scandal, it was found that
‘responsibilities [of regulating the funding to Kids Company] were passed
between departments like a hot potato’.95
Second, one regulator’s regulatory function may not be recognised or
respected by other regulators. For example, in China, in 2013, Song
Qingling Foundation of Henan Province was discovered by the media to
have abused its charitable resources. Under pressure from the public, the
local government set up a task force to investigate this charity. However, as
the registration and administration regulator monitoring this charity, the
93 For example, the inadequate sharing of information between the Charity Commission and HMRC
has been criticised by the National Audit Office and the Committee of Public Accounts. National
Audit Office (n 54) 44; Committee of Public Accounts, Gift Aid and Other Tax Reliefs on Charitable
Donations (Forty-first Report of Session 2013-14, HC835) (The Stationery Office 2014) 6.
94 See, for example, Committee of Public Accounts, The Government’s Funding of Kids Company
(Eighth Report of Session 2015-16, HC504) (The Stationery Office 2015); Public Administration and
Constitutional Affairs Committee (n 54).
95 Committee of Public Accounts (n 94) 3.
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department of civil affairs in Henan Province did not participate in this task
force,96 and thus lost the opportunity to assess and evaluate the charity’s
performance.97
Third, different standards or inefficient co-operative supervisory
mechanisms exist among regulators. For example, in England, both the
Charity Commission and the tax authority ‘have failed to pass on
information about some of the charities where they have identified
significant non-charitable activity’.98 In addition, there is a minor separation
between the standards recognising charitable status and those offering tax
benefits, which require that charities applying for tax benefits have to satisfy
the management requirements (‘the fit and proper persons test’).99
More seriously, in contrast to charity regulation in England, because a large
number of professional administrative units exist in China, and different
units usually have different standards and regulatory procedures, charity
regulation is of low efficiency and effectiveness (‘政出多门效率低下’).100
This regulatory system itself may greatly increase the co-ordination costs in
charity governance. For example, in the case of Song Qingling Foundation
of Henan Province, before the result of the task force’s investigation was
disclosed, the department of civil affairs in Henan Province had published
96 People, ‘How Deep Is the Water in the Event of Song Qingling Sculpture’ People (Beijing, 5th
August 2013) <http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/363551/367637/> accessed 20 September 2017.
97 It was criticised by some scholars, who argued that ‘the department of civil affairs, as the
registration and administrative regulator, should take part in the investigation of this foundation’.
People, ‘The Department of Civil Affairs Actually Was Not the Member of the Task Force’ People
(Beijing, 2 August 2013) <http://society.people.com.cn/n/2013/0802/c1008-22421054-2.html>
accessed 20 September 2017.
98 National Audit Office (n 54) 44. Also see Committee of Public Accounts (n 93) 6; Public
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, The 2015 Charity Fundraising Controversy:
Lessons for Trustees, the Charity Commission, and Regulators (Third Report of Session 2015-2016,
HC431) (The Stationery Office 2016) 3.
99 Finance Act 2010, sch 6, pt 1; HM Revenue & Customs, Guidance on the Fit and Proper Persons
Test (HM Revenue & Customs 2014). Concerning a recent analysis of charity taxation in England,
generally, see Debra Morris, ‘Recent Developments in Charity Taxation in the United Kingdom: the
Law Gives and the Law Takes Away’ in Matthew Harding, Ann O’Connell and Miranda Stewart (eds),
Not-for-profit Law: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (CUP 2014) 254-275.
100 Ming Wang and others, ‘Revising the Regulations on Social Organizations’ (2014) 6 The China
Nonprofit Review 1, 20-24.
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the result relating to the annual examination of this charity and had found no
drawback regarding this charity’s governance and management. 101 The
problem is that the department of civil affairs chose to carry out the annual
examination based on the incomplete information it had, ignoring the
investigation of the task force.
4.3.2.2 Reducing the Co-ordination Costs in Regulating Charity
Trustees
In practice, a number of good methods already exist to tackle the possible
conflicts between regulators in China in order to reduce the co-ordination
costs. For example, several relevant governmental departments choose to
jointly issue guiding advice dealing with some specific requirements for
charities.102 However, some more efficient co-operative regulatory
mechanisms need to be put in place.
First, Chinese law should clarify the regulatory functions held by different
regulators and their power and duty. This is a precondition of any further
co-operation between different regulators.
Second, Chinese law should further establish a range of co-operative
supervisory mechanisms. To avoid repeated regulation in the same area by
different regulators and to enhance the regulatory efficiency, it is of value to
establish a range of co-operative supervisory mechanisms among those
regulators, such as ‘joint registration’, which can ‘not only reduce the
burden on charities but also streamline processes between [regulators]’..103
Furthermore, Chinese law should improve co-operative mechanisms
facilitating the transfer of information among regulators.104 In this respect,
101 People (n 96).
102 For example, see the Circular on Management Issues concerning NPOs’ Eligibility of Tax
Deduction (Caishui [2009] No. 123) (‘《关于非营利组织免税资格认定管理有关问题的通知》(财
税[2009]13号)’), which is issued by the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation.
103 Lord Hodgson (n 12) 52.
104 For example, see CA 2011, ss 54-59.
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the Charity Law 2016 (China) seems to treat this requirement seriously: the
department of civil affairs above the county level should establish a charity
information sharing mechanism with other departments.105 However, to
make this rule work in practice, the law or any related governmental policies
should further clarify the contents, procedures, methods and other major
issues relating to information to be shared between different regulators.
In this respect, the various memoranda of understanding106 built by the
Charity Commission and a range of other regulators are really insightful and
worth considering by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in developing its co-
operative strategy. Take the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Charity Commission and the Fundraising Regulator, for example.
This memorandum clarifies and details its own purpose, the respective roles
and functions of the Charity Commission and the Fundraising Regulator, the
requirements and procedures relating to disclosure of information, the
referral process, liaison at both strategic and operational levels, and other
related matters.107 This will, to some extent, avoid conflicts between the
Commission and the Fundraising Regulator and accordingly reduce the co-
ordination costs in monitoring charity trustees. 108
4.3.3 Stimulating a Proportional and Accountable Regulatory
Approach
Governmental regulation cannot be efficient if the costs of supervision and
enforcement, the costs of the regulators’ moral hazard and the costs of the
negative effects of external intervention are not controlled in practice. The
costs of supervision and enforcement require that regulators should be
105 CL 2016 (China), s 78.
106 Those memoranda of understanding are available at
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/memoranda-of-understanding-with-the-charity-
commission> accessed 20th September 2017.
107 Charity Commission, Memorandum of Understanding: the Charity Commission and the
Fundraising Regulator (Charity Commission 2016).
108 In respect of a comprehensive analysis of the problems concerning information sharing in England,
see Law Commission, Data Sharing between Public Bodies: A Scoping Report (Law Com No 351)
(Law Commission, 2014).
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efficient in monitoring and facilitating the carrying out of duties by charity
trustees. No matter which regulator is mainly responsible for supervising
charity trustees, it has to control those costs in ensuring compliance.
Meanwhile, in respect of the costs of the regulators’ moral hazard and the
costs of the negative effects of external intervention, the excessive
regulatory powers held by regulators and unreasonable administrative
procedures may not only lead to abuse of power by the regulators, but also
negatively affect the performance of charity trustees, resulting in inefficient
use of charitable resources.
Hence, to reduce the regulators’ moral hazard, the supervisory costs and the
costs of the negative effects of external intervention, it is necessary to take a
proportional and accountable109 regulatory approach in supervising charity
trustees.
In this respect, in England, the Charities Act 2011 directly stipulates that one
of the Charity Commission’s general duties is that ‘[i]n performing its
functions the Commission must, so far as relevant, have regard to the
principles of best regulatory practice’, 110 including proportionality and
accountability.
By contrast, although the Charity Law 2016 (China) has built a general
regulatory framework governing charities and charitable activities,111 it does
little, if anything, to design a range of proportional and accountable
mechanisms to tackle the issues relating to charity regulation. As a matter of
fact, this law does not even mention the general regulatory principles (such
as proportionality and accountability) regulators should follow in
performing their duties. Therefore, it is of value to explore how to improve
Chinese law in this respect with a comparative study of English law and
practice.
109 For example, see Cabinet Office Strategy Unit (n 56) 71; Charity Commission, Regulatory Work:
Charity Commission (Charity Commission 2013).
110 CA 2011, s 16.
111 For example, see CL 2016 (China), Chapter 10 (supervision and administration).
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4.3.3.1 Taking a Proportional Regulatory Approach
Currently, both China and England are facing problems relating to
proportionality; this is particularly the case in China, where there is a long
history of strict governmental control over the internal affairs of charities. In
China, in terms of Song Qingling Foundation of Henan Province mentioned
above, the government set up a task force to investigate it for several
years,112 but the result of the investigation has not been disclosed to the
general public so far. As a matter of fact, the recent and frequent charity
scandals in China which led to a huge drop in donations113 may also confirm
that governmental regulators do not perform their regulatory functions
properly.
In England, sometimes the performance of the Charity Commission, as the
independent regulator of charities, and other regulators, is also not as
satisfactory as expected in practice: they either do too much or too little in
monitoring charities and their charity trustees. For instance, in March 2015,
the Charity Commission forced two charities to stop funding CAGE, which
is a non-charitable organisation.114 This action can be regarded as a direct
intervention in the decision-making of charity trustees in relation to the use
of charitable resources. However, the Commission reversed its position after
the relevant judicial review was withdrawn.115
By contrast, in an official report concerning the recent charity scandal
related to Kids Company, it was found that ‘[d]espite repeated warnings and
concerns about Kids Company’s financial situation and the impact it was
achieving, [the governmental] funding to the charity continued and was
112 People (n 96).
113 Sabrina Mao and Sui-Lee Wee, ‘Donations to Charities in China Plunge after Scandals’ Reuters
(London, 8th December 2011) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-donations-
idUSTRE7B70F820111208> accessed 20 September 2017.
114 Charity Commission, Charity Commission Statement: Charities Funding CAGE (Charity
Commission 2015).
115 Randeep Ramesh, ‘Charities Can Fund Cage Campaign Group, Commission Agrees’ Guardian
(London, 21 October 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/oct/21/charities-can-fund-
controversial-pressure-group-cage-court-finds> accessed 20 September 2017.
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never seriously questioned, let alone stopped’.116
In response to those problems, it is necessary to build a proportional
regulatory approach to supervising the performance of charity trustees,
efficiently reducing the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard, the
supervisory costs and the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention, such as ‘actions that might […] discourage responsible
volunteers from serving on boards’.117 In this respect, in contrast to Chinese
law and regulators, both English law and the Charity Commission have
more well-designed mechanisms in place to implement this principle.
For example, according to the recently enacted Charities (Protection and
Social Investment) Act 2016, the Charity Commission has the power to
issue official warnings to a charity trustee ‘who it considers has committed a
breach of trust or duty or other misconduct or mismanagement in that
capacity’. 118 By contrast, charity trustees undertaking money laundering,
terrorism or other specific serious offences will be automatically
disqualified.119
In addition, the Charity Commission adopts a proportional and risk-based
regulatory approach in monitoring the performance of charity trustees. 120
This approach requires that, before monitoring a charity or a special group
of the charitable sector, the Commission should assess the risk of
misconduct and mismanagement proactively. And, in handling the relevant
risks or abuses in charity governance, the Commission should take the most
effective response according to the nature and level of those risks.121
116 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (n 54) 3.
117 Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, Accountability of
Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (Independent Sector
2005) 22.
118 Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016 (CPSIA 2016), s 1. Of course, for charity
trustees, to perform their fiduciary duties, they themselves should also carry out risk management.
Charity Commission, Charities and Risk Management (Charity Commission 2010).
119 CPSIA 2016, s 9.
120 For example, see Charity Commission, Risk Framework: Charity Commission (Charity
Commission 2013).
121 For example, see Charity Commission, Tackling Abuse and Mismanagement: 2014-2015 (Charity
Commission 2015); Charity Commission, Regulatory Work: Charity Commission (Charity
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Here, it is worth noting that, although it takes a risk-based approach to
monitoring charity trustees, the Charity Commission does not always
perform well in practice, as noted above. However, it is necessary to point
out that its recently bad performance cannot be used to deny the function of
proportionality in ensuring efficient governmental regulation. It only
indicates that the Commission does not always accurately adopt this
regulatory principle or strictly follow its risk-based approach.
Hence, given that charity regulation in China is in its initial stage, it is
urgent for China to draw on the principle of proportionality developed by
English law and the proportional and risk-based approach adopted by the
Charity Commission to help reduce the agency costs arising from
governmental regulation.
4.3.3.2 Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms in Relation to Charity
Regulators
As Evelyn Brody points out, without transparency, it is ‘impossible to assess
whether regulators truly improve charity governance’.122 This also ‘makes it
hard to judge […] whether regulators are motivated by their own or the
public’s interest’.123
More seriously, apart from the issues relating to regulatory efficiency,
severe corruption is troubling Chinese charity regulators in the country’s
transitional period. In this respect, a very famous example is related to Yu
Pengnian, a billionaire and philanthropist who donated all his wealth (about
9.3 billion yuan) to charity. He donated 10 imported Mitsubishi ambulances
to a hospital, but those ambulances were finally taken by some local
Commission 2013); Charity Commission, How the Charity Commission Ensures Charities Meet Their
Legal Requirements (Charity Commission 2013); Charity Commission (n 120); Charity Commission,
Strategy for Charity Fraud, Financial Crime and Financial Abuse (Charity Commission 2013);
Charity Commission, Strategy for Dealing with Safeguarding Issues in Charities (Charity
Commission 2013); Charity Commission, Counter-terrorism Strategy (Charity Commission 2008).
122 Evelyn Brody, ‘Accountability and Public Trust’ in Lester M. Salamon (ed), The State of Nonprofit
America (Aspen Institute & Brookings Institute Press 2002) 480.
123 Evelyn Brody, ‘Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement’
(2004) 79 Indiana Law Journal 937, 950.
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governmental officers for their own private use.124 Another well-known
example is that recently the minister and several vice-ministers of the
Ministry of Civil Affairs were removed from office due to institutional
corruption within this ministry.125
Therefore, to reduce the costs of the government’s moral hazard and to
improve regulatory efficiency (in order to reduce the costs of the charity
trustees’ moral hazard, the costs of the negative effects of governmental
regulation, and the supervisory costs), it is also necessary to build some
sound accountability mechanisms to ensure that regulators themselves
efficiently perform their duty to regulate charity trustees. In this respect,
China can learn quite a lot from English law and practice.
First, China should strengthen the rules concerning disclosure of
information regarding charity regulation. In this respect, the mechanisms
relating to disclosure of information about how governmental regulators
perform their duty should be put in place. The Charity Law 2016 (China)
has made progress in this area, requiring that the department of civil affairs
and other related departments at the county level or above should disclose
the results of the examination and evaluation of charities and charitable
trusts, the results of the commendations and penalties of charities, other
organisations and individuals, and other related information in a timely
manner.126
However, in contrast to the Charity Commission, which publishes a
complete version of its reports, decisions, alerts and statements on its
official website127 in time to enable the public to understand and supervise
what it has done, further work needs to be carried out by the Ministry of
Civil Affairs and its branches at local level.
124 Guanchazhe, ‘The First Chinese Who Donated All His Wealth, 9.3 Billion Yuan, to Charity, Died
at the Age of 93’ Guanchazhe (Shanghai, 4 May 2015)
<http://www.guancha.cn/society/2015_05_04_318324_s.shtml> accessed 20 September 2017.
125 Wen (n 53).
126 CL 2016 (China), s 70.
127 Charity Commission, Charity Commission Reports, Decisions, Alerts and Statements (Charity
Commission 2013).
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Meanwhile, English law further requires the Charity Commission to hold an
annual public meeting, which can attract registered charities to discuss the
contents of its annual report and put questions to the Charity Commission.128
This arrangement provides a great opportunity for charities and their charity
trustees to make the charity regulator accountable, and thus it is worth
considering in implementing the principle of accountability in the Chinese
charity regulatory system.
Second, Chinese law should further provide legal remedies that are easily
accessible to charity trustees and other stakeholders. In contrast to its strict
control over the development of charities, the law does not perform well in
‘safeguarding the rights of those who try to form and register organizations
or work in them’.129 In tackling the above problems, it is of use to strengthen
the judiciary supervision of regulators’ performance by providing cost-
effective legal remedies to charity trustees and other related parties when
bringing a legal suit against the regulators.
In this respect, the ‘Charity Tribunal’ provides a good example about
holding regulators accountable. It was created by the Charities Act 2006 as a
cost-effective independent tribunal to ‘form part of the accountability
framework for [the Charity Commission] as a modern regulator’.130
The other policy objective of this Tribunal is to clarify and develop charity
law in this area to keep up with the development in society.131Although this
Tribunal is still in its initial stage and accordingly has many problems to
overcome, such as the limited scope of its jurisdiction, its inaccessibility for
128 CA 2011, sch 1, para 12.
129 Mark Sidel, ‘The Shifting Balance of Philanthropic Policies and Regulations in China’ in Jennifer
Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds), Philanthropy for Health in China (Indiana University
Press 2014) 44.
130 Alison McKenna, ‘Should the Charity Tribunal Be Reformed’ (2011-12) 14 The Charity Law &
Practice Review 1, 2. By virtue of the Transfer of Functions of the Charity Tribunal Order 2009, SI
2009/1834, the functions of this Tribunal have been transferred to the First-tier Tribunal and the
Upper Tribunal. Transfer of Functions of the Charity Tribunal Order 2009, SI 2009/1834, para 2.
131 Debra Morris, ‘The First-tier Tribunal (Charity): Enhanced Access to Justice for Charities or a
Case of David versus Goliath?’ (2010) 29(4) Civil Justice Quarterly 491, 492-493.
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ordinary individuals, and the too short time limit for bringing lawsuits,132
China can learn the basic idea behind it.
For example, China can establish a special tribunal inside each court,
principally dealing with cases relating to charity regulation, which can
strengthen the efficiency of judiciary supervision.133 Meanwhile, similar to
the second objective for establishing the Charity Tribunal, this arrangement
can strengthen the role of judges in explaining and clarifying the definitions
relating to charitable purposes, public benefit and other related terms. In
China, this arrangement can further avoid or at least reduce the possibility of
governmental regulators abusing their discretion and provide more
authoritative guidance on the performance of charity trustees in a special
case, especially in the context of the lack of case law and detailed statutory
rules guiding the practice.
4.3.4 Balancing the Supportive Function with the Regulatory Function
To control the costs of the negative effects of external intervention and to
ensure efficient utilisation of charitable resources (in order to reduce the
residual loss), it is of value for regulators to play a more supportive role in
charity governance, especially given that the charitable sector in China is
still in its initial stage. However, the relevant costs of governmental support
should also be taken into account in designing the supportive mechanisms.
4.3.4.1 Allowing Regulators to Play a More Supportive Role in Charity
Governance
In terms of charity regulation, the government in China commonly takes
administrative measures, such as investigations, punishments and removal
132 Lord Hodgson (n 12) 80-86; ibid; McKenna (n 130); Alison McKenna, ‘Applications to the First-
tier Tribunal (Charity) by “Persons Affected” by the Charity Commission’s Decision’ (2013-2014) 16
The Charity Law & Practice Review 147.
133 As a matter of fact, there are precedents in establishing a special tribunal dealing with a specific
legal area in China. For example, in 2014, the Supreme Court of China set up the Environmental and
Resources Tribunal to exclusively deal with cases involving environmental law.
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from registration, to monitor and enforce the duties of charity trustees.134 In
addition, in China there exists no system similar to the Attorney General.
Unless there are cases concerning criminal acts in which the Procuratorate
(‘检察机关 ’)135 should intervene, regulators usually enforce the duties of
the governing body of charities without legal suits.136
For example, in respect of charitable trusts, regulators can approve the
resignation of charity trustees,137 check the management affairs of trust
property, approve the report on the trust management of charity trustees,138
change charity trustees who breach their fiduciary duties,139 change the
terms of the trust document in accordance with the trust’s purpose,140
receive the termination report of charity trustees141 and approve the
liquidation report of charity trustees.142
However, the above regulatory mechanisms only form part of the functions
of governmental regulators. Sometimes those regulators also play a
supportive role in facilitating charity governance. In this respect, the laws in
both jurisdictions have paid special attention to the regulators’ supportive
function.
In China, the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) provides one
chapter regulating the supportive measures relating to charities and
charitable activities. 143 In England, according to the Charities Act 2011, one
general function of the Charity Commission is ‘[e]ncouraging and
134 For example, see CL 2016 (China), Chapters 10-11.
135 It is quite similar to the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales. The official website of
the Procuratorate is <http://www.spp.gov.cn/> 20 September 2017.
136 One exception may be that according to the recently enacted General Provisions of Civil Law 2017
(China), if the decision-making procedure of the decision-making body, executive body or legal
representative of a donated legal person violates the laws, administrative regulations, or its governing
document, or the contents of the decision do not comply with the governing document, the regulators
can appeal to the court to revoke this decision. GPCL 2017 (China), s 94.
137 TL 2001 (China), s 66.
138 TL 2001 (China), s 67. The thesis will discuss charity reporting in Chapter 8.
139 TL 2001 (China), s 68.
140 TL 2001 (China), s 69.
141 TL 2001 (China), s 70.
142 TL 2001 (China), s 71.
143 CL 2016 (China), Chapter 9.
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facilitating the better administration of charities’,144 and the performance of
the Commission must contribute to encouraging ‘(a) all forms of charitable
giving, and (b) voluntary participation in charity work’.145
However, in England, there are totally different views on the roles that
charity regulators should play in practice. As noted by the NCVO’s Charity
Law Reform Advisory Group, some people argue that ‘the Charity
Commission [cannot] be both enforcer and supporter’. 146 By contrast,
others believe that ‘the encouragement of good practice but a harsh line on
failures to meet minimum standards is the best means of securing
compliance without stifling the voluntary effort that government is seeking
to promote’.147
From the perspective of reducing the agency costs of charity governance,
the thesis takes the second view. In the charitable sector, if the government
plays a totally regulatory role, this may restrain the motivation of charity
trustees and volunteers to contribute to charity, and thus bring high costs
relating to the negative effects of external intervention, in particular when
the charity regulation is very intense and strict.148 Therefore, in charity
governance, although there should be a legal framework that can help
reduce the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard, its requirements have
to be minimum in order to reduce the unnecessary costs of the negative
effects of external intervention and supervisory costs.149
Meanwhile, it is also necessary to further reduce the residual loss due to
inefficient support from the government. In particular in China, given that
the charitable sector is still in its initial stage, this supportive role seems to
144 CA 2011, s 15.
145 CA 2011, s 16.
146 NCVO Charity Law Reform Advisory Group, For the Public Benefit?: A Consultation Document
on Charity Law Reform (NCVO 2001) 27.
147 ibid.
148 Of course, for charities such as Kids Company, where a large proportion of their funding comes
from the government, a strengthened regulation is usually understandable and acceptable by their
charity trustees. If the charity trustees do not accept those regulatory requirements and conditions,
they can choose to refuse the financial support from the government.
149 This is associated with the principle of proportionality discussed above.
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be more urgent and important than it is in England. Accordingly, in most
situations, in order to make charity trustees perform well and attract more
persons to act as charity trustees, Chinese regulators should play a
supportive role along with a regulatory one, which may be more efficient
and effective in ensuring the good performance of charity trustees.150
Therefore, in the future, Chinese regulators should strengthen their
supportive function in helping charity trustees to perform their duties and
ensuring sound governance in practice.151 As a matter of fact, the Charity
Law 2016 (China) requires that the relevant departments should provide
charities and trustees of charitable trusts with information relating to the
charitable demand, and guide and help them to carry out charitable
activities.152
In this respect, Chinese regulators can draw on the experience of the Charity
Commission, which has done a great deal in support of charity trustees. For
example, ‘to help [charity trustees run their] charity effectively’,153 the
Commission issues detailed operational guidance, supplies the relevant
information and advice and uses its legal power to facilitate the
administration of a charity (such as making schemes). In particular, in
contrast to detailed guidance issued by the Charity Commission,154 guidance
from the Ministry of Civil Affairs is rare.155
Accordingly, Chinese regulators should develop the contents of their
guidance to maximise their supportive function. In this respect, the
recommendations to the Charity Commission made in the report ‘Trusted
and Independent: Giving Charity back to Charities-Review of the Charities
150 For example, see James J. Fishman, ‘Improving Charitable Accountability’ (2003) 62 Maryland
Law Review 218, 248.
151 Brody (n 123) 947.
152 CL 2016 (China), s 77.
153 Charity Commission, The Essential Trustees: What You Need to Know (CC3) (Charity
Commission 2016) 3.
154 It is available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission> (accessed
20 September 2017).
155 Currently, there are only some regulatory rules listed on its official website:
http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/gk/fg/shzzgl/ (accessed 20 September 2017).
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Act 2006’ are also very suitable for the improvement of guidance in China.
For example, there should be ‘user-friendly, practical guidance on the legal
position and of the [regulator]’s power to intervene, to help trustees
understand their position and the protections available’.156 Furthermore, the
guidance ‘should be less legalistic, focused on practical issues and celebrate
the benefits of trusteeship as well as highlighting the (still important)
risks’.157
In addition, as a supportive measure, the guidance issued by Chinese
regulators should accurately explain the current legal requirement, and
further make a clear distinction between legal and regulatory requirements
and recommended practices to support the decisions that charity trustees
make in governing their charities. In this respect, a lesson Chinese
regulators need to learn from the Charity Commission is in relation to the
previous guidance interpreting public benefit,158 which was issued in 2008
and finally withdrawn due to its misinterpretation of the legal rules
governing public benefit159 and the relevant legal challenge.160
It is worth noting that, if the guidance issued by charity regulators violates
or misinterprets the rules provided by national laws, it will violate the
principles of proportionality and accountability discussed above and thus
bring high costs relating to the regulators’ moral hazard along with the costs
of the negative effects of external intervention. At the same time, this
guidance cannot play a supportive role in helping charity trustees to reduce
the residual loss arising from inefficient use of charitable resources.
4.3.4.2 Reducing the Costs of Governmental Support
However, support itself may also be expensive. That is why, facing budget
156 Lord Hodgson (n 12) 36.
157 ibid 38.
158 Charity Commission, Charities and Public Benefit (Charity Commission 2008).
159 Regarding a comprehensive analysis of rules in case law and those provided by the Commission’s
previous guidance governing public benefit, see Mary Synge, The ‘New’ Public Benefit Requirement:
Making Sense of Charity Law? (Hart Publishing 2015).
160 R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch 214.
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cuts, the Charity Commission has to adjust its regulatory strategy to focus
on its regulatory function instead of its supportive role. The recent report of
the Public Administration Select Committee also confirms this point: ‘[t]he
Cabinet Office must consider how to prioritise what is expected of the
Charity Commission, so that it can function with its reduced budget. This
must enable it to renew its focus on regulation as its core task.’161
However, based on the significance of the supportive function in charity
governance, it is still necessary to provide the basic guidance, information
and relevant policies to support charity trustees. In this respect, as a
response to the possible incapacity of the government in supporting the
performance of charity trustees, some professional organisations or umbrella
organisations162 specialising in this area can play an important supportive
role. Some of those organisations ‘exist solely to support other charities, and
better signposting to such sources of help is essential’. 163
They can co-operate with the government and charities to promote the
development of the charitable sector and the good performance of charity
trustees. The recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) also supports this
idea by encouraging the establishment of umbrella organisations which
‘reflect the demand of the charitable sector, promote communication among
this sector, strengthen self-regulation, raise the reputation of charities and
enhance the development of the charity undertakings.’164
To reduce the costs of governmental support, regulators can promote
professional, umbrella or industry organisations to play a more important
role in support of the governance of charity trustees through training,
education, advice, codes of conduct165 and any other effective methods.
161 Public Administration Select Committee, The Role of the Charity Commission and ‘Public Benefit’:
Post-Legislative Scrutiny of the Charities Act 2006 (Third Report of Session 2013-14, HC76) (The
Stationery Office 2013) 13.
162 So far in China independent umbrella organisations like the NCVO are very rare, due to the
government’s traditional excessive control on the development of non-profits, including charities.
163 Lord Hodgson (n 12) 47.
164 CL 2016 (China), s 19.
165 For example, see Charity Governance Code Steering Group, Charity Governance Code for Larger
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an economic and comparative analysis of
governmental regulation on charity trustees in both jurisdictions, with a
focus on two major issues, independent governance and implementation of
regulatory principles.
In terms of the independent governance of charity trustees, English law
allows the establishment and development of charities and reduces
excessive limitations on the registration of charities at the establishing stage,
and protects the independent governance of charity trustees at the daily
operational stage. For example, English law protects the rights of charities
to be registered, and recognises the charitable status of those organisations
that have charitable purposes, but according to the Charities Act 2011, do
not need to register. In addition, the Charity Commission, as the
independent regulator of charities, is required by law not to directly
participate in the internal governance issues of any charity.
By contrast, in China, due to the traditional regulatory system (i.e., the ‘dual
administrative system’), it is difficult for independent charities to exist. For
example, it is difficult for non-profits to be directly registered (as
associations, foundations or civil non-commercial units). Charity trustees in
organisations that choose to be attached to a legal organisation (‘挂靠’) have
to give up their independence in governing the charities, and are at risk of
being expelled at any time. Organisations registered as for-profit companies
are facing a range of problems, such as ineffective governance structures
and a lack of tax benefits. In addition, under such a system, governmental
regulators can maintain direct control over a charity’s internal governance
issues. In particular, the professional administrative units of charities may
participate in their day-to-day operation, replacing the governance function
of their charity trustees.
Charities (Charity Governance Code Steering Group 2017); Charity Governance Code Steering
Group, Charity Governance Code for Smaller Charities (Charity Governance Code Steering Group
2017).
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Although the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) provides a more
enabling environment for the establishment of charities by defining the term
‘charities’, by allowing non-profits complying with this new law to register
as charities, and by clarifying the department of civil affairs as the regulator
of charitable trusts, it does not fundamentally change the traditional
regulatory system.
From the perspective of reducing agency costs, in contrast to English law,
the current regulatory system in China leads to higher agency costs. First,
higher costs relating to the moral hazard of regulators and charity trustees.
Due to the lack of sufficient competition among charities and a strict control
over charities’ internal governance issues, regulators also act as charity
trustees in all but name, resulting in serious conflicts of interest and a lack
of effective mechanisms ensuring the sound performance of those charities.
Second, higher costs relating to the supervisory costs of the general public,
donors and other stakeholders due to the inefficient governmental regulation.
Third, higher cost regarding the negative effects of external intervention.
This is because, even for independent charities, the altruistic spirit of their
charity trustees is too constrained to promote them to actively participate in
charity governance.
Therefore, to reduce those costs, it is necessary to change the current legal
and regulatory rules limiting the establishment and independent governance
of charities in China. For example, the law should protect the rights of
charity trustees to independently govern their charity and further reduce the
situations in which regulators can intervene in the internal governance
issues of charities. Meanwhile, the law should detail the procedures related
of setting up a charity; abandon those policies negatively affecting the
fairness and transparency of registration, such as the ‘one region, one
organisation’ policy; and change the ‘no registration, no legality’ policy.
With respect to regulatory principles, this chapter has discussed
collaboration, proportionality, accountability and the supportive function of
regulators. Firstly, in respect of collaboration, there are a range of problems
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facing both China and England in dealing with the costs relating to co-
ordinating regulators. Despite this, due to the existence of a range of
different professional administrative units with differing standards and
procedures regulating charities, the situation in China is more serious,
leading to higher costs relating to co-ordinating the regulators than those in
England.
To reduce those collaboration costs, Chinese law should identify the
regulatory functions held by different governmental regulators and their
power and duty clearly and accurately; and establish a range of co-operative
supervisory mechanisms, such as joint registration and efficient co-operative
mechanisms facilitating the transfer of information among those regulators.
In this respect, Chinese regulators can draw on the experience of
memoranda of understanding between the Charity Commission and other
regulators, clarifying the contents, procedures, methods and other major
issues relating to information to be shared between different regulators.
Secondly, regarding proportionality and accountability, there is no clear
legal rule mentioning those principles in China. By contrast, they have been
required by English law. In addition, although both China and England are
facing problems regarding proportionality and accountability in practice,
English law seems to be more effective in reducing the related agency costs
(mainly the costs of the regulators’ moral hazard, the supervisory costs and
the costs of the negative effects of external intervention) through a range of
governance mechanisms, such as a risk-based regulatory approach, a more
complete disclosure of information and a special tribunal supervising the
Charity Commission.
Therefore, Chinese law should draw on the experience of English law and
the Charity Commission, taking a proportional and risk-based regulatory
approach. Meanwhile, it should further strengthen the accountability of
charity regulators by enhancing the rules governing disclosure of
information regarding charity regulation, such as providing more detailed
rules concerning the disclosed information and introducing an annual public
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meeting similar to that held by the Charity Commission. Furthermore, China
should establish more cost-effective legal remedies, such as the building of a
special tribunal in each court, available to charity trustees and other related
parties, to strengthen the accountability of charity regulators.
Thirdly, in terms of the supportive function of regulators, both English law
and Chinese law take this seriously. For example, English law defines one of
the Charity Commission’s functions as ‘[e]ncouraging and facilitating the
better administration of charities’.166 In China, the new charity law
establishes one chapter to provide rules supporting charities.167 However, in
practice, the Charity Commission does better than the Ministry of Civil
Affairs in terms of providing a range of detailed guidance and other methods
to support charity trustees in governing their charity. This can help reduce
the residual loss due to inefficient use of charitable resources.
Despite this, recently, the Commission has had to focus on regulatory
matters due to the budgetary limitations. However, given that China’s
charitable sector is still in its initial stage, the supportive role of regulators
in ensuring sound charity governance is much more important than that in
England. Hence, Chinese regulators should treat their supportive role very
seriously and take a range of methods, such as training courses, detailed
guidance, and education to support charity trustees in governing their charity.
Of course, Chinese regulators should draw on the lessons learnt by the
Charity Commission in this regard, which sometimes issues guidance
misinterpreting the legal rules, such as the guidance on public benefit issued
in 2008. It not only negatively affects the role of the Commission in
supporting charity trustees but also brings the costs of the Commission’s
moral hazard and the unnecessary costs of the negative effects of external
intervention. Meanwhile, Chinese regulators can encourage charity umbrella
organisations to play a supportive role in order to reduce the costs of
governmental support.
166 CA 2011, s 15.
167 CL 2016 (China), Chapter 9.
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After justifying the necessity of protecting the independent governance of
charity trustees and the ways to promote efficient governmental regulation,
the next chapter will further examine how to reduce the agency costs
regarding internal governance mechanisms in the context of independent
governance.
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Chapter 5 Transforming Internal Governance Mechanisms
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will make an economic and comparative analysis of internal
governance mechanisms in England and China. This economic and
comparative study can help evaluate the current legal rules and problems
and further provide the related strategies to improve the future internal
governance mechanisms in China.
Internal governance is of vital importance in ensuring the good performance
of charity trustees: if internal governance can ensure charity trustees
efficiently perform for the charitable purpose/public benefit of their charity,
then it may be unnecessary to supervise them from the outside world, thus
reducing the monitoring costs of key stakeholders.
In this chapter, two major problems are selected for examination, i.e., how
to design the fiduciary duties of charity trustees and how to improve internal
governance structures, such as supervision by charity members,
accountability to supervisory boards or trust supervisors, and support by
internal auditors (‘内部审计师’) and audit committees (‘审计委员会’).
Based on the revised agency theory, this chapter argues that the reform of
legal rules governing the fiduciary duties of charity trustees should strike a
balance between the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard and the key
stakeholders’ supervisory costs on the one hand and the enforcement costs
and the costs of the negative effects of external intervention on the other.
Meanwhile, both members and supervisory boards/trust supervisors should
fall within the scope of ‘other selected stakeholders’ defined in Chapter 3,
and the monitoring costs regarding accountability to members or
supervisory boards/trust supervisors should be reasonably reduced. However,
in contrast to members, supervisory boards/trust supervisors should be
identified as part of charity trustees and thus act as a self-regulatory
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mechanism of those charity trustees. In addition, charities could be
encouraged to establish an internal audit, as an internal governance
mechanism supporting the governance capacity of their charity trustees. A
further economic and comparative study in this chapter will justify those
arguments and offer the relevant measures in support of legal reform in
China.
5.2 Improving the Legal Rules Relating to Fiduciary Duties
5.2.1 Introduction
In charity governance, without the existence of owners who ‘have a vested
self-interest in ensuring that the public-benefit purpose is pursued and
controlling governance against abuse’,1 a range of effective mechanisms
commonly accepted in corporate governance, such as market competition2
and performance-related salaries,3 cannot be easily used. Hence, from an
economic perspective, ‘beyond the low-powered incentives provided by
informal sanctions such as reputation and pride’, 4 fiduciary duties are
extremely important in preventing the moral hazard of charity trustees and
guiding them in governing their charity.
Against this background, in this section, the thesis will compare the
fiduciary duties of charity trustees in both jurisdictions, evaluate which
jurisdiction’s legal rules governing fiduciary duties perform better in
reducing agency costs, and accordingly discuss how to improve the current
rules regulating fiduciary duties in Chinese law.
1 European Foundation Centre, Exploring Transparency and Accountability: Regulation of Public-
Benefit Foundations in Europe (European Foundation Centre 2011) 41.
2 Henry G. Manne, ‘Merger and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965) 73 The Journal of Political
Economy 110.
3 Eugene F. Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88 The Journal of Political
Economy 288.
4 Henry Hansmann, ‘The Economics of Nonprofit Organizations’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von
Hippel (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 68.
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5.2.2 Comparing the Rules Governing Fiduciary Duties in England and
China
5.2.2.1 Clarifying the Scope of Fiduciary Duties
Fiduciary duties5 derive from English trusts law, and have become the main
duties restraining charity trustees in charity law. ‘A fiduciary is someone
who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter
in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.’ 6
Accordingly, fiduciary duties require ‘that a person in a fiduciary position
should promote exclusively the beneficiary’s interests, and refrain from
allowing any self-interest or rival interests to touch or affect his or her
conduct’. 7
However, fiduciary duties may contain different obligations in different
jurisdictions. For example, ‘in the British Commonwealth, where, unlike the
position in the United States, fiduciary accountability contemplates only the
duty of loyalty’.8 As a matter of fact, in the strict sense, a range of duties,
including the duty of care, are not regarded as fiduciary duties in English
law.9
In other words, although there are a variety of duties ensuring the good
performance of charity trustees, such as the duty of loyalty, the duty of
care10 and other related duties,11 not all those duties fall within the scope of
5 Regarding a comprehensive study of fiduciary duties, generally, see Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law
(OUP 2011).
6 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18.
7 Joshua Getzler, ‘Duty of Care’ in Peter B.H. Birks & Arianna Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart
Publishing 2002) 41.
8 Robert Flannigan, ‘The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability’ (2007) 32 Delaware Journal of
Corporate Law 393, 398; Bristol & West Building Society (n 6); Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71
(HC) (Australia); K.L.B. v British Columbia [2003] 2 SCR 403 (Canada).
9 Bristol & West Building Society (n 6) 17; Permanent Building Society (in liquidation) v Wheeler
(1994) 14 ACSR 109, 157; Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (Law
Com No 350) (Law Commission 2014) 53.
10 With regard to the duty of care, it has been codified in some areas. For example, see CA 2011, s
221(2); Trustee Act 2000, ss 1-2 and sch1. From a comparative perspective, the duty of care is also
widely recognised in other European countries. European Foundation Centre (n 1) 16.
11 In the United States, the duty of obedience may be also recommended to become an essential
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fiduciary duties in English law. In this context, to facilitate a comparative
study in both jurisdictions, the scope of fiduciary duties discussed in this
chapter is limited to the duty of loyalty.12
5.2.2.2 The Duty of Loyalty
Given that the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) does not mention
the term ‘duty of loyalty’ or ‘fiduciary duty’, here the thesis will discuss the
rules in English law, and further explore whether similar rules are available
in Chinese charity law.
In English law, there are comparatively detailed rules governing the duty of
loyalty and some rules have been codified in some respects. As suggested by
Hubert Picarda, this duty mainly includes two aspects, observing the
objects13 and avoiding or remedying conflicts of interest.14 Both aspects of
this duty require charity trustees to perform in the best interests of the
charitable purpose/public benefit rather than in any other party’s private
interests. For example, according to the Charities Act 2011, the charity
trustee of a charitable incorporated organisation (CIO)15 ‘must exercise the
powers and perform the functions that the charity trustee has in that capacity
in the way that the charity trustee decides, in good faith, would be most
likely to further the purposes of the CIO.’16
As regards the duty to observe the objects, English law requires that ‘all
charity trustees are obliged to use charity funds for the specific purposes set
component of fiduciary duties in charity governance. Rob Atkinson, ‘Unsettled Standing: Who (Else)
Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?’ (1998) 23 Journal of Corporation Law 655, 661.
12 Regarding a more detailed discussion of fiduciary duties in English law, see Robert Pearce and
Warren Barr, Pearce & Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligations (6th edn, OUP 2015) 850-899.
13 Baldry v Feintuck [1972] 2 All ER 81.
14 Hubert Picarda QC, ‘Harmonising Nonprofit Law in the European Union: An English Perspective
and Digest’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance of
Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 187.
15 A charitable incorporated organisation (CIO) is a new type of incorporated charity created by the
Charities Act 2006 and is only regulated by the Charity Commission, compared to charitable
companies. Generally, see Gareth G. Morgan, Charitable Incorporated Organisations (Directory of
Social Change 2013).
16 CA 2011, s 221.
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out in the charity’s governing document and for no other purpose’.17
Similarly, Chinese law requires that ‘the property of a charity should be
exclusively used for its charitable purposes according to its governing
document and donation agreement’.18
However, in contrast to Chinese law, in English law, a range of guidance
and best practices are available to further clarify and facilitate the
implementation of this requirement, such as ‘The Hallmarks of an Effective
Charity’ 19 issued by the Charity Commission and ‘Good Governance: A
Code for the Voluntary and Community Sector’ (2nd edn)20 issued by the
Governance Code Steering Group. According to the ‘Charity Governance
Code for Larger Charities’ and the ‘Charity Governance Code for Smaller
Charities’, which recently replaced the above two documents, charity
trustees are recommended to take a range of measures to clarify and ensure
efficient realisation of the purposes pursued by their charity, among which
one suggestion is that charity trustees should ‘periodically [review] the
organisation’s charitable purposes, and the external environment in which it
works, to make sure that the charity, and its purposes, stay relevant and
valid’.21
In respect of the duty to avoid or remedy conflicts of interest, its core
requirement can be concluded as the principle that ‘no one who has a duty
17 Debra Morris and Karen Atkinton, ‘Charities Biting the Hand that Feeds: Relationships with Their
Funders’ in Debra Morris and Jean Warburton (eds), Charities, Governance and the Law: the Way
Forward (Key Haven 2003) 199; Attorney General v Brandreth (1842) 1 Y & C Cas 200. In addition,
in some special situations, to protect the public benefit, it is necessary for charity trustees to apply to
change the current purpose of their charity into a more updated one. In this context, the cy-près
principle can help tackle this issue, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. See, for example, CA 2011,
ss 61-68.
18 CL 2016 (China), s 52.
19 Charity Commission, The Hallmarks of an Effective Charity (Charity Commission 2008) 6. It is
worth noting that, this document has been replaced by the ‘Charity Governance Code’ recently
(<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-hallmarks-of-an-effective-charity-cc10> accessed
20 September 2017).
20 The Governance Code Steering Group, Good Governance: A Code for the Voluntary and
Community Sector (2nd edn, The Governance Code Steering Group 2010) 14. This document has been
replaced by a new edition recently.
21 Charity Governance Code Steering Group, Charity Governance Code for Larger Charities (Charity
Governance Code Steering Group 2017) 8; also Charity Governance Code Steering Group, Charity
Governance Code for Smaller Charities (Charity Governance Code Steering Group 2017) 8.
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to perform shall place himself in a situation to have his interest conflicting
with his duty’.22 This duty can play two roles in English law, i.e., to avoid
entering into transactions involving private interests and to make charity
trustees accountable for the benefits they obtained by using their fiduciary
position.23 Or, according to Hubert Picarda, this duty requires that charity
trustees should act gratuitously and should not make any profit from their
role as charity trustees.24 In the following discussion, this requirement is
referred to as the ‘principle of voluntary trusteeship’.
Nevertheless, although those rules are still applicable, there are some
exceptions and more detailed rules governing those exceptions in English
law.25 For example, the benefits of charity trustees, according to the
guidance of the Charity Commission, can be further divided into payment of
expenses to a trustee, paying trustees for services, paying for trusteeship,
employing a trustee or connected person and compensating trustees for loss
of earnings, which apply some specific rules respectively.26
By contrast, the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) only provides
one rule directly tackling conflicts of interest, which is too simple to
regulate the complex situations with which fiduciary duties have to deal in
practice.27
Managers of a charity must not damage the benefits of this charity,
the beneficiaries or the general public for the benefits of their
associates; if those managers transact with the charity, they must
22 Movitex Ltd v Bulfield [1988] BCLC 104, 117.
23 Peter Luxton, ‘Conflicts of Interest in Charity Law’ in Alison Dunn (ed), The Voluntary Sector, the
State and the Law (Hart Publishing 2000) 227.
24 Hubert Picarda QC, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (4th edn, Bloomsbury Professional
2010) 633.
25 Generally, see Luxton (n 23) 227-240; Charity Commission, Conflicts of Interest: A Guide for
Charity Trustees (CC29) (Charity Commission 2014); Charity Commission, Case Study: Conflicts of
Interest (Charity Commission 2014); Charity Commission, Legal Underpinning: Conflicts of Interest:
A Guide for Charity Trustees (CC29) (Charity Commission 2014).
26 Charity Commission, Trustee Expenses and Payments (Charity Commission 2012); concerning an
overview of the legal rules in this area, see Law Commission, Technical Issues in Charity Law: A
Consultation Paper (Consultation Paper No 220) (Law Commission 2015) 147-161.
27 Regarding trustees in a charitable trust, there are more detailed rules governing their duties. TL
2001 (China), ss 25-42. However, those rules do not regulate charity trustees in other types of charity.
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not participate in the decision relating to this transaction and the
matters concerning the related transaction must be disclosed to the
public.28
5.2.3 Evaluating the Rules Governing Fiduciary Duties in Both
Jurisdictions
If the fiduciary duties imposed by law are very strict and the punishment for
breaking them is quite severe, then charity trustees may be less motivated by
intrinsic motivations such as altruism and fewer capable individuals
(including many professionals) may choose to act as charity trustees (due to
the ‘crowding out phenomenon’, as noted in Chapter 3).
However, without any fiduciary duty, there may be room for charity trustees
to fall prey to moral hazard.29 Hence, in designing fiduciary duties, the law
should balance the costs of moral hazard after monitoring charity trustees
and the monitoring costs. In this context, this thesis will look for a
reasonable approach to reducing those agency costs in designing fiduciary
duties, and then evaluate whether Chinese law or English law has taken or
partly taken this approach.
5.2.3.1 Looking for a Reasonable Approach to Reducing Agency Costs
First, fiduciary duties should contain a mandatory aspect to help reduce the
costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard and the supervisory costs of key
stakeholders. Traditionally, ‘there is a mandatory core to the fiduciary
obligation that cannot be overridden by agreement. For example, the
principal cannot authorize the fiduciary to act in bad faith’.30
28 CL 2016 (China), s 14.
29 The thesis does not deny the altruism of a host of volunteers. However, in a legal system lacking
basic rules governing the performance of volunteers, some individuals mainly pursuing self-interest
under the cloak of being a volunteer may damage the benefits of charities and other supporters. That
is an important reason why fiduciary duties exist.
30 Robert H. Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law
Review 1039, 1046.
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The reason for the existence of those mandatory rules, from an economic
perspective, is that they ‘serve an internal protective and cautionary function
that protects the principal, and an external categorization function that
protects third parties who deal with the fiduciary’.31 This economic
argument can help justify the mandatory rules regarding the fiduciary duties
of charity trustees in the context of charity governance.
As suggested in Chapter 3, in a charity, the position of the principal (from an
economic perspective) should be replaced by the charitable purpose/public
benefit it pursues. In this context, the charitable purpose/public benefit itself
cannot even negotiate with the charity’s trustees directly and is further
vulnerable if the duty of loyalty and other duties can be eliminated totally.
Therefore, the mandatory rules of fiduciary duties can reduce the costs of
the charity trustees’ moral hazard and internally protect the realisation of the
charitable purpose/public benefit32 by constraining those trustees’ discretion.
On the other hand, the external categorisation function of these mandatory
rules is to ‘minimize third-party information costs’.33 In terms of charity
governance, combined with the charitable purpose/public benefit, the non-
distribution constraint and other principles and rules governing charities, the
mandatory rules of fiduciary duties can inform donors, volunteers and the
general public that the mandatory fiduciary duties governing charity trustees
cannot be changed, and have to be complied with. This can help maintain
the public trust and confidence, and thus reduce the supervisory costs of key
stakeholders.
Second, the costs of enforcement and the costs of the negative effects of
external intervention relating to fiduciary duties should be controlled. In
31 ibid.
32 In practice, this is also the focus of the charity regulators in regulating charity trustees. See, for
example, Charity Commission, Inquiry Report: Amy Marion Dwyer Will Trust (Charity Commission
2014); Charity Commission, Inquiry Report: Saint Stephen the Great Charitable Trust; Saint Stephen
the Great (Charity Commission 2016); Sam Burne James, ‘Regulator Orders Legacy Fund to Review
Governance after “Poor Management” Cost It £66,000’ Third Sector (London, 28 July 2014)
<http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/regulator-orders-legacy-fund-review-governance-poor-management-
cost-66000/governance/article/1305522> accessed 20 September 2017.
33 Sitkoff (n 30)1047.
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terms of charity governance, ‘as the recipients of public trust, confidence
and donations, charity trustees have a moral responsibility’ 34 to efficiently
realise their charity’s purpose. And, in practice, there is scope for internal
motivations (such as voluntary spirit) and informal rules or norms (such as
reputation and recommended practices) to adjust the conduct of charity
trustees and to make them perform effectively and efficiently.35 As noted in
Chapter 3, in contrast to legal duties and liabilities, those internal
motivations and informal rules and norms are usually self-enforced and
cost-effective.
In this context, the contents and legal consequences for breach of fiduciary
duties should be reasonably limited to allow the above internal motivations
of voluntary charity trustees and informal norms to play a role. This can not
only reduce the costs of the legal enforcement of fiduciary duties, but also
help control the costs of the negative effects of external intervention, such as
‘undue restrictions or burdensome procedures that make it difficult to recruit
[charity trustees].’36 In this respect, even if there are concerns about the
situation where ‘in the absence of inappropriate self-dealing, fiduciaries
generally have little to fear from the regulators’,37 it is worth noting that, the
legal requirements on fiduciary duties should be reasonably and
pragmatically limited.
Therefore, a well-designed legal mechanism governing fiduciary duties
should help control the serious mismanagement and misconduct of charity
trustees in order to reduce the costs of their moral hazard and the
34 Lord Hodgson, Trusted and Independent: Giving Charity back to Charities-Review of the Charities
Act 2006 (The Stationery Office 2012) 22.
35 James J. Fishman, ‘Improving Charitable Accountability’ (2003) 62 Maryland Law Review 218,
246.
36 James J. Fishman, ‘The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform’
(1985) 34 Emory Law Journal 617, 677. In this context, an insightful statement in corporate
governance may also apply to charity governance: ‘the accountability rules, no matter to whom the
accountability lies, must not be so restrictive as to stifle the entrepreneurial talents of the managers,
which talents constitute the rationale of conferring the wide discretion upon them in the first place.’
Paul L. Davies and Sarah Worthington, Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2012) 379.
37 Evelyn Brody, ‘Accountability and Public Trust’ in Lester M. Salamon (ed), The State of Nonprofit
America (Aspen Institute & Brookings Institute Press 2002) 479.
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supervisory costs of key stakeholders; but, in the meantime, the contents and
legal consequences of fiduciary duties should be limited in a reasonable and
pragmatic manner in order to reduce the enforcement costs and the costs of
the negative effects of external intervention.
5.2.3.2 An Economic Analysis of Chinese Law and English Law
As noted above, in the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China), there are
few rules dealing with conflicts of interest, which cannot sufficiently reduce
the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard in practice. By contrast,
English law provides more detailed rules relating to fiduciary duties, which
can perform better in controlling those costs.
On this basis, in England, the Charities Act 2006 (the main contents of
which are further consolidated by the Charities Act 2011) and case law seem
to strike a balance between controlling the charity trustees’ moral hazard
and reducing the related monitoring costs in developing their legal rules. For
example, English law establishes fiduciary duties by statutory and case law
to prevent the moral hazard of charity trustees and accordingly to reduce the
supervisory costs of key stakeholders.38
Meanwhile, to ensure the sound performance of charity trustees and to
encourage more capable individuals to act as charity trustees, recently
English law has adopted a series of measures to protect and support charity
trustees by efficiently reducing their legal burdens and risks, such as
indemnity insurance,39 and relieving charity trustees acting honestly and
reasonably from liability.40 Those measures can help reduce the costs of the
negative effects of external intervention (such as, inefficient use of
charitable resources due to excessive legal limitations and burdens).
Therefore, in contrast to Chinese law, English law takes a range of more
38 Susan R. Moody, ‘Policing the Voluntary Sector: Legal Issues and Volunteer Vetting’ in Alison
Dunn (ed), The Voluntary Sector, the State and the Law (Hart Publishing 2000) 40.
39 CA 2011, s 189.
40 CA 2011, s 191.
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effective measures in reducing the charity trustees’ moral hazard and
balancing different agency costs relating to fiduciary duties.
5.2.4 Improving the Rules Governing Fiduciary Duties in Chinese Law
Given that English law in this area works better in reducing agency costs,
Chinese law can draw on English law to develop its specific legal rules of
fiduciary duties governing charity trustees. Accordingly, the following
discussion will assess how to improve the current rules governing fiduciary
duties in Chinese law.
5.2.4.1 The Necessity of Codification
Currently, Chinese law does not stipulate detailed rules with regard to
charity trustees and their fiduciary duties, except for the quite simple rules
in the Trusts Law 2001 (China), the Regulation on the Administration of
Foundations 2004 (China) and the recently enacted Charity Law 2016
(China). This problem may, to some extent, be redressed by the governing
documents of charities. However, in order to efficiently reduce the moral
hazard of charity trustees and protect charitable assets, it may be a better
choice to enact the basic legal rules relating to fiduciary duties.41
As a matter of fact, in England, fiduciary duties have been codified in a
range of legal areas. For example, in the context of charitable companies,
the substantial content of those duties has been codified comprehensively:
there have been more detailed statutory rules governing the duty to act
within powers, the duty to promote the success of the company, the duty to
exercise independent judgment, the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill
and diligence, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, the duty not to accept
benefits from third parties and the duty to declare interest in proposed
transactions or arrangements.42
41 International Center for Civil Society Law, ‘Comments on the Draft Charity Law for the People’s
Republic of China’ (2007) 5(1) International Journal of Civil Society Law 22.
42 Companies Act 2006, ss 171-177.
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In addition, although in England the view against codification of fiduciary
duties is quite strong,43 given that China has no case law, in order to govern
fiduciary duties, there must be clear legal rules in its statutory laws. In this
context, when considering introducing the related rules developed by
English case law into Chinese law, the above codified and detailed rules
concerning fiduciary duties should not be ignored. Of course, those codified
rules should be transformed according to the principles, such as the
charitable purposes and public benefit requirement, of charity law, and
established in a manner that will help to reduce the related agency costs.
5.2.4.2 Incorporating the Principle of Voluntary Trusteeship into
Charity Law
Traditionally, in English charity law, charity trustees should not receive any
profit from their charity, which means charity trustees are usually
volunteers.44 This is the principle of voluntary trusteeship.
By comparison, in the current laws, regulations and policies in China,
voluntary trusteeship has not been accepted as a principle and seems not to
be paid sufficient attention. As far as this thesis is concerned, so far, few
Chinese scholars even mention this issue, let alone carry out any further
analysis of it. Currently, the laws and administrative regulations in this area
are quite obscure and uncertain. According to the Public Benefit
Undertakings Donations Law 1999 (China), a public benefit social
organisation should practise strict economics and reduce its management
costs; the salary of its staff and administrative expenses should be paid with
the organisation’s revenues according to the standard stipulated by the
government.45 Therefore, although this law require charities to control their
management costs, it does not mention the voluntary nature of charity
43 For example, the Law Commission argues that ‘[s]tatutory codification of the law in this area
would be a lengthy process and there is a danger of unintended consequences’. Law Commission (n 9)
146; Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules (Law Com No 236) (Law Commission
1995) 72.
44 Robinson v Pett (1734) 3 P Wms 249, 251; Brocksopp v Barnes (1820) 5 Madd 90; Barrett v
Hartley (1866) LR 2 Eq 789.
45 PBUDL 1999 (China), s 23.
150
trustees.
In addition, according to the Regulation on the Administration of
Foundations 2004 (China), directors who do not have a full-time job in a
foundation and supervisors (‘监事’) on this foundation’s supervisory board
cannot receive any remuneration.46 In other words, persons only acting as
directors of a charitable foundation along with its supervisory board cannot
receive any remuneration and accordingly should be volunteers. Hence, at
least in the context of charitable foundations, Chinese law accepts the
principle of voluntary trusteeship. However, in terms of the laws and
regulations governing associations, civil non-commercial units and
charitable trusts,47 there is no similar rule requiring voluntary charity
trustees. Hence, it is still unclear to what extent the principle of voluntary
trusteeship is implemented in practice.
From the perspective of reducing agency costs relating to charity
governance, the principle of voluntary trusteeship should be incorporated
into Chinese charity law to govern all types of charity. The main reasons are
as follows.
First, this principle will help reduce the costs of the charity trustees’ moral
hazard. Persons who act as voluntary charity trustees are usually motivated
by a strong sense of altruism (possibly also combined with other intangible
factors, such as reputation). The voluntary nature of trusteeship can help
control the costs relating to their moral hazard.
Second, this principle can help reduce the supervisory costs of donors and
46 RAF 2004 (China), s 23. By comparison, in the US, benefits can be given to charity trustees
although ‘there are complex legal rules designed to prevent trustees benefiting from their trusteeship
to the detriment of the charity’. The Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill, The Draft Charities
Bill: Vol. 1 Report, Formal Minutes and Evidence (HL Paper 167-I; HC 660-I) (The Stationery Office
2004) 71. In addition, many European countries ‘set limitations on the extent to which board
members may be remunerated, while remuneration is prohibited’ in several countries. European
Foundation Centre (n 1) 16.
47According to the Trusts Law 2001 (China), the trustees of a trust can obtain remuneration from their
trust when the trust document or any extra agreement between the parties to this trust allows it. TL
2001 (China), s 35.
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the general public. It requires that unpaid charity trustees strictly abide by
the non-distribution constraint, confirming to the public that charitable
resources may only be used for the charitable purposes as far as possible.
Accordingly, it can help reduce the supervisory costs of the financial
supporters of a charity.
Third, it will control the costs of the negative effects of monetary payments.
As noted in Chapter 3, a monetary payment to charity trustees may harm
(‘crowd out’) their intrinsic motivations and further restrain the involvement
of capable volunteers substantially motivated by these factors in charity
governance. This principle can copy with this problem.
5.2.4.3 Improving the Rules Governing the Exceptions to the Principle
of Voluntary Trusteeship
However, there should be some exceptions to the principle of voluntary
trusteeship. For example, charity trustees are facing increasing legal risks
and complexity in governing a charity, which is only a part-time job;48 in
practice, charity trustees are often volunteers49 and ‘may lack the corporate
or legal expertise that their for-profit counterparts often possess’;50 or some
transactions with the trustees of a charity can also benefit the realisation of
this charity’s purpose.
In those contexts, if the benefits given to charity trustees can contribute to
realising the charitable purpose of a charity, in order to reduce the costs
relating to inefficient use of charitable resources due to excessive legal
limitations, it should be acceptable to provide reasonable benefits to them.
However, given the important role of voluntary trusteeship in reducing
48 John Plummer, How Are Charities Accountable?: A Study of the Approaches to Governance and
Accountability Developed by Two Major Charities in Britain (Demos 1997) 46.
49 Karyn R. Vanderwarren, ‘Financial Accountability in Charitable Organizations: Mandating an
Audit Committee Function’ (2002) 77(2) Chicago-Kent Law Review 963, 966; Thomas H. Boyd, ‘A
Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-For-Profit Corporation Statutes’ (1987) 72
Iowa Law Review 725, 728.
50 Vanderwarren (n 49) 966; Fishman (n 36) 675.
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several types of agency costs (such as the costs of the charity trustees’ moral
hazard, the supervisory costs of key stakeholders and the costs of the
negative effects of monetary payments) as noted above, there should be a
range of strict requirements, conditions and procedures to deal with conflicts
of interests, to satisfy the information needs of key stakeholders, and to
reduce the negative effects of a monetary incentive.
In this respect, the English approach can provide valuable experience. For
example, in terms of payments to charity trustees for their services outside
their role as charity trustees, the Charities Act 2011 requires a limitation on
the amount of the remuneration, that the remuneration is in the best interests
of the charity, that the paid charity trustees are a minority, and that there is
no express prohibition provision in the government document. 51
Those measures can help control conflicts of interests and reduce the
negative effects of a monetary incentive (by limiting the amount of the
remuneration). Meanwhile, English law also requires that the legal authority
under which the payment was made, the name of the remunerated trustee,
details of why the remuneration was paid, the amount of remuneration paid
and other information should be provided in the charity accounts,52 which is
beneficial to meeting the information needs and reducing the supervisory
costs of key stakeholders. All those measures as a whole balance the
different types of agency costs in charity governance and thus are worth
considering in improving the legal rules in China.
Of course, there are some possible drawbacks relating to English law in this
respect. For example, in English law, those rules are only applicable to a
charity paying for services, which means that payment for the goods
supplied by charity trustees is excluded from this rule. However, it is
unreasonable to distinguish goods from services and only apply those rules
51 CA 2011, s 185.
52 Charity Commission and Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, Charities SORP (FRS 102)
(Charity Commission and Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator 2014) paras 9.6-9.7.
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to services.53 To make those rules function well in reducing the related
agency costs, they should apply to both services and goods provided by
charity trustees in the future charity law.
5.2.4.4 Providing Different Legal Consequences for Breach of Fiduciary
Duties
In designing the legal rules governing legal consequences for breach of
fiduciary duties, to balance the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard
with the monitoring costs, this thesis argues that a violation of fiduciary
duties can be further divided into two parts, ‘unintentional violation’ (‘过失
违反 ’) and ‘intentional violation’ (‘故意违反 ’),54 which lead to differing
legal consequences. In this respect, although there is no counterpart to this
distinction in English law, there is a similar approach distinguishing two
different types of liability for breach of fiduciary duties in the Charities Act
2011.
For example, in terms of the purchase of indemnity insurance, in principle
charity trustees can utilise their charity’s funds to purchase insurance to
indemnify them against liability for breach of trust or duty. However, this
rule does not apply to the liability relating to conduct ‘(i) which [the charity
trustees] knew (or must reasonably be assumed to have known) was not in
the interests of the charity, or (ii) [which the trustees] did not care whether it
was in the best interests of the charity or not’.55 In addition, as the charity
trustee of a charity, a person usually should be personally liable for a breach
of duty. However, English law allows the Charity Commission to relieve the
whole or part of this charity trustee’s liability if the Commission considers
that s/he ‘has acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused
for the breach of trust or duty’.56
53 This problem is also pointed out by the Law Commission. Law Commission (n 26) 147-161.
54 This is a typical classification of violations of duties in Chinese law. For example, see GPCL 2017
(China), ss 38 and 43; Criminal Law 1979 (China, revised in 2015) (CL 1979 (China, revised in
2015)), ss 14-15.
55 CA 2011, s 189.
56 CA 2011, s 191.
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From an economic perspective, those rules can be regarded as English law
aiming to strike a balance between controlling the charity trustees’ serious
moral hazard and reducing the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention (in this context, the threat from legal liability). This
arrangement can help reduce the related agency costs as a whole. Therefore,
in designing the legal consequences of breach of fiduciary duties, it is
necessary for Chinese law to distinguish two types of liability.
First, ‘liability relating to unintentional violation’. In this situation, due to
negligence, the charity trustee of a charity did not know that his/her
performance would damage the charitable purpose/public benefit, or s/he
would not have carried out this conduct.57 Therefore, no severe moral hazard
of the charity trustee exists in this situation.
Accordingly, the focus of the law should be on reducing the costs of the
negative effects of external intervention. Given the voluntary nature of
charity trustees, the difficulty in recruiting capable charity trustees and the
various contributions that charity trustees make to a charity (such as
fundraising, contacts with the local community, etc.), a less stringent
liability seems to be more reasonable.58 In this context, Chinese law can
introduce indemnity insurance, and empower charity regulators to relieve
charity trustees acting honestly and reasonably from liability to reduce the
legal burdens and risks facing them.
Second, ‘liability relating to intentional violation’. In this circumstance, a
charity’s trustees knew or should reasonably be assumed to have known that
their performance would damage the charitable purposes/public benefit, but
still carried out this conduct. 59 This usually means more serious moral
hazard for those charity trustees.
57 For example, see CL 1979 (China, revised in 2015), s 14.
58 Vanderwarren (n 49) 968.
59 CL 1979 (China, revised in 2015), s 15.
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In this respect, the focus of the law should be on reducing those costs of
moral hazard by clarifying and implementing the relevant civil or even
criminal liabilities those charity trustees should bear. In particular for
criminal liabilities, in China, although charity trustees may be punished by
criminal law under some specific circumstances, such as
‘embezzlement’(‘职务侵占罪 ’), ‘misappropriation’(‘挪用资金罪 ’) and
‘non-state staff’s bribe-taking’(‘非国家工作人员受贿罪 ’),60 there is no
offence dealing with all the situations associated with a serious breach of
fiduciary duties in charity governance. By contrast, any serious breach of
duties or any abuse of power by the staff of a state-owned enterprise,
company or public institution (as noted in Chapter 2, public institutions are
usually government-controlled organisations) which leads to a serious loss
to the state, is identified as an offence by Chinese criminal law.61
However, given the tax benefits62 conferred to, and the public nature of,
charities, the future law in this respect should provide that a serious breach
of fiduciary duties by charity trustees, resulting in a severe loss to their
charity (and the public indirectly), also forms an offence. This will
definitely facilitate the reduction of the charity trustees’ severe moral hazard
in ensuring sound charity governance. Meanwhile, for the majority of
charity trustees whose performance is honest and reasonable, they do not
need to worry about this punishment.
5.3 Reassessing the Role of Internal Bodies in Charity Governance
5.3.1 Introduction
Internal bodies play an important role in charity governance. If an internal
body in a charity is the governing body (made up of charity trustees), it will
govern and be finally responsible for this charity. If not, then this internal
body may play an essential role in monitoring or supporting the
60 CL 1979 (China, revised in 2015), ss 163 and 271-272.
61 CL 1979 (China, revised in 2015), s 168.
62 For example, charities and their income can enjoy tax exemptions. CL 2016 (China), s 79.
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performance of the governing body/charity trustees. Therefore, the law
should distinguish the governing body from other internal bodies, and
further provide reasonable rules to reduce the agency costs relating to other
internal bodies supervising or supporting the governing body/charity
trustees. However, the current legal rules in China cannot achieve this aim.
5.3.1.1 Which Internal Body Falls within the Scope of Charity Trustees?
Similar to the situation that the boards of for-profit companies are expected
to ‘be free to drive their companies forward’,63 charity trustees play a central
role in governing a charity and ensuring the performance of all the staff is in
the best interests of this charity. Meanwhile, in contrast to those governing a
for-profit company, charity trustees usually play a more significant role in a
charity, ‘as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetries and control
costs for primary stakeholders’.64
In this context, if it is not clear who are in charge of, and finally responsible
for, a charity, the related governance mechanisms cannot be implemented in
practice and there will be more disputes when deciding the internal affairs or
other issues of this charity, increasing the related agency costs. Therefore, to
avoid serious governance problems65 and further protect the realisation of
the charitable purposes pursued by a charity, it is vital to clarify ‘who the
[charity] trustees of a charity are’.66
However, there are two practical problems relating to the identity of charity
trustees in China. First, due to the lack of a unified title referring to those
persons in charge of a charity in Chinese law, it is not clear who are
members of the governing body in some circumstances. As noted in Chapter
1, the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) uses a number of terms,
63 Sir Adrian Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance
(Gee and Co. Ltd. 1992) para 1.1.
64 Gerhard Speckhacher, ‘Nonprofit Versus Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach’ (2008)
18(3) Nonprofit Management & Leadership 295, 316.
65 For example, see Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, Who’s in Charge: Control and
Independence in Scottish Charities (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator 2011).
66 Con Alexander and Jos Moule, Charity Governance (Jordan Publishing Limited 2007) 7.
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such as responsible persons,67 decision-making bodies,68 executive bodies69
and managers,70 but it does not clarify who are finally responsible for the
conduct of their charity.71
Second, in China, different types of charity have different internal bodies.
For example, in an incorporated association, its members and the board of
directors are the essential internal bodies.72 By contrast, the board of
directors and the supervisory board are the essential internal bodies in a
‘donated legal person’,73 which is an incorporated non-membership public
benefit organisation, such as a foundation, or a social service institute (‘社
会服务机构’，the new name for a ‘civil non-commercial unit’).74 This also
increases the difficulty in identifying the charity trustees in a charity.
5.3.1.2 How to Design a Framework Governing Internal Bodies?
In terms of the legal framework governing internal bodies, there are some
rules regulating different types of charities in the General Provisions of
Civil Law 2017 (China), the Regulation on the Administration of
Foundations 2004 (China) and the model governing documents issued by
the Ministry of Civil Affairs.75
However, currently, the legal rights, duties and liabilities relating to those
internal bodies are not well-designed or unavailable (in terms of internal
audit). For example, as noted in Chapter 1, formally, members are the
67 CL 2016 (China), ss 9, 16, 54 and 95.
68 CL 2016 (China), ss 11, 18 and 54.
69 CL 2016 (China), s 11.
70 CL 2016 (China), ss 14 and 58.
71 Similarly, due to some special terms or rules provided in the governing document of a charity,
sometimes there are also problems in identifying its charity trustees in England. A recent example is
the Greenfinch Charitable Trust. Charity Commission, Inquiry Report: Greenfinch Charitable Trust
(Charity Commission 2016).
72 Model Governing Document of Associations, ss 14 and 17; GPCL 2017 (China), s 91.
73 GPCL 2017 (China), s 93.
74 GPCL 2017 (China), ss 87, 92 and 93.
75 See, for example, GPCL 2017 (China), ss 89, 91 and 93; RAF 2004 (China), ss 20-24; Model
Governing Document of Associations, ss 7-29; Model Governing Document of Foundations, ss 8-28;
Model Governing Document of Civil Non-commercial Units (Legal Persons), ss 10-23; Model
Governing Document of Civil Non-commercial Units (Partnerships), ss 10-16.
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authority body of an association, but they are not required to be finally
responsible for this association, whilst most governance functions (such as
leading the activities of all internal bodies and enacting internal
management rules) are performed by the board of directors, but the board is
only regarded as the executive body.76
The recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) only requires that charities
should establish and improve their internal governance structures and clarify
the rights and duties of their decision-making, executive and supervisory
bodies,77 which does not change the rules in those regulations and model
governing documents. Similarly, although there are several rules regarding
the internal bodies of non-profit organisations in the General Provisions of
Civil Law 2017 (China), they do not fundamentally change the previous
rules in this respect.78
To solve those two problems, in this section, two internal bodies of vital
importance in Chinese law, i.e., charity members and supervisory
boards/trust supervisors, along with internal auditors/audit committees,
which are totally ignored by the current Chinese law, will be explored from
economic and comparative perspectives.
5.3.2 Reshaping the Rules concerning Charity Members as a
Governance Mechanism
For the purposes of the thesis, charity members are restricted to members
having the right to participate in charity governance. In England, charity
members in charitable companies, charitable incorporated organisations
(when members are not exactly the same as charity trustees) and charitable
unincorporated associations can usually supervise charity trustees. In China,
in a charitable association, its members can also supervise the board of
directors.
76 Model Governing Document of Associations, ss 17-18.
77 CL 2016 (China), s 12.
78 An exception may be the requirement for the establishment of a supervisory board as an essential
internal body of all donated legal persons, which will be discussed below.
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Members can bring a host of benefits to a charity, such as strengthening the
accountability of its charity trustees, informing the trustees of the
beneficiaries’ demands and diverse opinions, extending the social influence
of the charity, helping discover and attract volunteers and potential trustees,
and obtaining more financial support. However, members may also bring
some problems, such as more complexity of governance mechanisms and
accordingly more (potential) conflicts and disputes.79
So far, there is little, if any, legal or economic analysis of the role of charity
members as a governance mechanism.80 One of the reasons may be that
‘[m]ost charities and social welfare organizations, by contrast, have no
members, or have members only in the ceremonial sense, offering affinity
but not authority’.81 Based on the revised agency theory in this thesis, unless
they donate assets to or act as volunteers of a membership charity, those
members are not key stakeholders of this charity. Therefore, the use of
charity members as a governance mechanism can be regarded as a special
legal arrangement to strengthen the accountability of charity trustees82 in a
membership charity.
Despite this, from an economic perspective, the monitoring costs relating to
members as a governance mechanism should be reduced. Except for the
costs of the negative effects of external intervention (such as less capable
persons wanting to act as charity trustees) and the costs of supervision, as
noted in Chapter 3, there may be two principal disadvantages for members
to actively supervise charity trustees: one is the costs of the members’ moral
hazard (who may pursue their private benefits instead of the best interests of
their charity) and the other is the costs relating to the members’ collective
decision-making process.
79 Charity Commission,Membership Charities (RS7) (Charity Commission 2004) 9-11.
80 Exceptions include Jean Warburton, ‘Charities, Members, Accountability and Control’ (1997)
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 106; Jean Warburton, ‘Charity Members: Duties and
Responsibilities’ (2006) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 330; Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of
Enterprise (Harvard University Press 1996).
81 Evelyn Brody, ‘The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling through the Gaps between Law
and Practice--A View from the United States’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds),
Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 519.
82Alexander and Moule (n 66) 52.
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Accordingly, Chinese law should reduce those costs in designing its own
legal rules governing charity members. Here the thesis will compare the role
of charity members in both jurisdictions and discuss how to further reform
the rules governing the decision-making rights, the supervision rights and
the duties and liabilities of members, in order to reduce the related agency
costs.
5.3.2.1 Comparing the Roles of Charity Members in China and England
Before discussing how to reduce the agency costs concerning charity
members as an internal governance mechanism supervising charity trustees,
it is necessary to compare the roles of charity members in those two
jurisdictions to assess whether charity members in Chinese law are charity
trustees.
As a matter of fact, in for-profit companies, no one will ask the question
about whether members (principals) are directors (agents), because
members are the company owners and thus the principals to whom directors
owe fiduciary duties.
However, unlike shareholders in a for-profit company, charity members are
not the owners of their charity,83 and accordingly are not the principals of
the charity’s trustees. In this context, on the one hand, charity members are
not the owners of a charity; but, on the other hand, they have the right to
make decisions on some of this charity’s major affairs.84 This special
position may affect their capacity and motivation in charity governance.85 It
is therefore necessary to discuss whether members are charity trustees in
Chinese law. 86
83 In this respect, charity members are also different from beneficiaries in a private trust.
84 Mark Mullen and Josh Lewison, Companies Limited by Guarantee (3rd edn, Jordan Publishing
Limited 2011) 93.
85 For example, see Hansmann (n 4) 68.
86 Here, the situation that a member is selected to act as a charity trustee will not be discussed,
because even in Chinese law, there is no dispute about the fact that in a membership charity, its
charity members can be selected to have a position on the board of directors.
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With regard to this question, in England, it is charity trustees rather than
members who are generally responsible for the strategic decision-making
issues of their charity. For example, ‘[t]he CIO’s charity trustees are to
manage the affairs of the CIO and may for that purpose exercise all the
powers of the CIO’.87 However, sometimes members may be regarded as
charity trustees in English law. ‘[I]f there is deadlock on the board of
directors, or the directors are unable or unwilling to exercise their powers,
such powers are by default exercisable by the general meeting’.88 And ‘[i]f
the general meeting were to continue to exercise these powers for any length
of time, the members themselves become’ charity trustees.89
By contrast, in Chinese law, following the civil law tradition, members in an
association are usually regarded as its supreme body (authority body;
decision-making body) and the board of directors (the management board;
executive body) is responsible for implementing their decisions.90 And
‘members often retain for themselves the power over the most important
decisions affecting the organization’, 91 such as the right to select directors
or the right to make decisions for their organisation. In this context, there
may be disputes about whether members in Chinese law are also charity
trustees. So far, there is no clear answer in China.
Nevertheless, charity members are not the owners of their charity.
Meanwhile, even if they have the right to make decisions on some major
affairs relating to their charity, especially in Chinese law, most of the
decision-making rights (or, say, the general control and management rights)
are, as a matter of fact, still empowered to the board of directors. For
example, according to the Model Governing Document of Associations
(issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs), formally, members are the
authority body of a charitable association, but they are not required to be
finally responsible for this charity. In the meantime, most governance
87 CA 2011, s 216(2).
88 Peter Luxton, The Law of Charities (OUP 2001) 316; Barron v Potter [1914] 1 Ch 895.
89 ibid.
90 For example, see the Model Governing Document of Associations.
91 Lester M. Salamon, The International Guide to Nonprofit Law (John Wiley & Sons 1997) 21.
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functions, including directing the activities of all internal bodies and making
internal management rules, are performed by the board of directors.92
To reduce the agency costs due to this unclear relationship between the
members and the board of directors in a membership charity (i.e., a
charitable association in Chinese law), the thesis argues that, in this
membership charity, it is the board of directors rather than the members that
should fall within the scope of charity trustees (the governing body). On this
basis, the board of directors has the right to govern and should be finally
responsible for the charity. Meanwhile, in this membership charity, its
charity members should be identified as a special internal body supervising
the board of directors. In this context, if the charity members can efficiently
reduce the moral hazard of the board of directors, the monitoring costs of
the charity’s key stakeholders, such as the government, donors and the
general public, will be reduced accordingly.
However, choosing members as an internal body supervising charity
trustees also has its own costs. For example, charity members may be
exposed to moral hazard if they can avoid the related legal duties and
liabilities when making decisions on issues relating to their charity. To
reduce the costs of moral hazard similar to those of charity trustees and
other monitoring costs, the legal rules governing the participation of
members in charity governance should be carefully designed. This question
will be discussed in a more detailed manner below.
5.3.2.2 Distributing the Rights to Make Decisions Reasonably
As noted above, it is unclear whether charity members in Chinese law fall
within the scope of charity trustees in English law. Although the thesis
argues that they do not, sometimes charity members do have the rights to
make decisions on some major issues, such as merger and dissolution.
Nevertheless, as a governance mechanism, the excessive decision-making
92 Model Governing Document of Associations, s 18.
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rights of members in a charity may increase a range of agency costs in
practice.
First, it may increase the costs of the members’ moral hazard, because
‘members may be motivated by ‘‘personal’’ beliefs or aims rather than
concern for the charity’s purposes’.93 That may be a very important reason
for the Charity Commission to require that ‘members cannot bind trustees to
do something which is not permitted by the charity’s governing document or
which would be a breach of their duty’.94
Second, it will increase the costs relating to the members’ collective
decision-making process. It is quite understandable that, when there is a
huge number of members in a charity, even if they are totally altruistic and
concerned about the charity, a decision made by them may still be very
costly because of their diverse preferences and views in realising the
charitable purposes, in particular ‘when memberships split into factions’.95
And, due to inefficient decisions and costly decision-making processes,96
members in larger membership charities may elect ‘a board that lacks the
balance of skills and experience for the good governance of the charity or
the degree of competence necessary to direct highly professional members
of staff’.97
Third, it will increase the supervisory costs and the costs of the negative
effects of external intervention. Having a range of decision-making rights
may cost charity members a great deal of time, energy and money to
participate in the decision-making processes, increasing the supervisory
costs. Meanwhile, ‘members may not appreciate or understand operational
93 Con Alexander and the Charities Team at Veale Wasbrough Vizards, Charity Governance (2nd edn,
Jordan Publishing Limited 2014) 70.
94 Charity Commission, It’s Your Decision: Charity Trustees and Decision Making (CC27) (Charity
Commission 2013) 12.
95 Debra Morris, Disputes in the Charitable Sector (Charity Law Unit of University of Liverpool 2003)
20.
96 Hansmann (n 80) 41-42.
97 Kate Kirkland, ‘The Governance of Membership Charities’ (2004) 3 Private Client Business 171,
172.
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circumstances to which the charity trustees are responding’.98And, ‘because
decisions are shared between the trustees and the members’, 99 there may be
more conflicts relating to decisions. Accordingly, charity trustees have to
deal with those matters that are not related to the efficient use of charitable
resources. This will negatively impede their performance in realising the
charitable purposes and public benefit pursued by their charity.
All the above situations may not only disturb the effective performance of
charity trustees, but also may increase the whole monitoring costs. To deal
with those problems, English law has several methods to limit the decision-
making rights of charity members. For example, in terms of a CIO, English
law limits the scope of the members’ decision-making rights by clarifying
that the charity trustees can ‘exercise all the powers of the CIO’100 and by
requiring that this CIO cannot amend its constitution in a way ‘which would
result in the CIO’s ceasing to be a charity’.101 In addition, it provides that
alterations relating to the CIO’s purposes, the application of its property on
dissolution, and the authorisation for benefits to its charity members, charity
trustees or persons connected with them are regarded as ‘regulated
alterations’ and accordingly need prior written consent from the Charity
Commission.102 Those measures can help reduce the costs relating to the
members’ moral hazard and other related agency costs.
By contrast, in terms of the amendment to the constitution, the requirement
in Chinese law seems even much stricter. According to the Model
Governing Document of Associations, an amendment to the governing
document of an association cannot be valid unless it obtains consent from its
professional administrative unit and the approval of its registration and
administration regulator.103 Although it is unclear how Chinese regulators
exercise this power in practice, it is apparent that allowing those regulators
98Alexander and the Charities Team at Veale Wasbrough Vizards (n 93) 70.
99 Charity Commission (n 79) 10.
100 CA 2011, s 216.
101 CA 2011, s 225.
102 CA 2011, s 226.
103 Model Governing Document of Associations, s 40.
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to have this unlimited discretion may result in another problem, excessive
involvement of the government in internal governance, along with high
costs of governmental regulation (such as high costs of moral hazard, high
supervisory costs and high costs of the negative effects of external
intervention), as discussed in Chapter 4.
In order to deal with those specific problems in Chinese charitable
associations, Chinese law can draw on the experience of English law to
improve its rules. For example, although members are the supreme body in
a Chinese membership charity, Chinese law should confirm that the board of
directors should be empowered with all the decision-making rights, unless
specific requirements exist in the governing document of this charity. And,
in terms of the specific requirements, the governing document should
further clarify the members’ remaining decision-making rights and the
procedures for exercising those rights.
On this basis, for some major affairs which are directly associated with
charity governance, such as the change of the purpose of a charity and the
benefit provided to its charity trustees which fall with the ‘regulated
alterations’ in English law, Chinese law should clarify the regulators’ power
to approve. However, to control the costs regarding governmental regulation,
other alterations do not need the approval of the government.
5.3.2.3 Limiting the Forms of the Supervisory Rights of Charity
Members
To reduce the related monitoring costs, this thesis argues that the law should
limit the forms of charity members’ supervisory rights. In this context, it is
of value to assess whether Chinese law should recognise the right of
members to take a derivative action against charity trustees.104 In respect of
this problem, several types of costs need to be taken into consideration.
104 Currently in Chinese law, members in a charity do not have the right to take a derivative action
against its charity trustees.
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First, the costs of the members’ moral hazard should be controlled. Given
that, generally, ‘members have no proprietary interest in the organization’,105
derivative action may provide members with the opportunity to pursue their
own personal gain rather than the best interests of their charity, especially
when a decision by the charity’s trustees damages the personal interests of
certain members (such as those members who are also the potential
beneficiaries).
As a matter of fact, a derivative action in the commercial sector is a
commonly recognised legal device to directly protect the interests of a firm,
and indirectly the interests of the shareholders themselves. However, in
charity governance, charity members do not have the ownership106 on which
a derivative action is based, and ‘giving them standing to sue derivatively is
giving them an element of control over something they do not own’.107 It
may increase the members’ moral hazard if this right is authorised.
Second, unpredicted supervisory costs should be avoided. Derivative action
may bring a similar result to giving the general public the right to enforce
the fiduciary duties of charity trustees: a host of unnecessary litigation. In
addition, in contrast to some other stakeholders, charity members have
already acquired more legal protection in terms of internal governance:
‘members generally have the opportunity of exercising some control over
the organization’s management through the exercise of voting power’.108
Thus, obtaining a new supervisory right will lead to extra supervisory costs.
105 Fishman (n 36) 664.
106 Here, it is still necessary to distinguish charities from mutual benefits organisations: ‘[t]he
relationship of the members to [a mutual benefit organization] is not unlike that of shareholders to a
corporation: both receive a direct benefit from the organization in exchange for a financial stake.’
Geoffrey A. Manne, ‘Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations’ (1999) Wisconsin
Law Review 227, 242.
107 Rob Atkinson, ‘Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable
Fiduciaries?’ (1998) 23 Journal of Corporation Law 655, 671. However, someone may argue that ‘[a]
member does not expect the same return on his money as an investor in shares of stock, but he
expects that his money will be used in the manner represented to him when he became a member’.
Brenda Boykin, ‘Note: the Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina: Recognizing a Right to Member
Derivative Suits’ (1985) 63 North Carolina Law Review 999, 1012.
108 Henry Hansmann, ‘Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law’ (1981) 129 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 497, 613.
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Third, the costs of the negative effects of external intervention should be
reduced. In this context, the extra costs arising from bringing a legal suit
should be taken into account. Bringing a legal suit may lead to effects which
may be much more serious ‘than those typically resulting for a business
corporation or an individual. Publicity generated by the mere filing of the
suit may dry up sources of funds. The reputation of the organization may
never recover.’109
Hence, it may not be a good idea to introduce derivative action into charity
governance in Chinese law. From a comparative perspective, in England, the
legal rules relating to derivative action are stipulated by the Companies Act
2006.110 Therefore, theoretically, a charitable company’s members can use
this rule to supervise its charity trustees.
However, in respect of charitable companies, the rules in company law have
to be adopted jointly with charity law. According to the Charities Act 2011,
‘no charity proceedings relating to a charity are to be entertained or
proceeded within any court unless the taking of the proceedings is
authorised by order of the Commission’;111 and, if the Commission can
tackle this issue on its own, it will not authorise the proceedings.112 Hence,
even the right of members to bring a derivative action in the context of
charitable companies is also quite limited. 113
Therefore, in China, a more reasonable option may be to protect the current
voting rights of members (such as the right to select or remove directors)
and other supervisory rights commonly shared by other stakeholders. For
example, members who know that charity trustees have committed severe
109 Fishman (n 36) 671.
110 Companies Act 2006, ss 260-264.
111 CA 2011, s 115.
112 ibid.
113 In the United States, some state laws and some scholars support the idea of recognising the right of
members to bring a derivative suit. Boykin (n 107); Thomas Lee Hazen and Lisa Love Hazen,
‘Punctilious and Nonprofit Corporate Governance--A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’
Fiduciary Duties’ (2012) 14(2) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 347. However,
even in this context, the rights of members to bring derivative suits are, or are recommended to be,
limited.
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misconduct or mismanagement can report their complaints to governmental
regulators,114 which have the duty and capacity to investigate, and, if the
wrongdoing is confirmed, to enforce the fiduciary duties of, remove or
punish, charity trustees. Meanwhile, charities can build an internal dispute
resolution mechanism to reduce conflicts and disputes within the
membership or between their members and charity trustees to further reduce
the related monitoring costs.
5.3.2.4 Clarifying the Duties and Liabilities of Charity Members
In the commercial sector, shareholders are deemed and encouraged to
pursue their own private benefits. By contrast, in the charitable sector,
members are not the owners of their charity, and sometimes may perform
for their own private benefits instead of the best interests of the charity.
Accordingly, members having the rights to vote and to make decisions on
the major issues regarding a charity may damage the best interests of the
charity. In particular, in the case of members also acting as (potential)
beneficiaries, the risk of conflicts of interest may be very high. Therefore, to
reduce the costs of the charity members’ moral hazard, they should be
subject to the relevant duties and liabilities similar to those held by charity
trustees.
In terms of the duties of charity members, in China the Model Governing
Document of Association requires members to protect the legal rights of
their association.115 By contrast, in England, due to lack of case law, it is
still uncertain ‘except in relation to a CIO or where there is an express duty
incorporated into the constitution’.116
In respect of CIOs, the law requires any member to ‘exercise the powers
that the member has in that capacity in the way that the member decides, in
114 Boykin (n 107) 1009; CL 2016 (China), s 97.
115 Model Governing Document of Associations, s 11.
116Alexander and Moule (n 66) 69.
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good faith, would be most likely to further the purposes of the CIO’.117 This
duty is indeed important, especially when members have the potential power
to control their charity and further limit the charitable resources for their
own use, which may make this charity become a mutual benefit association
in all but name. Meanwhile, in contrast to the rule in China, this rule makes
it much clearer that charity members have a duty to perform in the best
interests of their charity whether their private interests conflict with the best
interests of this charity or not. Therefore, Chinese law should introduce this
rule into its future charity law.
Regarding the liabilities of charity members, according to the Model
Governing Document of Associations, if a Chinese member seriously
violates the rules provided in the governing document of his or her
association, the board of directors or the standing board of directors has the
right to remove his/her membership.118 But there is no further rule
governing members’ liability. Similarly, English law does not make clear the
legal consequences of violating the above duty. However, English law does
empower the Charity Commission to suspend or remove an individual’s
membership.119
From the perspective of reducing the members’ moral hazard in exercising
their decision-making and supervisory rights, apart from removal from
membership, Chinese law should stipulate that, if they violate their duties,
the relevant members of a charity should pay for the loss or part of it, or be
removed by the charity regulators or the charity, depending on the
seriousness of their action.120
Nevertheless, given that charity members are not charity trustees who
govern and are finally responsible for their charity, when designing Chinese
law in this respect, the duties and liabilities of those members should be
117 CA 2011, s 220.
118 Model Governing Document of Associations, s 13.
119 CA 2011, s 83.
120 Concerning the legal consequences for breach of duties, see the discussion in section 5.2.4.4 of this
chapter.
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limited to the situations where they exercise their decision-making and
supervision rights, and thus be separated from the other duties (such as the
duty to submit charity accounts) exclusively belonging to charity trustees.
5.3.3 Improving the Rules Relating to Supervisory Boards/Trust
Supervisors
Here, supervisors include supervisors (‘监事’)/supervisory boards (‘监事会’)
and trust supervisors (‘信托监察人 ’). According to the model governing
documents regarding foundations and civil non-commercial units (issued by
the Ministry of Civil Affairs) in China, supervisors (‘监事’) are an essential
internal body in the context of foundations and civil non-commercial units
which are legal persons.121 However, foundations with more than three
supervisors can, and larger civil non-commercial units who are legal persons
must, establish a supervisory board as their essential internal body.122
By contrast, a ‘donated legal person’, which is created as a new type of
incorporated non-membership organisation in accordance with the recently
enacted General Provisions of Civil Law 2017 (China),123 is required by law
to establish a supervisory board as its internal supervisory body.124
Accordingly, a supervisory board will automatically become the essential
internal body of all those incorporated foundations and social service
institutes (civil non-commercial units) in the future.
One reason for Chinese law to require the establishment of a supervisory
board in donated legal persons may be that, in an association, at least its
members as an internal body can make the board of directors accountable
whilst, in an organisation without membership, it is also necessary to
121 Model Government Document of Foundations, s 16; Model Government Document of Civil Non-
commercial units (Legal Persons), s 20.
122 ibid.
123 Donated legal persons include but are not limited to incorporated foundations and social service
institutes (the new name for ‘civil non-commercial units’). GPCL 2017 (China), s 92.
124 GPCL 2017 (China), s 93.
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establish an internal body to supervise the board of directors.125 This
arrangement complies with the general idea of agency theory: ‘[o]ne method
of reducing shirking is for someone to specialize as a monitor to check the
input performance of team members’.126
In respect of charitable trusts (which are unincorporated), trust supervisors
are created as a special legal device in Chinese law to supervise trustees.127
In this context, they are quite similar to trust protectors in a private trust,
who ‘[play] a role somewhat like the board of directors of a
corporation, overseeing the performance of the management on behalf of the
shareholders, or in this case, the trust beneficiaries’.128 In the context of
charity governance, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between those
supervisors and charity trustees and how to reduce the related agency costs
relating to those supervisors monitoring charity trustees.
5.3.3.1 Comparing the Role of Supervisory Boards/Trust Supervisors in
Chinese Law with that of English Charity Trustees
Before discussing how to reduce the agency costs relating to supervisory
boards in Chinese charitable donated legal persons and trust supervisors in
Chinese charitable trusts, it is necessary to clarify whether they can be
regarded as part of English charity trustees.
First, we need to consider whether supervisory boards in China can be
identified as charity trustees. To answer this question, it is of value to have a
brief assessment of the board structures of organisations in both jurisdictions,
as indicated in Table 2 below. In terms of corporate governance, there are
two prominent board structures: one-tier structure and two-tier structure.
125 Similarly, in many continental European countries, there is a legally required supervisory board in
a public benefit foundation. European Foundation Centre (n 1) 15.
126 Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization’ (1972) 62(5) The American Economic Review 772, 781.
127 TL 2001 (China), s 64; CL 2016 (China), s 49.
128 Jeffrey Evans Stake, ‘A Brief Comment on Trust Protectors’ (2006) 27 Cardozo Law Review 2813,
2814.
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Both for-profit companies and charities in England usually take the one-tier
board structure. In a for-profit company, the board of directors is the only
board and the independent directors (non-executive directors)129 are
responsible for overseeing the executive directors. By comparison, in an
English charity, the board of directors (whatever its name) is an unpaid
governing body which is made up of non-executive directors/trustees
responsible for making strategic policies and overseeing their
implementation.
Nevertheless, in both for-profit companies and charities, independent/non-
executive directors130 are ‘required to play a dual role in [England], i.e., they
should both participate in the formulation of business strategy and take
sufficient distance from the executives in order to monitor their
behaviour’.131
By contrast, for-profit companies and some charities in China usually take a
two-tier board structure, which means that there are two separated boards in
an organisation: the board of directors (the management board, in charge of
management) and the supervisory board (in charge of supervising the board
of directors). 132 In this context, it is clear that the functions of the board of
directors in an English charity are further divided into two aspects: strategic
decision-making and supervision of executives. The former function is
129 Regarding independent directors or non-executive directors in the UK, see John Parkinson,
‘Evolution and Policy in Company Law: The Non-executive Director’ in John Parkinson, Andrew
Gamble and Gavin Kelly (eds), The Political Economy of the Company (Hart Publishing 2000) 233-
263.
130 Concerning a detailed analysis of independent directors in charity governance, generally, see Dana
Brakman Reiser, ‘Director Independence in the Independent Sector’ (2007) 76(2) Fordham Law
Review 795.
131 S.H. Goo and Fidy Xiangxing Hong, ‘The Curious Model of Internal Monitoring Mechanisms of
Listed Corporations in China: the Sinonisation Process’ (2011) 12(3) European Business
Organization Law Review 469, 491; generally, see Rita Esen, ‘Managing and Monitoring: the Dual
Role of Non-executive Directors on U.K. and U.S. Boards’ (2000) 11(6) International Company and
Commercial Law Review 202, 202-209.
132 Although quite different in structure, ‘there is no stringent theoretical—let alone empirical—proof
that one of the two systems is better than the other’. Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Comparative Corporate
Governance: the State of the Art and International Regulation’ (2011) ECGI Working Paper No.
170/2011 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1713750> accessed 20 September 2017; generally, see Carsten
Jungmann, ‘The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems’
(2006) European Company and Financial Law Review 426.
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delivered to the board of directors and the latter is shared by the supervisory
board.
However, in China, there is a more complex board structure in terms of
listed companies. In this area, China also transplants the independent
director system widely used in England into its laws and accordingly forms
an unusual ‘dual monitoring system’ (i.e., the co-existence of
independent/non-executive directors and a supervisory board) in corporate
governance. A similar situation may also happen in a charitable donated
legal person when some of its directors have a full-time job in this charity,
which will be discussed below.
Table 2 Main Types of Board Structures of For-profit and Charitable
Organisations in England and China
Types Examples Board(s)
One-tier (co-existence of
executive and non-executive
directors)
Some for-profits
in England
The board of directors
One-tier (only including
non-executive directors)
Some charities in
England
The board of directors
Two-tier (co-existence of
executive directors and non-
executive supervisors)
Some for-profits
in China
The board of directors
The supervisory board
Two-tier (including
executive directors, non-
executive directors and non-
executive supervisors)
Chinese listed
companies and
some donated
legal persons
The board of directors
The supervisory board
After the above analysis, it may be much easier to identify the nature of
supervisory boards in Chinese law. Given that the board of directors is the
essential internal body responsible for the general control and management
of the administration of a charity, it is, of course, part of the governing body.
Meanwhile, as regards the charity’s supervisory board, although it does not
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make decisions for this charity, it shares one function of supervising the
management affairs with English charity trustees. Therefore, the thesis
argues that the supervisory board in a charity should be regarded as part of
the governing body and should have similar fiduciary duties to the board of
directors. Accordingly, the supervisory board of a charity acts as a self-
regulatory mechanism of the governing body.
This argument can also be justified by the current Chinese company law,
which enacts that supervisors on the supervisory board share similar
fiduciary duties to those on the board of directors (the management
board).133 Therefore, in Chinese law, it can be reasonably argued that, if a
charity has a supervisory board, both the board of directors and the
supervisory board should be regarded as the governing body of this charity.
Second, we need to consider whether trust supervisors in a Chinese
charitable trust fall within the scope of charity trustees as defined in English
law. This question can be further divided into two sub-questions. Firstly, are
charitable trusts organisations? Secondly, what is the relationship between
trust supervisors in charitable trusts and supervisory boards in charitable
donated legal persons?
As a matter of fact, whether trust supervisors of a charitable trust are an
internal or external governance mechanism depends on the nature of the
charitable trust itself, i.e., whether it is a (special) contract, property or an
organisation. Only when the charitable trust is an organisation, may its trust
supervisors be regarded as an internal governance mechanism. As noted in
Chapter 2, here, the function of organisations (legal entities) is defined as
‘the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the
entity’s owners or managers.’134
However, concerning the nature of trusts, there are absolutely different
133 Company Law 1993 (China, revised in 2013), Chapter 6.
134 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110
Yale Law Journal 387, 390.
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views both in common law countries and civil law countries transplanting
trusts law.135 In terms of private trusts, currently there are three basic
approaches (contract, property and legal entity).136 Despite this, in terms of
Chinese charitable trusts, the thesis argues that, from an economic
perspective, charitable trusts can be identified as organisations.
Firstly, the general arguments in economics on the nature of trusts as
property or contracts are usually limited to private trusts (such as family
trusts, commercial trusts or pension trusts) and can never be easily adapted
to an explanation of charitable trusts, in which beneficiaries are uncertain
and have no right (whether the right in personam or the right in rem) to
directly enforce the fiduciary duties of trustees.137 Secondly, in Chinese law,
trusts law complies with the principle of independence of trust property (‘信
托财产独立原则’), which means that a trust’s property is separated from its
settlors’ and trustees’ own property.138 This complies with the definition of
organisation from an economic perspective. Therefore, a Chinese charitable
trust can be regarded as an organisation,139 rather than a property or contract
established exclusively for charitable purposes.
On this basis, trust supervisors can be understood and designed as an
internal governance mechanism. Meanwhile, similar to the distinction
135 Generally, see Ming Wai Lau, The Economic Structure of Trusts (OUP 2011).
136 Regarding the contract approach, generally, see John H. Langbein, ‘The Contractarian Basis of the
Law of Trusts’ (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 625. In respect of the property approach, generally see
ibid; Ming Wai Lau, ‘The Nature of the Beneficial Interest: Historical and Economic Perspectives’
(2013) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2213055> accessed 20 September 2017.
Concerning the legal entity approach, generally, see Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, ‘Trust Law in
the United States: A Basic Study of Its Special Contributions’ (1998) 46 American Journal of
Comparative Law 133; Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, ‘The Functions of Trust Law: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis’ (1998) 73 New York University Law Review 434; Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 Yale Law
Journal 387. Regarding a civil law perspective, generally, see Pierre Lepaulle, ‘An Outsider’s View
Point of the Nature of Trusts’ (1928) 14 Cornell Law Quarterly 52; Lionel Smith, ‘Trust and
Patrimony’ (2009) 28 Estates, Trusts and Pensions Journal 332.
137 Regarding the role of beneficiaries in charity governance, see the discussion in Chapter 6.
138 TL 2001 (China), s 16.
139 In addition, recently, some scholars have begun to harmonise the above three arguments by
suggesting that organisational law is a mix of fiduciary governance and asset partitioning. Robert H.
Sitkoff, ‘Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance plus Asset Partitioning’ in Lionel Smith (ed) The World
of the Trust (CUP 2013) 428-453.
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between the board of directors and the supervisory board in a Chinese
charitable donated legal person, the governance function in a charitable trust
is further divided into the decision-making function and the monitoring
function, which are performed by its trustees and trust supervisors
respectively. Therefore, both trust supervisors and trustees form the
governing body of a charitable trust.
In summary, supervisory boards/trust supervisors in Chinese law can be
regarded as a self-regulatory mechanism of charity trustees. On the one
hand, this mechanism is different from charity members, because both
supervisory boards and trust supervisors are part of charity trustees. On the
other hand, this mechanism plays a similar function to members, reducing
the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard and accordingly reducing the
monitoring costs of key stakeholders.
5.3.3.2 Designing Supervisory Boards as Voluntary Internal Bodies
Non-executive directors and a supervisory board can co-exist in a donated
legal person in China. For example, according to the Regulation on the
Administration of Foundations 2004 (China), in a foundation, paid directors
should not exceed one third of the whole directors,140 and directors who do
not have a full-time job in the foundation and supervisors cannot receive
any remuneration.141 In this context, in terms of foundations, Chinese law
builds a two-tier board structure similar to that of Chinese listed companies:
there may be paid executive directors and unpaid non-executive directors on
the board of directors and unpaid non-executive supervisors on the
supervisory board. However, in contrast to Chinese listed companies,
sometimes there may be a more extreme situation in a donated legal person;
that is, both directors and supervisors are non-executive.
In this context, the problems of the dual monitoring system in relation to
Chinese listed companies may also occur in Chinese foundation governance,
140 RAF (China) 2004, s 20.
141 RAF (China) 2004, s 23.
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the biggest being that non-executive directors and supervisors share similar
functions. Accordingly, this governance mechanism may result in conflicts
and disputes142 and unnecessary monitoring costs. Thus, to reduce the
unnecessary monitoring costs due to the co-existence of independent
directors and a supervisory board which share similar functions, the thesis
argues that a supervisory board should be an alternative rather than an
essential internal body in a charitable foundation or any other donated legal
person.
5.3.3.3 Recognising the Rights of Supervisory Boards to Enforce
Fiduciary Duties
In terms of trust supervisors, they are mainly ‘established to represent the
indefinite beneficiary, so whether [they] supposedly enjoys all the rights of
the beneficiary except the distribution-receiving right needs clarification.’143
Nevertheless, the trust supervisors of a charitable trust not only have the
right to approve the trustees’ report concerning trust affairs144 and the
trustees’ liquidation report, 145 but also can directly bring a legal suit to
protect the beneficiaries’ interest in their own name.146 In other words, in
Chinese law, trust supervisors of charitable trusts have the rights to enforce
the fiduciary duties of trustees. By contrast, currently, the supervisory board
in a charity does not have this right in monitoring the board of directors.
Here, the problem is whether it is cost-effective to confer this right upon
trust supervisors or supervisory boards. Based on the revised agency theory,
this thesis supports allowing supervisory boards (along with trust
supervisors) to enjoy this supervisory rights. The main reason can be
concluded as follows.
First, the costs relating to those supervisors’ moral hazard are low.
142 Goo and Hong (n 131) 503.
143Yinglu Li, ‘Charitable Trusts in China’ (2014) 20(4) Trusts and Trustees 345, 349.
144 TL 2001 (China), s 67.
145 TL 2001 (China), s 71.
146 TL 2001 (China), s 65.
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Supervisors on a supervisory board do not obtain any remuneration. Thus,
as a self-regulatory mechanism of charity trustees, those supervisors are
more able to efficiently supervise directors and accordingly reduce the
supervisory costs of key stakeholders. Second, in contrast to charity
members, the number of those supervisors is comparatively small, which
may not lead to collective decisions having high costs.
Third, the current legal rules contribute to reducing the supervisory costs of
supervisory boards in monitoring directors. In terms of the supervisory
board in a charitable donated legal person, there is no detailed rule setting
out their rights in the recently enacted General Provisions of Civil Law 2017
(China). However, according to the Model Governing Document of
Foundations, the supervisory board of a foundation has the rights to check
the financial affairs of this foundation, to attend the meeting of the board of
directors, and to raise questions or suggestions on the matters to be decided
by the board of directors.147 Therefore, by exercising those rights, the
supervisory board may already have been familiar with the governance
issues relating to the board of directors, making it easy for this supervisory
board to find any mismanagement and misconduct by the directors.
Therefore, similar to the right of trust supervisors to enforce the fiduciary
duties of trustees, the right of supervisory boards to bring a legal suit
requiring directors to perform their fiduciary duties should be recognised by
law.
5.3.3.4 Distributing Governance Mechanisms Supervising those
Supervisors
After clarifying the role of those supervisors as part of the governing body
(charity trustees), supervisory boards and trust supervisors should also be
regulated by the internal and external governance mechanisms regulating
directors and trustees (such as fiduciary duties, supervision by members,
147 Model Governing Document of Foundations, s 19.
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governmental regulation and public accountability), in order to reduce the
costs of those supervisors’moral hazard.
First, with respect to fiduciary duties and liability, given that Chinese law
enacts no rule regulating trust supervisors, the future law can provide that
trust supervisors should have similar fiduciary duties and liabilities to
supervisory boards. For example, it is of value to introduce the principle of
voluntary trusteeship into the rules governing trust supervisors. Currently,
supervisors in a Chinese charitable foundation cannot receive any
remuneration.148 So the remaining problem is whether trust supervisors
should have the right to receive remunerations. So far the law does not
provide a clear answer.
Supervisors on a commercial company’s supervisory board can, of course,
receive remunerations from the company. However, given the role of
supervisory boards/trust supervisors as charity trustees, the rule governing
those supervisors should also comply with the principle of voluntary
trusteeship. The only exception in the future should be the situations
mentioned above when discussing the fiduciary duties of charity trustees
and the related accountability and transparency mechanisms should be put
in place accordingly.
In addition, given that there is no detailed legal rule149 governing the
liabilities of trust supervisors and supervisory boards,150 the thesis argues
that, as part of charity trustees, those supervisors should be liable for breach
of their fiduciary duties, which is similar to the liability imposed on
directors and trustees.
Second, the methods selecting or removing supervisors should be clarified
148 RAF 2004 (China), s 23.
149 One exception may be the rule in the Regulation on the Administration of Foundations 2004
(China): if supervisors on the supervisory board encroach upon, pocket or embezzle the property of
the foundation, they should return their illegally occupied property; and, if their above activity
constitutes an offence, they will be punished by criminal law. RAF 2004 (China), s 43.
150 By contrast, Chinese company law requires that the supervisors on the supervisory board should
pay for the loss arising from the conflicts of interest. CL 1993 (China, revised in 2013), s 21.
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in practice. In terms of supervisory boards, the Regulation on the
Administration of Foundations 2004 (China) does not enact the related rules.
However, according to the Model Governing Document of Foundations,
supervisors of a foundation can be selected and removed by its major donors
and professional administrative unit separately, or by the registration and
administration regulator if necessary.151
In terms of charitable trusts, the Charity Law 2016 (China) provides that a
charitable trust’s settlors have the right to select its trust supervisors. In
addition, according to the Trusts Law 2001 (China), trust supervisors shall
be prescribed in the trust document. If there is no provision in the trust
document, the regulator of public benefit undertakings shall appoint trust
supervisors.152 However, there is no rule relating to removing trust
supervisors. In this context, the future law should make it clear that, if the
trust supervisors of a charitable trust do not perform their duties, they may
be removed according to the governing document, or by the governmental
regulator (whether it is the department of civil affairs or the court).
Third, given that in a charity, the board of directors (or the trustee) is
responsible for decision-making and the supervisory board (or the trust
supervisor) is in charge of supervision, the law should require that the
supervisory board and the trust supervisor cannot participate in the decision-
making affairs of its charity in case of a potential risk: ‘[i]f every decision of
A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of
authority from A to B and hence no solution to the original problem.’153
5.3.4 Promoting the Development of Internal Audit in a Charity
Audit can be further divided into internal audit and external audit. External
audit is mainly responsible for supervising charity trustees, which will be
discussed in Chapter 7, whilst internal audit can contribute to the
151 Model Governing Document of Foundations, s 18.
152 TL 2001 (China), s 64.
153 Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limit of Organization (W. W. Norton & Company 1974) 78.
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strengthened governance capacity of charity trustees in efficiently
controlling and ruling their charity.
As a matter of fact, ‘[i]nternal auditing is a young, modern profession.’154
For charity trustees, receiving complete information without verification
may not help them to sufficiently improve their performance.155 To support
charity trustees in reducing the residual loss arising from inefficient use of
charitable resources due to insufficient information, it is of value to establish
an internal audit function in a charity to strengthening the completeness,
accuracy and objectiveness of information that the charity trustees receive
relating to charity governance, management and operation.
5.3.4.1 Developing Rules Governing Internal Audit Relating to
Charities
Establishing an internal audit function in a charity is not a legal requirement
in either jurisdiction. However, as ‘part of the internal control
management’,156 internal auditors will facilitate this charity’s trustees to
efficiently perform their duties in order to reduce the residual loss due to a
range of risks.
Therefore, for the government, professional organisations or charity
umbrella organisations, it is helpful to issue guidance or recommended
practices relating to the internal audit of charities in support of the
establishment and development of internal audit mechanisms in the
charitable sector. In this respect, the ‘Internal Financial Controls for
Charities’157 published by the Charity Commission and the ‘International
Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing’ issued by The
Institute of Internal Auditors (which is an international professional
154 Jeffrey Ridley and Andrew Chambers, Leading Edge Internal Auditing (ICSA Publishing Limited
1998) xxxviiii.
155 Paul Palmer and Adrian Randall, Financial Management in the Volunteer Sector (Routledge 2002)
36.
156 Charity Commission, Internal Financial Controls for Charities (Charity Commission 2012) 3.
157 ibid.
182
organisation specialising in providing best practices regarding internal
auditing)158 are good examples for China to draw on.
5.3.4.2 Encouraging the Establishment of an Audit Committee in a
Larger Charity
The role of an audit committee ‘is to help the trustees meet their
responsibilities for risk management, having effective internal controls and
the efficient and effective use of funds’.159 For smaller charities, as noted by
the Charity Commission, ‘[i]t is unlikely that [those] charities will have the
resources to support a separate audit committee’.160
By contrast, for a larger charity161 which is facing more complicated
governance structures, operational risks or other significant challenges, one
good measure to support the governance function of its charity trustees is
the establishment of an audit committee within the charity, which can
facilitate those charity trustees to strengthen control over the charity’s
financial operations.162
In addition, to assist this mechanism in helping charity trustees perform
their duties in order to reduce the residual loss, it is necessary to establish
the related rules governing audit committees. However, there is no specific
legal rule available in either jurisdiction. To tackle this problem, the
government, charity umbrella organisations or professional bodies can
design model rules regulating audit committees.163
In addition, a charity with an audit committee can stipulate the basic rules
158 The Institute of Internal Auditors, International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal
Auditing (The Institute of Internal Auditors 2016).
159 Charity Commission (n 156) 7.
160 ibid 6; Dana Brakman Reiser, ‘Director Independence in the Independent Sector’ (2007) 76(2)
Fordham Law Review 795, 804-805.
161 Regarding the definition of larger charities, see the discussion in Chapter 7.
162 Karyn R. Vanderwarren, ‘Financial Accountability in Charitable Organizations: Mandating an
Audit Committee Function’ (2002) 77(2) Chicago-Kent Law Review 963, 963.
163 Regarding a typical example of provisions governing the audit committee in a charity, see
Alexander and the Charities Team at Veale Wasbrough Vizards (n 93)161-163.
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associated with the functions, capacity, nomination and other matters
regarding the audit committee. In this respect, the ‘Guidance on Audit
Committee’164 issued by the Financial Reporting Council can provide many
insightful rules and ideas to assist charities in drafting the rules relating to
the audit committee in their governing documents, although some terms
(such as ‘shareholders’) and rules should be revised in order to comply with
charity law and the features of charities.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has carried out a comprehensive study of Chinese law relating
to the internal governance mechanisms of charities from economic and
comparative perspectives. The basic conclusions relating to fiduciary duties
and internal bodies were reached respectively.
First, in terms of the fiduciary duties of charity trustees, there are few rules
governing fiduciary duties in Chinese new charity law, and this is
insufficient to reduce the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard. By
contrast, there are more detailed rules governing fiduciary duties in English
law, which can contribute to the reduction of those costs.
Meanwhile, the design of English law in this respect takes agency costs into
account in practice and strikes a balance between the costs of the charity
trustees’ moral hazard and the monitoring costs. For example, in England,
on the one hand, fiduciary duties are developed by case law and statutes to
prevent the moral hazard of charity trustees. On the other hand, recently,
English law has adopted a series of measures to protect and support charity
trustees, such as indemnity insurance, and relieving charity trustees acting
honestly and reasonably from liability.
In this context, on the one hand, China should reduce the costs of moral
hazard and balance those costs with the monitoring costs (such as the costs
164 Financial Reporting Council, Guidance on Audit Committee (The Financial Reporting Council
Limited 2016).
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of the negative effects of external intervention) in improving its legal rules
governing fiduciary duties. On the other hand, as a civil law country, China
should codify the substantial contents of the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees.
For example, Chinese law should incorporate the principle of voluntary
trusteeship into its future rules. Meanwhile, to reduce the costs relating to
inefficient use of charitable resources and other monitoring costs, it is
necessary for the law to draw on the experience of English law, clarifying
the exceptions to this principle and detailing the related conditions and
procedures ensuring accountability and transparency.
In addition, Chinese law should further provide different legal consequences
for breach of fiduciary duties. In terms of ‘unintentional violation’, to avoid
unnecessary costs of the negative effects of external intervention, the legal
consequence of violating fiduciary duties can be relaxed by introducing
indemnity insurance, empowering regulators to relieve charity trustees from
liability and other methods. By contrast, for intentional violation, to control
the costs relating to the charity trustees’ severe moral hazard, the law cannot
relax the liability of those charity trustees, and should further clarify its civil
and criminal consequences.
Secondly, with respect to internal bodies supervising charity trustees, the
discussion is further divided into three parts, charity members, supervisory
boards/trust supervisors, and internal auditors/audit committees.
In respect of charity members, in England, it is comparatively clear that it is
charity trustees (such as the board of directors in a charitable company)
rather than members who govern a membership charity. By contrast, in
Chinese law, formally, members are regarded as the decision-making
body/authority body in a membership charity (a charitable association).
However, in practice, it is the board of directors that governs and is finally
responsible for this charity.
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From the perspective of reducing the agency costs due to this unclear
relationship between charity members and charity trustees, it is necessary to
clarify that members in Chinese law should not be regarded as part of
charity trustees. Instead, they are designed by law as a special internal
governance mechanism supervising charity trustees of membership charities,
to reduce the charity trustees’ moral hazard and the monitoring costs of key
stakeholders, such as donors and the general public.
On this basis, in contrast to Chinese law, the current legal rules in England
are more cost-effective. For example, English law empowers a CIO’s charity
trustees to exercise all the powers to manage its affairs, limits its members’
rights to amend its governing document (such as making this CIO cease to
be a charity) and requires that alterations regarding the purposes, the
application of property on dissolution, and the benefits transferred to the
members, charity trustees and connected persons should obtain the Charity
Commission’s approval. Those legal limitations on the scope and procedure
regarding the members’ decision-making rights in a CIO reduce the costs of
those members’ moral hazard and other monitoring costs, such as the costs
relating to their collective decision-making process. By contrast, Chinese
law gives the government unlimited discretion to decide whether to approve
this amendment, which may reduce the costs regarding the exercise by
members of decision-making rights, but in the meantime may lead to
excessive participation by the government in internal governance, increasing
the unnecessary costs associated with governmental regulation.
Nevertheless, there exists a similarity in both jurisdictions: neither Chinese
law nor English law directly empowers members to bring a derivative action,
which helps reduce the costs of the members’ moral hazard, supervisory
costs and costs of the negative effects of external intervention. For example,
in England, although theoretically, a charitable company’s members have
the right to bring a derivative action in accordance with the Companies Act
2006, this right is quite limited because of the restrictive requirements by
the Charities Act 2011 on ‘charity proceedings’.
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In addition, in terms of members’ duties, English law clarifies the duty of a
CIO’s members as being to perform in the best interests of this charity in
exercising their powers, contributing to the reduction of the costs of the
members’ moral hazard. In contrast to Chinese law, which requires members
to protect the rights of their association, the rule in English law is much
clearer, specifying that those members’ duty is to perform in the best
interests of their charity, whether there are conflicts of interest or not.
However, regarding the liabilities of members when breaching their duties,
there are few rules in either jurisdiction.
Therefore, to reduce the agency costs relating to charity members as a
mechanism supervising charity trustees, Chinese law should empower
charity trustees/directors to exercise the whole decision-making rights in
principle. Meanwhile, when members have the decision-making rights, the
law and the governing document of their charity should further clarify the
scope of those rights and the related procedures. However, the government’s
power to approve an amendment to the governing document of a
membership charity should be limited to those closely associated with
charity governance, such as the ‘regulated alterations’ in English law, to
control the costs arising from excessive participation by the government in
internal governance issues.
In addition, Chinese law should sustain its current legal arrangement which
does not recognise the rights of members to bring a derivative action.
Finally, Chinese law should further clarify the duties and liabilities of
members in exercising any decision-making and supervisory rights.
In terms of supervisory boards/trust supervisors, it is found that, in contrast
to the dual roles (i.e., the decision-making function and the supervisory
function) that charity trustees play in English law, the decision-making
function is separated from the supervisory function in China. For example,
in a Chinese charitable donated legal person (which is incorporated), the
board of directors is responsible for decision-making while the supervisory
board exercises supervisory rights. In a Chinese charitable trust (which is
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unincorporated), its trustees have the rights to make decisions for this trust
whilst the trust supervisors are responsible for supervising those trustees.
By contrast, in English law, charity trustees play those dual roles in practice,
making decisions for their charity on the one hand and supervising the
performance of the management team on the other. Therefore, supervisory
boards/trust supervisors in Chinese law should be regarded as part of charity
trustees. On this basis, supervisory boards and trust supervisors can be
identified as a self-regulatory mechanism of charity trustees.
To control monitoring costs regarding accountability to supervisory
boards/trust supervisors, Chinese law should be reformed as follows. First,
given that the co-existence of unpaid non-executive directors and an unpaid
supervisory board in a charitable donated legal person leads to unnecessary
monitoring costs, Chinese law should design the supervisory board of a
charity as a voluntary internal body rather than an essential internal body.
Second, given the low costs of moral hazard, collective decisions and
supervision regarding supervisory boards in monitoring directors, the law
should recognise their right to enforce the fiduciary duties of directors,
which has already been enjoyed by trust supervisors in a charitable trust. In
addition, to reduce the costs of the supervisory boards/trust supervisors’
moral hazard, Chinese law should distribute governance mechanisms
regulating charity trustees to monitor those supervisors, such as imposing
the fiduciary duties (including the principle of voluntary trusteeship) and
liabilities of directors and trustees on them, and clarifying the methods for
selecting or removing those supervisors.
In respect of internal auditors and audit committees, neither Chinese law nor
English law provides any specific rule governing internal audit. However, in
England, the Charity Commission at least issues some guidance on how to
ensure sound internal audit, such as ‘Internal Financial Controls for
Charities’.
To facilitate charity trustees to deal with different types of risks in order to
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reduce the residual loss, the government, professional bodies and charity
umbrella organisations can issue the relevant guidance in support of charity
trustees to effectively make use of some effective internal auditing
mechanisms. A larger charity can be encouraged to establish an audit
committee to strengthen its trustees’ ability to govern it.
In the next chapter, this thesis will examine another important aspect of
charity governance, i.e., accountability to third parties.
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Chapter 6 Improving Accountability to Third Parties
6.1 Introduction
This chapter will make an economic and comparative study of the legal
rules governing accountability to third parties, mainly including donors and
beneficiaries. In terms of ensuring sound charity governance, governmental
regulators usually play a vital role.1 However, the role of the government in
ensuring sound charity governance may be limited in practice, due to
restrictive budgets and not enough staff. Accordingly, as a supplement to
governmental regulation, third parties, along with internal governance and
public accountability, can also play a role in supervising and supporting
charity trustees in some circumstances.
Accordingly, this chapter will examine the problems relating to
accountability to donors and beneficiaries respectively in China and
England. Based on the revised agency theory, this chapter argues that, in
terms of donors, although they are ‘key stakeholders’ (who provide
charitable resources voluntarily) defined in Chapter 3 and should act as
supervisors to make charity trustees accountable for the charitable
purpose/public benefit pursued by their charity, their supervisory rights
should be reasonably limited to avoid unnecessary monitoring costs. By
contrast, although their views and experience are quite useful for the
improvement of the quality of services or goods provided by a charity,
beneficiaries are neither key stakeholders nor capable candidates to act as
‘other selected stakeholders’. Instead, it is more suitable for beneficiaries to
play a supportive role in charity governance.
The following discussion will provide a detailed analysis of the roles of and
legal rules governing donors and beneficiaries from economic and
comparative perspectives to develop the above arguments and further offer a
range of reform suggestions to improve Chinese law in this area.
1 See the discussion in Chapter 4.
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6.2 Reducing the Agency Costs relating to Accountability to Donors
6.2.1 Introduction
6.2.1.1 Clarifying the Scope of the Term ‘Donors’
In this chapter, donors are defined as financial supporters of the charitable
purpose of a charity on a voluntary basis (excluding the government
providing tax benefits to charities, which has been discussed in Chapter 4).
Accordingly, a party to any commercial contract, such as a sales contractor
(including any government department funding charities through contracts
for sales of goods or services,2 or any purchaser of goods or services of
charities in their ‘primary purpose trading’3), with a charity does not fall
within this definition and thus will not be discussed any more.
6.2.1.2 A Comparison of the Legal Nature of Donations in England and
China
In England, because of the doctrine of consideration, donations themselves
are usually not contracts,4 and accordingly donors do not have any
contractual rights to supervise charity trustees. However, this does not mean
that donors cannot have any other supervisory rights in English law, which
will be further examined below. Here, it is only worth noting that, donors at
least have rights to impose conditions and terms on their donations, and they,
as members of the general public, have rights to access information about
charities.
By contrast, except for bequests5 and initial donations by the founders6 of a
2 In China, these contracts are usually named as public service purchase contracts (‘公共服务购买合
同’).
3 As regards a recent analysis of the primary purpose trading, see Charity Commission, Trustees,
Trading and Tax: How Charities May Lawfully Trade (Charity Commission 2016) 9.
4 Edwin Peel, The Law of Contract (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 71.
5 In accordance with Chinese legal theory, a bequest is not a contract but a unilateral action (‘单方行
为’). Thus, it can be taken into effect without the consent of the donee. And the donee will have the
right to acquire the title of the donated property without the need to give any promise. Of course, the
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‘donated legal person’,7 inter vivos donations are contracts (‘donation
contracts’)8 in China, which are directly regulated by the Contract Law 1999
(China) and other relevant laws.9
In accordance with Chinese law, a donation contract is ‘a contract whereby
the donor transfers his property to the donee without reward and the donee
manifests his acceptance of the donation’.10 In this context, on the one hand,
the term ‘donation contract’ seems to be very strange to English law
scholars; on the other hand, the so-called ‘contract culture’11 is also difficult
for Chinese law scholars to understand because both grants12 and contracts
in English law can be regarded as contracts from the perspective of Chinese
law.
However, in terms of the specific legal rules, the gap may not be so huge.
Although donations are usually regarded as contracts in Chinese law,
according to the Contract Law 1999 (China), except for donation contracts
aimed at realising the public benefit, such as the relief of disasters or poverty,
performing moral duties or being notarised, donors have the right to revoke
donee can give up this right. Zejian Wang, An Introduction to Civil Law (China University of
Political Science and Law Press 2003) 83-84 (王泽鉴：《民法概要》，中国政法大学出版社 2003
年版).
6According to Chinese civil law theory, an initial donation of the founder (‘捐助行为 ’) is also a
unilateral action. ibid 66.
7 In Chinese law, donated legal persons include but are not limited to charitable foundations and social
service institutes (the new title for civil non-commercial units). GPCL 2017 (China), s 92.
8 For example, see CL 1999 (China), Chapter 11 (donation contracts); PBUDL 1999 (China). It is
necessary to point out that Chinese law complies with a general principle that ‘the special law should
be adopted before the general law’. Thus, in terms of donation contracts, the Public Benefit
Undertakings Donations Law 1999 (China) is the special law that should be used to regulate donation
contracts before the Contract Law 1999 (China). And, only if there is no rule governing a legal issue
in this special law, the Contract Law 1999 (China), as a general law, can be deployed to regulate the
relevant legal relationship.
9An absolute gift in English law can also be regarded as a donation contract according to Chinese law.
10 CL 1999 (China), s 185.
11 The phenomenon can be concluded as that ‘[c]ontracts or service agreements have increasingly
replaced existing grant aid and voluntary organisations have become exposed to the tighter service
specifications, increased accountability and managerialism’. Lynne Russell and Duncan Scott, The
Impact of the Contract Culture on Volunteers (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 1997); Debra Morris,
Charities and the Contract Culture: Partners or Contractors? Law and Practice in Conflict (Charity
Law Unit of University of Liverpool 1999).
12 In England, ‘[t]here is no legal difference between a grant and a donation, it is simply that grants
are often awarded by institutions and are more likely to be for specific purposes’. Sayer Vincent LLP,
Grants and Contracts (Sayer Vincent LLP 2015) 5.
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the donation before transferring the title of their property to donees.13 In a
recent case, Cheng Ji, the son of Xianxin Ji (a well-known Chinese scholar
who died in 2009) brought a legal suit against Peking University, requiring
the university to return his father’s donation. However, he lost his case
because the court identified that this was a donation aimed at realising the
public benefit, and thus could not be revoked.14
However, for any other donation which does not fall within the above
exceptions, its donees do not have the right to enforce the donation contract.
Accordingly, this situation is quite similar to that in English law, where
gratuitous promises usually cannot be enforced except for those in the form
of deed.15
6.2.1.3 The Necessity to Limit Donors’ Rights in Charity Governance
As noted in Chapter 3, because of contract failure, donors may prefer to
trust and donate assets to a charity rather than a for-profit firm. In this
context, donation contracts may not be an efficient way to supervise
charities: the ineffective contract supervision itself (due to serious
information asymmetry) is the main reason why donors choose to donate
property to a charity rather than a commercial firm to benefit the community:
in contrast to a for-profit company, a charity ‘gives [donors] greater
assurance that the services they desire will in fact be performed as they
wish’.16
13 CL 1999 (China), s 186.
14 Suya Liu, ‘The Appeal relating to Xianlin Ji Legacy Case Has Begun, but Cheng Ji is Still willing
to be reconciled with Peking University’ Beijing Evening News (Beijing, 27 March 2017)
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2017-03/27/c_1120703112.htm> accessed 20September 2017.
15 Peel (n 4) 169. In addition, although donations are usually not regarded as contracts in English law,
if a donation takes the form of a third party beneficiary contract which is regulated by the Contracts
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, it can become a valid contract. For example, see Charity
Commission for England and Wales v Framjee and others [2014] EWHC 2507. As a matter of fact, in
common law countries, there are still other side doors allowing a binding gift promise, such as
reliance and moral obligation plus subsequent promise. George S. Geis, ‘Gift Promises and the Edge
of Contract Law’ (2014) 3 University of Illinois Law Review 663.
16 Henry Hansmann, ‘Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law’ (1981) 129 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 497, 504; Rob Atkinson, ‘Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
Charitable Fiduciaries?’ (1998) 23 Journal of Corporation Law 655, 666.
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In this context, in contrast to ending donations, it is too costly for ordinary
donors to take any further action (such as designing complex contract terms
and conditions) to supervise charity trustees.17 Therefore, unless there are
specific charity scandals, the general public and smaller donors usually
choose to trust charities and donate unrestricted gifts to them directly
without any detailed requirements on the use methods, necessary outcomes,
quality standards or evaluation approaches, etc.
However, this may not be suitable for or satisfy some major donors18 or
donors with some specific requirements (restricted gifts19) on controlling the
use of their donated property.20 These donors may have the motivation, and
many of them may also have the professional capacity (such as some large
grant-making foundations or corporate donors), to further supervise the
performance of a charity through detailed contract terms and conditions.21
In terms of the motivation, donors are usually committed to benefiting the
community and ‘most would prefer that the goal is accomplished at the
lowest possible cost’.22 In the meantime, many donors ‘bargain over the best
way to use the invested resources for the organization’s mission—and even
over the interpretation of the mission itself’.23 In reality, donors are
17 Martin Ricketts, The Economics of Business Enterprise: An Introduction to Economic Organisation
and the Theory of the Firm (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2002) 38.
18 In the Code of Fundraising Practice, a ‘major donor’ means ‘an individual or family with the
potential to make or procure a gift which would have a significant impact on the work of the
organisation’. Fundraising Regulator, Code of Fundraising Practice (Fundraising Regulator 2016)
para 11.2 <https://www.fundraisingregulator.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Code-of-
Fundraising-Practice-v1-3.pdf> accessed 20 September 2017.
19 In English law, a restricted gift can be regarded as a ‘special trust’, i.e., ‘property which— (a) is
held and administered by or on behalf of a charity for any special purposes of the charity, and (b) is so
held and administered on separate trusts relating only to that property’. CA 2011, s 287.
20 Similarly, in the United States, a donor may choose to establish a donor-advised fund in which the
donor reserves the right to advise the charity in respect of distribution of this fund. Panel on the
Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, Accountability of Charitable
Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (Independent Sector 2005) 39.
21 Ciaran Connolly, Noel Hyndman and Danielle McConville, ‘Conversion Ratios, Efficiency and
Obfuscation: A Study of the Impact of Changed UK Charity Accounting Requirements on External
Stakeholders’ (2013) 24 Voluntas 785, 788; Noel Hyndman and Paul McDonnell, ‘Governance and
Charities: An Exploration of Key Themes and the Development of a Research Agenda’ (2009) 25(1)
Financial Accountability & Management 5, 12.
22 Geoffrey A. Manne, ‘Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations’ (1999)
Wisconsin Law Review 227, 234.
23 Gerhard Speckhacher, ‘Nonprofit Versus Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach’ (2008)
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motivated by quite different reasons, such as religious beliefs, tax incentives,
altruism and warm-glow giving, economic reasons and personal
connection.24 Accordingly, donors motivated by different reasons may have
different views about whether or how to supervise charity trustees.
In this context, supervision through donation contracts is a double-
edged sword. It may promote efficient governance in a charity (by
monitoring the performance of the charity directly, and that of its charity
trustees indirectly), but may also have some negative effects on the charity’s
normal operation, due to the donors’ motivation of pursuing private benefits,
the excessive supervisory costs, or the costs of the negative effects of
external intervention.
In this respect, as noted above, in contrast to English law, inter vivos
donations (excluding initial donations of the founders of a donated legal
person) in China are regarded as contracts. This arrangement may allow
donors to play a more active role in charity governance. However, when a
donation contract provides a range of decision-making and supervisory
rights to the donors without imposing any legal duty or liability, the donors
may pursue their own private benefits (as if they were the owners), greatly
increasing the total monitoring costs of the key stakeholders of the related
charity.
However, so far there has been little academic exploration concerning the
limitation of donors’ rights relating to charities in China. For example, in
terms of charitable trusts, ‘[t]he need of clarifying the rights of settlor[s] has
not drawn lots of attention’.25 Nevertheless, to reduce the agency costs
regarding accountability to donors, it is necessary to reasonably restrict the
rights of donors in charity governance. Here, the thesis will focus on an
examination of three pertinent problems: the condition of accepting a
donation, the limitations on the rights of donors participating in charity
18(3) Nonprofit Management & Leadership 295, 313.
24 Ciaran Connolly, Alpa Dhanani and Noel Hyndman, The Accountability Mechanisms and Needs of
External Charity Stakeholders (Certified Accountants Educational Trust 2013) 13-14.
25Yinglu Li, ‘Charitable Trusts in China’ (2014) 20(4) Trusts and Trustees 345, 348.
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governance, and the cy-près principle. The first one is related to any
donation before its establishment. By contrast, the focus of the analysis of
the other two is on any donation that has been legally established.
6.2.2 Denying Donations that May Bring Legal or Moral Risks
6.2.2.1 Reducing the Moral Hazard of Donors
Generally, a charity will accept any form of donation from any individual or
organisation. However, sometimes receiving donations may bring legal or
moral risks to this charity. In this context, to reduce the donors’ moral
hazard (especially when donors use a charity as a tool to carry out money
laundering or other illegal activities) and maintain the public confidence and
trust, charity trustees should take proper measures to prevent or manage
those issues through the relevant legal procedures.26
According to the Charity Law 2016 (China), charities cannot accept any
donation violating laws, regulations and social mores.27 So far, there is no
definition of ‘social mores’ in Chinese law. However, this term is quite
similar to ‘public policy’ in English law, which ‘is a variable notion,
depending on changing manners, morals and economic conditions’.28 From
the perspective of reducing the moral hazard of donors, this requirement is
good but insufficient. It should be complemented by some further conditions.
One is associated with fiduciary duties.
26 In this respect, the Fundraising Regulator provides the relevant guidance on this problem. See
Fundraising Regulator (n 18) para 1.3.2.
27 CL 2016 (China), s 15.
28 Ashwinie Kumar Bansal, Arbitration & ADR (2nd edn, Universal Law Publishing 2009) 91. A
typical example in this respect is a donation of land by a married man to a woman (who is not his
wife) if she continues to have a sexual relationship with him. Huixing Liang, The Hermeneutics of
Civil Law (China University of Political Science and Law Press 1995) 299 (梁慧星：《民法解释
学》，中国政法大学出版社 1995 年版); concerning a similar case in English law, see Benyon v
Nettlefold (1850) 3 Mac & G 94.
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6.2.2.2 Emphasising the Role of Fiduciary Duties in Refusing Illegal or
Immoral Donations
In England, ‘the fiduciary nature of charitable trusteeship and directorship
[…] demands that all decisions taken at trustee level are made solely in the
interests of the charity itself’.29 Accordingly, fiduciary duties30 themselves
require, and can also be used by, charity trustees to act independently to
avoid any undue intervention by donors and other stakeholders.
Regarding donations bringing legal or moral risks to charities, in contrast to
Chinese law, fiduciary duties in English law can further control the costs of
the donors’ moral hazard: if the terms or conditions of a donation do not
violate laws, regulations or social mores, but may conflict with the charity
trustees’ fiduciary duties, they should utilise their fiduciary duties to refuse
this kind of donation.
For example, in a CIO, a charity trustee has a duty to ‘exercise the powers
and perform the functions that the charity trustee has in that capacity in the
way that the charity trustee decides, in good faith, would be most likely to
further the purposes of the CIO’.31 In this context, for a charity aimed at
environmental protection, accepting a donation from heavy industry (which
causes much of the pollution) may violate its aims and seriously damage the
public trust and confidence in this charity, even though the donation itself
complies with the laws, regulations and social mores. Therefore, the charity
trustees in this charity should perform their fiduciary duty and not accept
this kind of donation.
In this context, Chinese law should draw on the experience of English law
and attach great importance to the role of fiduciary duties in this area: if
receiving a donation would lead to the trustees of a charity violating their
fiduciary duties, it is the duty of those charity trustees to refuse it. In
29 Jonathan Garton, The Regulation of Organised Civil Society (Hart Publishing 2009) 145.
30 Concerning the evaluation of the fiduciary duties of charity trustees, see the discussion in Chapter 5.
31 CA 2011, s 221.
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addition, it is helpful for charity trustees to further set up the internal rules
and procedures or model donation contracts to deal with those issues.
6.2.3 Limiting the Decision-Making and Supervisory Rights of Donors
in Charity Governance
6.2.3.1 Comparing the Legal Rights of Donors in Charity Governance
in the Two Jurisdictions
Here, ‘legal rights’ is defined as rights which are directly conferred by law,
compared to those given by the contract between a donor and a
charity/charity trustee or created in the governing document of a charity.
In this respect, English law does not allow donors to play an important role
in charity governance. With respect to unrestricted gifts, except for public
access to information, which will be discussed in Chapter 7, donors have no
further legal rights to supervise donees. As regards any donation in the form
of a trust, after the formation of the trust, the settlor also has no right to
supervise the recipient, except for the special rights stipulated in the trust
document.32 Even for a charitable trust, its settlor also does not ‘have [the]
standing to enforce its terms’.33
Nevertheless, donors or settlors may utilise ‘charity proceedings’34 to
supervise charity trustees: case law in this area seems to be ‘not prepared to
rule out the possibility that a donor or settlor would or could be a “person
interested”’35 to bring charity proceedings. However, this is only a possible
option rather than a statutory right of donors or settlors in English law.36
32 Marion R. Fremont-Smith, ‘The Search for Great Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations:
Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change’ (2007) 76(2) Fordham Law Review 609, 618.
33 G E Dal Pont, Law of Charity (LexisNexis 2010) 553.
34 The ‘charity proceedings’ will be further assessed when discussing beneficiaries in this chapter.
35 Hubert Picarda QC, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (4th edn, Bloomsbury Professional
2010) 917.
36 Concerning whether a donor or settlor can be regarded as a ‘person interested’, English case law
seems to be ‘the subject of controversy’. ibid; Haslemere Estates Ltd. v Baker [1982] 1 WLR 1109,
1122; Bradshaw v University College of Wales, Aberystwyth [1988] 1 WLR 190; Re Hampton Fuel
Allotment Charity [1989] Ch 484, 493; Charity Commission, Charities and Litigation: the Legal
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By contrast, in terms of charitable corporations which are regarded as ‘the
creatures of the founder’,37 English law does confer supervisory rights upon
their founders. One traditional mechanism is a ‘visitor’,38 who can be
authorised by the founder of a charitable corporation to have almost
unlimited power39 to interpret the governing document and ‘those internal
powers and discretions that derive from [it]’.40 Meanwhile, the founder and
his/her heirs may act as the visitors on their own.41 However, the exclusive
jurisdiction of this traditional governance mechanism has been greatly
reduced due to the recent legal reform,42 and to some extent, ‘lies in legal
desuetude and academic disfavor’.43
Nevertheless, for charitable donations, the general approach of English law
is to protect the concerns and information needs of donors through
supervision by the Attorney General and the Charity Commission or public
access to information, rather than to empower those donors to implement
the terms and conditions attaching to their donations directly.
In contrast to English law, Chinese law allows donors to play a much more
important role in charity governance. First, donors have the legal rights to
supervise charity trustees indirectly. For example, in a charitable donation,
the donor has the legal right to inquire of the donee (charity) about the use
and management of the donated property and put forward views and
suggestions. With respect to this inquiry, the donee (charity) should reply
truthfully.44 In this respect, although it is the related charity that is
accountable to its donor, its charity trustees are finally responsible for
performing those duties.
Underpinnings (Charity Commission 2016) 13-14.
37 St John’s, Cambridge v Toddington (1757) 97 ER 245, 269.
38 Regarding the discussion of ‘visitors’, see Picarda (n 35) 735-761; Kathryn Chan, The Public-
Private Nature of Charity Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 34-38.
39 Thomas v University of Bradford [1987] AC 795 (HL).
40 ibid 820.
41 Philips v Bury (1694) 90 ER 1294, 1299.
42 Picarda (n 35) 735.
43 Atkinson (n 16) 694; regarding the problems associated with this mechanism, see Atkinson (n 16)
695.
44 PBUDL 1999 (China), s 21.
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Second, Chinese donors have a range of supervisory rights directly
monitoring the performance of charity trustees. For example, in terms of a
donated legal person, Chinese law provides that, if the decision-making
procedure of the decision-making body, executive body or legal
representative of this organisation violates the laws, administrative
regulations or its governing document, or the contents of the decision do not
comply with the governing document, the founders (‘捐助人’) can request
the court to revoke the decision.45
Meanwhile, in a charitable foundation, the initiators or major donors46 of
this foundation are allowed by the Model Governing Document of
Foundations (issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs) to supervise its
governing body. For example, the major donors and initiators have the legal
right to nominate the candidates for directorship; and, when the board of
directors needs to be re-elected, the major donors have the legal right to
nominate the candidates and elect the new board of directors.47 In addition,
the major donors of a foundation also have the legal right to determine its
supervisors (‘监事’).48
In terms of Chinese charitable trusts, similar to the legal right of major
donors in a charitable foundation, settlors have the legal right to appoint and
change trustees, to appoint trust supervisors, and to receive the report from
trustees and trust supervisors.49 In addition, in contrast to settlors in English
law and other donors in Chinese law, Chinese settlors have more legal rights
relating to charitable trust governance.50 For example, apart from some
45 GPCL 2017 (China), s 94. Regarding ‘donated legal persons’, see the discussion in Chapter 5.
46 In contrast to England and civil law jurisdictions, Chinese law governing foundations does not even
mention the term ‘founder’ (‘the person who establishes a foundation and transfers a portion of his
assets to the foundation’). Thomas von Hippel and Knut B. Pißler, ‘Nonprofit Organizations in the
People’s Republic of China’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative Corporate
Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 462.
47 Model Governing Document of Foundations, s 10.
48 Model Governing Document of Foundations, s 18.
49 CL 2016 (China), ss 46-49.
50 Generally, see Atsoko Sese, ‘Comparative Studies on the Trust Law of the PRC: Taking into
Consideration of the Enactment of the PRC Property Law and Amendment to Japanese Trust Law,
English and the U.S. Trust Law’ (2009) 1 Kyoto Prefectural University Academic Report (Public
Policy) 63.
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rights relating to access to information,51 the settlors of a trust have the right
to require its trustees to adjust the management methods of the trust
property,52 the right to require the trustees to make compensation for loss
due to breach of their fiduciary duties,53 and the right to make decisions for
the trust’s affairs if the conflicts between the trustees cannot be resolved
according to the trust document.54
6.2.3.2 Contract Freedom in Relation to Charitable Donations in
Chinese Law
Apart from the legal rights which are directly conferred upon donors by law,
settlors in a charitable trust and founders in an English charitable
corporation/a Chinese donated legal person (including but not limited to a
Chinese charitable foundation) can also design the rules in the governing
document of this trust/corporation/donated legal person in order to enjoy
some supervisory rights. In Chinese private law theory, this arrangement is
reflective of the principle of ‘self-governance of private law’ (‘私法自治’),
which means that, within the scope of private law, individuals are allowed to
create legal relations freely as long as they do not violate the spirit of the
law.55
Meanwhile, in China, another legal area reflecting the principle of self-
governance of private law is contract law, which protects contract freedom.
In this respect, as noted above, in contrast to English law, Chinese law
recognises inter vivos donations (not including initial donations of the
founders of any donated legal person) as donation contracts. Accordingly,
apart from legal rights given to Chinese donors and rights provided in the
governing documents of charities, donors can also design the related
51 TL 2001 (China), s 20.
52 TL 2001 (China), s 21.
53 TL 2001 (China), s 22.
54 TL 2001 (China), s 31. Here, it is worth noting that, in accordance with the Charity Law 2016
(China), charitable trusts are regulated by the Trusts Law 2001 (China) if there are no specific rules in
the Charity Law 2016 (China). CL 2016 (China), s 50.
55 Huixing Liang, General Theories of Civil Law (3rd edn, Law Press) 158 (梁慧星：《民法总论
（第三版）》，法律出版社 2007年版).
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contractual rights to supervise charity trustees.
In this respect, one typical problem is associated with the methods for
donors to exercise their contractual rights. According to the principle of
contract freedom in Chinese law (which is also a basic principle both in
common law and civil law jurisdictions), contractors can agree that, if one
party does not perform the contractual duties, the other party will have the
right to revoke the contract and get his/her property back.
However, from the perspective of reducing agency costs in relation to
charity governance, the problem relating to this principle lies in the fact that,
if donors have the right to recover their charitable donations from
supervising a charity, it may facilitate them or their heirs to recover the
donated property in the name of correcting the charity’s wrongdoing.
In this context, even if a charity’s trustees do something wrong and their
mismanagement or misconduct is corrected, the charitable purpose and
public benefit that the charity pursues will still suffer the loss: there will be
less property available to benefit the public (i.e., the costs of the negative
effects of external intervention).56 This is particularly true for the heirs of a
donor who ‘may not have the donor’s charitable inclinations at heart. They
may, indeed, prefer to see the gift fail than to see it re-tailored in a way that
the donor would have preferred.’ 57
Currently, Chinese law seems to take two contradictory approaches to
tackling this problem. The first approach is to empower donors to supervise
donees without clarifying whether the donors can recover their donations if
the donees do something wrong. For example, according to the Public
Benefit Undertakings Donations Law 1999 (China), a donee who changes
the nature and purpose of the donated property without the consent of the
donor will be ordered to make corrections and be given a warning by the
relevant governmental department. If the donee refuses to make corrections,
56Atkinson (n 16) 693.
57 ibid.
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upon the consent of the donor, the government will deliver this donated
property to another public benefit social organisation or public institution
with the same or similar purposes.58 In this context, the law at least provides
an opportunity to ensure that the donated property continues to be used for
charitable purposes, but it does not make the legal consequence clear if the
donor refuses to consent.
Similarly, the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) only stipulates
that a charity’s donor has the right to request correction if the charity
violates the terms of the donation agreement on the charitable purposes or
abuses the charity’s property. However, it is unclear whether the donor can
recover his/her donated property if the charity does not correct its abuse.59
The second approach is to allow donors to recover their donations in
supervising charities. For example, according to the Contract Law 1999
(China), where a donation is subject to obligations, the donee should
perform his/her obligations according to the donation contract.60 The donor
has the right to withdraw the donation when the donee does not perform
his/her obligations under the donation contract,61 and to recover the donated
property from the donee.62 Similarly, the Regulation on the Administration
of Foundations 2004 (China) provides that, if the use of the donated
property by a foundation violates the donation agreement, the donor has the
right to require the foundation to abide by the donation agreement or to
apply to the court to withdraw the donation and revoke the donation
agreement.63
Awell-known Chinese case relating to the second approach is Lijiang Moms
Charity Association v United Moms Charity Association (‘丽江妈妈联谊会
58 PBUDL 1999 (China), s 28.
59 CL 2016 (China), s 42.
60 CL 1999 (China), s 190.
61 CL 1999 (China), s 192(3).
62 CL 1999 (China), s 194.
63 RAF 2004 (China), s 39.
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诉美国妈妈联谊会公益事业捐赠纠纷案’),64 where United Moms Charity
Association required to recover the donated property because Lijiang Moms
Charity Association used the donated property--which should have
exclusively provided orphans with clothes, food and health care--for another
purpose (purchasing a building to establish an school for orphans). United
Moms Charity Association finally won this case, and thus recovered its
donated property. However, in this case, it is not necessary to worry about
the loss of property benefiting the public: given its charitable status, this
organisation will continue to use the property for other charity projects.
However, for donors that are not charities, this may not be the case. In this
respect, a recent case is directly related to Chinese Red Cross Foundation. A
donor called Shuai Wang donated 12 yuan to this charity, which carried out
an online fundraising activity (selling virtual drinks called ‘Bai Xue Cola’)
to assist a patient called Bai Xue. Then, Wang found that the charity had
used part of the raised money to help other patients without informing him
in advance, so he brought a legal suit against the charity to revoke the
donation contract and recover his money. Wang finally lost the case due to a
lack of sufficient proof (he could not prove that his 12 yuan donation was
among the money used to help other patients).65
Strictly speaking, in this case, Wang’s donation cannot even be identified as
charitable, because it does not satisfy the public benefit requirement.
Nevertheless, even if it was a charitable donation and the plaintiff won this
case, it would reduce the money used to benefit the public because of the
return of the donation to the donor and the relevant costs relating to the legal
suit.
64 Lijiang Moms Charity Association v United Moms Charity Association (2002) The Third Civil
Tribunal of Yunnan Higher People’s Court, Final Judgment, No. 26 (丽江妈妈联谊会诉美国妈妈联
谊会公益事业捐赠纠纷案(2002)云高民三终字第 26号).
65 Ji Hong, ‘Chinese Red Cross Foundation Won the Legal Suits relating to “Bao Xue Cola”’ China
Red Cross News (Beijing, 1 January 2016)
<http://news.redcrossol.com/miropaper/article.aspx?aid=4066> accessed 20 September 2017.
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6.2.3.3 Reasonably Limiting Donors’ Rights in Supervising Charity
Trustees
Given that donors do not play an important role in English law, there are
few costs relating to their moral hazard or other monitoring costs regarding
accountability to them. By contrast, the current legal rules giving a range of
legal and contractual rights to donors in China may increase the costs of
their moral hazard and other monitoring costs by allowing them to make
decisions, supervise charity trustees or recover their donations.
For example, in respect of legal rules governing Chinese charitable trusts,
the rights of settlors are suitable for regulating private trusts rather than
charitable trusts. In a charitable trust, when the settlors exercise the
supervisory rights as noted above, if they are motivated by their private
benefits, those supervisory rights may finally damage the best interests of
the charitable trust, resulting in high costs of the settlors’ moral hazard and
other monitoring costs (such as the supervisory costs relating to bringing
legal suits).
To reduce the agency costs relating to donors in supervising charity trustees,
the thesis argues that the legal and contractual rights of donors should be
limited. First, donors should have similar fiduciary duties to charity trustees
in making decisions on, or supervising the management of, the internal
issues of a charity.
As a matter of fact, Chinese legislators have begun to realise that the
possibility of the donors’ moral hazard exists. A typical example is a rule
provided by the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China): a charity’s
major donors cannot damage the interests of this charity, its beneficiaries or
the general public for the benefits of their associates.66 However, this rule
only applies to ‘major donors’, which is not defined in this new law. From
the perspective of reducing the costs of the donors’ moral hazard and other
66 CL 2016 (China), s 14.
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monitoring costs, all donors, whether they are ‘major donors’ or not, should
have fiduciary duties in exercising their decision-making or supervisory
rights.
Second, Chinese law should replace the return of charity property with
alternative supervisory methods. Donors and their heirs67 may make use of
contractual rights to recover the donated property in the name of
accountability and accordingly reduce the property available to benefit the
public, leading to high costs in relation to their moral hazard and the related
monitoring costs. Hence, the thesis argues that, the right of donors to
supervise the performance of a charity should be evaluated in the context of
charity governance.
The justification for donors to supervise a charity should be to make its
performance comply with its charitable purposes and public benefit, but not
to pursue their own private benefits (by recovering the previously donated
property). If donors are given the right to recover their property when a
charity does something wrong, this method will not greatly help correct the
charity’s wrongdoing, but may mainly benefit the donors or their heirs
through giving the donation back to them and may lead to excessive
conflicts and legal suits in the name of correcting the wrongdoing of the
charity’s trustees.
Hence, it is necessary to restrict donors’ right to recover charitable donations
(as a supervisory right) in tackling the wrongdoing of charity trustees and to
find more reasonable options to replace this supervisory right. Among them,
a good strategy is to limit donors’ remedy to ‘specific performance by the
donee or diversion to another charitable organization’.68 In other words,
donors should not be given the right to recover the donated property if the
67 ‘Not all heirs will have the donor’s charitable incentive to enforce the terms of the gift, given the
fact that the gift may have been carved out of their inheritance or that they may hold a reversionary
interest in the gift’. Hansmann (n 16) 611; Marion Fremont-Smith, Foundations and Government:
State and Federal Law and Supervision (Russell Sage Foundation 1965) 206-207.
68 Iris J. Goodwin, ‘Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor
Empowerment’ (2005) 58 Vanderbilt Law Review 1093, 1162.
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relevant charity does something wrong, but can be empowered to transfer
the donated property to another charity with the same or similar purposes.
This legal arrangement can reduce the costs relating to both charity trustees
and donors’ moral hazard, help avoid unnecessary legal suits motivated by
the self-interest of donors or their heirs, and, finally, reduce the relevant
agency costs in supervising the performance of charity trustees.
6.2.4 Enhancing the Legal Rules Governing the Cy-près Principle in
Chinese Law
6.2.4.1 Clarifying the Role of the Cy-près Principle in Reducing the
Agency Costs Relating to Charity Governance
In contrast to the board of directors in a for-profit company, due to a lack of
owners and effective market control mechanisms, charity trustees may be
supervised in a looser manner. To limit their discretion and accordingly
reduce the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard, it is necessary for
them to obey the conditions and terms provided by donors.69
In this respect, charity laws in both England and China usually respect the
special requirements of donors as long as these requirements do not violate
the legal rules (such as the rules respecting conflicts of interest) or public
policy.70 For example, according to the Public Benefit Undertakings
Donations Law 1999 (China), the use of donated property should respect the
will of the donor and comply with the public benefit purposes and no one
can divert donated property to other purposes. In addition, both the donated
property received by public benefit social organisations (‘社会团体 ’) and
any value added to it are social public properties (‘社会公共财产 ’) and
protected by law. Neither organisations nor individuals are allowed to
69 In addition, the conditions and terms required by donors are also a useful way to stimulate
charitable donations. To encourage donors, it is ‘eminently desirable that no doubt should be cast on
the security and permanency of their bequests’. Re Weir Hospital [1910] 2 Ch 124, 138.
70 See, for example, Matthew Harding, Charity Law and the Liberal State (CUP 2014) 31-33.
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misappropriate, divert for other purposes or damage these properties.71
However, as time goes by, the original donors’ requirements on charitable
donations may be impossible or impractical or lead to inefficient use of
charitable resources. In this context, strictly complying with these
requirements72 may often result in the remaining property being returned to
the donors or their heirs, or negatively affect the performance of the charity
trustees.
From an economic perspective, this approach leads to high costs relating to
both the donors’ moral hazard (donors and their heirs may seek to return
their donated property) and the negative effects of external intervention
(fewer donations available to benefit the public, or inefficient use of
charitable resources).
In this respect, the cy-près principle in England can help reduce those two
types of costs by relaxing or eliminating the relevant requirements of donors
in some circumstances. This principle allows charity property to be used for
a charitable purpose which is ‘as near as possible to the one originally
specified’73 when the original purpose of this property becomes impossible
or impracticable or any other special reason exists.74 In this context:
[d]onor-imposed restrictions were binding only to the extent that
[the charity regulator] chose to enforce them. By vesting
enforcement powers in [the charity regulator] rather than the donor,
the law ensured that the public had a voice in deciding whether
donor-imposed restrictions produced the best social use for
71 PBUDL 1999 (China), ss 5 and 7.
72 This is called the ‘dead hand’ problem by many law scholars. For example, see Richard Posner,
Posner RA, Economic Analysis of Law (3rd edn, Little, Brown and Company 1986) 481-483; Evelyn
Brody, ‘From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable Donor Standing
(symposium)’ (2007) 41 Georgia Law Review 1183.
73 Picarda (n 35) 437.
74 ibid 437-473; Rachael Mulberon, The Modern Cy-près Doctrine: Applications and Implications
(UCL Press 2006).
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subsidized charitable assets.75
Accordingly, it will keep ‘in existence a gift to charity so that it may
continue as a public benefit from generation to generation’76 and ensure the
efficient use of charitable resources for the public benefit.
6.2.4.2 Identifying the Rules Relating to the Cy-près Principle in China
There is no rule called ‘the cy-près principle’ in Chinese charity law.
However, similar rules do exist to the cy-près principle of English charity
law. For brevity, these rules in Chinese law are also called ‘the cy-près
principle’.77
For example, according to the Trust Law 2011 (China), if there is no person
who has the right to own the trust property or the trust property belongs to
the uncertain public when the charitable trust terminates, the trustee should
utilise the trust property for a purpose similar to the original charitable
purpose, or transfer it to a charity or another charitable trust with a similar
purpose with the approval of the public benefit undertakings regulator.78
Similarly, in accordance with the Regulation on the Administration of
Foundations 2004 (China), the remaining property after deregistration
should be used for the public benefit purposes stipulated in the government
document; properties which cannot be dealt with according to the governing
document will be donated by the registration and administration regulator to
another public benefit organisation which has the same nature and purpose,
and be made public.79
75 Reid Kress Weisbord and Peter DeScioli, ‘The Effects of Donor Standing on Philanthropy: Insights
from the Psychology of Gift-Giving’ (2009/10) 45 Gonzaga Law Review 225, 237.
76 Lord Nathan, Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts (The
Stationery Office 1952), para 71; Jonathan Garton, ‘Justifying the Cy-près Doctrine’ (2007) 21(3)
Trust Law International 134, 134-149.
77 As a matter of fact, many continental European countries also have similar rules. European
Foundation Centre, Exploring Transparency and Accountability: Regulation of Public-Benefit
Foundations in Europe (European Foundation Centre 2011) 14.
78 TL 2001 (China), s 72.
79 RAF 2004 (China), s 33; also RRAA 1998 (China, revised in 2016), s 26; Model Governing
Document of Associations, s 45; PRRACNU 1998 (China), s 25.
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In the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China), there are several sections
concerning the cy-près principle.80 For example, after liquidation, a charity’s
remaining property should be transferred to another charity having the same
or similar purpose in accordance with the governing document of the former
charity; where the governing document does not make any requirement, this
property should be transferred to another charity having the same or similar
purpose under the leadership of the department of civil affairs, and this
transfer should be disclosed to the public.81
In addition, after a charity project is terminated, the remaining donated
property should be disposed of according to the fund-raising scheme or
donation agreement; if there is no requirement in the fund-raising scheme or
donation agreement, the charity should use the remaining property for other
charity projects having the same or similar purposes, and disclose it to the
public.82
6.2.4.3 How to Further Improve the Cy-près Principle in Chinese Law
In English law, the cy-près principle mainly applies to charitable trusts.83 By
contrast, the above rules stipulated in the Charity Law 2016 (China) apply to
charities which are not charitable trusts.84 Another feature of Chinese law in
this respect is that all situations applying the cy-près rules are ‘supervening’
rather than ‘initial’, and that the ‘paramount/general charitable intent’ does
not play any role in deciding whether to apply those rules or not.85 However,
although it may be a disadvantage for Chinese law to ignore the adoption of
80 However, given that this law has only been implemented recently, there are no practical examples
of implementing the cy-près principle in real life.
81 CL 2016 (China), s 18; also GPCL 2017 (China), s 95.
82 CL 2016 (China), s 57.
83 However, the courts also apply this principle to other incorporated charities in some situations. For
example, see Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v Attorney General [1981] 1
Ch 193. For most incorporated charities, changing purposes is very straightforward. They just need
the consent of the Charity Commission. Charity Commission, How to Make Changes to Your
Charity’s Governing Document (Charity Commission 2014).
84 As noted above, the cy-près principle applying to charitable trusts is provided by the Trusts Law
2001 (China). TL 2001 (China), s 72.
85 As to terms such as ‘initial’, ‘supervening’ and ‘paramount/general charitable intent’ and a
comprehensive analysis, generally, see Picarda (n 35) 445-470.
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the cy-près rules at the initial stage, it falls outside the focus of the thesis,
which is on making charity trustees perform well for the charitable purposes
and public benefit; thus, it will not be discussed any more.
As noted above, the existence of the cy-près principle can reduce the agency
costs, mainly including the costs of the donors’ and their heirs’ moral hazard,
and the costs of the negative effects of external intervention. In this context,
by drawing on the experience of English law, it is necessary to improve the
current legal rules governing the cy-près principle in Chinese law, in
particular the Charity Law 2016 (China), in order to further reduce the
related agency costs.
First, the situations in which the cy-près principle is applied should be
extended. As noted above, the cy-près principle can reduce both the high
costs of the donors’ and their heirs’ moral hazard and the high costs of the
negative effects of external intervention. Thus, if the situations to apply this
principle are very limited, the cy-près principle cannot effectively reduce
those costs.
In Chinese law, only when charities are liquidated or charity projects are
terminated is it possible to adopt the above legal rules. This legal
arrangement strictly limits the scope of applying this principle, such as the
circumstance where the effective use of charitable resources becomes urgent.
Therefore, the scope of utilising the cy-près scheme in Chinese law is very
restrictive.
By contrast, recently, English law has relaxed its traditionally strict
requirement on the adoption of the cy-près principle (limited to
impossibility or impracticability),86 and provides for many occasions in
order to satisfy the changing social demand more effectively and
efficiently.87 Those extended situations can assist the cy-près principle in
reducing the related agency costs, and thus should be taken into account in
86 ibid 446-454.
87 CA 2011, s 62 (occasions for applying property cy-près).
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revising Chinese law in future.
Second, Chinese law should detail the factors regulators need to consider.
Currently, Chinese law does not clarify what factors regulators must take
into account, resulting in the costs of the regulators’ moral hazard due to
their unlimited discretion in applying the cy-près principle. By contrast,
English law stipulates several matters that the court and the Charity
Commission should consider in making a cy-près scheme, which can be
integrated into Chinese law to reduce the charity regulators’ moral hazard:
(a) the spirit of the original gift,
(b) the desirability of securing that the property is applied for
charitable purposes which are close to the original purposes, and
(c) the need for the relevant charity to have purposes which are
suitable and effective in the light of current social and economic
circumstances.88
Third, Chinese law should not give donors the right to approve a change to
the purpose of their donated property. As noted above, in terms of charity
projects in Chinese law, only when they are terminated can the cy-près
principle be applied. However, in circumstances which do not relate to the
termination of charity projects, what is the procedure if it is necessary to
change the purpose of the donated property?
According to the Charity Law 2016 (China), if it is necessary to change the
purpose stipulated in the donation agreement, the charity should obtain the
donor’s consent.89 In other words, the law directly empowers donors to
decide whether to change the purpose of the property that they have donated.
However, this legal arrangement may increase their moral hazard. In dealing
88 CA 2011, s 67(3); also Re Lepton’s Charity [1972] Ch 276; Peggs v Lamb [1994] Ch 172. Similarly,
in the United States, ‘[l]iberalization started to appear at the start of the twentieth century as some
judges looked at the broad purposes of a gift and expressed more concern for the needs of society than
the narrow wishes of donors’. Marion R. Fremont-Smith (n 32) 622.
89 CL 2016 (China), s 55. There are similar legal rules in the Public Benefit Undertakings Donations
Law 1999 (China). PBUDL 1999 (China), s 18.
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with this problem, Chinese law should not give donors the right to decide on
a change in purpose of the donated property after it has already been
delivered to a charity. In the meantime, the law should further clarify, and
apply the cy-près principle to, those ‘necessary’ situations.
6.3 Rethinking the Role of Beneficiaries in Charity Governance
6.3.1 Introduction
Beneficiaries usually cannot influence the performance of a charity by any
contract enforcement mechanism, unless they have to pay for the products
or services provided by the charity.90 In that case, they can usually be
protected by the relevant consumer protection laws and regulations. In
addition, beneficiaries can also supervise charity trustees by acting as
members of a charity, or even performing as charity trustees. However, in
those circumstances, the beneficiaries’ rights to supervise charity trustees
are derived from their other roles. In the meantime, in these situations, to
reduce the costs of the beneficiaries’ moral hazard, it is important for
Chinese law to efficiently control and manage conflicts of interest, 91 which
has been explored in Chapter 5.
As to the supervisory mechanisms exclusively relating to beneficiaries, it is
necessary to point out that beneficiaries are not the owners of their charity.
From an economic perspective, this fact makes charity governance different
from both corporate governance (where shareholders are the owners) and
private trust governance (in which beneficiaries are the owners).
Meanwhile, as noted in Chapter 3, beneficiaries are not key stakeholders
90 In England, an exception may be a third-party beneficiary contract created according to the
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. For example, if a donor signs a third-party beneficiary
contract with a charity to benefit another charity, the latter as beneficiary will have the enforceable
contractual rights to supervise the former charity. Charity Commission for England and Wales (n 15).
In China, in some limited circumstances, such as insurance contracts, the law may also empower
beneficiaries, who are not a party to a contract, to directly enforce the contractual rights. Insurance
Law 2009 (China).
91 Charity Commission, Users on Board: Beneficiaries who Become Trustees (Charity Commission
2012).
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who provide charitable resources voluntarily to a charity. Despite this,
beneficiaries may fall within the scope of ‘other selected stakeholders’
defined in Chapter 3 and thus play a similar role to charity members in
supervising charity trustees and reducing the monitoring costs of key
stakeholders. However, whether beneficiaries can play such a role should
be carefully assessed in the context of reducing agency costs.
As a matter of fact, in both jurisdictions, beneficiaries of charities usually
cannot protect themselves directly by enforcing the fiduciary duties of
charity trustees, but can be protected by other governance mechanisms,
such as accountability to governmental regulators (the Charity Commission
or the department of civil affairs).92
In this section, the thesis seeks to justify the legal arrangement denying or
limiting beneficiaries’ rights to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees on the one hand and to argue that beneficiaries should play a more
supportive rather than supervisory role in charity governance on the other.
6.3.2 Denying or Limiting Beneficiaries’ Rights to Enforce Fiduciary
Duties
As noted in Chapter 3, a charity’s beneficiaries are neither this charity’s key
stakeholders who voluntarily provide charitable resources, nor its owners.
Accordingly, if a governance mechanism exists that confers the rights to
enforce the fiduciary duties of charity trustees upon beneficiaries, it must be
created directly by operation of law, which falls within the scope of ‘other
selected stakeholders’ defined in this thesis, in order to reduce the charity
trustees’ moral hazard and the monitoring costs of key stakeholders. In this
respect, it is necessary to assess whether it is cost-effective to select
beneficiaries to play this supervisory role.
92 In addition, with regard to charitable trusts, Chinese law also establishes a mechanism called ‘trust
supervisors’, who can represent beneficiaries to directly enforce the fiduciary duties of trustees in
their own name. In respect of those trust supervisors, see the analysis in Chapter 5.
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6.3.2.1 The ‘Other Interested Persons’ Rule in Chinese Law vs ‘Charity
Proceedings’ and the ‘Persons Affected’ Rule in English Law
In both jurisdictions, there is no rule directly allowing all beneficiaries to
enforce the fiduciary duties of charity trustees. However, some other
governance mechanisms exist that may be available for beneficiaries to
enforce the fiduciary duties of charity trustees in some situations.
In China, in terms of ‘donated legal persons’,93 the law provides that, if the
decision-making procedure of the decision-making body, executive body or
legal representative of a donated legal person violates the laws,
administrative regulations or its governing document, or the contents of the
decision do not comply with the governing document, its founders and other
interested persons can request the court to revoke the decision (For brevity,
this rule is called the ‘other interested persons’ rule in the following
discussion).94 However, there is no further explanation of the meaning of
‘other interested persons’, so it is unclear whether beneficiaries can
automatically make use of this rule to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees.
In England, there are two main governance mechanisms that may be
available for beneficiaries to supervise charity trustees. First, if a beneficiary
falls within the scope of ‘any person interested in the charity’ (which is
similar to the ‘other interested persons’ rule in China), s/he may bring
charity proceedings.95 In this context, although beneficiaries cannot become
a separate governance mechanism supervising charity trustees, they may
utilise this mechanism to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity trustees.
However, English law takes a very restrictive approach in allowing persons
to bring charity proceedings.
93 See the discussion in Chapter 5.
94 GPCL 2017 (China), s 94.
95As to the definition of and the procedure relating to charity proceedings, see Picarda (n 35) 913-946.
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According to the Charities Act 2011, ‘any person interested in the charity’ 96
may bring charity proceedings. However, the rights of those persons to
bring charity proceedings are generally limited by the order of the Charity
Commission and if under charity law the Charity Commission can deal with
the case, then the claim will be denied.97 In accordance with the guidance of
the Charity Commission, charity proceedings can only be authorised by the
Commission ‘where matters are contentious, intractable, and difficult and
cannot be resolved in any other way whether by the commission or anybody
else’.98
In addition, in terms of ‘any person interested’ in the charity, there is only
one further explanation from English case law. In Re Hampton Fuel
Allotment Charity, the ‘interested persons’ was referred to as those having
‘an interest materially greater than or different from that possessed by
ordinary members of the public’.99 However, it is still very difficult to judge
whether a person is an interested person.100 In RSPCA v Attorney General,
Lightman J pointed out that this test was ‘not a technical rule of law, but a
practical rule of justice affording a degree of flexibility responding to the
facts of each particular case’.101
In this context, whether someone belongs to the ‘interested person’, to a
great extent, depends on the specific circumstances and facts of a case.102 In
Re Hampton Fuel Allotment Charity, it was held that a potential beneficiary
would not always qualify as an interested person.103 Therefore, it is clear
that English law takes a very restrictive approach to allowing private parties
(including beneficiaries) to bring charity proceedings to directly enforce the
fiduciary duties of charity trustees.
96 CA 2011, s 115.
97 ibid.
98 Charity Commission, Charities and Litigation: A Guidance for Trustees (Charity Commission 2016)
11.
99 Re Hampton Fuel Allotment Charity (n 36) 494.
100 Peter Luxton, The Law of Charities (OUP 2001) 521.
101 Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Attorney General [2001] EWHC 474 (Ch)
[21].
102 Re Hampton Fuel Allotment Charity (n 36) 496.
103 ibid 493.
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Second, in English law, there is a ‘persons affected’ rule104 which may be
used by beneficiaries to indirectly enforce the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees. As noted in Chapter 4, to strengthen the accountability of the
Charity Commission, the Charities Act 2006 established the Charity
Tribunal (the functions of which are now performed by the First-tier
Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal) to deal with an appeal against the
Commission. It is worth noting that, appeals to the Tribunal do not belong to
the above ‘charity proceedings’, ‘because (i) the Tribunal is not a court and
(ii) it does not exercise the court’s inherent jurisdiction with respect to trusts
for charitable purposes’.105 In this respect, English law provides that persons
specified in column 2 of schedule 6 to the Charities Act 2011 may bring an
appeal against the decisions, directions and orders made by the Charity
Commission and listed in column 1 of schedule 6 to the Charities Act
2011.106
In some situations, those persons include ‘any other person who is or may
be affected by’ the decision/direction/order.107As noted by Alison McKenna,
the Principal Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (Charity), although the Tribunal
is established to enhance the accountability of the Charity Commission,108 it
‘may in fact also be used as a mechanism by which charities are held to
account by members of the public’.109 From her perspective, this rule seems
to ‘cast the net wider than the need to show an interest in it, whether a
“sufficient” one or not’.110
In this context, although in a recent case, the appeal of one beneficiary (the
second appellant) failed to require the Charity Commission to ‘allow the
trustees very little room to manoeuvre in the discharge of their
104 Alison Mckenna, ‘Applications to the First-Tier Tribunal (Charity) by ‘‘Persons Affected’’ by the
Charity Commission’s Decision’ (2013-14) 16 The Charity Law & Practice Review 147, 147-162.
105 ibid 153-154.
106CA 2011, s 319.
107CA 2011, sch 6.
108 Before the creation of this Tribunal, legal suits against the Charity Commission had to be brought
to the High Court, which was both expensive and time-consuming.
109McKenna (n 104) 162.
110 ibid 155.
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responsibilities as trustees’ in its scheme,111 it does open a door for
beneficiaries to take advantage of this rule to supervise charity trustees
indirectly.
However, it remains to be seen whether all beneficiaries can automatically
fall within ‘any other person who is or may be affected’. In addition, even if
all beneficiaries are identified as those persons who are or may be affected,
their rights to supervise charity trustees will still be limited because the
scope of the decisions, directions and orders against which they can bring an
appeal is restricted by English law.112
In summary, neither Chinese law nor English law directly gives all
beneficiaries the right to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity trustees,
although they may make use of other governance mechanisms to supervise
charity trustees under restrictive circumstances.
6.3.2.2 The Reasons and Measures to Limit Beneficiaries’ Rights in
Chinese Law
From an economic perspective, choosing beneficiaries as a governance
mechanism enforcing the fiduciary duties of the governing body of a charity
may be too costly to implement. First, it is extremely necessary to control
the costs of the beneficiaries’ moral hazard. On the one hand, in contrast to
shareholders in a for-profit company or beneficiaries in a private trust,
beneficiaries in a charity are not the owners of this charity. On the other
hand, beneficiaries do not fall within the scope of key stakeholders who
provide charitable resources to a charity and form the economic basis for its
existence (according to Hansmann’s enterprise ownership theory). Instead,
beneficiaries are only the channel for a charity to realise its charitable
purpose and public benefit.113
111 Sparrow, Carne and Websper v Charity Commission for England & Wales (CA/2013/0006;
CA/2013/0007 and CA/2013/0008) [29].
112 CA 2011, sch 6.
113 James J. Fishman, ‘The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform’
(1985) 34 Emory Law Journal 617, 670; George Gleason Bogert, ‘Proposed Legislation Regarding
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In this context, in contrast to key stakeholders, beneficiaries are more likely
to pursue their personal gain rather than the charitable purpose/public
benefit pursued by the relevant charity. And, if the current beneficiaries of a
charity have the right to enforce the fiduciary duties of its charity trustees
and finally succeed, ‘charitable assets [may be] locked into uses that may
not produce the greatest good to either the greatest number or to the most
needy’.114 Accordingly, this governance mechanism may increase rather
than reduce the monitoring costs of key stakeholders:
beneficiaries may be able to exercise rights their benefactor never
intended, against the very wishes of the benefactors themselves
(and […] against both the charitable fiduciaries’ ideas of the
particular charity’s best interests and the [regulator]’ conception of
the best interests of charity in general).115
Second, different from other selected stakeholders defined in Chapter 3,
such as charity members and supervisory boards/trust supervisors (discussed
in Chapter 5) and external auditors (who will be examined in Chapter 7), a
charity’s beneficiaries are usually uncertain or sometimes may be the
general public if this charity is aimed at benefiting the society as a whole.
Accordingly, allowing beneficiaries to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees may lead to a similar result of empowering all members of the
public to enforce those duties: high monitoring costs, such as the costs
relating to the beneficiaries’ moral hazard mentioned above, the supervisory
costs relating to the exercise by them of those rights, and the costs of the
negative effects of external intervention relating to charity trustees’
accountability to beneficiaries.
That may be why, in terms of charity proceedings, English law limits the
rights of private parties (including beneficiaries) through the pre-
State Supervision of Charities’ (1954) 52 Michigan Law Review 633, 633.
114Atkinson (n 16) 693.
115 ibid 674-675.
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authorisation of bringing the charity proceedings.116 This approach may be
reasonably explained as a method to protect charities and charity trustees
from ‘being harassed by a multiplicity of hopeless challenges’,117 especially
unnecessary litigation by ‘busybodies’.118 It will help reduce the costs due to
the negative effects of external intervention by preventing ‘charities from
frittering away money subject to charitable trusts in pursuing litigation
relating to internal disputes’;119 otherwise, some of charities’ charitable
resources will have to be used to deal with legal disputes rather than to
realise their charitable purposes.
Third, in Chinese law, there are already a range of governance mechanisms
to control the charity trustees’ moral hazard. For example, in terms of
governmental regulation, the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China)
allows any organisation or individual finding that there is any illegal activity
relating to charities or charitable trusts to complain or report to the
department of civil affairs, other related regulators or charity industry
organisations. And the latter should carry out a timely investigation. 120 In
addition, the existing supervisory mechanisms, such as accountability to
supervisory boards/trust supervisors,121 contract supervision by donors,122
and consumer protection mechanisms (if beneficiaries are also consumers),
also help monitor the performance of charity trustees.
Meanwhile, the Charity Law 2016 (China) also requires that a charity or a
charitable trust’ trustee should inform its beneficiaries of the funding
standards (e.g., the specific amount of payment to any beneficiary), work
procedures (i.e., what steps the charity or the trustee takes to assist
beneficiaries), work regulations (i.e., the rules with which the charity or the
trustee should comply in carrying out the relevant charitable activities) and
116 CA 2011, s 115.
117 Scott v National Trust for Places of Historic interest or Natural Beauty [1998] 2 All ER 705 (HC).
118 Ibid.
119 Muman v Nagasena [2000] 1 WLR 299, 305.
120 CL 2016 (China), s 97.
121 See the analysis in Chapter 5.
122 See the discussion in this chapter.
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other related information.123 In this context, empowering beneficiaries
(member of the general public if a charity is aimed at benefiting the whole
community) to enforce fiduciary duties, as a matter of fact, increases the
whole monitoring costs of key stakeholders in ensuring compliance by
charity trustees.
Accordingly, to control the costs of the beneficiaries’ moral hazard, the
supervisory costs, the costs of the negative effects of external intervention
and the whole monitoring costs relating to the existing governance
mechanisms, the current approach to restricting the rights of a charity’s
beneficiaries to enforce the fiduciary duties of its trustees in Chinese law
should be preserved.
Following this logic, the ‘other interested persons’ rule recently enacted in
Chinese law should not be regarded as empowering all beneficiaries of a
Chinese donated legal person to enforce the fiduciary duties of its charity
trustees. Instead, it depends on the discretion of the courts to strengthen the
accountability of charity trustees by considering the specific facts of a case.
6.3.3 Involving Beneficiaries in the Promotion of Charity Governance
6.3.3.1 The Value of the Supportive Role of Beneficiaries in Charity
Governance
In practice, beneficiaries can play a positive role in supporting rather than
supervising charity trustees. For instance, a charity can establish the related
mechanisms ensuring that the needs, comments or even complaints of its
beneficiaries are delivered to the trustees in a timely manner.124 This can
123 CL 2016 (China), s 75. However, although the law stipulates that charities and trustees have a duty
to disclose their information to the public and further clarifies the legal consequence of breaching this
duty (CL 2016 (China), ss 71 and 99), there remains uncertainty about whether the duty to inform
beneficiaries of the funding standards, work procedures and work regulations is part of the duty to
disclose information to the public. If it is not, then it will become a legal rule without any legal
consequence and thus the effect of this rule remains to be seen in practice.
124 In the guidance of the Charity Commission, a range of methods relating to ‘user involvement’ are
available. Charity Commission (n 91) 2-3.
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reduce the residual loss by enhancing the efficiency of the charity trustees’
performance without increasing the costs of the beneficiaries’ moral hazard,
the supervisory costs or the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention.
6.3.3.2 Encouraging Beneficiaries to Participate in Charity Governance
as Advisors or Non-voting Members
In this respect, there are many useful methods that can be used to improve
this mechanism. One good way is to encourage beneficiaries to act as non-
voting advisors of a charity. ‘This enables [those beneficiaries] to put
forward their views but avoids the obstacles associated with trusteeship
such as conflicts of interest and remuneration’.125
In addition, for a membership charity, it may be helpful to attract some
beneficiaries to become its non-voting members126 (because voting
members will play a more supervisory rather than supportive role in charity
governance).127 A discussion of their interests and views can inspire the
charity’s trustees when making decisions on realising the public benefit and
help enhance the quality of services and goods delivered by this charity.
6.3.3.3 Building a Complaints Procedure Facilitating the Understanding
of the Needs of Service Users
Nevertheless, ‘complaints can help improve the charity’s performance’.128
For charity trustees of any charity, complaints may assist them in
supervising the performance of the charity’s volunteers and employees and
understanding the demands and expectations of its service users, which
125 Robert Meakin, ‘The Legal Aspects of User Trusteeship’ in Debra Morris and Jean Warburton
(eds), Charities, Governance and the Law: the Way Forward (Key Haven 2003) 93.
126 In contrast to voting members, those members usually ‘have no role in determining the
constitution and direction of the charity’. Charity Commission, Membership Charities (Charity
Commission 2004) 5.
127 Concerning the voting members as a governance mechanism, see the discussion in Chapter 5.
128 Charity Commission, Cause for Complaints? How Charities Manage Complaints about Their
Services (Charity Commission 2006) 7.
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‘could be key determinants of long-term success’.129
Therefore, it is of great value for charities to build a formal complaints
procedure to deal with those specific complaints. Of course, in this respect,
it is necessary to recognise that ‘[t]here is no “one size fits all”
procedure’.130 Charities should take account of their own features (such as
the size, activity area, etc.) in establishing the specific complaints procedure.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has assessed the legal rules regarding accountability to third
parties, especially to donors and beneficiaries, from economic and
comparative perspectives and further provided a range of reform strategies.
First, in terms of accountability to donors, in contrast to English law,
Chinese law not only identifies inter vivos donations (excluding initial
donations of the founders of any donated legal person) as ‘donation
contracts’, but also allows Chinese donors to enjoy a range of legal and
contractual rights to supervise charity trustees, leading to higher agency
costs.
Firstly, regarding donations bringing legal or moral risks to charities, in
contrast to the rule in China, fiduciary duties in English law can better
reduce the costs of the donors’ moral hazard. For example, if some terms of
a donation do not violate laws, regulations or social mores, but conflict with
the fiduciary duties of charity trustees, the charity trustees can directly
refuse this kind of donation.
Secondly, given that donors do not play an important role in English law,
there are few costs relating to their moral hazard. By contrast, in China, the
current legal rules giving donors a great deal of decision-making and
129 Ciaran Connolly and Noel Hyndman, Performance Reporting by UK Charities: Approaches,
Difficulties and Current Practice (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 2003) 18.
130 Charity Commission (n 128) 38.
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supervisory rights may increase the costs of their moral hazard and other
monitoring costs that may arise from them in making decisions, supervising
charity trustees or recovering their donations.
Thirdly, in terms of the cy-près principle, in contrast to English law, the
limited situations in which this principle can be applied, the high discretion
enjoyed by regulators and the rights of donors to approve the change of
purpose of a donation in Chinese law may increase the costs of the negative
effects of external intervention (excessive limitations on the application of
this principle may result in inefficient use of charitable resources), and costs
relating to both the charity regulators’ and the donors’ moral hazard.
Therefore, to deal with those problems and accordingly reduce the related
agency costs, Chinese law should strengthen the role of the fiduciary duties
of charity trustees in refusing illegal or immoral donations. In addition, all
donors should have fiduciary duties in exercising their decision-making and
supervisory rights. Meanwhile, Chinese law should reasonably limit the
contract freedom relating to charitable donations by replacing the return of
charitable donation (as a method of supervising charity trustees) with
alternative methods, such as the right to transfer the donated property to
another charity with similar purposes.
Furthermore, Chinese law should draw on the English experience, extending
the situations in which the cy-près principle can be applied and limiting the
discretion of charity regulators by clarifying the factors they need to
consider in applying this principle. In the meantime, donors’ rights to
consent to the change of purpose of their donated property should be
revoked in the future reform.
Second, in respect of accountability to beneficiaries, neither Chinese law
nor English law allows all beneficiaries to directly enforce the fiduciary
duties of charity trustees. However, in England, beneficiaries may make use
of the ‘charity proceedings’ or the ‘persons affected’ rule to supervise
charity trustees indirectly. Despite this, currently, English law takes a
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restrictive approach in allowing private parties to bring charity proceedings.
Meanwhile, the ‘persons affected’ rule is mainly used to supervise the
Charity Commission rather than charity trustees, and the scope of the
decisions, directions and orders against which they can bring an appeal is
also limited. By contrast, in Chinese law, it is still uncertain whether
beneficiaries can make use of the recently created legal rules governing the
‘other interested persons’ of a donated legal person to enforce the fiduciary
duties of charity trustees.
Nevertheless, from an economic perspective, beneficiaries are neither
owners nor key stakeholders (providing charitable resources) of a charity. In
this context, given the strong self-interest motivations of beneficiaries
(pursuing private benefits from, rather than the best interests of, the relevant
charity), the large number of beneficiaries and the existence of other
governance mechanisms, to reduce the related agency costs, the current
legal arrangement in both jurisdictions, which limits the role of beneficiaries
in directly enforcing the fiduciary duties of charity trustees, should be
preserved.
However, to promote sound charity governance and reduce the residual loss
due to a lack of related information, beneficiaries can be encouraged to
participate in charity governance as non-voting members or advisors in
support of the decision-making of charity trustees, and charity trustees
should build a complaints procedure facilitating the understanding of the
needs of service users.
In respect of the rights of the general public, including donors and
beneficiaries, to access information, the thesis will integrate them into the
next chapter, which focuses on public accountability.
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Chapter 7 Enhancing Public Accountability
7.1 Introduction
This chapter will explore the public accountability mechanisms based on an
economic and comparative analysis1 of the law and practice in China and
England, and identify the possible reform suggestions to improve the
governance mechanisms relating to the charity accounting, reporting,
auditing and public access to information in China.
Falling within the scope of ‘key stakeholders’ defined in Chapter 3, the
general public not only provides charitable resources to charities indirectly
(by recognising the tax benefits enjoyed by those charities), but are also
donors or potential donors to any charity. Hence, their concerns and
information needs should be protected.
As a matter of fact, in practice, ‘[i]t is the belief that charities operate in the
best interest of the public that allows them to continue to operate’.2 In this
context, if the public totally trusts charities and their charity trustees, and
those charities and charity trustees really perform well for their respective
charitable purposes, there will be few, if any, agency costs left: the public
would not need any further supervisory measures to monitor the charity
trustees whilst those trustees would not need to justify their performance
through a range of activities enhancing transparency and accountability.
However, this can never be a reality.
The reality is that insufficient accounting, reporting, auditing and
information disclosure mechanisms may seriously damage the public’s trust
1 Regarding a previous comparative study of the financial accounting of Chinese charities, see
Guanzhong Zuo, ‘The Transparency of Chinese Affiliated International Charities: A Comparative
Analysis’ (Master’s thesis, Auckland University of Technology 2012)
<http://aut.researchgateway.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10292/5228/ZuoG.pdf?sequence=3> accessed 20
September 2017.
2 Lord Hodgson, Trusted and Independent: Giving Charity back to Charities-Review of the Charities
Act 2006 (The Stationery Office 2012) 14; Jeremy Kendall and Martin Knapp, The Voluntary Sector
in the UK (Manchester University Press 1996) 257.
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‘and reduce both charitable giving and charitable activity’.3 Especially in
China, a lack of accountability and transparency may be the most important
reason why charities cannot currently enjoy the public’s trust and
confidence.4 As noted by Xijin Jia (a senior researcher at the NGO Research
Centre in Tsinghua University), the main issue lies in ‘public trust or
accountability of charities’.5
Hence, to improve charity trustees’ performance, reduce the difficulty for
the public to supervise them, and maintain public confidence and trust, the
general public should also have some kind of supervisory rights to make
charity trustees accountable for the charitable purpose/public benefit. 6
However, accountability to the general public has its own costs, which may
be a vital reason why, in respect of charity governance, the law neither gives
the general public the right to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees,7 nor forces charity regulators to make a comprehensive
investigation of each charity every day. Instead, given the vast size of the
public, to control the monitoring costs relating to public accountability,8
different from other key stakeholders, such as the government and donors
discussed in the previous chapters, the rights that the general public can
exercise directly are usually limited to their access to information.
3 Noel Hyndman and Danielle McMahon, ‘The Evolution of the UK Charity Statement of
Recommended Practice: the Influence of Key Stakeholders’ (2010) 28 European Management Journal
455, 465; Debra Morris, ‘New Charity Regulation Proposals for England and Wales: Overdue or
Overdone’(2005) 80 Chicago-Kent Law Review 779, 785; Evelyn Brody, ‘Agents without Principals:
the Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-profit Organizational Forms’ (1996) 40 New
York Law School Law Review 457, 466.
4 Rachel Wang, ‘Why No One Trusts Government Charities in China Anymore’ The Atlantic
(Washington, 13 May 2013) <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-no-one-trusts-
government-charities-in-china-anymore/273989/> accessed 20 September 2017.
5 Edward Wong, ‘Online Scandal Underscores Chinese Distrust of State Charities’ The New York
Times (New York, 3 July 2011)
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/world/asia/04china.html?src=un&feedurl=http%3A%2F%2Fjs
on8.nytimes.com%2Fpages%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Findex.jsonp> accessed 20 September 2017.
6 ‘The [charities] are agencies of society as a whole, and everyone has a right to participate in their
governance.’ John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets and America’s Schools (The
Brookings Institution 1990) 32.
7 In this respect, there is an interesting discussion of the standing rules in charity law from the
perspective of the public law-private law divide. See Kathryn Chan, The Public-Private Nature of
Charity Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 81-101.
8 Karyn R. Vanderwarren, ‘Financial Accountability in Charitable Organizations: Mandating an Audit
Committee Function’ (2002) 77(2) Chicago-Kent Law Review 963, 964; Lord Hodgson (n 2) 65.
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In order to exercise this right to access information, charity accounts and
reports should be put in place and sometimes there should be an external
audit to strengthen the accuracy, objectivity and reliability of the
information contained in charity accounts. Accordingly, the term ‘public
accountability’ used in this chapter mainly refers to any mechanism
governing accounting, reporting, auditing and public access to information,
although those mechanisms are, to some degree, related to governmental
regulation,9 internal governance10 and accountability to third parties11
explored in the previous chapters. On this basis, this chapter will examine
three areas of public accountability respectively, i.e., charity accounting and
reporting, auditing, and public access to information.
Based on the revised agency theory, this chapter argues that, in designing
the rules governing charity accounts and reports, charity audits, and public
access to information, the law should help reduce the supervisory costs of
the general public and other key stakeholders and strike a balance between
the supervisory costs of key stakeholders and other agency costs, such as the
negative effects of external intervention, when there are conflicts in
reducing those costs.
A detailed economic and comparative assessment will be carried out to
enrich those arguments in the areas of charity accounting and reporting,
auditing, and public disclosure, and to look for those well-designed rules or
insightful ideas in support of further reform in China.
9 For example, the Charity Commission has the power to make charities have their accounts audited
or examined. CA 2011, s 146.
10 For example, charity trustees have the duty to prepare and submit the relevant accounts and reports
and make them public. CA 2011, ss 130-143 and 162-173.
11 For example, donors can make use of this right to monitor the performance of charity trustees.
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7.2 Improving the Charity Accounting and Reporting System
7.2.1 Introduction: Satisfying the Information Needs of Key
Stakeholders
From an economic perspective, the existence of charity accounts and reports
is aimed at satisfying the information needs of the general public and other
key stakeholders12 in order to reduce their supervisory costs. However, in
this regard, Chinese law does not effectively take account of the information
needs of key stakeholders in developing its charity accounting and reporting
system.
For example, there are few, if any, rules relating to the disclosure of
remuneration of charity trustees and other staff and the transactions with
related parties in either the Private Non-profit Organisations Accounting
System 2005 (China) (‘民间非营利组织会计制度’), which constitutes the
basic accounting system governing charities and other non-profit
organisations in China, or the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China).13
In addition, there is no requirement on trustees of a charity to explain how
they realise the charity’s purpose and public benefit through their activities.
By contrast, to reduce the supervisory costs of key stakeholders in
supervising charity trustees, the law and practice in England considers the
information needs of stakeholders, including ‘funders, donors, financial
supporters, service users and other beneficiaries’,14 in particular the ‘past,
current and potential funders, donors and financial supporters’,15 in
12 For example, among all the stakeholders, according to a survey by two specialists in this area, ‘the
perception amongst charity managers and auditors of charity financial statements [is] that the annual
report of a charity should primarily be directed towards meeting contributors’ information needs’.
Ciaran Connolly and Noel Hyndman, Performance Reporting by UK Charities: Approaches,
Difficulties and Current Practice (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 2003) 11.
13 One exception may be the rules in the CL 2016 (China) governing transactions with related parties.
CL 2016 (China), s 14.
14 Charity Commission and Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, Charities SORP (FRS 102)
(Charity Commission and Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator 2014) (Charities SORP (FRS 102)),
para 1.1.
15 Charities SORP (FRS 102), ‘Introduction’, para 12.
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designing the contents of charity accounts and reports. For example, the
Charities SORP (FRS 102) details rules governing the benefits of charity
trustees and other staff, 16 and incorporates a public benefit report into the
annual reports of charities, which is ‘important for transparency and
building public trust and confidence’.17
Despite this, it is worth noting that, in England, the practice does not always
perform as well as expected. For example, it was recently found that there
were a range of problems associated with charity fundraising in England,
such as targeting vulnerable people and selling data.18 As a response to
those scandals, the Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016
added the requirement that further information be provided about
fundraising in a charity’s annual report.19
Therefore, China should take account of both the experience and lessons of
English law in this area to improve its rules. On the one hand, to reduce the
supervisory costs of the general public and other key stakeholders, it is still
necessary for China to draw on the experience of English law, considering
the information needs of key stakeholders and accordingly designing the
related rules governing charity accounts and reports.
On the other hand, drawing on the lessons of English law, in reforming its
current rules governing charity accounts and reports, it is also critical for
Chinese law and charity regulators to actively respond to the changing
information needs of key stakeholders (especially when the current
information required by law cannot effectively tackle the charity trustees’
moral hazard in practice) in order to further control the related supervisory
costs of those key stakeholders.
16 Charities SORP (FRS 102) paras 9.1-9.32.
17 Lord Hodgson (n 2) 27.
18 For example, see Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, The 2015 Charity
Fundraising Controversy: Lessons for Trustees, the Charity Commission, and Regulators (Third
Report of Session 2015-16, HC431) (The Stationery Office 2016).
19 CPSIA 2016, s 13.
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Of course, given the initial stage of the development of a charity accounting
and reporting system in China, the first step is to draw on English law’s
experience, ensuring the information can satisfy the basic need of the
general public. In this regard, this section will evaluate three types of
problems, i.e., problems regarding ‘comparability’, ‘relevance’ and
‘understandability’,20 and further discuss how to ‘enhance the relevance,
comparability and understandability of the information presented in charity
accounts’21 and reports in China.
7.2.2 Ensuring the Comparability of Information Contained in Charity
Accounts and Reports
To facilitate the general public to carry out a comparative assessment of the
performance of charity trustees through the information contained in charity
accounts and reports in order to reduce their supervisory costs, it is of value
to reduce any unnecessary limitations on the application of unified rules.
7.2.2.1 Basic Components of Charity Accounts and Reports in Both
Jurisdictions
Before discussing how to improve Chinese law to ensure the comparability
of information contained in charity accounts and reports, it is necessary to
provide a brief introduction to the basic components of charity accounts and
reports in both jurisdictions. In England, according to the Charities SORP
(FRS 102), charity accounts (financial statements) may include a statement
of financial activities, a balance sheet, a statement of cash flows, an income
and expenditure account, and notes,22 while the contents of an annual
report23 mainly contain ‘objectives and activities; achievements and
20 The definitions of those three terms can be found in the standard issued by the Financial Reporting
Council. Financial Reporting Council, The Financial Reporting Standard Applicable in the UK and
Republic of Ireland (The Financial Reporting Council Limited 2015) paras 2.4-2.5 and 2.11.
21 This is also one of the objectives of the Charities SORP (FRS 102). Charities SORP (FRS 102),
‘Objective of the SORP’, para 10.
22 Charities SORP (FRS 102), ‘How to use the modular SORP’, para 26.
23 Concerning a comprehensive study of annual reports, generally, see Edmund Douglas Hayward
Flack, ‘The Role of Annual Reports in A System of Accountability for Public Fundraising Charities’
(DPhil thesis, Queensland University of Technology 2007) <http://eprints.qut.edu.au/16362/1/-
Edmund-FlackThesis.pdf> accessed 20 September 2017.
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performance; financial review; structure, governance and management;
reference and administrative details; exemptions from disclosure; and funds
held as custodian trustee on behalf of others’.24
In Chinese law, a counterpart to the relationship between charity accounts
and annual reports is the relationship between financial reports (‘财务会计
报告’) and annual work reports (‘年度工作报告’). In accordance with the
Private Non-profit Organisations Accounting System 2005 (China),
financial reports mainly include accounts (‘ 财 务 报 表 ’, i.e., financial
statements, including at least a balance sheet, a statement of financial
activities and a statement of cash flows), notes and a financial situation
statement (‘财务情况说明书’). In this context, accounts and notes are, as a
whole, similar to charity accounts in England.
Furthermore, a financial situation statement is a special document focusing
on explanations concerning the purpose, organisational structure and staff,
etc. of the organisation; explanations regarding financial activities,
completion of the annual plan and budget, analysis of the differences arisen,
and the plan and budget of the next financial period, etc.; and explanations
in relation to other matters having a major influence on the operation of the
organisation.25 In this respect, the financial situation statement is similar to
the strategic report (the former ‘operating and financial review’),26 which
forms part of a company’s annual report in English company law.
7.2.2.2 The Current Problems in Chinese Law
Currently, there are several problems affecting the application of unified
rules in Chinese law. First, the current law governing financial reports does
not apply to charitable trusts. In terms of the financial reports of charities,
except for charitable trusts, the contents are clear and unified.
24 Charities SORP (FRS 102) para 1.14; also Charities SORP (FRS 102) paras 1.1-1.53.
25 Private Non-profit Organisations Accounting System 2005 (China), s 72.
26 Accounting Standards Board, Reporting Statement: Operating and Financial Statements (The
Accounting Standards Board Limited 2006); Financial Reporting Council, Guidance on the Strategic
Report (The Financial Reporting Council Limited 2014).
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However, in contrast to associations, civil non-commercial units and
foundations, charitable trusts are not regarded as organisations in Chinese
law. Therefore, this system does not regulate the contents of financial
reports relating to charitable trusts. This arrangement makes it difficult for
key stakeholders to compare the performance of charity trustees in a
charitable trust with the achievement of those in other types of charity. By
contrast, in England, the Charities SORP (FRS 102) also regulates charitable
trusts, and thus reduces the unnecessary barrier to comparing the
achievement of charity trustees in different charities.27
Second, the relationship between financial reports and annual work reports
varies by type of charity. In English law, there a clear relationship between
charity accounts and annual reports: a charity’s accounts mainly deal with
the financial position and financial performance of this charity, and its
annual report ‘provides a context within which to interpret the accounts and
links the activities and achievements reported with the sources of income
used to finance them and the expenditure incurred on those activities’.28
By contrast, in China, there is no such clear relationship, and the
relationship between financial reports and annual work reports may differ by
type of charity. This phenomenon continues to exist after the enactment of
the Charity Law 2016 (China), because this new law does not distinguish
the contents of an annual work report from those of a financial report at all,
although it requires that they should contain the matters relating to annual
fund-raising activities and donations received; the matters relating to the
management and use of charity property; the matters relating to the
implementation of charitable projects; and the wages and benefits of the
27 Nevertheless, in England, the type of charities does play a role in deciding the basis on which
charity accounts should be prepared. For example, for non-company charities, only when their annual
income exceeds £250,000, do they need to prepare their charity accounts on the accruals basis
required by the Charities SORP (FRS 102) whilst other non-company charities only need to prepare
their accounts on the receipts and payments basis, which is much simpler than the former. However,
all charitable companies have to prepare their charity accounts on the accruals basis. Charity
Commission, Charity Reporting and Accounting: the Essentials (Charity Commission 2015).
28 Charities SORP (FRS 102) para 1.12.
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staff.29
Firstly, as to associations and civil non-commercial units, the contents of
their annual work report are the matters about whether the association/unit
complies with laws, regulations and national policies; the matters relating to
the completion of the registration procedure according to the regulations;
the matters relating to the activities carried out according to the governing
document; the matters relating to the changing staff and internal bodies; and
the matters relating to financial management.30 Therefore, it seems that
financial reports, as part of the matters relating to financial management, are
contained in those organisations’ annual work reports.
Secondly, with respect to foundations, the contents in their annual work
report include a financial report; an auditor’s report; the matters relating to
fundraising, receiving donations and providing funding, etc.; the matters
relating to the changing staff and internal bodies; and other matters.31 Here,
it is very clear that annual work reports in Chinese foundations include
financial reports.
Thirdly, the relationship between financial reports and annual work reports
in a Chinese charitable trust is not clear. As a matter of fact, even the term
‘financial reports’ or ‘annual work reports’ is not mentioned by the law
governing charitable trusts. In this regard, neither the Trusts Law 2001
(China) nor the Charity Law 2016 (China) requires the trustees of a
charitable trust to provide an annual work report. Instead, the Trusts Law
2001 (China) imposes a duty on the trustees of a trust to give a report on the
management of the trust’s affairs and the financial position.32 In addition, in
accordance with the Charity Law 2016 (China), the trustees must make a
report on the management of the trust’s affairs and property to the settlors
and file the matters relating to the management of the trust’s affairs and
financial situation with the filing authority (i.e., the department of civil
29 CL 2016 (China), s 13.
30 RRAA 1998 (China, revised in 2016), s 28; PRRACNU 1998 (China), s 23.
31 RAF 2004 (China), s 36.
32 TL 2001 (China), s 67.
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affairs), and disclose those matters to the general public.33
The different types of relationship between financial reports and annual
work reports may not facilitate the general public and other key stakeholders
to have a comparative evaluation of the achievement of charity trustees
working in different types of charity, thus increasing the supervisory costs of
those key stakeholders.
7.2.2.3 Applying the Same Regulatory Framework to Charitable Trusts
and Unifying the Relationship between Financial Reports and Annual
Work Reports
The above arrangement in Chinese law may negatively influence members
of the general public to compare the performance of charity trustees in
different charities, thus increasing their supervisory costs. Therefore, the
thesis argues that the same regulatory framework governing non-profit
organisations should also be applied to evaluate the performance of trustees
in charitable trusts and that Chinese law should further clarify and unify the
relationship between financial reports and annual work reports in all
charities, including charitable trusts.
In terms of the second suggestion, one good option is to draw on the English
approach that separates financial reports from annual work reports. On this
basis, an annual work report can be developed into a supportive and
explanatory document assisting users in understanding and evaluating how
charity trustees perform their fiduciary duties in achieving their charity’s
purposes, which will be discussed below. In addition, in China, charity
trustees, whether they are trustees of a charitable trust or members of the
governing body of any other charity, should be required to carry out the
same duty to make financial reports and annual work reports.34
33 CL 2016 (China), s 48.
34 According to the Charity Law 2016 (China), charities now have the duty to disclose their annual
work reports and financial reports to the general public. CL 2016 (China), s 72.
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7.2.3 Enhancing the Relevance of the Information Contained in Charity
Accounts and Reports
According to ‘The Financial Reporting Standard Applicable in the UK and
Republic of Ireland’ issued by the Financial Reporting Council, ‘relevance’
in this context means that the ‘information is capable of influencing the
economic decisions of users by helping them evaluate past, present or future
events and confirming, or correcting, their past evaluations’.35
In terms of charity governance, relevance is directly associated with the
information concerning the performance of charity trustees in realising the
charitable purpose and public benefit pursued by their charity. For key
stakeholders, one common goal may be that: ‘[t]he greatest possible portion
of the wealth donated to private charity must be conserved and used to
further the charitable, public purpose; waste must be minimized and
diversion of funds for private gain is intolerable.’36
In this respect, to satisfy the information needs of key stakeholders, 37 it is
necessary to improve the current rules governing the contents of charity
accounts and reports in China. Here, two specific recommendations are
made with a comparative analysis of English law.
7.2.3.1 Detailing the Rules Governing Remuneration of Charity
Trustees
First, it is of value to detail the rules governing remuneration of charity
trustees. In making decisions about whether to support and fund a charity,
the general public does want to know its charity trustees’ remuneration. As a
matter of fact, only by knowing this information, can donors and the general
public have a basic understanding that ‘the charity is operating for the
public benefit and that its trustees are acting in the interests of their charity
35 Financial Reporting Council (n 20) para 2.5.
36 Kenneth L. Karst, ‘The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility’
(1960) 73(3) Harvard Law Review 433, 434.
37 Hyndman and McMahon (n 3) 463-464.
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and not for private benefit’.38
However, in contrast to the detailed rules stipulated in the Charities SORP
(FRS 102),39 a major drawback in Chinese law relating to charity accounts
lies in its insufficient rules relating to the disclosure of the remuneration of
charity trustees and other staff and the transactions with related parties. For
example, there is no definition or interpretation of ‘related parties’ in the
Charity Law 2016 (China), compared to a full definition in the Charities
SORP (FRS 102). 40
Moreover, alongside a lack of detailed rules, there are several problems
relating to the relevant rule of the Charity Law 2016 (China), which
provides that annual work reports and financial reports should include
information relating to the wages and benefits (‘福利 ’) of the staff.41 One
problem is that it is not clear whether charity trustees (members of the
governing body) fall within the scope of the term ‘staff’. Another one is the
scope of benefits (‘福利’). It is worth noting that, in China, benefits (‘福利’)
are usually confined to the employee benefits provided by an organisation.
Other advantages, such as those arising from transactions with related
parties, are not viewed as benefits (‘福利’) in this context. Accordingly, this
vague expression may not facilitate some charity trustees to add this
information to their charity accounts.
Therefore, the contents of charity accounts in China should be provided in a
more detailed way to ensure that the information directly relating to the
implementation of the fiduciary duties of charity trustees is clearly defined
and disclosed. For example, China can draw on the experience of the
Charities SORP (FRS 102), providing detailed rules governing disclosure of
charity trustees’ remuneration, benefits, expenses and transactions with
38 Charities SORP (FRS 102) para 9.2.
39 Charities SORP (FRS 102) paras 9.1-9.32.
40 Charities SORP (FRS 102)Appendix 1.
41 CL 2016 (China), s 13.
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related parties.42
As noted in Chapter 5, Chinese law can require charity accounts to contain
the legal authority under which the payment was made, the name of the
remunerated trustee, details of why the remuneration was paid, the amount
of remuneration paid and other information.43 Meanwhile, the definition or
scope of ‘remuneration’, ‘related parties’ and any other important term
should be clarified.
7.2.3.2 Strengthening the Requirements on the Contents of the
Financial Reports andAnnual Work Reports of Larger Charities
Here it is necessary to clarify the standard utilised to distinguish larger
charities from smaller ones. For the purposes of this thesis, a reasonable
standard to evaluate the size of a charity is its income and assets. From a
comparative perspective, English law provides a good example, which
regards a charity as a larger one if:
(a) the charity’s gross income in that year exceeds £1 million, or
(b) the charity’s gross income in that year exceeds the accounts
threshold and at the end of the year the aggregate value of its assets
(before deduction of liabilities) exceeds £3.26 million.44
China can adjust the specific amount by taking into account its current
economic and social conditions.
For key stakeholders, it is apparent that ‘[a] greater degree of public
accountability and stewardship reporting is expected of larger charities’.45 In
contrast to smaller charities, larger charities usually face more risks,
uncertainty and challenges. In this context, once there is any misconduct or
42 Charities SORP (FRS 102), paras 9.1-9.32.
43 Charities SORP (FRS 102), paras 9.6-9.7.
44 CA 2011, s 144, substituted (with application in accordance with art. 5 of the commencing S.I.)
by the Charities Act 2011 (Accounts and Audit) Order 2015 (S.I. 2015/321), arts 1 and 3.
45 Charities SORP (FRS 102) para 1.34.
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mismanagement by those charities’ trustees, the residual loss will be huge,
greatly damaging the public confidence and trust. Accordingly, key
stakeholders can be reasonably expected to have the motivation to require
more information regarding the governance, management and operation of
those larger charities.
Nevertheless, a strengthened requirement on the contents of the accounts
and reports of larger charities may bring more costs relating to the negative
effects of external intervention. In this context, it is of value for the law to
balance its costs of the negative effects of external intervention and its
benefits (such as reducing the charity trustees’ moral hazard and the
supervisory costs of key stakeholders).
In respect of a larger charity, once any misconduct or mismanagement exists,
the charity will suffer a huge loss of charitable resources. Meanwhile, key
stakeholders need more information to efficiently evaluate and supervise the
performance of charity trustees, and the bad performance of charity trustees
in a larger charity, with which the general public is usually familiar, will
severely damage public trust and confidence in this charity in particular, and
the charitable sector as a whole. In addition, larger charities often have more
resources (such as sufficient money and professional employees) available
to provide more detailed and complete information, which may not bring
too many costs relating to the negative effects of external intervention
relative to the charities’ size.
Hence, in contrast to the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention, the high costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard and the high
supervisory costs of the general public and other key stakeholders in respect
of larger charities should be given priority in practice.
In this respect, in England, the Charities SORP (FRS 102) does consider the
costs and benefits relating to information: ‘the preparer should also balance
the cost of obtaining information with the benefit it provides both internally
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to management and externally to funders and other stakeholders.’46
Following this logic, the Charities SORP (FRS 102) distinguishes larger
charities from other charities, and imposes more requirements on the
former’s accounts and reports.47
By contrast, Chinese law does not provide any different requirement in
terms of charity accounting and reporting, which may not effectively
regulate the charity trustees’ performance in larger charities, thus increasing
the supervisory costs of key stakeholders. Hence, to reduce the high costs
relating to the charity trustees’ moral hazard in larger charities in order to
satisfy the information needs of those charities’ key stakeholders, Chinese
law should strengthen the charity accounting and reporting requirements on
larger charities.
7.2.4 Promoting the Understandability of the Information Contained in
Charity Accounts
Due to the inherent problems associated with the understandability of
charity accounts, it may be necessary to develop a narrative report
facilitating the general public in understanding information in charity
accounts, which will eventually reduce the public’s supervisory costs.
7.2.4.1 The Problems Relating to the Understandability of Charity
Accounts
As noted above, key stakeholders are usually concerned about how a
charity’s trustees perform their fiduciary duties for the charity’s purposes.
For the general public and the financial supporters of a charity, one major
concern is not about how much the charity has spent, but ‘how much has
been achieved in affecting the issues being addressed and meeting the
charity’s objectives’.48 In this regard, one vital drawback of charity accounts
46 Charities SORP (FRS 102) para 3.10.
47 For example, in terms of the extra requirements on larger charities relating to annual reports, see
Charities SORP (FRS 102) paras 1.34-1.53.
48 Paul Palmer and Adrian Randall, Financial Management in the Volunteer Sector (Routledge 2002)
135.
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is that they ‘too rarely contain qualitative information that is essential for a
full understanding of the figures’.49 In other words, the information
contained in charity accounts cannot itself ‘give the user a rounded
overview of what has been achieved from the charity’s activities and the
resources used in their delivery’.50
Accordingly, if charity accounts themselves cannot satisfy the information
needs of the general public in evaluating whether charity trustees have
performed their duties properly, the supervisory costs of the society as a
whole will be increased: the general public, donors and volunteers may have
to choose other methods to obtain the relevant information to facilitate the
assessment of the charity trustees’ performance, thus increasing their
supervisory costs.
7.2.4.2 Developing a Narrative Report to More Clearly Reflect the
Charity Trustees’ Performance in Achieving their Charity’s Purpose
To cope with this problem, it is necessary to provide the information in a
more understandable manner. In this context, whether charity accounts are
contained in annual work reports, a narrative report supporting charity
accounts should be set up to assist the general public in understanding the
information contained in them. And the requirements contained in this
narrative report itself, if well-designed and effectively implemented in
practice, can help the key stakeholders and other stakeholders of a charity to
make a better evaluation of the effectiveness of its performance,51 and
accordingly ‘form the basis for discharging accountability by the charity’,52
thus reducing the supervisory costs of key stakeholders.
In this respect, Chinese law requires charities to include information relating
to annual fund-raising activities, donations, implementation of charitable
projects, and wages and benefits of the staff in their financial reports and
49 ibid.
50 Charities SORP (FRS 102) para 1.12.
51 Con Alexander and Jos Moule, Charity Governance (Jordan Publishing Limited 2007) 290.
52 Connolly and Hyndman (n 12) 19.
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annual work reports.53 However, it does not require charity trustees to
explain how they realise the charitable purposes and public benefit through
their activities. Accordingly, the public benefit report required in English
law can bring a great deal of insight to improving the annual work reports in
China.
To address the problems regarding charity accounts, English law has
developed a narrative annual report which ‘assist[s] the user to make
economic decisions in relation to the charity and to assess the charity’s
progress against its objectives and to understand its plans in relation to its
purposes’.54 On this basis, in England, a public benefit report has been
incorporated into the annual reports of charities, to strengthen their public
accountability.55 Under this report, ‘public benefit is no longer an abstract
concept, but rather a requirement on which every registered charity—small
or large—must report every year’.56 However, in accordance with a recent
report on behalf of the Charity Commission, the practice relating to the
public benefit report does not perform quite well even in England.57
One reason may be that, in respect of charity governance, in contrast to
corporate governance, there is a lack of sufficient evaluation methods to
accurately judge the performance of charity trustees. For a charity, ‘the
multiplicity of objectives, outputs and outcomes; different outputs at
differing organisational levels; and the allocation of joint costs to various
outputs’58 may negatively affect an accurate and objective evaluation of it.
In this context, a public benefit report that does not provide sufficient or
53 CL 2016 (China), s 13.
54 Charities SORP (FRS 102) para 1.2.
55 Lord Hodgson (n 2) 27.
56 Gateth G. Morgan and Neil J. Fletcher, ‘Mandatory Public Benefit Reporting as a Basis for Charity
Accountability: Findings from England and Wales’ (2013) 24 Voluntas 805, 827.
57 Gateth G. Morgan and Neil J. Fletcher, ‘Public Benefit Reporting by Charities: Report of a Study
Undertaken by Sheffield Hallam University on behalf of the Charity Commission for England and
Wales’ (2011) Centre for Voluntary Sector Research of Sheffield Hallam University 2011
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284708/public_benefi
t_reporting_shu.pdf> accessed 20 September 2017.
58 Ciaran Connolly, Noel Hyndman and Danielle McConville, ‘Conversion Ratios, Efficiency and
Obfuscation: A Study of the Impact of Changed UK Charity Accounting Requirements on External
Stakeholders’ (2013) 24 Voluntas 785, 789.
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clear standards with which charity trustees should comply may not
contribute much to the effective public accountability of charity trustees.
To deal with this problem, some advanced evaluation measures can be taken
in practice, such as social return on investment (SROI)59 ‘which blends
traditional stock reporting with an assessment of social costs and benefits’.60
Although those measures may also not be perfect, the overall aim behind
them, i.e., making the evaluation standards clearer, more understandable and
practicable, is worth pursuing.61
In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 3, given the abstract nature of the
charitable purposes and public benefit, it is of value for charity trustees to
establish more specific objectives or plans relating to their annual activities
and to make them more measurable and understandable in practice, further
reducing the general public’s supervisory costs.
7.3 Improving the Rules Governing Charity Auditing
7.3.1 Introduction
If there is a lack of objective review, examination or evaluation of financial
reports, in particular those of larger charities, the submission or disclosure
of accounts and reports to regulators or the public itself may not ensure
public confidence in charities automatically. In terms of external audit,
according to the Charity Commission, an auditor should ‘express [his or her]
professional opinion as to whether the accounts are “true and fair” and
undertake procedures necessary to form that opinion in accordance with
International Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland)’.62
59 Jeremy Nicholls and others, A Guide to Social Return on Investment (The SROI Network 2012).
60 Evelyn Brody, ‘Accountability and Public Trust’ in Lester M. Salamon (ed), The State of Nonprofit
America (Aspen Institute & Brookings Institute Press 2002) 490.
61 Some scholars expect that, in practice, ‘the SROI evaluation method is likely to become
increasingly popular’. Huajun Gao, ‘The Charity Industry Network: A New Driving Force in China’s
Nonprofit Sector’ in Chien-Chung Huang and others (eds), China’s Nonprofit Sector: Progress and
Challenges (Transaction Publishers 2014) 137.
62 Charity Commission, Internal Financial Controls for Charities (Charity Commission 2012) 3.
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Here, it is worth noting that, external auditors are not persons voluntarily
providing charitable resources to charities (‘key stakeholders’ defined in
Chapter 3). Hence, similar to charity members and supervisory boards/trust
supervisors (who fall within the scope of ‘other selected stakeholders’), their
supervisory rights are given directly by operation of law, making them act as
an independent governance mechanism which helps reduce the charity
trustees’ moral hazard and the monitoring costs of key stakeholders:63 the
‘strict professional regulation of the independent exercise of informed
judgement provides credible public assurance that charity accounts really do
show the general reader an unbiased, thus “true and fair”, view’.64 In the
meantime, the law has to take account of the costs of this mechanism in
applying it to monitoring charity trustees. In this respect, Chinese practice
has much to learn from that in England.
7.3.2 Building a Comprehensive Regulatory Framework of Charity
Auditing
First, it is necessary to build a comprehensive regulatory framework of
charity auditing. In England, there is updated guidance on charity auditing,
i.e., the ‘Practice Note 2011: the Audit of Charities in the United
Kingdom’,65 which provides detailed guidelines on how to apply the
International Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland) in the charitable
sector. By contrast, China has not built a regulatory framework focusing on
charity auditing,66 which means that the general principles applying to all
audit activities also directly regulate charity auditing.
The main problem relating to this regulatory approach lies in the fact that
63 Of course, different from members and the supervisory board/trust supervisors, external auditors act
as an external governance mechanism.
64 Greyham Dawes, ‘Charity Commission Regulation of the Charity Sector in England and Wales: the
Key Role of Charity Audit Regulation’ in Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (eds), Comparative
Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations (CUP 2010) 861.
65 Auditing Practices Board, Practice Note 2011: the Audit of Charities in the United Kingdom
(Financial Reporting Council 2012).
66 One exception may be the Guidance on the Audit of Financial Reports of Foundations 2012 (‘基金
会财务报告审计指引’), which was implemented in 2013 and only regulates charitable foundations.
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the general principles may not take account of the special considerations
relating to charity auditing and thus sometimes cannot work well in practice.
For example, according to the Auditing Standards for the Chinese Certified
Public Accountants No. 1323 (Related Parties), the auditor should review
the records relating to investors and check the minutes form shareholder
meetings.67 This cannot be realised in the charitable sector because charities
do not have owners (investors) and many charities do not have members,
making it impossible in practice to review the minutes from shareholder
meetings.
Therefore, since the implementation of the Charity Law 2016 (China), to
facilitate external auditors in efficiently supervising charity trustees in order
to control those trustees’ moral hazard and the supervisory costs of the
general public, it has become urgent to build a comprehensive framework
focusing on the regulation of charity auditing, similar to the above guidance
in the United Kingdom, which can help clarify the roles, rights, duties,
liabilities and relevant procedures relating to external auditors.
7.3.3 Extending the Scope of External Audit to Larger Charities
Second, the scope of the external audit mechanism in Chinese law should
pay special attention to larger charities, the definition of which has been
given above. The justification for this argument is similar to that for
supporting strengthening the requirements relating to the contents of charity
accounts and reports of larger charities. For larger charities, if any
mismanagement or misconduct exists, it will greatly increase the costs of
the charity trustees’ moral hazard and damage the realisation of those
charities’ purposes. That may be why in England all larger charities should
be audited.68
By contrast, for smaller charities, having an external auditor may be a great
67 See Auditing Standards for the Chinese Certified Public Accountants No. 1323 (Related Parties), s
7 (‘中国注册会计师审计准则第 1323号----关联方’).
68 CA 2011, s 144.
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burden to bear, resulting in high costs relating to the negative effects of
external intervention. Meanwhile, in a smaller charity which has less
income or fewer assets, even if there is any misconduct or mismanagement
by the charity trustees, it may not bring too many costs of moral hazard.
Therefore, from the perspective of controlling the whole agency costs, the
external audit mechanism should focus on larger rather than smaller
charities.
However, in contrast to English law, in accordance with the Charity Law
2016 (China), only charities having the authorised status of public
fundraising (‘public fundraising charities’) should have their accounts
audited.69
Similar to public collections certificates70 in English law, a Chinese charity
needs to apply for public fundraising status before it can carry out
fundraising activities with the public.71Although it is understandable for the
law to strengthen the regulation of public fundraising charities based on the
considerations of protecting the large number of donors and maintaining
public order, it is unreasonable to confine the scope of the statutory audit to
those charities. This is because charities with large assets may not apply for
the legal status of public fundraising whilst public fundraising charities may
not have many assets or much income. To reduce the costs of the charity
trustees’ moral hazard and the supervisory costs of key stakeholders in
larger charities, the thesis argues that in China, larger charities, including
those which are not public fundraising charities, should be audited.
7.4 Enhancing Public Access to Information
7.4.1 Introduction
‘Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
69 CL 2016 (China), s 72.
70 CA 2006, ss 47 and 51-57.
71 CL 2016 (China), s 22.
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efficient policeman’.72 Public disclosure of accounts, annual reports and
other relevant information plays a very significant role in enhancing charity
governance. Although it may increase the burden on charity trustees and
their charity, those costs are necessary because they can usually bring more
benefits.73
For example, an effective public disclosure system can reduce the costs of
the charity trustees’ moral hazard and force them to perform better for their
charity;74 it will relax the difficulty for the public to supervise and support
the relevant charity75 and accordingly reduce the public’s supervisory and
supporting costs;76 and, in contrast to a mechanism authorising a number of
stakeholders with the rights to directly enforce the fiduciary duties of charity
trustees, public access to information is more moderate and will not place
too much pressure on charity trustees to carry out their activities
independently (i.e., reducing the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention).
In this context, this section will discuss how to improve Chinese law and
practice in this respect to reduce those costs. In terms of public access to
information, it can be further divided into two parts. First, the legal rights of
the general public to access information provided by charities. Second, the
charity trustees’ voluntary disclosure of extra information to the public. In
either situation, the law or regulators should take a range of measures to
reduce the supervisory costs of key stakeholders and other relevant costs.
7.4.2 Protecting the Rights of the General Public to Access Information
The general public has the right to have direct access to information as
72 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It (Frederick A. Stokes
Company 1914) 92.
73 Lord Hodgson (n 2) 24.
74 Connolly and Hyndman (n 12) 22.
75 The role of public disclosure lies in the fact that it can help donors, beneficiaries and the general
public ensure that the contributions to a charity ‘are devoted in their entirety to the services that the
organization promises to provide’. Henry Hansmann, ‘Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law’ (1981)
129 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 497, 615.
76 Lord Hodgson (n 2) 65.
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required by law. However, to facilitate the general public’s exercising of this
right, the persons and methods to make charity accounts and reports public
must be clarified and most of the information required by law to be made
public should be incorporated into the contents of financial reports and
annual work reports.
7.4.2.1 Identifying Charity Trustees as the Persons Having the Duty to
Disclose Information to the Public
In China, according to the Public Benefit Undertakings Donations Law 1999
(China), the donee of charitable donations should make the matters relating
to those donations and their use and management public and accept the
supervision of the public.77 And there are similar rules in the Regulation on
the Registration and Administration of Associations 1998 (China, revised in
2016), the Regulation on the Administration of Foundations 2004 (China),
the Provisional Regulation on the Registration and Administration of Civil
Non-commercial Units 1998 (China), and the Charity Law 2016 (China).78
In this respect, although it is clear that the charity itself has a duty to publish
the relevant information, it is not clear which individuals should be
personally responsible for doing so.
The relevant problem is that, according to the Charity Law 2016 (China)
and the Regulation on the Administration of Foundations 2004 (China), if
the duties to publish the relevant information are not carried out or
sufficiently carried out, the charity itself will be warned and required to end
its activities; and, in serious cases, its registration will be revoked.79 For
example, Ageing Development Foundation of Sichuan Province, a
charitable foundation in Sichuan Province, was recently deregistered due to
a violation of its duty to make information public and other duties.80
77 PBUDL 1999 (China), s 22.
78 For example, see RRAA 1998 (China, revised in 2016), s 26; RAF 2004 (China), s 25; PRRACNU
1998 (China), s 21; CL 2016 (China), s 72.
79 For example, see CL 2016 (China), ss 99-100; RAF 2004 (China), s 42.
80 Dan Li, ‘Two Foundations Were Deregistered due to Serious Violation of Laws’ Xinhua (Beijing,
11 January 2017) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/gongyi/2017-01/11/c_129441239.htm> accessed 20
September 2017.
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However, there is no clear rule about whether charity trustees will have to
accept any legal consequence if their charity breaches this duty. In this
respect, although the Charity Law 2016 (China) provides that the chief
officers and other staff directly responsible for (‘直接负责的主管人员和其
他责任人员 ’) the public disclosure of information will be punished in
violation of their duty,81 it is unclear who and whether charity trustees are
among the so-called ‘chief officers and other staff’. At least in the charity
scandal relating to Ageing Development Foundation of Sichuan Province, as
noted above, no charity trustee was punished. Therefore, the law may not
encourage charity trustees to publish the relevant information and
accordingly may increase their moral hazard.
By contrast, in England, the Charities Act 2011 requires that charity trustees
have a duty to provide a copy of the most recent annual report or accounts to
a member of the general public.82 A violation of this duty may make them
guilty of an offence and accordingly they may be punished by law.83
Drawing on the experience of English law in this respect, Chinese law
should clarify a charity’s trustees as the persons finally responsible for
issues relating to publishing the relevant information of this charity.
Meanwhile, Chinese law should impose the related legal consequences to
ensure that those charity trustees perform their duties to prepare the charity
accounts and reports, to submit them to the regulator or to disclose them.
7.4.2.2 Detailing the Methods to Disclose Information to the Public
‘To encourage participation and confidence in the non-profit sector, the
public must have access to accurate, clear, timely, and adequate information
about the programs, activities, and finances of all charitable organizations.’
84 However, unless there is a pragmatic and accessible way for the general
81 CL 2016 (China), ss 99-100.
82 CA 2011, ss 171-172.
83 CA 2011, s 173.
84 Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, Accountability of
Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (Independent Sector
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public to easily receive the information contained in the financial reports
and annual work reports of a charity, disclosure may not be effectively
implemented in practice.
In this respect, currently, Chinese law does not specify the methods to
disclose information to the general public. By contrast, in English law,
charity trustees must provide a copy of the most recent annual reports or
accounts to a person within two months if this person requests it in writing
and pays a reasonable fee, if any, for the relevant costs.85
To make disclosure effective, Chinese law should draw on the experience of
English law, further clarifying the specific methods of disclosing the above
information. For example, the law should require charity trustees to provide
a printed or electronic copy upon request by a member of the general public,
or to publish the information on their charity’s official website.
7.4.2.3 Incorporating the Main Information to Be Disclosed into
Financial Reports andAnnual Work Reports
In terms of the contents of the information to be disclosed to the public, in
English law, the main contents are contained in charities’ accounts and
annual reports.86
By contrast, there is no unified rule in Chinese law. In 2011, the Ministry of
Civil Affairs issued the Guideline on Disclosure of Information concerning
Charitable Donations 2011 (China) (‘公益慈善捐助信息公开指引 ’),87
which set up the principles, contents, time and methods of disclosure of
information for charities receiving donations. According to this guideline,
the information to be disclosed to the public includes basic information
relating to the party disclosing the information, information relating to
2005) 21.
85 CA 2011, ss 171-172.
86 ibid.
87 Its English version is available at <http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=9142>
accessed 20 September 2017.
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fundraising, information relating to receiving and using donations, financial
information on donees, and necessary updated information, etc.88
However, the contents of the information required in the Charity Law 2016
(China) are different from those in this guideline. In accordance with this
new law, the information required to be disclosed to the public includes
charities’ governing documents, information relating to the members of their
decision-making, implementation and supervision bodies, and other
information required by the Ministry of Civil Affairs along with their annual
work reports and financial reports.89 However, the relationship between the
information relating to a charity’s governing documents and internal bodies
and that contained in its annual work reports and financial reports is not
clear.
This arrangement increases the costs for the general public to collect and
analyse the information provided by charities. For example, because the
information to be disclosed to the public may or may not be contained in a
charity’s accounts and reports, the public has to collect this information
from this charity’s accounts and reports, and information published on its
website (if any) or provided in any other manner, which will definitely
increase their information collection costs. In addition, given the disclosure
of a range of information based on different disclosure requirements, key
stakeholders, if they want to, have to further analyse which information has
already been included in the related charity’s accounts and reports, and
whether the information describing the same issue but published in different
places differs.
In the meantime, for charity trustees, to satisfy different disclosure
requirements means that there are high costs relating to the negative effects
of external intervention in practice. They have to deal with those issues
instead of focusing on the realisation of the charitable purposes their charity
pursues. And their altruistic spirit may also be hurt, negatively affecting the
88 Guideline on Disclosure of Information concerning Charitable Donations 2011 (China), s 10.
89 CL 2016 (China), s 72.
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efficient use of charitable resources.
To reduce those costs, Chinese law can draw on the experience of English
law, incorporating the main information required by law to be disclosed to
the general public into the charity accounts and reports as far as possible.
On this basis, Chinese law can focus on designing and developing the
contents of charity accounts and annual reports as noted above, and
accordingly making them public. Following this approach, the information
to be prepared, evaluated or published is usually contained in financial
reports and annual work reports, which can be used and examined by
charities, their financial supporters, regulators and the general public,
reducing the supervisory costs of key stakeholders along with the costs of
the negative effects of external intervention.
7.4.3 Encouraging Voluntary Disclosure of Extra Information by
Charity Trustees
7.4.3.1 The Role of Voluntary Disclosure in Reducing the Supervisory
Costs of Key Stakeholders
The focus of the above discussion in this chapter was on legal requirements.
However, sometimes voluntary public disclosure beyond the legal
requirements is of vital importance to satisfy the general public’s need for
information and to strengthen public confidence and trust.90
In this respect, a famous recent example in China is the dispute relating to
Smile Angel Foundation (whose Chinese name is ‘嫣然天使基金’). Yapeng
Li, who was a well-known Chinese actor and also the founder of this charity
was suspected of utilising it for illegal purposes. But Li did not address this
suspicion at the outset and then responded that ‘from the legal perspective,
we have no further duty to disclose other information’.91 Although the final
90 Generally see Christopher D. B. Burt, Managing the Public’s Trust in Non-profit Organizations
(Springer 2014).
91 Bo Liang, ‘Misappreciation? False Fundraising? The Dispute Is Continuing’West China City Daily
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auditing result indicated that the suspicion was incorrect, Li’s tardy response
greatly damaged his personal fame92 and the reputation of the charity.
From an economic perspective, although voluntary disclosure is not
required by law, it is directly associated with reducing the agency costs
relating to charity governance. If a charity does not disclose or interpret its
essential information in a timely, proper and transparent manner, thus
raising public concern, its reputation will be damaged or even ruined in a
very short period.
This will not only greatly increase the supervisory costs of the general
public in supervising this charity (information required to be disclosed by
law is insufficient to meet the needs of the public), but also result in the
residual loss (such as fewer charitable donations due to distrust). In this
context, the charity trustees of any charity must be aware of this risk and are
recommended to actively disclose extra information to satisfy the public
demand, in particular in dealing with any trust crisis.
7.4.3.2 How to Stipulate that Charity Trustees Disclose Extra
Information to the General Public
Voluntary disclosure need to be encouraged in practice to satisfy the
information need of key stakeholders. First, in guiding charity trustees to
disclose extra information to the general public, the government or charity
umbrella organisations can develop guidance and voluntary codes of
conduct93 dealing with voluntary disclosure.
(Chengdu, 24 March 2014) <http://wccdaily.scol.com.cn/shtml/hxdsb/20140324/197238.shtml>
accessed 20 September 2017.
92 Mixing celebrity and charity can also be a tricky business in England. For example, see Karl
Wilding, ‘Mo Farah Foundation Closure Holds Lessons for Other Charities’ The Guardian (London, 1
June 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/voluntary-sector-network/2016/jun/01/mo-farah-
foundation-close-charity> accessed 20 September 2017.
93 For example, see Charity Governance Code Steering Group, Charity Governance Code for Larger
Charities (Charity Governance Code Steering Group 2017); Charity Governance Code Steering
Group, Charity Governance Code for Smaller Charities (Charity Governance Code Steering Group
2017).
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Second, it is also necessary for charity trustees themselves to be aware of
their ‘moral duties’ relating to voluntary disclosure. As a matter of fact, ‘[i]n
a public accountability relationship, the accountee is a ‘‘forum’’ or ‘‘moral
community’’’.94 Therefore, in the charitable sector, in order not to damage
the public trust and confidence in charity trustees, it is of great value for
those charity trustees to regard themselves as having the moral duty to
provide the general public with access to extra information about their
charity. 95
Of course, its success needs the efforts of the whole society, including but
not limited to the guidance and support from the government, the codes of
conduct from the charitable sector and the cultivation of a charity culture
which recognises voluntary disclosure as part of the moral duty of charity
trustees.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a comprehensive economic and comparative
study of the legal rules regarding the accountability of charities to the public
in both jurisdictions and a range of specific reform suggestions for
reforming Chinese law and practice. In this chapter, public accountability
mainly refers to charity accounting and reporting, auditing and public access
to information.
First, in terms of charity accounting and reporting, although both China and
England have some problems with which to cope (such as the fact that the
contents of the information required to be made public cannot meet the
needs of the public in some situations), the current legal arrangement in
China is less cost-effective than English law and practice in satisfying the
information needs of the general public and other key stakeholders. Similar
to charity accounts and annual reports in English law, there is a distinction
94 Flack (n 23) 27.
95 Kate Kirkland, ‘In Trust: the Changing Role of Trustees’ in Chris Hanvey and Terry Philpot (eds),
Sweet Charity: the Role and Workings of Voluntary Organisations (Routledge 1996) 106.
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between financial reports and annual work reports in China. The current
problems regarding financial reports and annual work reports in Chinese
law can be concluded as follows.
Firstly, in terms of the comparability of information, Chinese law does not
incorporate charitable trusts into its regulatory framework governing other
charities and non-profit organisations and, in the meantime, the current
relationship between financial reports and annual work reports in China is
not clear or unified. In respect of associations and civil non-commercial
units, financial reports seem to be part of annual work reports; as to
foundations, it is clear that financial reports are contained in annual work
reports; with regard to charitable trusts, their relationship is not clarified.
Those arrangements increase the difficulty for the general public and other
key stakeholders to compare the achievements of charity trustees between
charitable trusts and other charities, leading to unnecessary supervisory
costs. By contrast, in England, charitable trusts are also regulated by the
same charity accounting and reporting system and there is a clear
relationship between charity accounts and annual reports: an annual report
supplies ‘a context within which to interpret the accounts’. 96
Secondly, with respect to the relevance of information, Chinese law does not
provide sufficient and relevant information to satisfy the needs of the public,
resulting in more supervisory costs for key stakeholders. For example,
neither the Private Non-profit Organisations Accounting System 2005
(China) nor the recently enacted Charity Law 2016 (China) provides
sufficient rules relating to the disclosure of the remuneration of charity
trustees and other staff and the transactions with related parties. In addition,
there is no further requirement for the accounts and reports of larger
charities to meet the public’s expectation for them to disclose more
information.
96 Charities SORP (FRS 102) para 1.12.
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By contrast, there are a variety of more detailed rules governing the benefits
of charity trustees and other staff, and a clear distinction between larger
charities and smaller charities along with a strengthened requirement for the
annual reports and accounts of larger ones in the Charities SORP (FRS 102).
Thirdly, in terms of the understandability of information, the current
reporting system in China does not require charity trustees to explain how
they realise the charitable purposes and public benefit through their
activities. By contrast, to reduce the problems regarding charity accounts in
this regard, English law has not only developed an annual report to make it
easier for the public to understand the performance and achievement of
charity trustees, but also requires charity trustees to provide a public benefit
report, explaining how they realise the public benefit their charity aims to
deliver.
Hence, to reduce those problems, Chinese law should apply the current
charity accounting and reporting system to charitable trusts, and further
clarify and unify the relationship between financial reports and annual work
reports. Meanwhile, China should draw on the experience of English law,
detailing the rules governing the remuneration and other benefits of charity
trustees and strengthening the accounting and reporting requirements on
larger charities. Furthermore, it is necessary to develop a narrative report
which facilitates the general public to more easily understand the
performance of charity trustees in achieving the charitable purposes of their
charity.
Second, with respect to external auditing, in England, there is a
comprehensive regulatory framework for charity auditing, i.e., the ‘Practice
Note 2011: the Audit of Charities in the United Kingdom’, and the scope of
external auditing extends to larger charities. By contrast, China has not
established a comprehensive regulatory framework for charity auditing and
the scope of external auditing is limited to public fundraising charities. In
contrast to English law and practice, the current legal rules in China can
neither contribute to facilitating the role of external auditors in reducing the
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supervisory costs of key stakeholders, nor control the high costs relating to
the charity trustees’ moral hazard in larger charities which do not fall within
the scope of public fundraising charities.
To reduce those costs relating to charity auditing, it is necessary for China to
draw on the experience of the ‘Practice Note 2011: the Audit of Charities in
the United Kingdom’, and build a comprehensive regulatory framework for
charity auditing. Meanwhile, the scope of the external audit mechanism
should be extended to larger charities.
Third, concerning public access to information, it can be further divided into
the rights of the public to access information and the voluntary disclosure by
charity trustees of extra information. In terms of the legal rights of the
public to access charities’ information, in contrast to English law, Chinese
law does not clarify whether charity trustees have a responsibility for the
public disclosure, what methods charities should take to disclose the
information, and the relationship between the information that charities
should disclose to the public and the contents of their financial reports and
annual reports. This arrangement may result in higher costs relating to the
charity trustees’ moral hazard, along with higher supervisory costs for the
general public and higher costs relating to the negative effects of external
intervention.
Therefore, it is necessary for Chinese law to clarify the duty of charity
trustees to make charity accounts and reports public and the specific
disclosure methods, and to incorporate the main information to be disclosed
into the contents contained in financial reports and annual work reports.
In addition, based on the previous poor performance of charity trustees in
this area, it is critical for charity regulators in China to further encourage
voluntary disclosure of extra information by charity trustees, especially in
dealing with any trust crisis, to reduce the supervisory costs of the general
public, donors, the government and other stakeholders, and the residual loss
(such as fewer donations).
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In the next chapter, the thesis will summarise the core arguments in the
above chapters and comment on the possibility of realising the above reform
suggestions in practice and the need for any further study to be carried out
in the future.
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Chapter 8 Concluding Remarks
8.1 Introduction
This final chapter aims to summarise the core points in the previous
chapters, to comment on whether and how the reforms suggested in this
thesis can be implemented in practice, and to further point out what further
work needs to be done beyond this study.
Here, it is worth noting that, in terms of charity governance, in contrast to
governmental regulation which is closely associated with Chinese politics,
the legal rules concerning internal governance, supervision by third parties
and public accountability do not have a direct relationship with the current
political arrangement in China. In this context, it is helpful to discuss
governmental regulation separately, with a focus on any specific policy
consideration of the government.
Hence, this chapter will assess the economic and comparative perspectives,
governmental regulation and other governance mechanisms, along with an
overall conclusion.
8.2 Economic and Comparative Perspectives
8.2.1 Economic Analysis
In terms of an economic analysis of charity governance, this thesis has
developed a theoretical framework (‘the revised agency theory’)
incorporating the traditional agency theory with other related theories to
better guide legal reform and practice in China. In this revised agency theory,
the charitable purpose/public benefit of a charity plays the role of the charity
trustees’ (persons who govern this charity) principal, whilst persons who are
not the charity trustees but who provide charitable resources to this charity
(‘key stakeholders’) and other selected stakeholders (by operation of law)
should act as the supervisors with the rights to make the charity trustees
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accountable for the charitable purpose/public benefit. And the human nature
of those charity trustees (who are often volunteers) should be understood in
a more pragmatic manner, which means that they can usually be trusted but
should be monitored in some circumstances to control serious moral hazard.
On this basis, although agency costs continue their role in evaluating charity
governance, their contents should be extended to the costs relating to co-
ordinating the supervisors and their collective decision-making process; the
costs of supervision, support and enforcement; the costs of the supervisors’
moral hazard; the costs of the negative effects of external intervention (the
above four types of costs are called the ‘monitoring costs’ in this thesis); and
the residual loss (including both the costs of the charity trustees’ misconduct
or mismanagement due to ineffective accountability and the costs relating to
the inefficient use of charitable resources because of insufficient support).
Accordingly, the legal reform regarding charity governance should take
account of and sometimes strike a balance between those costs.
In this context, along with the assessment of fiduciary duties in Chapter 5
and the analysis of charity accounts and reports in Chapter 7, this thesis has
examined the roles of and legal rules regarding two types of supervisors.
The first is key stakeholders who provide charitable resources voluntarily to
charities, such as the government (Chapter 4), donors (Chapter 6) and the
general public (Chapter 7). Conferring some types of supervisory rights
upon those key stakeholders can reduce the costs of the charity trustees’
moral hazard, and the supervisory costs of those key stakeholders (for
example, the right of the public to access charity accounts and reports
reduces the costs for each donor to collect information regarding the
performance of charity trustees).
Second, other selected stakeholders who can make charity trustees
accountable for the charitable purpose/public benefit based on a special
legal arrangement (whether they provide charitable resources or not in
practice), such as supervisory boards/trust supervisors as a self-regulatory
mechanism of charity trustees (Chapter 5), charity members as an internal
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governance mechanism (Chapter 5), and external auditors (Chapter 7).
Accountability to those selected stakeholders can help reduce the costs of
the charity trustees’ moral hazard and the monitoring costs of key
stakeholders.
In addition, this thesis also emphasises and evaluates the supportive
functions of some stakeholders (including but not limited to key
stakeholders), such as governmental regulators (Chapter 4), internal auditors
(Chapter 5), and beneficiaries (Chapter 6). Those supportive mechanisms
can play a vital role in supporting charity trustees to perform their duties and
in reducing the residual loss due to insufficient support.
Meanwhile, a range of reform suggestions regarding the above governance
mechanisms have been offered to further reduce the relevant agency costs in
any special context or as a whole. However, the economic analysis in this
thesis does not include all aspects of the legal rules regarding charity
governance. Other governance mechanisms, such as self-regulation by the
charitable sector itself, accountability to volunteers and supervision by the
media, do not fall within the scope of this study. Accordingly, a future study
is necessary to explore other governance mechanisms ensuring the sound
performance of charity trustees.
Furthermore, this revised agency theory is only an initial attempt to provide
a range of reasonable solutions to the problems relating to charity
governance in China. Although it clarifies the roles of the charitable
purpose/public benefit, key stakeholders, other selected stakeholders and
charity trustees, the contents of the agency costs to be reduced, and the
methods to reduce those costs, a further study is still needed to improve and
develop this theory in order to provide more detailed and practical
recommendations on the future legal reform in China.
In this respect, one area to be further developed concerns how to balance the
rights between different types of stakeholders (such as the government and
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donors) in supervising charity trustees.1 To reduce the whole agency costs
(mainly including supervisory costs due to conflicts between those
stakeholders), there should be some legal rules addressing this problem.
Take charitable trust governance in China for example. In the context of
Chinese law, there remains a difficult question to be answered, i.e., how to
balance the rights of settlors,2 trust supervisors3and governmental
regulators4 in charitable trust governance, especially when they have totally
different views in judging the performance of trustees.5 To reduce the
supervisory costs, it may be helpful to clarify that trust supervisors are a
self-regulatory mechanism of charity trustees; settlors have rights conferred
by law or arising from the trust contract6/trust document to supervise both
trustees and trust supervisors; and governmental regulators (including the
courts) are the final supervisors of the performance of trustees, trust
supervisors and settlors.
In addition, more empirical study is also needed to improve this revised
agency theory. For example, this theory only points out the necessity of
disclosing detailed information relating to remuneration and other benefits
obtained by charity trustees in order to reduce the supervisory costs of the
general public and donors. An empirical study is required to provide more
accurate knowledge of what other information Chinese donors and the
general public would like to know when deciding whether to support and
fund a charity.
8.2.2 Comparative Study
In terms of the comparative analysis of charity law, with the development of
charity law as an emerging research area in China, there will be an
1 In this thesis, the rights of those stakeholders are analysed respectively in Chapters 4-7.
2 The role of settlors has been examined in Chapter 6.
3 Trust supervisors have been analysed in Chapter 5.
4 Government regulators have been assessed in Chapter 4.
5 Stakeholders may often ‘bargain over the best way to use the invested resources for the
organization’s mission--and even over the interpretation of the mission itself’. Gerhard Speckhacher,
‘Nonprofit Versus Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach’ (2008) 18(3) Nonprofit
Management & Leadership 295, 313.
6 In China, a trust can be created by a contract (‘trust contract’). TL 2001 (China), s 8.
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increasing need for scholars, especially Chinese scholars and foreign
scholars interested in Chinese charity law, to have a comparative analysis of
Chinese law and laws in any other jurisdiction. In this respect, this thesis
can form a basis for, or at least provide related knowledge or experience to,
any further comparative study.
Meanwhile, from a comparative perspective, this thesis, with its focus on
several aspects of charity governance, is only a start in carrying out a
comparative study of charity law in China and England. A range of
interesting subjects relating to charity law do not fall within this study’s
remit and thus are not dealt with comprehensively, such as how to
understand public benefit,7 how to regulate the trade, investment and public
fundraising of charities, and how to address the problems regarding
governmental funding. Furthermore, even for the subjects that have been
discussed in this thesis, such as charity regulators, charity accounts and
accountability to donors, any further specific study would be beneficial to
deepening the understanding of how those governance mechanisms work
under different legal, political and social circumstances.
8.3 Governmental Regulation and Agency Costs
8.3.1 Abandoning the Traditional Strict Control Approach
In contrast to English law which allows and protects the establishment and
independent governance of charities, the traditional ‘dual administrative
system’ in China strictly limits the existence of independent charities, and
keeps direct control over the internal governance issues of a legally
established charity, leading to the existence of a large number of
government-controlled charities. The recently enacted Charity Law 2016
(China) does not fundamentally change this situation.
7 Although English scholars have already carried out a comparative analysis of the legal rules
governing public benefit in a more detailed manner, such as Jonathan Garton, Public Benefit in
Charity Law (OUP 2013) and Mary Synge, The ‘New’ Public Benefit Requirement: Making Sense of
Charity Law? (Hart Publishing 2015) Chapter 7, there is no similar comparative analysis of public
benefit in Chinese law and English law.
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From an economic perspective, the strict limitations on the establishment
and governance of charities in China may lead to high agency costs in
practice. For example, based on the fact that regulators frequently replace
the role of charity trustees in a charity and strictly limit competition, in
practice there are increased conflicts of interest arising from the dual roles
of those regulators and a lack of external pressure for them to efficiently use
charitable resources, resulting in high costs relating to the regulators’ and
charity trustees’ moral hazard.
Accordingly, the general public and donors have to pay extra supervisory
costs due to the inefficient governmental regulation in this area. In addition,
the government’s excessive control in the internal governance of either
government-controlled or independent charities may also bring high costs of
the negative effects of external intervention: it restricts the participation of
potential volunteers in charity governance and the active performance of
current charity trustees in realising the charitable purposes of their charities.
To reduce those agency costs relating to this restrictive regulatory approach
in China, it is necessary to relax the legal limitations on the establishment of
independent charities and to further protect their independent governance.
This is because, in contrast to government-controlled charities, to maintain
an independent charity’s existence and further its charitable purpose, the
charity trustees have to compete in attracting donations and voluntary
participation. This will help enhance the efficient use of charitable resources
and make the charity trustees more accountable, transparent and user-
oriented to maintain their charity’s reputation, finally reducing their moral
hazard. Meanwhile, without the direct participation of regulators in the
internal governance of charities, the costs of those regulators’ moral hazard
arising from conflicts of interest will also be greatly reduced. In addition,
motivated by non-monetary factors, charity trustees in independent charities
are more likely to efficiently perform in the best interests of those charities.
Accordingly, Chinese law should draw on the experience of English law,
protecting the independent governance of charities and reducing the
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limitations on the establishment of charities. First, all Chinese charities
should be recognised as independent by law, like those in England. Charity
law should protect the rights of charity trustees to govern their charity
independently on the one hand and prohibit the direct control by regulators
over any charity’s internal governance issues on the other. On this basis, any
governmental regulator, such as a professional administrative unit in China,
should not directly participate in the management and administration of a
charity.
Second, Chinese law should reduce any undue legal restrictions on the
existence, establishment or registration of independent charities. For
example, the law should detail the rules governing the registration
procedures, promote fairness of the registration procedures themselves and
further protect the legal rights of those unregistered non-profits which carry
out charitable activities.
However, the above suggestions may be compromised in practice based on
Chinese politics. Therefore, it is necessary to further discuss the political
factors which may negatively affect the reforms suggested above.
8.3.1.1 Independent Governance?8
Given the current political system in China, to what extent charity trustees
can achieve independent governance will depend on the attitude of the
leadership of the Communist Party of China. Without introducing a Western
democratic model, the Party and the government make political and social
stability the priority of their policy. More accurately, ‘maintaining economic
growth with social stability has been and will continue to be [the
Communist Party of China] central leadership’s political priority’.9
8 Some of the above material discussing this issue has been published in Dejian Li, ‘Comments on the
Emerging Law on the Administration of Foreign NGOs in China: Based on Its Historical, Political,
Social and Legal Contexts’ (2015) 13(1) International Journal of Charity Sector Law 15.
9 Xian Huang, ‘The Politics of Social Welfare Reform in Urban China: Social Welfare Preferences
and Reform Policies’ (2013) 18 Journal of Chinese Political Science 79.
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On this basis, although China permits the existence of, and in more recent
times promotes the development of, human rights protection,10 the rule of
law,11 and direct democratic electoral systems at local level, 12 the Party and
the government do not accept and will prohibit any action directly
challenging the authority of the fundamental political system or harming
political or social stability.
In this context, as long as one new phenomenon does not negatively
influence, but instead contributes to, the political and social stability, the
Party and the government usually allow for or even promote its
development, and accordingly adjust their previous policies in this area.
Accordingly, for independent charities as well as other non-charitable non-
profits:
as China continues to allow nonprofits to expand their role, the
government has begun to shift the balance, opening space for
nonprofits to solve social problems while maintaining control over
the growth and development of civil organizations that could
become a threat to societal control and stability.13
10 In the past, human rights were regarded as the privilege of the capitalist class and therefore could
not be accepted in a socialist country such as China. However, with a long-term effort from scholars,
governmental reformers and other stakeholders, human rights were accepted by the Constitutional
Law 1982 (China, revised in 2004), which provides that ‘the State respects and preserves human
rights’. CL 1982 (China, revised in 2004), s 33. And a host of specific measures have been put in
place to protect human rights in China. Concerning human rights with Chinese characteristics, see
Phil C.W. Chan, ‘Human Rights and Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?’ (2013) 13(4) Human
Rights Law Review 645, 645-689.
11 For example, see the Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the Building of a Government
which Complies with the Rule of Law (No.33 [2010] of the State Council) (《国务院关于加强法治
政府建设的意见》 (国发 [2010]33 号 )). Here, it is worth noting that, there is a total difference
between the rule of law (‘法治’) and the rule by law (‘法制’) in China. In principle, the rule of law
means that law rather than any individual government official should govern a nation and no one is
beyond the law, while the rule by law refers to the legal system as an instrument for social control.
For example, see Linda Chelan Li, ‘The “Rule of Law” Policy in Guangdong: Continuity or
Departure? Meaning, Significance and Processes’ (2000) 161 The China Quarterly 199, 199-220.
12 For example, currently any head at the village level is directly voted for and selected by all capable
villagers through a direct democratic procedure. Its legal foundation is the Organic Law of Village
Committees 1998 (China, revised in 2010) (‘村民委员会组织法’). In respect of rural democracy in
China, generally, see Baogang He, Rural Democracy in China: the Role of Village Elections (Palgrave
Macmillan 2007).
13 Lincoln C. Chen, Jennifer Ryan, and Tony Saich, ‘Introduction: Philanthropy for Health in China:
Distinctive Roots and Future Prospects’ in Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln C. Chen and Tony Saich (eds),
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In this context, for charities which are aimed at providing public goods and
do not damage political and social stability, so far the general attitude of the
Party and the government is to allow for their existence and accordingly to
reform the current laws and policies to provide a more relaxed and enabling
legal environment for their development. A recent example in this respect is
the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China).
However, although the Charity Law 2016 (China) regulates all types of
charity, charities which may challenge the authority of the Party or affect the
political and social stability can be reasonably expected to continue to be
strictly controlled and monitored by the government in practice.
In this context, although in principle maintaining the independence of
charity trustees may contribute to the reduction of agency costs relating to
charity governance, the Party and the government may continue to set some
extra limitations on the independent decision-making of charity trustees,14
especially those working in some charities carrying out politically sensitive
activities. This will definitely make Chinese charity trustees enjoy less
autonomy that those in England in practice.
8.3.1.2 Co-existence of Promoting the Establishment of Independent
Charities and Maintaining the Existence of Government-controlled
Charities?
In terms of promoting the establishment and development of independent
charities, it has been more or less supported by Chinese legislators for a
long time. For example, their encouragement of the development of
independent charities has even been confirmed by an unpublished draft of
charity law as early as 2006: one aim of this draft is ‘that charity should
Philanthropy for Health in China (Indiana University Press 2014) 8.
14 A recent policy in this area is the Opinions on Reforming the Regulatory System of Social
Organisations and Promoting the Healthy and Orderly Development of Social Organisations (21st
August 2016) (关于改革社会组织管理制度促进社会组织健康有序发展的意见), which was
jointly issued by the Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the
Office of State Council. This guidance emphasises the role of any party branch (established inside a
social organisation) in ensuring the political correctness of this organisation.
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become more of a private venture instead of being state-controlled’.15
Ten years later, after the coming into force of the Charity Law 2016 (China),
which gives a legal definition of charities, empowers organisations
complying with its legal requirements to register as charities and identifies
the department of civil affairs as the regulator of charitable trusts, the
limitations on the establishment of independent charities in China have been
gradually changed. Although the relevant laws, regulations and policies
need to be revised according to the spirit and principles of this new law, the
task relating to ‘giving charity back to charities’ can be accomplished much
more easily than before.
However, although this new law does contribute to the establishment of
independent charities in China, it does not mention whether government-
controlled charities should be transformed into independent charities or not.
In this respect, as a comparison, it is worth noting that, in reforming China’s
for-profit enterprise system, the policy of the Chinese leadership was not to
purely transform all state-owned enterprises into privately owned
enterprises. Instead, the leadership encouraged the establishment and
development of privately owned enterprises on the one hand and maintained
the existence and prosperity of a variety of large state-owned enterprises on
the other. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether those government-
controlled charities, such as Red Cross Society of China (and its branches)
and Song Qingling Foundation of Henan Province mentioned several times
in this thesis, will be changed into independent organisations or continue to
co-exist with other newly established independent charities.
Nevertheless, although it is still uncertain how much independence charity
trustees can enjoy and whether government-controlled charities will be
transformed into independent charities in China, it is quite clear that, after
the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), charity trustees will enjoy
more autonomy and there will be an increasing number of independent non-
15 Karla W. Simon, Civil Society in China: The Legal Framework from Ancient Times to the ‘New
Reform Era’ (OUP 2013) 271-272.
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profits to be registered and recognised by the government as charities.
8.3.2 Implementing Modern Regulatory Principles
In terms of governmental regulation, purely ensuring the autonomy of
charity trustees is insufficient to reduce agency costs. To further control the
agency costs in respect of governmental regulation, it is necessary to
promote efficient regulation. One good approach is to clarify and further
implement the basic regulatory principles relating to charity regulation,
which, this thesis argues, include co-operative, proportional and accountable
regulation, along with balancing the supportive and regulatory roles of
charity regulators. Those ideas should be incorporated into Chinese law and
the specific regulatory mechanisms implementing them should also be put
in place.
8.3.2.1 Co-operative Regulation
In terms of co-operation between different regulators, although both
England and China have to tackle a variety of problems, such as a lack of
efficient co-operative supervisory mechanisms, China is facing more
challenges due to the existence of a large number of professional
administrative units with different regulatory standards or procedures.
To reduce the costs associated with the co-ordination of different regulators,
the next reform in China should identify the regulatory functions, powers
and duties held by different governmental regulators accurately, and further
establish a range of co-operative supervisory mechanisms between those
regulators, such as joint registration and information sharing mechanisms. In
this respect, it is helpful for Chinese regulators to draw on the experience of
the memoranda of understanding signed between the Charity Commission
and other regulators, which usually detail the related contents, procedures,
methods and other matters regarding information transferred to each other.
In practice, although this principle is not mentioned by Chinese charity
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regulators, those regulators are gradually implementing it. Recently, a good
phenomenon has emerged that, as long as an issue relating to charity
regulation concerns the power or duty of another governmental regulator,
the Ministry of Civil Affairs will choose to co-operate with this regulator to
jointly issue a policy or guideline.
For example, on 25th August 2016, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the
China Banking Regulatory Commission jointly issued the ‘Circular on the
Issues concerning Filing of Charitable Trust Documents’ (‘关于做好慈善信
托备案有关工作的通知’),16 providing detailed rules relating to the filing of
charitable trust documents. This can assist in reducing the conflicts between
the department of civil affairs (regulating charitable trusts) and the China
Banking Regulatory Commission (regulating all trusts).
In addition, on 11th October 2016, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry
of Finance, and the State Administration of Taxation jointly issued the
‘Rules on the Annual Expenditure and Management Expenses for Charitable
Activities of Charities’ (‘关于慈善组织开展慈善活动年度支出和管理费
用 的 规 定 ’),17 clarifying the requirements carried out by those three
regulators who have the power relating to charities’ expenditure and
expenses.
In contrast to the lack of co-operation between the department of civil
affairs of Henan Province and other regulators in investigating the charity
scandal relating to Song Qingling Foundation of Henan Province, which
was discussed in Chapter 4, those measures will definitely relax the
conflicts between regulators and reduce the related co-operative costs in the
future.
16 Circular on the Issues concerning Filing of Charitable Trust Documents (25th August 2016)
<http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/mzyw/201608/20160800001587.shtml> accessed 20
September 2017.
17 Rules of Taxation on the Annual Expenditure and Management Expenses for Charitable Activities
of Charities (11th October 2016) <http://xxgk.mca.gov.cn:8081/newgips/contentSearch?id=82663>
accessed 20 September 2017.
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8.3.2.2 Proportional and Accountable Regulation
In terms of the principles of proportionality and accountability, although
regulators in both jurisdictions are facing several problems in improving
their performance (such as undue intervention in the decision-making of
charity trustees in some circumstances), English law and practice perform
better than those in China.
For example, English law provides that those two principles should be
complied with by the Charity Commission,18 and establishes a special
tribunal to make the Commission accountable. In addition, the Charity
Commission takes a risk-based approach in supervising charity trustees and
provides comprehensive public disclosure of its reports, guidance and
related information. All those measures, if effectively implemented, can
reduce the costs of the regulators’ moral hazard, their supervisory costs, and
the costs of the negative effects of external intervention.
Therefore, Chinese regulators should take the Charity Commission’s risk-
based regulatory approach, assessing the risks proactively and responding to
the related problems effectively. Furthermore, to strengthen the
accountability of the government in order to reduce its moral hazard in
regulating charity trustees, the law should require governmental regulators
to disclose more detailed, timely and accurate information to the general
public on the one hand and provide charity trustees with effective legal
remedies, in particular low-cost and user-friendly judicial mechanisms, on
the other.
However, in contrast to co-operative regulation and governmental support
(as noted below), it may be more difficult for the Chinese government to
implement those two principles in practice. This is because, in terms of
charity regulation, the government took a strict control approach for a long
time, so it is difficult to change the traditional ideas, methods and systems in
18 CA 2011, s 16.
271
this area within a short period, and it is also very challenging for
governmental officials working in the department of civil affairs to
accumulate new skills and experience associated with proportional and
accountable regulation. That may be a very important reason why the
Ministry of Civil Affairs organised a range of training courses and seminars
relating to the new charity law for its staff,19 including sending a delegation
to visit the Charity Commission, as noted in Chapter 1.
In addition, because there was neither a legal definition of charity nor a
specific regulatory procedure governing charity regulators in China until the
enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), even judges have little, if any,
experience in identifying a charity or monitoring the misconduct of charity
regulators. Accordingly, it is necessary to carry out a further investigation of
whether the current court system can provide effective judicial remedies to
charity trustees when they seek to challenge the decisions of charity
regulators in accordance with this new law.
Despite this, it is forecast that the Chinese leadership is abandoning its
traditional separated supervisory functions within the Community Party of
China and the government, and instead is establishing a comprehensive
Committee for Inspection of State Affairs (‘国家监察委员会 ’) at the
national level to strengthen the accountability of governmental regulators
themselves.20 In terms of charity regulation, a further investigation is needed
to assess to what extent this new institutional arrangement will encourage
the department of civil affairs to take a more proportional and accountable
approach.
8.3.2.3 Governmental Support
19 China Community Newspaper, ‘What Has the Ministry of Civil Affairs Done to Implement the
Charity Law 2016’ China Community Newspaper (Beijing, 6 September 2016)
<http://mzzt.mca.gov.cn/article/qgmzxxcsf/mtpl/201609/20160900886170.shtml> accessed 20
September 2017.
20 Shu Wang and others, ‘The Timetable to Establish the National Committee for Inspection of State
Affairs Has Been Clarified’ The Beijing News (Beijing, 20 January 2017)
<http://www.bjnews.com.cn/feature/2017/01/20/431271.html> accessed 20 September 2017.
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As regards regulators’ supportive role, in contrast to the Ministry of Civil
Affairs, the Charity Commission has the advantage of issuing a variety of
guidance and reports to support charity trustees in governing their charity.
However, due to the limited budgets, the Commission has to focus on
regulatory issues.
From an economic perspective, governmental support may not lead to costs
arising from the negative effects of external intervention but instead will
help reduce the residual loss by supporting charity trustees to efficiently use
charitable resources. Meanwhile, given that the development of the
charitable sector in China remains in its initial stage, in contrast to England,
it is more urgent for China to provide a range of supportive measures
assisting charity trustees in performing their duties.
In this context, Chinese regulators should provide guidance, education and
training in support of charity trustees and to encourage capable volunteers to
act as charity trustees. Of course, Chinese regulators should draw on the
lessons of the Charity Commission, which misinterpreted legal rules
governing public benefit in its previous guidance. In this respect, Chinese
regulators should clarify the legal requirement and the recommended
practices in their guidance, in support of charity trustees to efficiently
perform their duties. In the meantime, to reduce the supporting costs of
governmental regulators, charity umbrella organisations and other
professional organisations in China can be stimulated to play a more active
role in supporting charity trustees in order to ensure sound charity
governance.
In this regard, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has made a great deal of progress
in encouraging the development of charities and their charity trustees. For
example, after the enactment of the Charity Law 2016 (China), it issued a
number of implementation policies for this new law, detailing the rules
associated with the contents and procedure of charity registration and
273
providing a comprehensive guideline relating to identifying charities. 21
In addition, given that this new charity law promotes charity umbrella
organisations to play a significant role in supporting charities,22 it can be
expected that those organisations will also facilitate the development of
charities in the future. As a matter of fact, some organisations had carried
out a great deal of work in guiding the governance and operation of charities
even before the implementation of this new charity law. For example, on
26thApril 2014, Capital Philanthropy Federation (‘首都慈善公益组织联合
会’), a non-profit incorporated association, issued the first industry standard
of the charitable sector in China, i.e., the ‘Guidelines for the Management of
Charities’ (‘慈善公益组织管理流程指引’).23 With the establishment and
prosperity of those organisations, it can be reasonably expected that they
will greatly promote the ability of Chinese charity trustees to efficiently
govern and manage their charities.
8.4 Other Governance Mechanisms and Agency Costs
8.4.1 Internal Governance
The focus of this thesis in this respect has been on the fiduciary duties of
charity trustees and on the internal bodies supervising or supporting those
charity trustees. The following discussion summarises the main points based
on an economic and comparative analysis.
8.4.1.1 Fiduciary Duties
In respect of the fiduciary duties of charity trustees, in contrast to Chinese
law, English law not only provides more detailed rules governing those
21 The related materials can be easily found on the official website of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. For
example, see <http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/yw/shjzgl/bsfw/201701/20170100003051.shtml>
accessed 20 September 2017.
22 CL 2016 (China), s 19.
23 Ke Kan (ed), Interpretation of the Charity Law of the People’s Republic of China (Law Press 2016)
263-264 (阚珂主编：《中华人民共和国慈善法释义》，法律出版社 2016年版，第 263-264页).
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duties, but also balances the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard and
the related monitoring costs in designing its rules. For example, in detailing
its rules relating to fiduciary duties in both case law and statutes, English
law relaxes the liability of charity trustees under some circumstances by
allowing the purchase of indemnity insurance and empowering the Charity
Commission to relieve the whole or part of charity trustees’ legal liability.
This arrangement makes English law perform better in reducing the agency
costs relating to fiduciary duties. Therefore, Chinese law can draw on the
experience of English law in this respect, improving its current legal rules
governing fiduciary duties.
For example, Chinese law should introduce the principle of voluntary
trusteeship into its legal mechanisms and clarify the exceptions to this
principle and the related procedures regulating the situations in which
charity trustees can obtain benefits. Meanwhile, in terms of the legal
consequences for violation of fiduciary duties, Chinese law can further
divide them into two types, i.e., ‘liability relating to unintentional violation’
and ‘liability relating to intentional violation’.
Given that the first type is not associated with the serious moral hazard of
charity trustees, to reduce the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention (the threat of legal burdens and risks in this context), it should
be reasonably limited by indemnity insurance, regulators’ relief of liabilities,
and other mechanisms. However, for the second type, the law should not
relax the liability of charity trustees due to the existence of severe moral
hazard. Instead, Chinese law should further clarify and impose the related
civil and criminal consequences in order to control those costs arising from
the charity trustees’ moral hazard.
In addition, in contrast to English law, given its civil law tradition, China
should further codify those rules governing fiduciary duties along with more
detailed and unified requirements. As a matter of fact, codification of the
fiduciary duties of the governing body has been done by Chinese regulators
of the for-profit sector, such as the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
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Companies 2002 (China) (‘上市公司治理准则’), which was issued by the
China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2002.24 Therefore, in practice,
charity regulators can codify those fiduciary duties by issuing policies or
model governing documents with little difficulty.
However, in respect of the content of the fiduciary duties of charity trustees,
it may be difficult to introduce the principle of voluntary trusteeship.
Although as justified in Chapter 5, this principle contributes to the reduction
of agency costs, so far it seems that neither Chinese charity regulators nor
ordinary charities truly realise the significance of voluntary trusteeship in
promoting sound charity governance. Meanwhile, except for the rules in the
Regulation on the Administration of Foundations 2004 (China), which
requires that supervisors and directors who do not serve a full-time position
cannot be paid,25 the Charity Law 2016 (China), along with other related
laws and regulations, does not require charity trustees to be volunteers.
Despite this, given that this principle is beneficial to charity governance in
China, charity regulators and charity umbrella organisations can incorporate
it into part of their recommended practice, and encourage capable
individuals to actively participate in charity governance as voluntary charity
trustees. If this practice proves to be effective in ensuring sound charity
governance and reducing the related agency costs, it will be more acceptable
by the Chinese charitable sector as a whole in the future.
8.4.1.2 Internal Bodies
To reduce the agency costs relating to internal bodies supervising or
supporting charity trustees, it is essential for Chinese law to further identify
the role of, and reasonably design the rights and duties relating to, internal
bodies in different types of charity. In this respect, the focus of this thesis
was on members in membership charities (i.e., charitable associations in
24 Its full content is available on the official website of the China Securities Regulatory Commission:
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/ssgs/gszl/201012/t20101231_189703.html>
accessed 20 September 2017.
25 RAF 2004 (China), s 23.
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China) and supervisory boards in charitable donated legal persons (which
are incorporated non-membership organisations created by the recently
enacted General Provisions of Civil Law 2017 (China) and mainly include
foundations and social service institutes)/trust supervisors in charitable
trusts (which are unincorporated), along with internal auditors and audit
committees.
In terms of membership charities, in contrast to English law, the relationship
between members and charity trustees in Chinese law is not very clear. On
the one hand, in civil law jurisdictions (including China), members are
usually regarded as the decision-making body in an association. On the
other hand, the governance rights are often conferred on the board of
directors in practice and those members themselves do not hold any
personal responsibility for their decisions. From the perspective of reducing
monitoring costs due to such an unclear relationship, Chinese law should
clarify that in a membership charity, it is its charity trustees/directors rather
than the members that govern this charity. Accordingly, those members
should be regarded as an internal governance mechanism supervising the
performance of the directors.
With respect to specific rules governing the rights, duties and liabilities of
members, in contrast to Chinese law, English law utilises a range of more
effective measures in reducing the related agency costs. For example,
English law limits the scope and procedure for members to make decisions,
and further clarifies the duties of members in a CIO in exercising their rights,
which helps reduce the costs of the members’ moral hazard, the costs
relating to their collective decision-making process and other monitoring
costs. Meanwhile, in contrast to Chinese law which requires any amendment
to the governing document of an association to obtain consent from
regulators, English law only confers the power to approve the amendment to
the governing document of a CIO upon the Charity Commission in respect
of ‘regulated alterations’, avoiding the Commission’s unnecessary
intervention in the internal governance issues of a membership charity and
the relevant costs regarding governmental regulation. However, neither
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English law nor Chinese law directly allows members to bring a derivative
action against charity trustees, which, from an economic perspective, helps
reduce the related agency costs.
Therefore, in reforming the legal rules governing charity members in the
future, Chinese law should confirm that, in a membership charity, the
decision-making rights belong to the board of directors, unless any specific
requirement exists in its governing document. As to the specific
requirements, the governing document should further make clear the
remaining decision-making rights and procedures relating to the charity’s
members.
On this basis, for some major affairs which are closely associated with
charity governance, such as the change of a charity’s purpose or the benefit
provided to charity trustees, falling within any ‘regulated alteration’26 in
English law, Chinese law should clarify the power of charity regulators to
approve. However, to reduce the costs regarding governmental regulation,
this power should be limited to those ‘regulated alterations’ rather than all
amendments to the governing document of a membership charity.
Meanwhile, the supervisory rights of members, in particular the rights to
take a derivative action, should be limited in order to reduce the agency
costs.
Furthermore, to avoid the costs of the members’ moral hazard, China can
draw on the legal rules governing CIOs, requiring a charity’s members to
perform in good faith for its best interests in exercising their powers,27 and
further clarify the legal consequences for not doing so.
With regard to supervisory boards in donated legal persons and trust
supervisors in charitable trusts, it is worth noting that, the dual roles (the
decision-making function and the supervisory function) of charity trustees in
English law, are played by different internal bodies in Chinese donated legal
26 CA 2011, ss 198 and 226.
27 CA 2011, s 220.
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persons and charitable trusts. In those charities, the directors or trustees are
responsible for the decision-making issues whilst the supervisors on the
supervisory board or the trust supervisors play the supervisory role.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to regard a charity’s supervisory board or trust
supervisors as part of its charity trustees. In this context, they are utilised by
their charity as a self-regulatory mechanism of its charity trustees.
On this basis, from the perspective of reducing the agency costs relating to
accountability to supervisory boards/trust supervisors, several reform
suggestions are given as follows. First, given that the co-existence of
supervisors and non-executive directors in a charitable donated legal person
will, to some degree, increase the monitoring costs, this mechanism can
only be adopted voluntarily. Second, given the role of supervisory boards in
monitoring directors and reducing the supervisory costs of key stakeholders
and the low monitoring costs for those boards to supervise directors,
Chinese law should recognise the rights of a supervisory board to enforce
the fiduciary duties of directors. Third, as part of charity trustees,
supervisory boards and trust supervisors should also be monitored by the
governance mechanisms supervising charity trustees, such as fiduciary
duties and liabilities, to control their moral hazard.
In terms of internal audit, neither English law nor Chinese law has designed
any rule governing this area. However, to strengthen the governance
capacity of charity trustees and reduce the residual loss, regulators and
charity umbrella organisations can issue related guidance facilitating the
adoption of internal audit mechanisms and encouraging the establishment of
an audit committee in larger charities.
Provided that those above reform suggestions will reduce the related agency
costs of internal governance, after charity regulators realise the importance
of those suggestions, most of those reforms can be carried out easily through
policies or model governing documents issued by those regulators. However,
in terms of several suggestions, such as transforming a supervisory board as
an alternative rather than an essential internal body of donated legal persons,
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they can only be realised by revising the General Provisions of the Civil
Law 2017 (China). In this respect, in contrast to the policies issued by
regulators, legislation may be more time-consuming and thus more difficult
to put in place in the near future.
8.4.2 Accountability to Third Parties
In the context of charity governance, providing third parties with the
relevant rights is not aimed at delivering private benefits to them but to
ensure that trustees of a charity perform efficiently for the charity’s purposes
and public benefit. Accordingly, in terms of third parties’ rights, it is
necessary to reduce the agency costs regarding accountability to those
parties. In this thesis, the term ‘third parties’ mainly refers to donors and
beneficiaries.
8.4.2.1 Donors
In contrast to English law, Chinese law not only recognises inter vivos
donations (which do not include initial donations of the founders of a
donated legal person) as contracts (‘donation contracts’), but also confers a
variety of legal rights upon donors to directly or indirectly supervise charity
trustees’ performance. This arrangement may result in higher agency costs
associated with accountability to donors. To reduce those costs, Chinese law
should improve its current rules in the following aspects.
First, to deal with donations which may bring legal or moral risks to a
charity, the law should make clear that a donation contract should not
conflict with the charity’s charitable purposes or the fiduciary duties of its
charity trustees, otherwise the charity trustees should perform their fiduciary
duty to refuse this donation. Second, charitable donors should have similar
fiduciary duties to charity trustees in exercising their decision-making or
supervisory rights in order to reduce their moral hazard and the related
monitoring costs. Meanwhile, if charities do not perform their duties as
required by a donation contract, the law should allow donors to transfer the
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property to another organisation with similar purposes rather than empower
them to recover the donated property directly.
Third, in respect of the cy-près principle, to reduce the costs of the negative
effects of external intervention (inefficient use of charitable resources due to
strict compliance with the terms and conditions regarding a donation) and
the costs of the regulators’ moral hazard, Chinese law should draw on the
experience of English law, expanding the occasions when the cy-près
scheme can be applied and providing the factors regulators should consider
in applying this principle. Meanwhile, to control the moral hazard of donors
or their heirs, the legal rights of donors to approve the change of purpose of
the donated property currently recognised by Chinese law should not be
given in the future.
Of course, it is worth noting that, although the above suggestions may help
reduce the agency costs relating to the participation of donors in charity
governance, they may also curb potential donors’ enthusiasm for charitable
donations. Hence, a further study is necessary to evaluate to what extent a
more restrictive approach regarding donors’ role in charity governance will
negatively affect their motivation to make a donation as well as the amount
of the donation.
8.4.2.2 Beneficiaries
With regard to accountability to beneficiaries, the law in both jurisdictions
does not directly give beneficiaries the rights to enforce the fiduciary duties
of charity trustees. In practice, English beneficiaries may deploy the ‘charity
proceedings’ and the ‘persons affected’ rule (which is mainly aimed at
making the Charity Commission accountable) to supervise charity trustees
indirectly, whilst Chinese beneficiaries of donated legal persons may make
use of the ‘other interested persons’ rule to enforce the duties of charity
trustees.
However, both English law and Chinese law take a restrictive approach in
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allowing beneficiaries to use those governance mechanisms. For example,
the ‘charity proceedings’ need prior approval by the Charity Commission; a
legal suit relating to the ‘persons affected’ rule should be brought against the
Charity Commission first. Meanwhile, the scope of decisions, directions and
orders that can be challenged is also limited. In addition, the ‘other
interested persons’ rule recently created by the General Provisions of the
Civil Law 2017 (China) only applies to donated legal persons.
Nevertheless, in Chinese law, there is no further explanation of who
constitutes ‘other interested persons’. Therefore, an investigation of how the
Chinese courts will identify ‘other interested persons’ and whether the
courts will identify all beneficiaries or only part of them as ‘other interested
persons’ should be carried out in the future.
From an economic perspective, it may be too costly to use beneficiaries as a
governance mechanism enforcing the fiduciary duties of charity trustees.
First, they are not key stakeholders (voluntary financial supporters) of a
charity. Therefore, in contrast to key stakeholders, they are more likely to be
concerned about the private benefits they can receive from a charity rather
than the best interests of this charity, leading to high costs of moral hazard.
Second, in contrast to other selected stakeholders in this thesis, such as
charity members, supervisory boards/trust supervisors and external auditors,
beneficiaries of a charity are usually uncertain or may be the general public
if their charity is aimed at benefiting the society as a whole. In this context,
allowing beneficiaries to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity trustees may
result in a similar result to empowering all members of the public to enforce
those duties: high monitoring costs.
Third, there are a range of other governance mechanisms monitoring charity
trustees, such as governmental regulation, accountability to members and
supervisory boards/trust supervisors, contract supervision by donors, and
public access to information in Chinese law. Conferring this right on
beneficiaries may unnecessarily increase the monitoring costs regarding
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charity governance as a whole. Accordingly, to reduce the related
monitoring costs, Chinese law should deny or limit the rights of
beneficiaries to directly enforce the fiduciary duties of charity trustees.
Meanwhile, in contrast to their supervisory function, the supportive role of
beneficiaries may not bring many costs (mainly including costs relating to
the establishment and implementation of supportive mechanisms) but can
assist charity trustees in efficiently performing their fiduciary duties in order
to reduce the residual loss. Hence, a charity can build related mechanisms
facilitating its beneficiaries’ role in supporting charity governance, such as
allowing the beneficiaries to act as the charity’s advisors or non-voting
members or improving its current complaints procedure to effectively tackle
the feedback and needs of the beneficiaries in order to support its charity
trustees’ effective decisions.
8.4.3 Public Accountability
Given that the public is very unsatisfied with the charitable sector in China
in terms of accountability and transparency,28 China can draw on some
experience in English law, and establish a comprehensive system governing
accounting, reporting, auditing and disclosure of information in relation to
charities in order to maintain public confidence in this sector and reduce the
related monitoring costs of the whole society. Meanwhile, this system itself
must be improved in a cost-effective manner.
8.4.3.1 Financial Reports andAnnual Work Reports
With respect to the accounting and reporting system, in contrast to English
law, Chinese law does not perform well in promoting the comparability,
28 For example, see Rachel Wang, ‘Why No One Trusts Government Charities in China Anymore’ The
Atlantic (Washington, 13 May 2013) <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-no-
one-trusts-government-charities-in-china-anymore/273989/> accessed 20 September 2017; Weiyun
Tan, ‘China’s Charities Confront Public Trust Crisis’ Shanghai Daily (Shanghai, 8 April 2015)
<http://www.shanghaidaily.com/feature/news-feature/Chinas-charities-confront-public-trust-
crisis/shdaily.shtml> accessed 20 September 2017.
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relevance and understandability of information regarding financial reports
and annual work reports, all of which are mainly aimed at better satisfying
the information needs of the general public and other key stakeholders.
For example, Chinese law neither includes charitable trusts in its accounting
and reporting system, nor unifies the relationship between financial reports
and annual work reports, making it difficult for members of the public to
compare information contained in charity accounts and reports between
different charities.
In addition, Chinese law neither details the rules governing the information
associated with remuneration and other benefits obtained by charity trustees,
nor strengthens the requirements on larger charities, which cannot help the
general public and other key stakeholders to make decisions based on an
effective assessment of the performance of charity trustees in all charities
(in respect of the issues relating to remuneration and benefits) or specific
charities (with regard to larger charities).
Furthermore, Chinese law does not require charity trustees to explain how
they realise the public benefit their charity aims to deliver in their charity
accounts and reports, making it more difficult for key stakeholders to
understand and further evaluate their performance.
To tackle those problems, Chinese law can draw on the experience of
English law. First, it can enhance the comparability of information by
applying the charity accounting and reporting system to all charities,
including charitable trusts, and further clarifying and unifying the
relationship between financial reports and annual work reports. Second, to
promote the relevance of information, Chinese law should provide the rules
governing the information regarding remuneration and other benefits
obtained by charity trustees and the information concerning larger charities
in a more detailed manner. Third, Chinese law should further develop a
narrative report (or transform the current annual work report of a charity) to
facilitate the general public to better understand how charity trustees
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perform in the best interests of their charity.
8.4.3.2 Charity Auditing
In respect of charity auditing, English law is more cost-effective than
Chinese law in reducing the supervisory costs of key stakeholders and
balancing those costs with other costs. For example, in England, there is a
unified regulatory system governing charity audit, the ‘Practice Note 2011:
the Audit of Charities in the United Kingdom’, in support of external
auditors in performing their duties. In the meantime, it requires
organisations which fall within ‘larger charities’ to be audited, which not
only helps reduce the supervisory costs of the general public in monitoring
those larger charities, but also avoids excessive costs relating to the negative
effects of external intervention on a number of smaller charities.
By contrast, there is no unified regulatory system governing the external
auditing of charities in China, which negatively affects the efficient
performance of external auditors in overseeing charity trustees. Meanwhile,
in China the scope of charities to be audited is limited to public fundraising
charities, which means larger charities that do not carry out public
fundraising activities do not need to be audited. This arrangement may
increase the costs of the charity trustees’ moral hazard in those larger
charities which are not public fundraising charities. To deal with those
problems, China should build a special framework focusing on the
regulation of charity auditing, and meanwhile extend the scope of charities
to be audited to include larger charities.
8.4.3.3 Public Access to Information
With respect to public access to information, in contrast to Chinese law,
English law clarifies the duties of charity trustees to disclose information to
the public and the specific methods, which helps reduce those charity
trustees’ moral hazard and the supervisory costs due to unclear disclosure
methods. Meanwhile, English law also incorporates most of the information
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to be disclosed into charity accounts and reports, reducing the supervisory
costs of the general public and the costs of the negative effects of external
intervention due to different requirements on the contents of information to
be disclosed.
Therefore, China should clarify the duty of charity trustees in preparing,
submitting and disclosing financial reports and annual work reports, specify
the methods to disclose this information, and further integrate information
required by law to be made public into the contents of financial reports and
annual work reports. In the future, those suggestions can be implemented
easily if legislators or governmental regulators realise the fact that those
methods can help reduce the related agency costs relating to charity
governance.
Meanwhile, in view of the previous poor performance of Chinese charities
in terms of information disclosure, it is also helpful to encourage charity
trustees to voluntarily disclose related information to the general public, in
particular when their charities are facing a serious trust crisis or reputational
risk. This will definitely reduce the supervisory costs of the whole society
and help maintain public trust in those charities.
However, this suggestion seems very difficult for either government-
controlled charities (such as Red Cross Society of China and its branches at
local level)29 or independent charities (such as Smile Angel Foundation) to
carry out, at least based on recent trust crises. This may be a big obstacle for
the general public to trust Chinese charities as a whole. In this context, it is
necessary to have a further study of why Chinese charities are often
reluctant to make voluntary disclosures to the public, especially when they
suffer public distrust, although this study has been beyond the scope of this
research.
29 Yajun Hu, ‘80 Percent of Red Cross Societies Refused to Disclose Information’ 21st Century
Business Herald (Guangzhou, 20 July 2011)
<http://gongyi.ifeng.com/news/detail_2011_07/20/7813435_1.shtml> accessed 20 September 2017.
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8.5 Overall Conclusion
In developing a multilevel social welfare system, charities will play a
significant role in providing public goods to the general public or any sub-
group of it in China. However, the current governance system regulating
charity trustees in China is inefficient to tackle charity scandals in practice
as well as low public trust and confidence in the charitable sector. Against
this background, this thesis has sought to deploy an economic and
comparative approach to evaluating the current legal rules regarding charity
governance in England and China, and further points out a range of more
reasonable measures to improve Chinese law and practice in this respect.
However, an economic and comparative analysis should not be the only
approach to be taken in studying Chinese charity law and practice. Other
perspectives,30 such as civil society, democracy and freedom of religion, can
be critical in evaluating or designing the legal rules governing some special
types or areas of charity in the future, and thus are worth further studying.31
Nevertheless, given that the development of China’s charity law is still in its
initial stage,32 an economic analysis (aimed at reducing agency costs in
ensuring compliance) along with a comparative study of English law and
practice can at least bring new ideas and approaches to assist legislators,
regulators, the charitable sector and the general public in rethinking the
current legal framework regarding charity governance in China.
Hopefully, although as noted above, some of the specific reform suggestions
in this thesis may have to be compromised by certain political and social
issues in practice, this study may contribute to the future legal reform in
30 For example, see Chris Cornforth and William A. Brown (eds), Nonprofit Governance: Innovative
Perspectives and Approaches (Routledge 2014); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer and Brendan M. Wilson,
‘Regulating Charities in the Twenty-first Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis’ (2010) 85
Chicago-Kent Law Review 479, 479-550.
31 A good example in this respect is Matthew Harding’s ‘Charity Law and the Liberal State’ (CUP
2014), although this book does not deal with Chinese charity law.
32 China did not have a comprehensive charity law until the enactment of Charity Law 2016 (China).
However, even this law mainly deals with principles rather than detailed rules regulating charities and
charitable activities.
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relation to charity governance, the healthy development of an increasingly
expanding charitable sector in China and any further academic research on
Chinese charity law.
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Appendix II: Translation of Important Terms Used in this Thesis
English Chinese Characters
annual work reports 年度工作报告
associations 社会团体
audit committee 审计委员会
being attached to 挂靠
board of directors 理事会
charitable activities 慈善活动
charitable aims 慈善宗旨
charitable purposes 慈善目的
charities 慈善组织
charity governance 慈善组织治理
charity law 慈善法
charity trustees 慈善组织托管人
civil non-commercial units 民办非企业单位
decision-making bodies 决策机构
department of industrial and commercial
administration
工商部门
department of civil affairs 民政部门
dual administrative system 双重管理体制
donated legal persons 捐助法人
donors 捐赠人/赠与人
executive bodies 执行机构
external auditors 外部审计师
financial reports 财务会计报告
foundations 基金会
founders 捐助人/创立人
government-controlled charities 政府控制的慈善组织
independent charities 独立的/民间慈善组织
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initiators 发起人
intentional violation 故意违反
internal auditors 内部审计师
law 法/法律
major donors 主要捐赠人
managers 管理人员
members 社员/成员/会员
members of the governing body 治理机关成员
Ministry of Civil Affairs 民政部
‘open one eye, and close the other one’ 睁一只眼闭一只眼
organisations 组织
planned economy 计划经济
professional administrative units 业务主管单位
public benefit 公共利益/公益
public institutions 事业单位
‘Reform and Opening Up’ 改革开放
registration and administration regulators 登记管理机关
responsible persons 负责人
‘self-governance of private law’ 私法自治
social organisations 社会组织
social service institutes 社会服务机构
sponsor units 挂靠单位
supervisors (who have the rights to make
charity trustees accountable for the charitable
purpose/public benefit) defined in this thesis
监督者
supervisory board/supervisors in a donated
legal person
捐助法人中的监事会/
监事
trust supervisors 信托监察人
unintentional violation 过失违反
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Appendix III: Abbreviations for Statutes and Regulations Frequently
Cited in this Thesis
Year Title Abbreviation
2017 General Provisions of the Civil
Law 2017 (China)
GPCL 2017 (China)
2016 Charities (Protection and Social
Investment) Act 2016
CPSIA 2016
2016 Charity Law 2016 (China) CL 2016 (China)
2011 Charities Act 2011 CA 2011
2010 Equality Act 2010 EA 2010
2006 Charities Act 2006 CA 2006
2004 Regulation on the Administration of
Foundations 2004 (China)
RAF 2004 (China)
2001 Trusts Law 2001 (China) TL 2001 (China)
1999 Contract Law 1999 (China) CL 1999 (China)
1999 Public Benefit Undertakings
Donations Law 1999 (China)
PBUDL 1999 (China)
1998 Provisional Regulation on the
Registration and Administration of
Civil Non-commercial Units 1998
(China)
PRRACNU 1998 (China)
1998 Regulation on the Registration and
Administration of Associations
1998 (China, revised in 2016)
RRAA 1998 (China,
revised in 2016)
1993 Company Law 1993 (China,
revised in 2013)
CL 1993 (China, revised
in 2013)
1982 Constitutional Law 1982 (China,
revised in 2004)
CL 1982 (China, revised
in 2004)
1979 Criminal Law 1979 (China, revised
in 2015)
CL 1979 (China, revised
in 2015)
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